Hdfc Ergo General Insurance vs . Smti. Riti Pde & 2 Ors.
2022 Latest Caselaw 17 Meg

 Serial No. 01
 Regular List

                         HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
                               AT SHILLONG


MACApp. No. 1 of 2021
                                                 Date of Decision: 17.02.2022
HDFC ERGO General Insurance            Vs.          Smti. Riti Pde & 2 Ors.
Co. Ltd.
Coram:
                 Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge

Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)   :    Mr. S. Jindal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)             :    Mr. S. Kumar, Adv. for R 1.

None for R 2 & 3.

i)     Whether approved for reporting in                   Yes/No
       Law journals etc.:

ii)    Whether approved for publication
       in press:                                           Yes/No


1.     Matter taken up via video conferencing.

2. A motor vehicle accident claim application was preferred before the Member, Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (MACT) at Nongpoh, Ri-Bhoi District by the respondent No.1 herein which application was registered as MACT Case No. 1 of 2010, later re-registered as MACT Case No. 5 of 2015.

3. The filing of the said MAC case was occasioned by the death of the husband of the appellant/claimant who died as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 15.07.2008 at about 10:45 a.m. at a place called Down Gate, Nongpoh.

4. From the particulars given in the claim application, what could be seen is that the deceased husband of the appellant who was a pedestrian while

trying to cross the road at Down Gate, Nongpoh was hit by a tourist taxi bearing registration No. ML-05-F-3806 being driven in a rash and negligent manner causing grievous injuries on the person of the said deceased who succumbed to the said injuries.

5. In this regard, an FIR was filed before the Nongpoh police station and a case being Nongpoh PS Case No. 84(7)/08 u/s 274/304(A) IPC was registered against the driver of the said offending vehicle.

6. Additional information as could be gathered from the said claim application is that the deceased victim named Shroilington Syiem was 44 years at the time of his death and was a Government employee posted at Station Officer under the Superintendent of Meghalaya (F & ES) Shillong. His monthly salary at the time of his death is said to be ₹14,290/- (Rupees fourteen thousand two hundred and ninety) only. Compensation was claimed from the insurer of the said vehicle as well as from the owner and driver of the same. The total amount of compensation claimed is ₹ 38,54,600/- (Rupees thirty eight lakhs fifty four thousand and six hundred) only.

7. On appearance of the parties, the matter proceeded for filing of written statement and for framing of issues, on these formalities being completed, the learned Member, MACT recorded the evidence of the claimant's witnesses who have examined five witnesses including herself as CW-1. It may be mentioned that the matter had proceeded exparte against the OPs No. 2 & 3/respondents No. 2 & 3 since 10.11.2017. The OP-1/appellant contested the claim and had cross examined the witnesses of the claimant. However, no witnesses were called by the appellant before the Tribunal.

8. After the evidence has been recorded, the learned Member, MACT heard the argument of the parties and also took into account the written argument filed by the appellant and thereafter, the impugned judgment dated 14.10.2019 was passed by awarding compensation of ₹ 21,76,636/- (Rupees twenty one lakhs seventy six thousand six hundred thirty six) only to the

claimant and the deceased's other dependents.

9. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 14.10.2019, the appellant /Insurance Company has preferred this instant appeal on the grounds stated therein.

10. Heard Mr. S. Jindal, learned counsel for the appellant who has submitted that while assailing the impugned judgment and order, the appellant would however press this matter only on three issues that is on the issue of dependency, rate of interest awarded and the computation of the accrued interest.

11. On the first issue, Mr. Jindal has submitted that it is on record that as on today, one of the children of the deceased that is the elder daughter of the claimant/respondent No.1 is already married and is staying with her husband. As was observed by the learned Tribunal who has taken note of the statement made by the claimant/respondent No.1 in her evidence when she stated that, her eldest daughter is already married and staying with her husband and as such, the learned Tribunal while deciding on the issue of dependency, has allowed one-fourth deduction from the personal expenses of the deceased on the basis that the number of dependents were 4(four), which actually should be 3(three) and accordingly, the deduction for dependency should have been one-third and not one-fourth. The case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport v. P. Raghavaiah: (1989) ACJ 622 at paragraph 5 was relied upon by the learned counsel in this regard.

