Hanuman Singh vs State Of Rajasthan
2022 Latest Caselaw 8896 Raj

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

(1) S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 229/2022

1. Hanuman Singh S/o Sh. Jai Singh, Aged About 39 Years, R/o Behind Kripal Bhairu Ji Temple, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner. (Raj.)

2. Goverdhan Singh S/o Sh. Bharat Singh, Aged About 43 Years, R/o Near Narsingh Sagar Talab, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner (Raj.)

----Petitioners Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary To The Government, Department Of Home, Rajasthan, Jaipur.

2. Director, General Of Police, Rajasthan Police Head Quarter, Jaipur (Raj.)

3. Superintendent Of Police, Bikaner (Raj.)

4. Additional Superintendent Of Police (City), Bikaner (Raj.)

----Respondents

(2) S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 230/2022

1. Hanuman Singh S/o Sh. Jai Singh, Aged About 39 Years, R/o Behind Kripal Bhairu Ji Temple, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner. (Raj.)

2. Goverdhan Singh S/o Sh. Bharat Singh, Aged About 43 Years, R/o Near Narsingh Sagar Talab, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner (Raj.)

----Petitioners Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary To The Government, Department Of Home, Rajasthan, Jaipur.

2. Director, General Of Police, Rajasthan Police Head Quarter, Jaipur (Raj.)

3. Superintendent Of Police, Bikaner (Raj.)

4. Additional Superintendent Of Police (City), Bikaner (Raj.)

----Respondents

(2 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. B.S. Sandhu Mr. D.S. Gharsana For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vineet Jain, Sr. Advocate, Special PP with Mr. Pravin Vyas Mr. Gaurav Singh, PP Mr. M.A. Siddiqui, GA-cum-AAG II

JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA

Order

Reportable 07/07/2022

1. The instant petitions call in question orders dated

17.05.2022 and 20.05.2022, passed by learned Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, No.4, Bikaner and Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Bikaner respectively (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court'),

while invoking this Court's powers under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

2. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the rival

counsel, it would be apt to unfold the factual canvas of the case.

3. The petitioners are practicing advocates at Bikaner and

Jaipur. According to the petitioners, the police authorities

are/were having vengeance against them because, they had

unravelled various irregularities/illegalities and corruption in

various government departments including police.

4. Initially, an FIR being FIR No.39 dated 16.02.2010 came to

be lodged by one Kundanmal at P.S. Kotgate, Bikaner, inter alia,

levelling allegations of forgery, filing false complaints, extortion

and creating false and forged documents.

5. Another FIR being FIR No.47/2010 came to be registered at

P.S. Naya Shahar, Bikaner at the instance of Constable Gajanand,

(3 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

posted at P.S. Kotgate, Bikaner reporting that during the

investigation of FIR No.39 dated 16.02.2010, the petitioners'

house and office were searched and various seals, particularly that

of Junior Specialist, Government Satellite Hospital, Bikaner was

found and seized. It was alleged that petitioners had been

misusing the official seals which amounted to offences under

Sections 420, 463 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code.

6. In relation to FIR No.39, which was registered at Kotgate,

Bikaner, the Investigating Officer, after due investigation,

submitted negative final report on 23.01.2014, inter alia,

observing that the complainant has filed a false written report as

he was having animosity with the accused persons (petitioners

herein).

7. Negative final report also came to be filed qua FIR

No.47/2010, registered at P.S. Naya Shahar, Bikaner on

27.12.2013, concluding that the seal that was found in petitioners'

premises, might have been used for attesting certain documents

but ingredients of Sections 420, 463 and 465 of the Indian Penal

Code were absent, because arms license was not issued to the

petitioners.

8. Upon submission of the above mentioned final negative

reports, the complainant filed protest petitions and the same are

pending consideration before the trial Court(s). It is noteworthy

that in both the cases, charges have not been framed yet.

9. Having narrated the factual background, Mr. Sandhu, learned

counsel for the petitioners submitted that both the petitions

involve common questions of facts and law and requested that

they be decided conjointly. He however, requested the Court to

(4 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

take Writ Petition No.229/2022, as the lead case and made

submissions accordingly.

