Rajasthan High Court
Munna @Jaid, S/O Fakir Mohd vs State Of on 5 June, 2024
Author: Sudesh Bansal
Bench: Sudesh Bansal
[2024:RJ-JP:25701]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 14/1991
1. Munna alias Jaid S/o Fakir Mohd., resident of Kachchi Basti,
Delhi Byepass Road, Housing Board, Jaipur
2. Faiz Mohd. S/o Fakira Mohd., resident of Idgah Kachchi Basti
Jaipur
----Appellants
Versus
State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. D.K. Dixit
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Laxman Meena, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
Judgment
Reserved on: 29/05/2024
Pronounced on: 05/06/2024
BY THE COURT:
1. Both accused-appellants have preferred this joint appeal
under Section 374 CrPC, assailing the judgment dated 17.01.1991
passed in Sessions Case No.3/1988 (State Vs. Munna @ Jaid) by
the Court of Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Cases),
Jaipur whereby and whereunder appellants have been convicted
for offence under Section 307 IPC and sentenced to undergo
seven years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.100/- each and
in default to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment.
2. The genesis of the present criminal appeal is a parcha bayan
of Murarilal- complainant/ injured, who was a police Head
Constable, made on 28.03.1988 whereupon FIR No.100/1988 was
registered at Police Station Kotwali, Jaipur against appellants for
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (2 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC. In parcha bayan (Ex.P4)
injured Murarilal stated that Faiz Mohd. and Munna had rivalry
from him and when he went at about 2:30 PM to get iron his
clothes from washerman Kalu at Maniharo Ka Rasta, he was
attacked by both accused with knife. He stated that he was
stabbed in stomach, waist, chest and left shoulder as also on back
by the knife and when he fell down, both accused ran away from
there shouting that he has died. He further stated that, after
having hurt, he hired an auto-rickshaw and came Kotwali where
he met with Constable Usman Khan with whom he went to
hospital. In the parcha bayan, he also named one Mohd. Shafi
(third brother of both assailants). Parcha bayan of Murarilal was
recorded in the hospital and after registration of FIR, investigation
was commenced thereupon. Both accused-appellants were
arrested. After concluding the investigation, charge-sheet against
both accused-appellants for offences under Section 307/34 IPC
was submitted before the concerned Magistrate, who committed
the case for trial to the Sessions Court. Before the Sessions Court,
after framing charges, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial. In prosecution evidence as many as 11 witnesses
were examined and documents were exhibited. Then statements
of both accused under Section 313 CrPC were recorded. Accused
persons did not produce any defence evidence. Thereafter,
Sessions Court vide judgment impugned has convicted and
sentenced both accused as mentioned hereinabove, hence, this
appeal by both accused-appellants.
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (3 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
3. The contention of learned counsel appearing on behalf of
appellants is that there are contradictions and discrepancies in
statements of complainant/ injured Murarilal and he has falsely
implicated both accused in the present criminal case because of
having previous rivalry with them, hence, the evidence of injured
Murarilal is not trustworthy enough to convict appellants. The
contention of learned counsel is that as per prosecution, there
were three eye witnesses of the incident namely Hukumat Rai,
Babulal and Hanuman, who were made witnesses of prosecution.
Only one eye witness Hukumat Rai appeared as PW.3, who has
been declared hostile and has not supported the case of
prosecution. Other two eye witnesses have not appeared to prove
the case of prosecution. Recovery memo of weapon (Knife) and
blood stained clothes has not been proved and witnesses of
recovery memo also turned hostile. The recovery of knife was
made from an open place and knife was not confronted from the
injured to verify that same was used by appellants to stab him.
Learned counsel contends that out of five knife blows only one
blow has been found in stomach, which too has not been proved
to be dangerous to life and sufficient to cause death in ordinary
course of nature. In this respect, statements of Dr. V.N. Gupta
(PW.5) Medical Jurist and Dr. Raghvendra Rana (PW.1), who
perform operation of injured, do not support the prosecution case.
Report of FSL has not been exhibited, therefore, linking evidence
to match the blood group of injured with the blood found on
stained clothes and weapon, is absent. Hence, the contention of
counsel for appellants is that the prosecution has miserably failed
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (4 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
to prove the offence against appellants beyond reasonable doubt
and solitary statements of injured Murarilal, being suffered from
infirmities and malice, are not reliable and trustworthy to convict
appellants for the alleged offence, therefore, according to counsel
for appellants, the conviction of accused-appellants is liable to be
set aside, extending benefit of doubt to appellants.