12. As to the rate of interest, Mr. Jindal has strenuously submitted that the award with regard to the rate of interest allowed by the learned Tribunal at 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment is also not tenable and in the light of many decisions in this regard made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the rate of interest should be quantified at 6% pa. The learned counsel has also drawn up a comparative table of a few banks offering respective rates of interests shown thereof. The said table is reproduced herein below as:-

  NAME OF BANK                     TENURE            INTEREST
 Punjab National Bank             1 year            5.20%
 State Bank of India              1 year            4.90%
 Bank of India                    1 year            5.25%
 Central Bank of India            1 year            4.90%

13. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has cited the following decisions: -

(i) Kaushnuma Begum & Ors v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd & Ors: (2001) 2 SCC 9 paragraph 24;

(ii) Chandrakanta Tiwari v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd: Civil Appeal No. 2527 of 2020 (dated 08.06.2020);

(iii) Kurvan Ansari Alias Kurvan Ali & Anr. v. Shyam Kishore Murmu & Anr: Civil Appeal No. 6902 of 2021 (Dated 16.11.2021) paragraphs 4, 6 & 17;

(iv) Shantaben & Ors. v. National Power Transport & Anr: (2019) 5 SCC 623, paragraph 10;

(v) Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Shanti Devi & Ors: (2009) 4 SCC 355, paragraph 11 and

(vi) Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India & Anr: (2003) 3 SCC 148, paragraphs 6 & 18.

14. Mr. Jindal has again submitted that the proceedings before the learned Tribunal from the time the claim application was filed on 10.02.2010 till date, about eleven years or so has passed. On interest payable on the award being made, the Tribunal is usually guided by the provision of Section 171 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 which provides that a Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation, simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date, not earlier than the date of making the claim. More often than not, the Tribunal has exercised this discretionary power to

grant interest from the date of filing of the claim petition, however in the context of the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, it is submitted that this discretionary power should not be exercised without looking into the conduct of the claimant who has delayed the adjudication of the matter. Mr. Jindal has further submitted that a perusal of the records would show that the claimant has been responsible in one way or the other such as, impleadment of a wrong party that is HDFC bank instead of HDFC ERGO General Insurance Co. Ltd. for which steps for rectification of the same was taken only in the year 2014, wherein, the appellant herein, had entered appearance only on 25.11.2014. However, without going to further details, it is submitted that a period of 4(four) years from 10.02.2010 till date may be exempted while computing the interest due and payable.

15. In this connection, the appellant has relied upon the following authorities:-

(i) Kajal v. Jagdish Chand: (2020) 4 SCC 413, paragraph 31;

(ii) National Insurance Company v. Purna Devi in MA No. 231/2016 (Dated 18.07.2020) Jammu & Kashmir High Court, paragraph 36;

(iii) Shashikant v. Shantabai: 2008 (1) MhLj 957, (Bombay High Court) paragraph 5;

(iv) Leela Devi v. Union of India- Rajasthan High Court, Judgment dated 19.09.2006, paragraph 21.

16. Per contra, Mr. S. Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent 1/Claimant has submitted that the contentions of the appellant are misplaced and not on factual basis and in this regard, the response of the respondent No. 1 on the three issues raised by the appellant has been reduced in writing in the form of the written submission apart from the oral submission.

17. On the issue of dependency, the learned counsel has submitted that at the time of the occurrence of the said motor vehicle accident, the

Claimant/respondent No. 1 along with her three children were dependent on the deceased victim and all the three children were minors, whose age ranges from 15 years to 2 ½ months, the eldest daughter being born on 28.11.1992 which makes her age at 15 years 7 months on the date of the said accident. This fact was also reflected in the impugned judgment. Though it is true that at the time of passing of the award, the eldest daughter has become an adult and was also married and staying with her husband, however the fact remains that she was dependent on her deceased father at the relevant period and has to be considered accordingly.