10. It was firstly contended by learned counsel that because of

the forthrightness of the petitioners, large scale corruption

rampant in the government departments including the police

department came to limelight due to which the administration got

annoyed with the petitioners and multiple FIRs came to be lodged

against them and the petitioners had to file at least 8 criminal

misc. petitions challenging those FIRs. He submitted that finally,

negative final reports came to be filed qua almost all the FIRs and

resultantly, those criminal misc. petitions were rendered

infructuous.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited Court's attention

towards the order dated 13.08.2018, passed by this Court in S.B.

Criminal Contempt Petition No.400/2010 and highlighted that a

Coordinate Bench of this Court had noticed its concern about

petitioners' victimization at the hands of State machinery.

12. Learned counsel apprised the court that during the pendency

of protest petition, the State moved an application for returning

the case diary for further investigation, which came to be rejected

by the trial Court vide its order dated 16.12.2014. The trial Court

categorically held that the application in question did not disclose

any justifiable ground while also observing that no reason has

been indicated therein as to why after 4 years of furnishing the

final report, further investigation is warranted. It was also

recorded by the trial Court that the letter of the Inspector General

of Police simply contained an endorsement/ remark to do and no

direction to investigate the matter further.

(5 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

13. Learned counsel submitted that though the trial Court had

dismissed above referred application observing that it was filed in

a cavalier manner, yet another application of similar nature has

been filed by the State on 17.05.2022, praying that the case diary

of FIR No.47/2010 be returned. But this time, regardless of the

fact that the application hardly discloses any reason, the trial

Court has accepted it by an unreasoned order passed on the same

day (17.05.2022).

14. Oppugning the order dated 17.05.2022, whereby the case

diary has been returned giving a liberty to investigate further,

learned counsel argued that the trial Court has hastily passed the

order no sooner had the police filed the application than the trial

Court returned the case diary for further investigation.

15. While reading the short application and the equally short

order, learned counsel argued that not only the application but

also the order of the Court does not assign any reason for

returning the case diary. He remarked that learned Magistrate has

passed the impugned order in routine manner, as if an

administrative order has been passed.

16. It was argued by Mr. Sandhu that returning of file and the

impugned order dated 17.05.2022 amounts to fresh investigation,

hence, the trial Court was required to apply its mind and give

detailed reasons while doing so.

17. It was next contended by learned counsel that in the teeth of

earlier order dated 16.12.2014, where identical request for

returning the case diary had been turned down, it was not open

for the trial Court to take a u-turn and return the case diary,

(6 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

pursuant to an application, which was vague and cavalier in

nature.

18. It was also argued by learned counsel that neither any fresh

material has been collected nor has such material come to light

necessitating leave for further investigation. He commented that

the State has put the cart before the horse by saying that let the

case diary be returned, whereafter the police would collect

material by further investigation.

19. It was emphasized that unless the prosecution comes with

some additional material and places the same before the

Magistrate and establishes that there exists some material or

ground requiring further investigation, an application for such

purpose cannot be allowed.

20. In support of his contention that an order for further

investigation cannot be passed in the manner done by the trial

Court, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments:-

(i) Amrubhai Shambhubhai Patel Vs. Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel and others (2017) 4 SCC 177

(ii) Chug Singh Rajput Vs. State of Rajasthan 2018(3) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1240

(iii) Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2020 Cr.L.R (SC)

21. Mr. Vineet Jain, learned Senior Counsel, appearing as Special

Public Prosecutor, argued that the writ petition as framed by the

petitioners is not maintainable. He argued that firstly order of

returning file or permitting further investigation is a judicial/quasi-

judicial order and secondly, the petitioners have no vested right to

assert that the case diary be not returned and further

investigation be not ordered.

(7 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

22. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that unless the negative

final report is accepted by the Court, the investigating agency can

carry out further investigation albeit with the leave of the Court

until the stage of framing charges.

23. In respect to the earlier order dated 16.12.2014, which was

passed by the trial Court while refusing the request to return the

case diary, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the earlier

application was rejected on technical ground and a liberty was

granted to the State to move fresh application on receipt of any

additional material. He argued that the order dated 16.12.2014

cannot be read to mean that State's right to ask for further

investigation has been denied for all times to come.

