[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Patna High Court
The New India Assurance Company ... vs Apollo Trauma Centre, Represented ... on 4 February, 2026
Author: Rajeev Ranjan Prasad
Bench: Rajeev Ranjan Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
COMMERCIAL APPEAL No.5 of 2024
======================================================
The New India Assurance Company Limited, 6th and 7th Floor, BSFC
Building Frazer Road, Patna-1, through Surya Prakash, aged about 38 years,
son of Satya Prakash, Assistant Manager / Authorized Signatory / Duly
Constituted Attorney, New India Assurance Company Limited, Regional
Office-6th and 7th Floor, BSFC Building, Frazer Road, Patna-1.
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. Apollo Trauma Centre, Represented through Dr. Rajat Kumar, Male, Aged
about 55 years, Son of Late Dr. Padam Deo Narayan Singh, Resident of- G-
96, P.C. Colony, Kankarbagh, P.S.- Kankarbagh, Town and District- Patna,
Bihar.
2. Vidal Health Insurance TPA Pvt. Ltd., Shop No.- 9, Grand Shere Apartment,
Exhibition Road Crossing, Patna- 800 001 having registered office at Tower
2, 1st Floor, SJR I PARK, Plot No. 13, 14, 15, EPIP Area, Whitefield,
Bangalore-560 066.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr.Durgesh Kumar Singh, Advocate
Ms. Anjana Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent No.1: Mr.Bipin Bihari, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRAVEEN KUMAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD)
Date : 04-02-2026
Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned
counsel for the respondent no.1 as also perused the records. This
Court has been informed that respondent no.2 is not a necessary
party and no notice need be served upon respondent no.2.
2. The present appeal has been preferred for setting aside
the order dated 22.03.2024 passed by the learned District Judge,
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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Patna in Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case No.115 of 2022. By the
impugned order, the learned court has been pleased to dismiss the
miscellaneous case on the ground of its being barred by limitation.
3. It appears on perusal of the records that being aggrieved
by and dissatisfied with the arbitral award dated 25.04.2022, the
present appellant presented a Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1996') for setting aside of the
award. The Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case was presented/filed
on 30.08.2022. The Sheristedar of the court placed a report saying
that there is a delay of 37 days in filing of the miscellaneous case.
4. It further appears that at the time of hearing of the
miscellaneous case, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant.
The learned District Judge, Patna heard learned counsel for the
respondents, perused the records and having noticed that there is a
delay of 37 days in filing of the case which is more than the
maximum period which may be condoned by the court in terms of
sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, decided to
dismiss the miscellaneous case as being barred by limitation.
5. In appeal before us, learned counsel for the appellant
has contended that the learned District Judge has erred in
appreciating the true import of the scheme of the Statute i.e. the
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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Act of 1996. Referring to Section 31 of the Act of 1996, learned
counsel submits that sub-section (5) of Section 31 mandates that
after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to
each party.
6. It is submitted that the period of limitation prescribed
under Section 34 for filing an application for setting aside of the
award is three months. Sub-section (3) provides that an application
for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed
from the date on which the party making that application had
received the arbitral award. Thus, a conjoint reading of sub-section
(5) of Section 31 and sub-section (3) of Section 34 would make it
clear that the reckoning point for computation of the period of
limitation is the date on which the party making the application
had received the arbitral award.
7. It is further submitted that under proviso to sub-section
(3) of Section 34, the court is empowered to condone a delay after
the stipulated period of three months but the maximum period
which may be condoned by the court shall not exceed beyond a
period of thirty days.
8. In the aforementioned background, learned counsel
submits that in the case of Union of India Vs. Tecco Trichy
Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 and in the case of
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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Benarsi Krishna Committee & Others VS. Karmyogi Shelters
Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 9 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
considered the meaning of the word 'delivery of a signed copy of
the Arbitral Award on the party'. Learned counsel has relied upon
the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as recorded in
paragraph '15' of the judgment in the case of Benarsi Krishna
Committee (supra). It is submitted that on perusal of the
impugned award, it would appear that in this case the learned
arbitral tribunal after signing of the arbitral award recorded that a
copy of the singed award is delivered to the claimant and
respondents by registered post as also on e-mail of the advocates
of both parties. It is submitted by filing a supplementary affidavit
before this Court that the registered post by which the signed
award was sent to the respondent-appellant was received in the
office of the respondent only on 01.06.2022. In that view of the
matter, it is submitted that the reckoning period for the limitation
would start from 01.06.2022 and not from the date of signing of
the award.