18. As to the issue as regard the rate of interest chargeable on the awarded compensation, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that contrary to the assertion of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Tribunal has given due consideration to the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation: (2009) 6 SCC 121 as well as in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Pranay Sethi: (2007) 16 SCC 680 as regard the award and the interest applicable and as such, the precedent set by the Apex Court has to be followed by the sub-ordinate courts for which the learned Tribunal has committed no irregularity or error in this regard.

19. In the case of Pranay Sethi (supra), the Apex Court has thought it fit to maintain the rate of interest payable at 9% and in the case of Erudhaya Priya v. State Express transport Corporation Ltd: (2020) SC Online decided on 27.07.2020, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the issue of interest has considered 9 % as reasonable. This was also reiterated in the case of Karthik Subramanian v. B. Sarath Babu & Anr: (2021) SC Online decided on 02.03.2021 where yet again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has granted interest at 9%, further submits the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel that the learned Tribunal has only followed the precedent set by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as far as award of interest is concerned and the same may not be upset by this Court.

20. On the issue of rate of interest, the learned counsel for the respondent No 1/claimant has also cited the following judgment wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has allowed or decided that the rate of interest should be 9 %;

(i) Bhartiben Nayabha Ker & Ors v. Sidabha Pethabha Manke & Ors: (2018) 5 SCC 716, paragraphs 6 & 7

(ii) Kirti & Anr v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd: AIR 2021 SC

21. To counter the assertion of the learned counsel for the appellant as regard the exemption of payment of interest for the alleged period of delay caused by the conduct of the Claimant/respondent No. 1 during the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that records would prove to the contrary, inasmuch as, the appellant has exhibited lack of interest in pursuing the matter and eventually when called upon to take part in the proceedings has time and again caused delay in the said proceedings for no fault of the respondent No. 1 and as such, the contention of the appellant in this respect cannot be accepted by the Court, it is submitted.

22. Taking this Court through the records of the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, the learned counsel has submitted that at the time of filing of the claim application, initially the name of HDFC Bank and Insurance Co. Ltd was arrayed as one of the opposite parties as per information available from the seizure list dated 18.07.2008 vide MR No. 62 of 08. On notice being issued, the HDFC Bank appeared and clarified that the correct identity of the opposite party is the HDFC ERGO General Insurance Co. Ltd and accordingly, notice was reissued. It is further submitted that the appellant had also participated in the Lok Adalat held on 20.10.2011, but this matter could not be settled and the case was filed for filing of written statement which was filed only after a gap of two and a half years when the appellant appeared and filed their written statement on 25.11.2014.

23. Even after filing of the written statement, the appellant/Insurance Company as well as the opposite parties driver and owner has failed to diligently take part in the proceedings, which has compelled the learned Tribunal to close the filing of the written statement of the opposite parties driver and owner on 15.09.2016.

24. The respondent No. 1/claimant has then filed the evidence vide affidavit, that of CW-1 on 13.03.2018 and of CW-2 on 10.04.2018, but these witnesses were cross-examined by the appellant only on 25.06.2018. The respondent No. 1/claimant has also caused recording of the evidence of CW- 3 and CW-4 on 12.09.2018 and that of CW-5 on 05.10.2018 but the appellant/ Insurance Company has failed to cross-examine them and the matter was then fixed for filing of written argument and was also orally heard on 27.09.2019. It is therefore evident that it was the appellant who has caused delay in the proceedings and not the claimant/respondent No. 1 submits the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1.

25. Having given due consideration to the submission and contention of the learned counsels for the rival parties present, this Court has perused the impugned judgment as well as the records of the learned Tribunal including the evidence adduced. However, the appellant has assailed the impugned judgment specifically on the three broad issues indicated herein namely; (i) On dependency; (ii) on the rate of interest and (iii) the period for which the interest is to be imposed, for which this Court would confine itself while dealing with this appeal.

