High Court of Meghalaya
Smti. Sheila Margaret Sootinck vs . Meghalaya Transport on 20 May, 2022
Serial No. 13
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 73 of 2022 Date of Order: 20.05.2022
Smti. Sheila Margaret Sootinck Vs. Meghalaya Transport
Corporation & Ors.
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Ms. A. Paul, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. R. Kharmawlong, Adv.
Mr. S. Chanda, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Sen, SC MTC (For R 1 & 2)
Ms. Z.E. Nongkynrih, GA(For R 3).
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
1. This writ petition is directed against a notice dated 21.02.2022,
issued under Section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1980 read with Rule 3 directing the
petitioner to show cause as to why an order of eviction be not passed in
respect of the premises occupied by the petitioner.
2. The main plank of the challenge is that the said impugned notice
has been issued by the respondents, inspite of an assurance that no
coercive action would be taken against the petitioner which had been made
in the course of Civil Court proceedings namely T.S. No. 5(H) of 2020
and recorded in order dated 11.11.2020; and also order dated 22.12.2021,
passed in Misc. Case No. 21(H) of 2021 in T.S. No. 20 of 2021, wherein
status quo has been directed to be maintained.
3. On the part of the respondents, it is contended that, the writ
petition is not maintainable under Article 226, as notwithstanding
anything else, the Public Premises Act overrides the Rent Control Act,
there is no dispute over the title and ownership of the respondent
corporation over the premises and further, disputed facts have been
brought into play by the petitioner. It has also been contended that
pendency of Civil Court proceedings does not preclude the initiation of
proceedings under the Public Premises Act.
4. Though, arguments and submissions have been advanced by the
parties, as to the purport of the orders passed in the civil proceedings, as
well as the conduct of the parties in the said suits, suffice it to say that, the
said proceedings will have no bearing on the outcome of this writ petition
before this Court, inasmuch as, the same is limited to a challenge to the
impugned notice under the Public Premises Act, with the attendant facts
thrown in by the petitioner to prop up her case.
5. Ms. A. Paul, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. R.
Kharmawlong, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the show-
cause issued under the Public Premises Act amounts to coercive action
being taken against the petitioner and submits that the same is contrary to
the undertaking that had been given in the Civil Court proceedings and as
such, on this ground, the petitioner has been compelled to approach this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
6. Mr. S. Sen, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents MTC,
while repelling the submissions of the petitioner has relied upon the
following judgments: -
i) Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2020)
2 SCC 659.
ii) Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Chembur Service
Station reported in (2011) 3 SCC 710.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, as aforenoted,
the issue necessarily revolves on the point, as to whether the instant writ
petition is maintainable against a show-cause notice under the Public
Premises Act. It is settled law that the pendency of civil proceedings will
not preclude the initiation of proceedings under the Public Premises Act.
In the judgment cited by the respondents i.e., Bharat Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. (supra), it has been held in Paras -85 and 86 as follows:
"85. In the present case as stated above, the respondents are
occupying the premises, may be as an agent of the appellant,
right from 1-4-1972. According to the appellant the respondent
have no authority to remain on the premises after the dealership
agreement is terminated. As against that the respondent has
contended that the respondent is a tenant and in any case a
"deemed tenant" of the premises. The respondent has moved the
Court of Small Causes for the declaration and has obtained an
order of status quo. That order presently survives and is not set
aside though the learned Single Judge has observed in the
impugned order that the order of status quo would operate only
till the competent authority passes the order of eviction. The
respondents have not challenged this order either by filing a
special leave petition or by filing any cross-objections in the
present appeal, and therefore it binds them.
86. In the circumstances of the present case, the learned Single
Judge has permitted the appellant to proceed against the
respondent under the Public Premises Act on the footing that
after the termination of the dealership agreement the occupation
would be unauthorised. He has rightly observed that the
pendency of the proceeding in the civil court cannot preclude
the appellant from taking recourse to recovery of the possession
of the suit premises by following the due process of law
including by resorting to action under the provisions of the
Public Premises Act, if permissible. He has, however, made it
clear that in any case possession cannot be obtained by force.
In our view, there is no reason for this Court to take any different
view. The respondent has to be afforded an opportunity of being
heard, may be in the forum of the appellant, and only after
obtaining an order from the competent authority the respondent
can be evicted."
Similarly, in the instant case therefore, though civil proceedings are
pending, the initiation of proceedings under the Public Premises Act, cannot
be said to be illegal or perverse. Further the Supreme Court in the judgment
of Harbhajan Singh (supra) has held that the Public Premises Act, being a
later enactment would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in
respect of public premises.
8. In the face of the legal position and the circumstances surrounding this
matter, no case has been made out to warrant exercise of discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and as such, the
writ petition is held to be not maintainable.
9. However, before parting with the records, though the respondent is
not precluded from resorting to the Public Premises Act for recovery of the
possession of the suit premises, taking into account that civil proceedings are
pending, wherein interim orders are operating, all further actions by the
respondents are to be in accordance and with the due process of law.
10. Accordingly for the reasons aforementioned, the writ petition is
dismissed. However, parties are left to bear their own costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
20.05.2022
"D.Thabah-PS"
