Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 10620 Ori
Judgement Date : 2 September, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.1943 of 2023 &
CRLMC No. 2113 of 2023
Applications under Section 482 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
---------------
AFR CRLMC No.1943 of 2023
Bibudhendra Dash ...... Petitioner
- Versus -
Bibhuti Bhusan Behera ....... Opp.Party
CRLMC No. 2113 of 2023
Madhusudan Panda & Others ...... Petitioners
- Versus -
Bibhuti Bhusan Behera ....... Opp.Party
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
_________________________________________________________
For Petitioners : M/s. Gokulananda Mohapatra,
B.N. Mohapatra, T.Mohapatra &
P. Mohanty, Advcates.
[in both the CRLMCs]
For Opp. Parties : M/s. P.K. Mallick &
S.K. Nayak, Advocates,
[in both the CRLMCs]
_________________________________________________________
CORAM:
JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
JUDGMENT
nd 2 September, 2023
SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J. In both the cases, the petitioners have
prayed for quashing of the order of cognizance dated
16.03.2003 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Special
Court under S.C. & S.T. (PoA) Act, Cuttack in ICC Case No.
2 of 2020.
FACTS
2. One Bibhuti Bhusan Behera (opposite party)
lodged an FIR in Lalbag Police Station on 27.10.2016
alleging therein that while he had been to the Orissa High
Court Bar Association Hall, one Sapan Kumar Pal
(petitioner No.3 in CRLMC No. 2113 of 2023) suddenly
abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault
him but because of intervention by other advocates he was
saved. Again at 1.00 p.m. when he entered the Bar
Association Hall with the purpose of meeting his lawyer,
Advocates, Sarojkanta Mandal, Sapan Kumar Pal,
Prasanna Kumar Routray and Madhusudan Panda
encircled him and Madhusudan Panda without any rhyme
or reason abused him in filthy language and also gave two
fist blows on his face causing bleeding injuries. He also
abused the informant saying 'sala keuta‟ etc. Again the
informant was rescued by other advocates. Basing on such
FIR, Lalbag P.S. Case No. 74 of 2018 was registered under
Sections 294/323/506/34 of IPC read with Section
3(1)(r)(s)/(2)(va) of S.C. & S.T. (PoA) Act followed by
investigation. In course of investigation, the I.O. did not
find any evidence of the occurrence as alleged and
therefore, submitted final report stating it as mistake of
fact. The informant thereafter filed a protest petition in the
form of a complaint case being ICC Case No. 2 of 2020 in
the Court below making similar allegations but by adding
the names of seven more advocates in his complaint. The
Court below recorded the initial statement of the
complainant and also conducted enquiry under Section
202 of Cr.P.C. Being satisfied that the allegations made in
the complaint petition find support from his initial
statement and that of the witnesses, the Court below took
cognizance of the aforementioned offences and issued
process against petitioners vide the impugned order.
SUBMISSIONS
3. Heard Mr. G.N. Mohapatra, learned counsel for
the petitioners in CRLMC No. 1943 of 2023 and CRLMC
No. 2113 of 2023 and Mr. S.K. Mishra, learned Additional
Standing Counsel for the State. Though the opposite party
had engaged Mr. P.K. Mallick, Advocate and associates to
represent his case yet despite repeated opportunities said
counsel did not appear on the dates of hearing. However,
the opposite party- complainant also filed a counter
affidavit, which is on record and has been duly considered
by this Court.
4. Mr. Mohapatra has assailed the impugned
order on several grounds as are enumerated below:
(i) The basic ingredient of the offence under Section
3 of the S.C. & S.T. (PoA) Act is absent inasmuch
as there is nothing on record to show that the
complainant belongs to either scheduled caste or
scheduled tribe. Further, the complaint petition is
silent as regards the caste of the accused persons.
(ii) The necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offences under the IPC are absent.
(iii) The allegations do not reveal any mens rea
for the accused persons for committing the
offences, which is an essential ingredient in a case
like this.
(iv) Even otherwise, if the allegations are
considered as a whole, it would appear as entirely
improbable to any prudent person.