26. Taking the issue of dependency first, what is canvassed by the appellant is that of the dependents of the deceased victim, at the time of passing of the award, the eldest daughter was already married and staying with her husband at Downgate, Nongpoh and going by the decision of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport v. P. Raghavaiah (supra) wherein the High Court at paragraph 5 has held that

married children and living away from their mother are not entitled to compensation, has asserted that the number of dependency should be counted as three and not four and as was held in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation(supra) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 14 has held that where the dependency on the victim is two to three, the deductions towards personal and living expenses should be 1/3rd , but the learned Tribunal has taken the number of dependents at four and has accordingly taken 1/4th as the deductions which is not correct.

27. The respondent No 1/claimant has insisted that at the time of filing of the claim petition, the eldest daughter was a minor of about 15 years and as such, the learned Tribunal has rightly counted her as one of the dependents even though at the time of passing of the award she was already married.

28. From the records, it is seen that there is no objection or dispute as regard the status of the said eldest daughter of the deceased victim even in the body of the claim application at paragraph 20 of the same, the respondent No 1/claimant has mentioned that she is the mother of three minor children. In her evidence when crossed-examined, she has deposed that her eldest daughter Mercyful S. Pde was 26 years and married at the relevant period.

29. Now the question is whether apart from the respondent No. 1/claimant who was the wife of the deceased victim, are her children also legal representatives of the deceased victim and as such, are also entitled to compensation? The answer lies in the provision of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act which provides for application for compensation in case of death arising out of a motor vehicle accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. This provision implies that the compensation applied for shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives, the wife and children of the deceased in this case are certainly his legal representatives.

30. As regard the entitlement of major married and even earning legal

representatives of the deceased victim, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with a similar issue in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Birender & Ors: (2020) 11 SCC 356, at paragraph 14 has held as follows:

"14. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Having said that, it must necessarily follow that even the major married and earning sons of the deceased being legal representatives have a right to apply for compensation and it would be the bounden duty of the Tribunal to consider the application irrespective of the fact whether the legal representative concerned was fully dependent on the deceased and not to limit the claim towards conventional heads only......"

31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd: (2007) 10 SCC 643 at paragraph 19, while agreeing with the distinction drawn by the High Court between "right to apply for compensation and "entitlement to compensation" has also observed that the High Court has rightly held that even a married daughter is a legal representative and she is certainly entitled to compensation.

32. In the light of the above, there can be no doubt that the objection of the appellant as to the dependency of the married daughter of the deceased cannot be sustained. Accordingly, this Court holds that the dependents of the deceased including the respondent No.1/claimant are four in numbers and in this respect, the findings of the learned Tribunal cannot be disturbed.

33. Coming to the issue of rate of interest, it is seen that the appellant has contested the award of interest @ 9% by the Tribunal on the amount due and payable to the respondent No. 1/claimant. The argument raised is that the rate of interest awarded should be linked to the rate of interest offered by Nationalised Banks on fixed deposits for one year, a table(supra) was presented to prove this point and to say that the prevalent rate of interest is 6% p.a. The case of Kaushnuma Begum (supra) was referred to, to fortify this contention, wherein at paragraph 24 of the same, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that... "Earlier, 12% was found to be the reasonable rate of simple

interest. With a change in economy and the policy of the Reserve Bank of India the interest rate has been lowered. The nationalised banks are now granting interest at the rate of 9% on fixed deposits for one year. We, therefore, direct that the compensation amount fixed hereinbefore shall bear interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the claim made by the appellants......." It is therefore submitted that since the rate of interest awarded in the year 2001 was 9% based on the interest rate offered by the Nationalised Banks at that point of time, at present the rate of interest should be set at 6%. On the same point, the case of Abati Bezbaruah (supra) was also cited, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that award of interest would normally depend upon the bank rate prevailing at the relevant time.

34. The other judgments cited and referred to by the appellant noted accordingly at paragraph 12 above, all speaks of the inclination of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on award of interest at the rate of 6%.