4. In alternative to the above noted arguments, counsel for
appellants would contend that in case, this Court affirms the
conviction of appellants, his prayer would be to release appellants
on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958. He submits that both appellants have no criminal
antecedents except the present criminal case and are poor
persons, who earn their livelihood by selling water balls on cart
and are living in the society peacefully as there is no complaint
against them about their conduct either prior or post to the
incident in question. He submits that incident is of 29.03.1988 i.e.
about 36 years have passed and after arrest of appellants on
29.03.1988, accused-appellant No.1 Munna @ Jaid was granted
bail on 17.05.1988 and accused-appellant No.2 Faiz Mohd. was
released on bail on 09.06.1988, since thereafter there is no
adverse report about their good behavior in society and both are
leading peaceful life in the society. Now appellant No.1 has
attained the age of about 59 years and appellant No.2 has
attained the age of about 62 years, therefore, considering all such
attending and mitigating circumstances, it is a fit case where at
least benefit of probation may be granted to appellants, if their
conviction is not set aside. He submits that a lenient view may be
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (5 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
taken in the present matter considering the nature of injuries
inflicted upon injured Murarilal, which have not resulted into major
physical disability or reduction of his life span, therefore, in this
view also, at the most, appellants may be saddled with additional
fine to pay as compensation to the victim for suffering injuries,
but sending appellants into jail would be against interest of
justice, so it is expedient to release appellants on probation to
maintain good behavior.
5. Counsel for appellants has placed reliance on the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Indra Devi Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh [2016 (12) SCC 770] and the judgment
dated 19.02.2024 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court
in S.B. Criminal Appeal No.483/1993: Naval Kishore Vs.
State of Rajasthan, granting benefit of probation to accused-
appellants who were convicted and sentenced for a period of five
years rigorous imprisonment for offences under Sections 307/34
IPC.
6. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor has repelled
contentions made by counsel for appellants and argued that
contradictions and discrepancies pointed out in the evidence of
injured Murarilal (PW.4) are trivial in nature, which do not render
his evidence as non-reliable. Learned Public Prosecutor submits
that from the evidence of injured, his presence on the spot at
Maniharo Ka Rasta on 29.03.1988 at about 2:30 PM it means at
the place and time of occurrence of alleged incidence, is not
doubtful and merely for the reason that prior to his parcha bayan
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (6 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
(Ex-P4), he has not named both accused-appellants either to the
driver of auto-rickshaw or to the Constable Usman Khan with
whom he came to hospital, evidence of injured may not be
discarded. He submits that the testimony of an injured witness
has been accorded a special status in law and required to be given
due weightage as much as cannot be brushed aside unless there
are sound reasons to reject his evidence on the basis of major
contradictions and discrepancies creating a doubt about his
presence on the spot at the time and place of occurrence. Thus,
according to Public Prosecutor, the impugned judgment of
conviction does not call for any interference to convict appellants
on the basis of evidence of injured. In respect of awarding
sentence, Public Prosecutor submits that appellants be suitably
punished taking into consideration the nature of serious offences,
however, he could not contradict facts, pointed by the counsel for
appellants to grant benefit of probation. Learned Public Prosecutor
has not shown any adverse report against appellants about their
good behavior peaceful attitude and leading a normal social life
like civilized citizens prior to or post to the incident in question.
The prayer of learned Public Prosecutor is that the appeal be
dismissed.
7. Heard learned counsels for both parties at length and
perused the record.
8. At the outset, it is note worthy that the injured/ complainant
in the present criminal case is Murarilal Gupta on whose parcha
bayan, the investigation in the present criminal case was initiated
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (7 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
after registration of FIR on 29.03.1988. Murarilal himself stated
that he was stabbed by both accused because of having rivalry
with him. In his statements, Murarilal stated that rivalry was due
to a previous criminal case against him for abduction of sister of
accused persons. Both accused persons namely Munna @ Jaid and
Faiz Mohd. are brothers and in the parcha bayan, Murarilal also
named third brother Mohd. Shafi to be involved in assaulting him,
however, in his cross-examination, Murarilal did not support
allegations against Mohd. Shafi. In the charge-sheet, prosecution
has named four witnesses including injured Murarilal as eye
witness of incident. Other three witnesses are Hukumat Rai,
Babulal and Hanuman. Hukumat Rai appeared as PW.3 and has
not supported the prosecution case, therefore, he has been
declared hostile. Other two eye witnesses Babulal and Hanuman
have not appeared before the trial Court to support the case of
prosecution. Thus, the case of prosecution is basically based on
statements of injured Murarilal, who is victim himself as well as
eye witnesses of the incident.