Mr. Mohapatra has relied upon several case laws in
support of his contentions which would be referred to at
the appropriate place.
5. Mr. S.K. Mishra, learned State Counsel on the
other hand would contend that it is not necessary for the
Court to make a roving enquiry at the time of taking
cognizance of the offences and it would suffice if only a
prima facie case is made out. The materials on record
prima facie show commission of the alleged offences and
therefore, the Court below rightly took cognizance of the
same. Whether, the offences are actually made out or not
would depend on evidence adduced during trial but not at
this stage.
6. The complainant in his counter has referred to
police inaction in relation to the FIR lodged by him initially,
for which he had to approach the National Commission for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is because of
intervention of the National Commission that the case was
registered by the Police but only to submit Final Report. It
is further stated that police had done so being influenced
by the accused advocates. As regards the occurrence, it is
stated that the same was reported in several Odia
newspapers at the relevant time. As regards the ingredients
of the alleged offences it is stated that the Bar Association
Hall being a public place and the complainant being
abused and assaulted therein in full view of others, the
offence under Section 3 of the S.C. and S.T. (PoA) Act is
entirely made out. It is also stated that the entire incident
started at the behest of Advocate, Sarojkanta Mandal, for
which the complainant has approached the Bar Council for
taking disciplinary action against him. The Court below
has rightly taken cognizance basing on the statement of the
complainant and the witnesses, which therefore, suffers
from no illegality.
ANALYSIS
7. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the
rival contentions it would be apposite to first keep in mind
the general principles laid down by the Supreme Court for
exercise of inherent power by the High Court to quash a
criminal proceeding in the case of State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
8. Coming to the facts of the case, Mr. Mohapatra
has forcefully argued that in the original FIR, the informant
had made allegations only against four advocates, namely,
Sapan Kumar Pal, Sarojkanta Mandal, Prasanna Kumar
Routray and Madhusudan Panda. In his complaint petition
however, he added the names of as many as eight
advocates namely, Bibudhendra Dash, Gagan Chandra
Meher, Baladev Panda, Manas Ranjan Panda, Sudarsan
Behera, Amiya Kumar Mohanty, Ashok Kumar Das and
Gouranga Charan Mohapatra. According to Sri Mohapatra,
this by itself shows the falsity of the allegations. Secondly,
in the FIR it is alleged that Sapan Kumar Pal had abused
him and attempted to assault him during his first visit to
the Bar Association Hall at 11 a.m. and on the second
occasion i.e., at 1 p.m. on the same day on the instigation
of Sapan Kumar Pal, the other three advocates committed
the alleged offences. In his complaint petition however, it is
stated that on the second occasion the other advocates
acted on the direction of Sarojkanta Mandal. According to
Mr. Mohapatra, this shows that the complainant has
himself changed his version of the alleged occurrence from
time to time.
9. As regards the ingredients of the offences under
Section 3 of S.C. & S.T. (PoA) Act, Mr. Mohapatra draws
attention of the Court to the FIR wherein the accused
persons are said to have referred to him as „Keuta toka‟.
Same is also mentioned in the complaint petition. In the
FIR, the complainant has referred to himself as belonging
to the „Keuta‟ caste. Nothing has been stated about his
caste in the complaint petition. However, in his initial
statement he has described himself as „Kaibarta‟ sub-caste
under the scheduled caste. So, according to Mr.
Mohapatra, firstly, there is doubt as to what exactly is the
caste of the complainant and secondly, even assuming that
he belongs to the caste 'Kaibarta/Keuta‟ nothing is stated
either in the FIR or in the complaint petition as regards the
caste of the accused persons. In the case of Gorige
Pentaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 12 SCC 531: (2008) 41
OCR (SC) the Supreme Court observed as follows;
"5.......As far as Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned, it reads as under:
"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--
(i)-(ix)***
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;"
6. In the instant case, the allegation of Respondent 3 in the entire complaint is that on 27-5-2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (Respondent 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate Respondent 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law."