24. In order to satisfy the Court about the fresh

material/information, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the

complainant has been representing the higher authorities of the

police department and requesting to carry out further

investigation and when the representation dated 13.05.2022,

written by the complainant came to be received by the

Superintendent of Police, he referred the mater to the Additional

Superintendent of Police, Bikaner City, Bikaner. When the

Additional Superintendent of Police examined the matter, he

realised the need for further investigation and thus, moved

application dated 16.05.2022 in the trial Court on 17.05.2022.

25. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in his

interrogatory note, which was prepared in relation to FIR No. 97

dated 15.04.2012, the accused (petitioner No.2) has clearly

accepted that he was possessing 19-20 seals of various

departments, including that of Junior Specialist, Satellite Hospital,

(8 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

Bikaner, which he had used for preparation of certificates with

forged signature of the doctor.

26. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that in a haste of

completing the investigation or otherwise, the then Investigating

Officer had filed negative final report without conducting proper

investigation.

27. Navigating the Court through the negative final report

No.432 dated 27.12.2013 he submitted that the same is based on

conjectures and surmises. He added that despite finding that a

number of seals were found at the premises of the petitioners, the

then Investigating Officer had superficially observed that

ingredients of Sections 420, 463 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code

were absent and concluded that no offence had been committed.

28. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the recent judgment of

the Supreme Court, reported in the case of Vinubhai Haribhai

Malviya & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in 2019

Cr.L.R. (SC) 1279 and particularly para Nos.38 and 39 thereof,

which are reproduced hereunder:-

"38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate's powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate's nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed,

(9 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercises suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such jurisdiction on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrubhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana Vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.

40. We now come to certain other judgments that were cited before us. King Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmand, AIR 1945 PC 18, was strongly relied upon by Shri Basant for the proposition that unlike superior Courts, Magistrates did not possess any inherent power under the Cr.P.C. Since we have grounded the power of the Magistrate to order further investigation until charges are framed under Section 156(3) read with Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., no question as to a Magistrate exercising any inherent power under the Cr.P.C. would arise in this case."

29. He further invited Court's attention towards para Nos.40.4

and 40.5 of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the

case of Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 762

which are being reproduced hereunder:-

(10 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

"40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8).

40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would advance the cause of justice and legislative object sould to be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation to the police even after filing a report, but intended to curtain the power of the Court to the extent that even where the facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the Court can still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own."

30. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of Apex Court in

Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat reported in

(2004) 5 SCC 347.

31. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

32. Before adverting to the submissions made by rival counsel,

this Court would like to delve upon the nature of the impugned

order dated 17.05.2022. A careful reading of the order suggests

that it is not an order of returning case diary simplicitor. It grants

a leave or permission to the police to undertake further

investigation. When the Court permits further investigation

pursuant to a request made by the police or Investigating Officer,

it has to satisfy itself about the existence of fresh

evidence/material or need of further investigation. But, in no case,

the Court is required to pass a detailed order setting out reasons

for the same, particularly when the magistrates propose to allow

an application filed by the Investigating Officer/Agency.

(11 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

33. Since such order is not a quasi-judicial order, neither the

accused is required to be heard nor is the application/letter filed

for such purpose by the Investigating Officer required to contain

reasons. This Court is not much convinced with the argument of

Mr. Sandhu that the Investigating Officer has put the cart before

the horse and has first claimed the case diary to find reasons to

file supplementary charge-sheet.

34. The petitioners' contention that in the face of earlier order

dated 16.12.2014, whereby the Court had turned down the

request for returning the case diary moved by the police, fresh

application was not maintainable, appears to be attractive on the

first blush but it turns out to be lacking substance, if considered

carefully.

35. True it is, that the State's earlier application was rejected by

the trial Court with an observation that no reasons have been

assigned but according to this Court, it is the subjective

satisfaction of the Magistrate having due regard to the nature of

allegations involved, final report and the other incriminating

material made available by the police authorities to the Court to

enable it to opine as to whether the case diary should be returned

for further investigation or not.

36. Both the learned counsel have cited a number of judgments,

which are on general principles governing Magistrate's power to

order further investigation. None of the judgments throw light on

the core question involved herein. Hence, this Court does not

deem it necessary to deal with those judgments

individually.

(12 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

37. In light of the judicial precedents including those cited at the

Bar, it is settled that the Court has the power to order further

investigation until the stage of framing of the charges. But, the

question as to whether such order should contain reasons for the

same, does not come forth from the judgments cited.