Statements of injured Murarilal were also recorded by the
Judicial Magistrate at about 5:10 PM on the date of occurrence i.e.
29.03.2988 itself during his hospitalization and such statements
have been exhibited as (Ex-D1). There is no apparent discrepancy
in statements of Murarilal, recorded in the parcha bayan (Ex-P4)
and recorded by the Judicial Magistrate (Ex-D1). Learned counsel
for appellants has highlighted few contradictions and discrepancies
in the evidence-in-chief and the cross-examination of injured
Murarilal, recorded during course of trial. It has been pointed out
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (8 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
that there is apparent contradiction in respect of presence of
washerman Kalu on his shop because in the chief statement of
injured Murarilal (PW.4), he stated to handover clothes for ironing
to kalu and pay him charges as well, after the incdident of attack
on him, whereas in the cross-examination, injured has denied
presence of kalu on his shop. It has been pointed out that the site
map of the incident was not prepared in presence of Kalu
washerman. It has also been pointed out that there is apparent
contradiction in statements of injured, in respect of place of
occurrence. His statements, have been claimed to be unreliable,
due to implicating Mohd. Shafi as well along with two accused
persons initially in the parcha bayan whereas neither charge-sheet
was filed against Mohd. Shafi nor in Court statement Mohd. Shafi
was named by Murarilal. It has further been urged that evidence
of injured Murari Lal becomes suspicious and unnatural, since,
firstly, he did not lodge the report at first instance, despite of
reaching to police station Kotwali through auto-rickshaw as much
as did not name both assailants despite knowing them to the
Constable Usman Khan with whom he went to hospital from police
station Kotwali. It has been urged that if the evidence of injured
Murarilal is taken as a whole, same may not be treated as
trustworthy as much as sufficient to convict appellants for the
alleged offence, more so when it is an admitted case of injured
there being enmity between him and assailants. Hence, the
possibility of false implication of appellants in the present criminal
case may not be ruled out in the backdrop of admitted fact of
having rivalry between complainant- Murarilal and assailants.
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (9 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
9. In the judgment of Indra Devi (supra) referred by the
counsel for appellants, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in
para No.7 as under:-
"The proposition of law that an injured witness is
generally reliable is no doubt correct but even an
injured witness must be subjected to careful scrutiny if
circumstances and materials available on record
suggest that he may have falsely implicated some
innocent persons also as an after thought on account
of enmity and vendetta. The trial court erred in not
keeping this in mind."
In case of Indra Devi (supra), the Apex Court observed that
the injured has improvised his evidence, during court trial and
apart from two male assailants, three ladies were also tried to be
involved in making the assault. In that context, there was
apparent major contradictions in allegations made in the FIR and
allegations made in statements of injured during course of trial.
The allegations in statements of injured during court trial were
observed to be exaggerated and wholly contrary to allegations
made in the FIR. The subsequent allegations made by the victim
against accused-appellants were not found corroborated by the
medical evidence also. Implication of ladies accused was observed
to be unnecessarily just due to having previous enmity and land
dispute. In that backdrop of factual matrix, the conviction of
accused-appellants for offence under Section 147/ 148/ 307 read
with Section 149 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act based on the
sole evidence of injured, was set aside by the Apex Court. But in
the present case, nature of contradictions and discrepancies
pointed out in the evidence of injured Murarilal are not so serious
rather can be termed to be minor and trivial contradictions which
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (10 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
are sometimes natural also, therefore, it is not just to discard the
testimony of injured-Murarilal merely on account of such minor
infirmities in his evidence. Therefore, the evidence of injured-
Murarilal cannot be declared unreliable and untrustworthy. Rather
considering the uncontroverted situation that injured Murarilal
suffered grievous hurt and received as many as five knife blows on
various parts of his body, in the occurrence allegedly occurred on
29.03.1988 in afternoon at about 2:30 PM at Maniharo Ka Rasta,
Jaipur his presence on the spot cannot be doubted in any manner
and therefore, due credence has to be given to the evidence of
injured being eye witness as also victim. Thus, the Sessions Court
has not committed any illegality in giving due weightage to
evidence of injured Murarilal against accused-appellants to prove
their guilt for commission of offence.