10. As already stated, neither the FIR nor the
complaint petition nor even the initial statement of the
complainant and the statements of the witnesses examined
on his behalf contain a whisper that the accused persons
do not belong to the scheduled caste. Obviously in the
absence of any such averment/statement it is not for the
Court to draw any presumption as regards the caste of the
accused persons. Thus, this Court finds that the basic
ingredient necessary to constitute the offence under
Section 3 of the S.C. & S.T. (PoA) Act is not made out.
11. As regards the ingredients of the other offences
namely, Sections 294, 323 and 506 IPC, this Court
observes that the allegations appear to be quite improbable
inasmuch as there seems to be no mens rea involved. It has
not been suggested as to why would an advocate abuse a
person visiting the Bar Association Hall out of the blue
unless there is some prior enmity with him or the person
had done something to annoy the advocates. This only
adds to the improbability of the complaint's version of the
alleged occurrence. It is trite law that the surrounding
factors of an occurrence have also to be taken note of to
ascertain whether any criminality exist in the alleged acts.
According to the complainant, Advocate, Sapan Kumar Pal
and Sarojkanta Mandal as the case may be suddenly
abused and assaulted him and also instigated others to do
so but nothing has been said as to their previous
relationship, in the absence of which the reason for the
advocates exhibiting such hostility appears extremely
improbable. Moreover, what would the accused advocates
have gained from the whole affair is not forthcoming nor
discernible from the facts alleged.
12. It must be kept in mind that the accused
persons belong to what is known as the noble profession of
advocacy who are supposed to be intellectually oriented. In
the instant case, barring accused Sapan Kumar Pal and
Sarojkanta Mandal, who are aged 34 and 45 years
respectively, all the others are elderly persons, aged more
than 50 years. Accused Madhusudan Panda is aged 71
years, accused Bibudhendra Dash, 65 years, accused
Gagan Chandra Meher, 66 years, accused Baldev Panda,
59 years and accused Manas Ranjan Panda, 58 years.
Therefore, it is difficult to believe that they would have
abused the informant using such obscene words inside the
Bar Association Hall as also assaulted him and that too for
no apparent reason. One thing this Court is unable to
fathom from the materials on record is the reason for the
accused persons allegedly committing the offence. As
regards the witnesses examined in the enquiry under
Section 202 Cr.P.C. it is seen that three witnesses were
examined who claim to be eye-witnesses to the alleged
occurrence, one of whom namely, Dillip Kumar Sethi is an
Advocate practicing in the High Court of Orissa. The
second and third witnesses examined by the complainant
are housewives and have not stated anything as to why
they were present in the Bar Association Hall at the
relevant time. Surprisingly, witness, Dillip Kumar Sethi,
who is an Advocate has also not stated as to why the
accused persons behaved in the manner as alleged.
CONCLUSION
13. Thus, on an overall consideration of all the
materials on record, this Court finds the allegations
inherently unworthy of belief. It has been held in Bhajan
Lal (supra):
"(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
14. Similar view was taken in the case of Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque,
reported in (2005) 1 SCC 122, wherein it was held that a
case where the FIR of the complainant does not disclose
any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, the
proceedings can be quashed.
15. Allowing a criminal proceeding to continue in
such a case would certainly be a travesty of justice. It must
also be kept in mind that a criminal proceeding is not to be
resorted to as a matter of course. One of the paramount
duties of the superior courts is to see that a person who is
apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and
humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable
complaint. The above view was taken by the Supreme
Court in the case of Mahesh Chaudhary v. State of
Rajasthan, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 439.
16. Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of
facts and law made hereinbefore, this Court is of the
considered view that the criminal proceedings initiated on
the basis of the complaint lodged by the complainant
cannot be allowed to continue as the same would amount
to an abuse of the process of the Court.
17. Resultantly, the CRLMCs are allowed. The
criminal proceedings in ICC Case No. 2 of 2020 of the
Court of learned Presiding Officer, Special Court under S.C.
& S.T. (PoA) Act, Cuttack are hereby quashed.
.................................. Sashikanta Mishra, Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack, The 2nd September, 2023/ A.K. Rana, P.A.
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: AJAYA KUMAR RANA Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 04-Sep-2023 18:22:01
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