35. Per contra, the respondent No.1/claimant has also referred to a few judgments as indicated at paragraph 19 above, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in the facts and circumstances of the particular case held that the rate of interest on the award of compensation be 9%. It may also be mentioned that as recent as in the year 2021, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karthik Subramanian (supra) vide order dated 02.03.2021 has directed that interest payable throughout would be at 9% p.a.

36. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abati Bezbaruah (supra) at paragraph 18 has held that ".....The rate of interest must be just and reasonable depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and taking all relevant factors including inflation, change of economy, policy being adopted by Reserve Bank of India from time to time, how long the case is pending, permanent injuries suffered by the victim, enormity of suffering, loss of future income, loss of enjoyment of life etc., into consideration." and again in the last part of the paragraph has opined that "...there cannot be any

hard-and -fast rule in awarding interest and the award of interest is solely on the discretion of the Tribunal or the High Court as indicated above."

37. In the case of Erudhaya Priya (supra), the issue of interest rate was discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In that case, the MACT has allowed interest @7.5% with the appellant therein making a prayer for enhancement of the same to 12%. However, after taking everything into consideration and on the basis of the submission of the parties, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has thought it fit to quantify the rate of interest at 9%.

38. Similarly, in the case of Karthik Subramanian (supra), the issue of rate of interest was argued by the parties, and a three Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has deemed it fit to allow 9% as the rate of interest applicable to the award.

39. In the light of the authorities cited above, this Court is of the considered opinion that taking everything into consideration, the rate of interest as awarded by the learned Tribunal should be maintained at 9% p.a.

40. Coming to the last issue, on the consideration, the main contention of the appellant is that that the proceedings before the learned Tribunal was inordinately delayed by the action or rather inaction of the respondent No.1/claimant firstly, by impleading an unnecessary party i.e., the HDFC Bank instead of the present appellant, for which the matter was delayed for 2(two) years till the situation was rectified when the present appellant appeared before the Tribunal and secondly, that the written statement of the other opposite parties/respondents No. 2 and 3 herein were not filed for which the learned Tribunal before closing the chance to file the written statement had to wait for a period of 6(six) years, in this manner, even when the matter was posted for framing of issues, another 15(fifteen) months was delayed in the process, the records are necessary to be perused.

41. If the records show that the cause of delay is squarely attributable to the

conduct of the respondent No. 1/claimant before the learned Tribunal, then the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, some of which are extracted below, will be relevant.

42. In the case of Kajal v Jagdish Chand (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 31 has held that "......Normally interest should be granted from the date of filing of the petition and if in appeal enhancement is made the interest should then again be from the date of filing of the petition. It is only if the appeal is filed after an inordinate delay by the claimants, or the decision of the case has been delayed on account of negligence of the claimant, in such exceptional cases the interest may be awarded from a later date........"

43. In the case of National Insurance Company v. Purna Devi (supra) the J&K High Court at paragraph 36 has held that "Granting interest to a party, who is guilty of protracting the litigation, would be encouraging the parties to indulge in unnecessarily delaying the litigation. It is well settled that a person cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong".

44. In the case of Shashikant v. Shantabai (supra) the Bombay High Court at paragraph 5 has held that "It would be a different case where the decision of the petition is delayed due to serious lapse on the part of the petitioner in prosecuting the petition. In such cases, the Court may use discretion not to award interest from date of the application. But where there are no lapses on the part of the petitioner and the proceedings unnecessarily drag on, he must be awarded interest. The Court holds while passing the award that on the date of the filing of the petition the petitioner was entitled to compensation. Therefore, it is from the date of the application that the Tribunal should award interest unless there are circumstances suggesting protraction on part of petitioners".

45. In the case of Leela Devi (supra) the Rajasthan High Court at paragraph 21 has held that "This Court is clearly of opinion that in a Motor accident

claim case, the claimants ought not be deprived of reasonable rate of interest on the award amount from the date of filing of claim application as required by Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It could only be in such cases where the claimants could be held guilty of intentional and inexplicable delay that some part of interest could be considered for denial but not ordinarily".