38. According to this Court, it is the discretion of the Magistrate

to order or permit further investigation, of course as per his

subjective satisfaction based on material available. Exercise of

such discretion pre-supposes application of mind hence, an order

of further investigation cannot be passed as a matter of course. It

is to be understood that application of mind by itself does not call

for recording of reasons - the reasons may be express or implied.

39. In the instant case while passing the order for further

investigation vide its proceedings of 17.05.2022, the trial Court

has not recorded reasons, which in the opinion of this Court is

permissible, particularly when the Court has clearly recorded that

it has perused the file and application moved by the police.

40. Mr. Jain, learned Senior Counsel, asserted that the

expression "i=koyh" used in the proceedings of 17.05.2022 does

not refer to the available case record. It points towards office copy

of the case diary commonly known as C.O. File and other

documents placed therein.

41. Learned Public Prosecutor has produced copy of case diary

(C.O. Diary) which contains various other documents than those

are contained in the case diary. While wading through the same it

has transpired that on 13.05.2022, a representation has been

addressed by the complainant (Kundanmal Bohra) underscoring

(13 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

that the then Investigating Officer had not conducted any inquiry

about the signatures, which were inscribed along with the seal

(rubber stamp) of Junior Specialist to ascertain as to whether the

signatures are genuine or not.

42. Pursuant to the representation, the Superintendent of Police,

Bikaner asked the Additional Superintendent of Police, Bikaner

City, Bikaner to give his factual report, whereupon the Additional

Superintendent of Police, on 16.05.2022, found and reported that

on 23.09.2010, the Forensic Science Laboratory, Jodhpur, vide its

letter No.276, had communicated that the Investigating Officer

had sent the specimen of the impression of the seal on a paper

instead of sending the contentious seal (rubber stamp) itself. It is

also noteworthy that on 05.10.2013, the Circle Inspector, vide his

letter dated 02.05.2013, had asked the S.H.O., P.S. Naya Shahar,

Bikaner to obtain the original seal (rubber stamp) and send the

same to the Laboratory, but nothing was done in this regard.

43. For the sake of convenience, the relevant fact noticed by the

Additional Superintendent of Police, Bikaner City, Bikaner is

reproduced hereinfra:-

"rRi'pkr i=koyh esa vfxze vuqla/kku vuqd`fr mTtSfu;k o`rkf/kdkjh uxj }kjk vuqla/kku "kq: fd;k tkdj xokg tSrdaoj xks;y rRdkfyu dEikmaMj lSVsykbZV vLirky chdkusj ls vuqla/kku dj c;ku ys[kc) fd;sA izdj.k esa iwoZ esa ,Q,l,y gsrq Hksth xbZ lhy eksgj ds feyku ds laca/k esa ,Q,l,y tks/kiqj }kjk vius i= dzekad fnukad 23-09-10- dk izkIr gqvk ftles ,rjkt fd;k x;k fd fooknxzLr eqgj u Hkst dj blds uewuk eksgj rS;kj dj Hksth tkuh pkfg;s ftl ij o`rkf/kdkjh us vius i= dzekad 2573 fnukad 05-10-13 }kjk Fkkukf/kdkjh iqfyl Fkkuk u;k"kgj chdkusj dks funsZ"k fn;s x;s fd mDr "khYM"kqnk eksgj iSdsV dks ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds le{k is"k dj "khYM"kwnk iSdSV dh lhy rqMok;k tkdj "khYM eqgj dk uequk fy;k tkdj iSdsV dks iqu% "khYM djok;k tkos o fooknxzLr nLrkost

(14 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

guqekuflag ij yxh eksgj dk feyku gsrq i= okLrs ijh{k.k iqu% tkjh djok;k tkosA fdarq bl laca/k esa vfxze dk;Zokgh djus lacaf/kr i=-koyh dh fdlh Hkh lhMh esa dksbZ vadu ugha gS blls Li'V gS fd mijksDr ds laca/k esa vfxze dk;Zokgh fu'ikfnr ugha dh xbZ gSA"

44. It is, therefore, clear that an important aspect has come to

the notice of the Additional Superintendent of Police that the

stamp/seal in original was not sent for FSL for which, requisite

investigation as to whether the contentious rubber stamp (seal),

which was recovered during the raid at petitioners' premises was

stolen or was got prepared by the petitioners. When this fact came

to the notice of the learned Magistrate, he proceeded to permit

further investigation.