10. In respect of evidential value and importance of the evidence
of injured, who is usually eye witness also of the incident,
reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in case of State of
U.P. Vs. Naresh [2011 (4) SCC 324] would be suffice where in
para No.26 and 27, the Apex Court observed as under:-
"26. The High Court has disbelieved Balak Ram
(PW5), who had suffered the gunshot injuries. His
evidence could not have been brushed aside by the
High Court without assigning cogent reasons. Mere
contradictions on trivial matters could not render his
deposition untrustworthy.
27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given
due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his
presence cannot be doubted. His statement is
generally considered to be very reliable and it is
unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant inorder
to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (11 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as
he has sustained injuries at the time and place of
occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that
he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the
testimony of an injured witness is accorded as special
status in law. The witness would not like or want to let
his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate
a third person falsely for the commission of the
offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness
should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the
rejection of his evidence on the basis of major
contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail
Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2009) 9 SCC 719],
Balraje Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC
673], and Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of M.P. [(2010)
10 SCC 259])"
(emphasis supplied)
11. It is true that the seizure memo (Ex-P13) prepared while
seizing the knife and shirt of accused Faiz Mohd. on the
information divulged by him from his house has not been proved
by the witnesses of seizure memo and the report of FSL was also
not exhibited by the prosecution, to prove the match of blood
group of the blood stain on the shirt and knife, with the blood
group of injured-Murarilal, yet on the strength of sole evidence of
injured Murarilal, implication of both accused appellants in the
present incident of assaulting the injured with knife may not be
disbelieved. The contention of counsel for appellants that because
of enmity, appellants have been falsely implicated by the injured is
not acceptable. In this regard, it would be suffice to observe that
the enmity is a double edged weapon. On facts of the present
case, it is the case of prosecution since beginning that, it was only
because of the said enmity due to which the victim was attacked
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (12 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
by accused-appellants, when he went at Maniharo Ka Rasta to get
ironing of his clothes and accused also want to take benefit of
such enmity, claiming his false implication. In the opinion of this
Court, in overall facts and circumstances of the present case, the
admitted fact of previous enmity between parties, lends support to
the case of prosecution rather than demolish the same. Thus, this
Court does not find any manifest illegality or jurisdictional error on
the part of Sessions Judge in deciding point No.1 against accused-
appellants and holding them guilty for assaulting the Murarilal with
knife.
12. As far as nature of injuries inflicted upon the injured
Murarilal are concerned, he has been inflicted five blows by knife
on back, shoulder, waist and one blow was received by him on the
side of stomach. As per statements of injured, it is apparent that
after receiving such injuries, he was in fully conscious state of
mind and he hired auto-rickshaw, came at police station Kotwali
then went to hospital accompanied with Constable Usman Khan.
After reaching the hospital as well, he was in full conscious state
of mind and deposed his parcha bayan. If seriousness of his
injuries is taken from the medical point of view, his medical check
up was done by Dr. V.N. Gupta, who prepared his injury report
(Ex-P6). The medical jurist Dr. V.N. Gupta (PW.5) has deposed
that injury No.1 in stomach was dangerous to life and was
sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. He stated
that injured Murari Lal had to be operated to save his life. As per
note on injury report, opinion was kept reserve to be given after
receiving X-ray plate but X-ray plate has not been produced on
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (13 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
record. The operation of injured-Murarilal was conducted by Dr.
Raghvendra Rana (PW.11), who has deposed that injury in
stomach of Murari Lal was grievous in nature and dangerous to his
life. In the operation note (Ex-P14), prepared by Dr. Raghvendra
Rana (PW.11), no such opinion has been given. The opinion given
by Dr. V.N. Gupta (PW.5), also do not corroborate with the injury
report, since he kept reserve his opinion after receiving the X-ray
report. X-ray report has not placed on record. In this view,
through medical evidence, it is not established beyond doubt that
injuries were dangerous to life and sufficient to cause death in
ordinary course of nature. However, merely on the basis of oral
opinion of both Doctors PW.5 and PW.11, the Sessions Court
recorded findings that the injury in the stomach of Murarilal was
dangerous to his life and due to which he could have died. In the
opinion of this Court, even if it is held that the injury in stomach of
Murarilal has not been proved to be dangerous to life and
sufficient to cause death, for want of supportive medical evidence
to this effect as also looking his physical and mental condition post
to the incident, yet as per statements of injured Murarilal it is
proved that he received five blows with knife on various parts of
his body (vital and non-vital). It is proved that previous enmity
between parties is an admitted fact. The weapon used to assault
the injury is a sharped weapon i.e. knife. Therefore, from overall
facts and circumstances, the intention of appellants may be
gathered to kill Murarilal and their conviction for offence under
Sections 307 IPC may not be held to be erroneous.