46. In the case of Puttana v. Lakshmana (supra) the AIR 2000 Kant 187 at paragraph 14 has held that "It has further to be held that while determining the rate of interest and the period for which the same is sought to be granted, the Tribunal should give due consideration to the fact as to whether the claim proceedings have been sought to be lingered either by the claimant or the owner or his insurer, so that it may act as deterrent against the erring party and compensatory for the other".

47. In the case of Sukumar Pattjoshi v. Rajdeep Leasing & Finance (supra) the ACJ at paragraph 5 has held that "While awarding interest on the amount of compensation, the Tribunal has observed that since the delay was caused by the appellant in producing witnesses, he will not be entitled to interest for a period of three years. From the record, I find that the first day for recording of evidence was in the month of March, 1995 when no evidence was present, the matter was adjourned to 5.12.1995 when also no evidence was present and it was then adjourned to 26.8.1996. Since no evidence was present even on 26.8.1996, the same was adjourned to 14.7.1997. The delay on the part of appellant in producing the evidence is only up to 26.8.1996 and thereafter the matter was adjourned not because of any adjournment taken by appellant but for other reasons. In my view, therefore, the appellant cannot be penalised for not producing evidence subsequent to 26.8.96. For the foregoing reasons, I direct that the appellant will be entitled to compensation with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum both on the original compensation awarded by the Tribunal as well as on the enhanced compensation awarded by this court from the date of filing of the petition till the payment minus two years and not three years as has been directed by the

Tribunal. With these observation, the appeal stands disposed of."

48. On careful consideration of the contention of the rival parties on this issue and taking into account the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and noted above what can be deduce is that generally interest on the award of compensation in a motor vehicle accident claim is provided under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Section 171 states as under:-

"171. Award of Interest where any claim is allowed.- Where any Claims Tribunal allows for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf".

49. Based on the aforementioned Section, generally the learned Tribunal on passing of the award would also allow or award interest on the award from the date of filing of the claim application till realization of the said award. However, it has also been held that the award including interest is not to be a windfall to the claimant(s) but only what is justly entitled by them and as such, it is expected that in a proceeding for claim of compensation, due diligence and interest has to be shown by the claimant(s), in fact, by all the parties involved.

50. The authorities cited by the appellant would show that the Court has given due consideration to the issue of negligence and intentional delay caused by the claimant. Nothing is said about the role of the opposite parties, however it is assumed that to protect their own interest, even monetarily, the opposite parties, particularly the Insurance Company is expected to take a keen interest in the matter for speedy disposal of the claim application.

51. On perusal of the records, particularly the order sheets, this Court has found that except for a brief period of one month from the date of filing of the

claim application where the exact identity of the appellant/Insurance Company is to be determined, on being directed vide order dated 19.03.2010 the claimant has taken fresh steps for issue of notice. Thereafter, records would show that the appellant/Insurance Company has failed to respond positively and even in the latter part of the proceedings, it is noticed that the appellant/Insurance Company has remained absent from the proceedings and has failed diligently to pursue its case. This, in effect would show that it is not the fault of the claimant that the proceedings before the learned Tribunal has travelled for about 9(nine) years or so. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard cannot be accepted and the authorities cited would not come to the rescue of the appellant, consequently the prayer for exemption of payment of interest for the period of 4(four) years is hereby rejected.

52. On an overall consideration of the matter, this Court has come to the conclusion that the appellant has not been able to make out a case for disturbing the award passed by the learned Tribunal and as such, the impugned judgment shall remain intact.

53. The appellant/HDFC ERGO General Insurance Company Limited is hereby directed to satisfy the award within a period of 45(forty-five) days from the date of this order.

54. Registry is directed to send back the case record.

55. Appeal disposed of. No cost.

Judge

Meghalaya 17.02.2022 "N. Swer, Stenographer"