9. Contesting the submissions of learned counsel for the
appellant, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has placed
before this Court the statements made in the application under sub-
section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 read with Section 5 of
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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the Limitation Act on behalf of the appellant. Attention of this
Court has been drawn towards paragraph '3' of the application
wherein it is stated that the award after preparation was made over
to the counsel by the office of the arbitrator and the same after
perusal and with opinion was made over to Patna office and the
Patna office after due deliberation and application of mind referred
the matter to the head office which is the ultimate controlling
office of such cases. It is the contention of learned counsel for the
respondent no.1 that there is an admission on the part of the
learned counsel for the respondent-appellant that the award was
made available to learned counsel for the respondents and then the
learned counsel had perused the same and sent it with his opinion
to the Patna office of the appellant-company.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 further
submits that there is an admission on the part of the appellant in
paragraph '14' of the application seeking condonation of delay that
there is a delay in filing of the appeal and the appellant would be
put to irreparable loss if the delay is not condoned. Learned
counsel has also relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High
Court in the case of Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports,
Department of Ports, Government of India Vs. Ernst and
Young Pvt. Ltd. (Now known as Ernst and Young LLP) and
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Another reported in 2023:DHC:6055 wherein a learned Single
Judge of the Hon'ble High Court has held that even receipt of
photocopy of a signed award from an arbitral tribunal is to be
taken as receipt of arbitral award in terms of Section 31(5) of
Arbitration Act. It is pointed out that there is no requirement in
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for filing ink signed copy of the
award. The said judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has
relied upon its earlier judgment in the case of Continental
Telepower Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others
reported in 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1859.
11. Learned counsel has further pointed out paragraph '47'
of the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court wherein it has
been held that the delivery of a copy of the award through e-mail is
to be taken as a valid service in terms of sub-section (5) of Section
31 of the Arbitration Act. On these grounds, learned counsel for
the respondent no.1 submits that the impugned order passed by the
learned District Judge needs no interference and the appeal is
liable to the dismissed.
Consideration
12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on
perusal of the records as also the judicial pronouncements placed
before this Court, this Court finds that there is an admitted position
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firstly that the impugned award was signed on 25.04.2022. It is
also an admitted position that the learned Arbitrator directed its
office to make available the signed copy of the award to the
claimant and the respondent through registered post and to their
respective lawyers through e-mails. Secondly, it is admitted that so
far as the e-mails are concerned, the arbitral tribunal did not send
the signed copy of the award through e-mails to the parties. There
is no dispute that so far as the registered post is concerned, the
same was received by respondent no.1 on 01.06.2022. In fact the
copy of the affidavit in this regard filed by the appellant has been
earlier served on the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 but
there is no contest on this issue.
The real contest is on the submission that once the copy of the
award was sent to the learned advocate for the appellant on his e-
mail and the same was perused by the learned advocate for the
respondent and he further sent the said copy with his opinion to the
appellant, the compliance with sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the
Act of 1996 is to be taken as complete.
13. This Court has, therefore, been called upon to take a
view as to whether the delivery of the signed copy of the award
through e-mails of the advocate of the appellant is to be taken as
compliance with the mandate of sub-section (5) of Section 31 of
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the Act of 1996. Before we advert to the said question, it would be
relevant to reproduce Section 31 and Section 34(3) of the Act of
1996 hereunder for a ready reference:-
31. Form and contents of arbitral award.--(1) An
arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be
signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), in arbitral
proceedings with more than one arbitrator, the
signatures of the majority of all the members of the
arbitral tribunal shall be sufficient so long as the reason
for any omitted signature is stated.
(3) The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon
which it is based, unless--
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be
given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under
section 30.
(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place
of arbitration as determined in accordance with section
20 and the award shall be deemed to have been made at
that place.
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall
be delivered to each party.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the
arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on
any matter with respect to which it may make a final
arbitral award.
(7) (a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where
and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of
money, the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for
which the award is made interest, at such rate as it
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the
money, for the whole or any part of the period between
the date on which the cause of action arose and the date
on which the award is made.
1
[(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award
shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest
at the rate of two per cent. higher than the current rate
of interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date
of award to the date of payment.
Explanation.--The expression "current rate of interest"
shall have the same meaning as assigned to it under
clause (b) of section 2 of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of
1978).]
2
[(8) The costs of an arbitration shall be fixed by the
arbitral tribunal in accordance with section 31A.]
34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.--(1)
xxxxx
(2) xxxxx
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which
the party making that application had received the
arbitral award or, if a request had been made under
section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three months it
may entertain the application within a further period of
thirty days, but not thereafter."
1. Substituted by Act 3 of 2016, S. 16, for Cl. (b) (w.r.e.f. 23-10-2015).
2. Substituted by Act 3 of 2016, S. 16, for sub-S. (8) (w.r.e.f. 23-10-2015).
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14. On a bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it
would appear that they are in consonance with each other as both
the provisions talk of receipt of a copy of the signed copy of the
award by the party.