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (14 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
13. For aforesaid reasons, this Court is not inclined to interfere
with findings of conviction of accused-appellants for offence under
Section 307 IPC and affirms the conviction of accused-appellants
made by the Sessions Judge for offence under Section 307 IPC, in
the impugned judgment.
14. Coming to the sentence part, it is established proposition of
law that the accused should be suitably punished for the offence
for which he/ she has been held guilty. For offence under Section
307 IPC, no minimum sentence of jail is prescribed. The incident is
undisputedly of about 36 years ago, which occurred on
29.03.1988. Appellant No.1 Munna @ Jaid has remained in
custody from 31.03.1988 to 17.05.1988. Appellant No.2 Faiz
Mohd. was arrested on 29.03.1988 and released on bail on
09.06.1988. After their conviction vide judgment impugned dated
17.01.1991, sentence of both appellants was suspended vide
order dated 23.01.1991 and since then appellants are on bail.
During course of this appeal, on account of non-presence of
counsel for appellants, their bail bonds were forfeited vide order
dated 26.07.2023, but later on, said order has been recalled on
22.08.2023 and their previous bail bonds have been revived. At
present appellant No.1 has reached to the age of about 59 years
and appellant No.2 has crossed the age of 62 years. There are no
criminal antecedents, except the present case, to the discredit of
appellants.
15. Counsel for accused-appellants has made a prayer to grant
benefit of probation to accused-appellants, and admits that the
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (15 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
fine amount may be suitably enhanced to pay as compensation to
the victim. Counsel for appellants has submitted that accused-
appellants are living peacefully in the society prior or post to the
incident and during course of trial or hearing of the present
appeal, there is no adverse report about their good behaviour and
conduct. As much as there are no criminal antecedents of
appellants to their discredit.
16. Learned counsel has relied upon judgment dated 19.02.2024
passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Nawal Kishore
(supra), granting benefit of probation to accused-appellants who
were convict for offences under Sections 307/ 34 IPC wherein the
Coordinate Bench observed that there is no bar under law to
extend the benefit of probation to convict the accused above 21
years of age.
17. It is noteworthy that powers to release accused on probation
may be exercised by the Appellate Court as well, within limitation
of Section 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 but
only when in the opinion of Court, it is expedient to do so. The Act
of 1958 recognizes a distinction between offenders below 21 years
of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty for
offence punishable with death penalty or imprisonment for life and
those who are guilty of a lesser offence. In case of Rattan Lal Vs.
State of Punjab [AIR 1965 SC 444], the Hon'ble Supreme
Court while discussing the purpose and object of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958, observed that for offenders, who are above
the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the Court to
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (16 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct
subject to the scope of the Act. Thus, the view of Coordinate
Bench is in consonance and conformity to the precedent settled by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while granting probation to the
accused, who were above the age of 21 years on the date of
commission of offence and it is permissible in law to release the
accused on probation, even though, he has crossed the age of 21
years on the date of occurrence.
18. In case of Matibar Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
[2015 (16) SCC 168], the Apex Court took a lenient view while
awarding punishment to an accused for offence under Section 307
IPC taking note of the fact that incident was about 40 years ago
and keeping in mind that the nature of injury inflicted upon the
victim has not resulted in any major physical disability or reduced
life span of victim. The Apex Court while reducing the period of
her sentence, enhanced the amount of fine, out of which
maximum amount was paid to the victim or his family members as
compensation.
19. In case of Lakhbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab [2021 (2)
SCC 763], the Apex Court awarded benefit of probation to the
accused appellants who were convicted for offence under Section
307, 382 and 397 IPC taking note that none of these offences is
punishable with death or imprisonment for life; appellants have
suffered half of the sentence period and there was no adverse
report against them about their conduct in jail, as much as the
complainant has entered into compromise with appellants.