45. True it is, that no reasons have been assigned by the learned

Magistrate for doing the same. In the opinion of this Court, he was

not required to set out reasons for the same, when the leave to

carry out further investigation is granted.

46. It is to be noted that the police itself has the power to

conduct further investigation. But, by way of judicial

pronouncement, such power has been circumscribed and a check

has been carved out that it should be done with the leave of the

Magistrate. It has been held that the propriety demands that the

Investigating Officer should inform and take permission from the

Magistrate. There is a subtle difference between ordering further

investigation and permitting further investigation. Ordering further

investigation requires recording of reasons, however, brief they

may be and permission for further investigation does not

necessarily require recording of reasons.

(15 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

47. In the case of Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya (supra), the Apex

Court has held that whether further investigation should be

ordered or not is discretion of the learned Magistrate based on the

facts of each case. When the Magistrate discards a final report of

its own accord or pursuant to a protest petition and directs the

Investigating Officer to carry out further investigation, the

situation may be slightly different. Then, he is supposed to give

reasons in brief why he does not agree with the conclusion drawn

and/or what aspect has not been investigated by the police.

48. It has been the contention of the petitioners that further

investigation is being carried out without any reason or rhyme,

simply with a view to harass the petitioners. In order to ward off

any such eventuality, this Court has examined and satisfied itself

about the need of further investigation while exercising its

inherent power.

49. In this process, the negative final report, which was filed on

27.12.2013, has also been perused. On a simple reading thereof,

it is apparent that the investigation done by the then Investigating

Officer was cursory rather perfunctory. He has drawn his

conclusion on the basis of conjectures and surmises.

50. Having found that an official seal (stamp) was recovered

from the premises of the petitioners and that it was used/misused

in verifying the documents, including the ones which were

submitted by the petitioner No.1 for obtaining arms license, it was

incumbent upon the Investigating Officer to thoroughly examine

as to whether such seal (of Junior Specialist) and other seals

(rubber stamps) were used/misused by the petitioners claiming

(16 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

themselves to be advocates in other transactions or not,

particularly when it was a specific allegation of the complainant.

51. That apart, in the face of the statements given by all the

Junior Specialists, posted in Satellite Hospital, Bikaner that the

signatures on the application for arms license were not theirs, it

was all the more a matter of concern and required thorough

probe.

52. The final report makes it abundantly clear that the

Investigating Officer was much swayed by the fact that the

petitioner No.1 did not get the arms license. In the opinion of this

Court, the end result that the petitioner No.1 was not granted

arms license is of little avail. The commission of offence of forgery

(if any), is not dependent upon the consequence of getting or not

getting the license, but simply creating a false and forged

document - the very act of inscribing forged signatures and using

the official seal (stamp) of Junior Specialist of Satellite Hospital

prima-facie constitutes an offence because the words used in

Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is 'dishonestly induces'.

53. The Investigating Officer has seriously erred in concluding

that the requisite ingredients of Section 420 of the Indian Penal

Code are absent because there was no malafide intention to gain

undue advantage and to cause loss to the others.

54. In the opinion of this Court, getting the documents attested

with the forged signature and unauthorised seal (rubber stamp)

itself is indicative of guilty animus that the petitioner No.1 wanted

to gain undue advantage/gain of procuring the license for the

arms. The expression "whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly

induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any

(17 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022]

person" brings within its fold the act of inducing a public authority

to deliver arms license, which in a way is a valuable right having

traces of 'property'.

55. As an upshot of the discussion foregoing, the final report,

which was filed by the Investigating Officer on 27.12.2013, in

relation to FIR No.47 at P.S. Naya Shahar, Bikaner was shoddy

and perfunctory, if not malafide.

56. On over-all assessment of the facts and circumstances of the

case and material available, this Court does not find any error in

the impugned decision of the Magistrate allowing further

investigation and returning the case diary for such purpose.

57. The writ petitions, therefore, fail.

58. The stay applications also stand disposed of accordingly.

(DINESH MEHTA),J 220-221-skm/-

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