15. In the case of Tecco Trichy Engineers &
Contractors (supra), the application for setting aside of the award
was filed along with an application seeking condonation of delay
of 27 days. The same was contested on the ground that the delay
was of 34 days and this having been filed beyond 30 days it could
not be condoned by the court. While dealing with the said issue,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to delve into the
provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 31 and the proviso to sub-
section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. What has been held
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph '8' of its judgment are
being reproduced hereunder for a ready reference:-
"8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of
Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of
substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has
passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings
within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The
delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to
be "received" by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral
Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion
several periods of limitation such as an application for
correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under
Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an
award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the
copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the
party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those
rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which
would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of
award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party
constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings."
16. It is evident that in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court having noticed that the signed copy of the award was
received by the General Manager of the Railways and not by the
Chief Engineer who had singed the agreement on behalf of the
Union of India as a respondent, took a view that service of arbitral
award on the general manager by way of receipt in his inwards
office cannot be taken to be sufficient notice so as to activate the
Department to take appropriate steps in respect of and in regard to
the award passed by the arbitrators to constitute starting point of
limitation for the purposes of Section 34(3) of the Act. The service
of notice on the Chief Engineer on 19.03.2001 would be the
starting point of limitation to challenge the award in the court.
17. In the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee & Others
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has once again considered
both the provisions of the Act of 1996 and has also taken into
consideration the definition of the word "party" as occurring in
Section 2(h) of the Act of 1996. In this regard, the discussions
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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made and the opinion rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
paragraph '15' and '16' of its judgment are required to be quoted
hereunder for a ready reference and we do so accordingly.
"15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on
behalf of the respective parties and having particular regard
to the expression "party" as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the
1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections 31(5) and 34(3)
of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the
decision2 of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
impugned in these proceedings. The expression "party" has
been amply dealt with in Tecco Trichy Engineers case4 and
also in ARK Builders (P) Ltd. case8, referred to hereinabove.
It is one thing for an advocate to act and plead on behalf of a
party in a proceeding and it is another for an advocate to act
as the party himself. The expression "party", as defined in
Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates a person
who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition
is not qualified in any way so as to include the agent of the
party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in
Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act can only
mean the party himself and not his or her agent, or advocate
empowered to act on the basis of a vakalatnama. In such
circumstances, proper compliance with Section 31(5) would
mean delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award on the
party himself and not on his advocate, which gives the party
concerned the right to proceed under Section 34(3) of the
aforesaid Act.
16. The view taken in Pushpa Devi Bhagat case9 is in
relation to the authority given to an advocate to act on behalf
2. Karmyogi Shelters (P) Ltd. v. Benarsi Krishna Committee, AIR 2010 Del 156
4. Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239
8. State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders (P) Ltd., (2011) 4 SCC 616 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 413
9. Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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of a party to a proceeding in the proceedings itself, which
cannot stand satisfied where a provision such as Section
31(5) of the 1996 Act is concerned. The said provision clearly
indicates that a signed copy of the award has to be delivered
to the party. Accordingly, when a copy of the signed award is
not delivered to the party himself, it would not amount to
compliance with the provisions of Section 31(5) of the Act.
The other decision cited by Mr Ranjit Kumar in Nilkantha
Sidramappa Ningashetti case6 was rendered under the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which did not have a
provision similar to the provisions of Section 31(5) of the
1996 Act. The said decision would, therefore, not be
applicable to the facts of this case also."
18. In the aforementioned views expressed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, we would have no hesitation in recording that
mere receipt of a signed copy of the impugned award on the e-
mails of the learned advocate of the respondent-appellant and then
the forwarding of the said e-mail with his opinion by the advocate
to his client cannot be taken to have satisfied the mandate of sub-
section (5) of Section 31 of the Act of 1996. We cannot stretch the
meaning of the provision or substitute our own opinion in place of
the wisdom of the legislatures as contained in sub-section (5) of
Section 31 of the Act of 1996.
19. So far as the judgment cited on behalf of the
6. Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti, AIR 1962 SC
666 : (1962) 2 SCR 551
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.5 of 2024 dt.04-02-2026
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respondent no.1 in the case of Government of Maharashtra Vs.
Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Private Ltd. reported in
(2021) 6 SCC 460 is concerned, we find that the issues canvassed in
the said judgment are not calling for consideration in the present
case.
20. In result, we find that the impugned order dated
22.03.2024
passed by the learned District Judge, Patna dismissing the
Misc. (Arbitration) Case No.115 of 2022 on the ground of limitation
is liable to be set aside. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned
order. The reckoning date for the period of limitation in this case
would be the date on which the copy of the arbitral award was
received by the appellant through registered post. Hence, the
Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case is within time. The learned District
Judge, Patna shall now hear the main case on its own merit.
21. This appeal is allowed.
22. Let a copy of the judgment along with the records be
sent back to the court of learned District Judge, Patna.
(Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J)
(Praveen Kumar, J)
arvind/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE
Uploading Date 05.02.2026
Transmission Date