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (17 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
20. In case of Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of UP [2017 (2) SCC
198], in para No.24 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed that "We have made it clear that there is no minimum
sentence and hence, provision of Probation of Offenders Act would
apply." The Apex Court, after giving reference to the previous
judgment delivered in case of Dalbir Singh Vs. State of
Haryana [2000 (5) SCC 82] observed and held that Parliament
has made it clear that only if the Court forms an opinion that it is
expedient to release the convict on probation for the good conduct
regard being had to the circumstances of the case and one of the
circumstances which can be sidelined in forming the said opinion
is "the nature of the offence".
It was observed that it is for the Court to decide that the
case is fit to be expedient to grant benefit of probation of good
conduct to the convict, within exercise of powers under section 4
of the Probation of Offenders Act, and while explaining the word
"expedient", the Court held as under:-
"9. The word "expedient" had been thoughtfully
employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it
as "apt and suitable to the end in view". In Black's Law
Dictionary the word expedient is defined as "suitable
and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified
object" besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In
State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri [1975 (1) SCC
2233] a two-Judge Bench of this Court has considered
the word "expedient". Learned Judges have observed in
para 21 thus:
".... Again, the word 'expedient' used in this
provisions, has several shades of meaning.
In one dictionary sense, "expedient" (adj.)
means "apt and suitable to the end in view",
"practical and efficient"; "politic";
"profitable"; "advisable", "fit, proper and
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (18 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
suitable to the circumstances of the case". In
another shade, it means a device
"characterised by mere utility rather than
principle, conducive to special advantage
rather than to what is universally right" (see
Webster's New International Dictionary)."
10. It was then held that the court must construe the
said word in keeping with the context and object of the
provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word
"expedient" is used in Section 4 of the PO Act in the
context of casting a duty on the court to take into
account "the circumstances of the case including the
nature of the offence...". This means Section 4 can be
resorted to when the court considers the circumstances
of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and
the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and
appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the
offender can be released on probation of good conduct."
21. Taking into consideration the ratio decidendi as expounded
by the Apex Court in various judgments referred hereinabove and
considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present
case as also the uncontroverted factual matrix about status of
appellants as noted in para No.14 and 15, and the fact that
injured has not suffered any permanent disability or reduction of
his life span because of hurts received to him rather has
recuperated, this Court deems it just and proper that instead of
sending appellants to suffer incarceration for remaining period of
jail sentence, it would be expedient to grant the benefit of
probation to accused-appellants but simultaneously an additional
fine of Rs.50,000/- on appellants is imposed which shall be
payable as compensation to the victim Murarilal and if he has
passed away, then to the family/ legal heirs of victim-Murarilal.
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (19 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
22. Consequently, the instant appeal is partly allowed and the
impugned judgment dated 17.01.1991 is modified in the manner
that the conviction of both accused-appellants for offence under
Section 307 IPC is hereby affirmed, but the sentence awarded by
the Sessions Court is interfered with and both accused-appellants
are hereby released on probation of maintaining good conduct
under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 subject to
furnishing a personal bond by each accused-appellant for a sum of
Rs.50,000/- along with two sureties for a sum of Rs.25,000/- each
to the satisfaction of the trial Court along with a written
undertaking to appear and receive sentence when called upon
during the period of three years and in the meantime to maintain
peace and good behavior and not to repeat the same offence
during such period. Further appellants shall deposit a lumpsum
total additional fine amount of Rs.50,000/-, apart from making
payment of fine amount of Rs.100/- by each appellant as imposed
by the Sessions Judge in the impugned judgment, and the default
stipulation in case of non-payment of fine i.e. one month rigorous
imprisonment to both shall remain same as indicated in the
impugned judgment.
23. Appellants are allowed two months time to furnish the bail
bonds, sureties and undertaking as also to deposit the fine
amount (Rs.50,000 + Rs.100 + Rs.100) as ordered hereinabove,
failing which, the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court in the
impugned judgment shall be restored.
[2024:RJ-JP:25701] (20 of 20) [CRLA-14/1991]
24. It is made clear that after deposition of the additional fine
amount of Rs.50,000/-, same will be paid to the victim Murarilal or
in case he has passed away to his family members/ legal heirs.
25. Both accused-appellants are on bail, hence, on furnishing the
fresh bail bonds, sureties and undertaking to release on probation,
their previous bail bonds shall stand discharged automatically.
26. Record of the trial Court be sent back forthwith along with
copy of this order for information and necessary compliance.
(SUDESH BANSAL), J
NITIN /
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