Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 7475 Mad
Judgement Date : 26 September, 2025
S.A.(MD)No.312 of 2019
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reserved on : 12.08.2025
Pronounced on : 26.09.2025
CORAM
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE A.D. MARIA CLETE
S.A.(MD)No.312 of 2019
and
C.M.P.(MD)Nos.6311 & 10990 of 2019
Jeyanthi,
W/o. Esakkimuthu,
125, Thirumalaisamypuram,
Naagal Nagar,Dindugal Town,
Dindugal District ... Appellant/Respondent /Plaintiff
Vs.
Manikandan,
S/o. Pitchai Naidu,
49, Raju Nayakkar Compound,
Naagal Nagar,Dindugal Town,
Dindugal District.
Now Residing at-
Old No. 70, New No. 124,
Thirumalalsamypuram,
Near Lalitha Bankers
Dindugal. ... Respondent/Appellant/Defendant
PRAYER in SA: The Second Appeal filed under Section 100 C.P.C., to
set aside the judgment and Decree passed in A.S.No. 19 of 2017 on the
file of the Principal Sub Court, Dindugal, dated 01.03.2019 reversing the
1/13
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S.A.(MD)No.312 of 2019
judgment and decree passed in O.S.No. 710 of 2009 on the file of the
Additional District Munsif Court, Dindugal, dated 23.01.2017 and thus
render justice.
PRAYER in CMP(MD)No.6311 of 2019:
To grant an order of temporary injunction forbearing the
respondent his men agents and servants from interfering with the
appellant’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
property and not to put up any construction and change the character of
the suit schedule property the subject matter in OS.No.710 of 2009 on
the file of the Additional District Munsif Court Dindigul pending
disposal of this second appeal and thus render justice.
PRAYER in CMP(MD)No.10990 of 2019:
To vacate the interim injunction granted in CMP No.6311 of 2019
in SA No.312 of 2019 dated 12.11.2019 on the file of this Honourable
Court and thus render justice.
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES:
For Appellant : Mr.N.GA. Natraj, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr.S.M.Thirunavukkarasu, Advocate
JUDGMENT
Heard.
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2. This Second Appeal has been preferred against the judgment
and decree dated 01.03.2019 passed in A.S. No.19 of 2017 by the learned
Principal Subordinate Judge, Dindigul, whereby the judgment and decree
dated 23.01.2017 in O.S. No.710 of 2009 passed by the learned
Additional District Munsif, Dindigul, was reversed.
3. For convenience, the parties will be referred to by their ranks as
in the trial court.
4. At the time of admitting the Second Appeal on 19.07.2019, this
Court framed the following substantial questions of law for
consideration, which are extracted verbatim below:
I. Whether the 1st appellate court was correct in allowing the
appeal on the wrong notion as though the respondent is a co-owner
along with the plaintiff, relying on the boundary recitals mentioned
in the sale deed Ex A5, when it is not the case of the respondent that
he is the co-owner?
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II. Whether the 1st appellate court is correct in disallowing
mandatory injunction when all the constructions except the
impugned constructions described in the plaint are put forth during
the pendency of the suit as per the Commissioner’s report?
III. Whether the 1st appellate court is correct in not ordering
mandatory injunction when admittedly all the impugned
construction are made during the pendency of the suit either in the
exclusive property of the Plaintiff or in a Co-owner’s property; and
thus committing an error of encouraging illegality being committed?
5. The appellant herein, who was the plaintiff before the Trial
Court, instituted O.S. No.710 of 2009 seeking a declaration of title, a
decree of permanent injunction, and a decree of mandatory injunction.
6. The suit schedule property measures East–West 47’ and North–
South 35’, totalling 1645 sq. ft. The present dispute, however, is
confined to a narrow strip of land measuring 47’x 2’ (94 sq. ft.), forming
the northern boundary of the plaintiff’s property and the southern
boundary of the defendant’s property.
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7. According to the plaintiff, under Ex.A5 he purchased the
property measuring 47’ x 35’ . His building, however, extends only up to
33’ North–South, leaving a strip of 2’ on the northern side, which forms
the lane in question. He contends that this 2’ passage is also part of his
purchase under Ex.A5 and that he is entitled to rights over the northern
common lane as recited therein.
8. The defendant, on the other hand, claims title under Exhibits.A6
to A8. Originally, the property belonged to one Parvathi Ammal, who
settled it in favour of her husband, Muthusamy Naidu, under Ex.A6. The
extent of the property so settled measured East–West 100’ and North–
South 27’. The successors in title of Muthusamy Naidu sold the
property to the defendant’s mother under Ex.A7, describing it as
measuring East–West 100’ and North–South 28’ on the western side and
29’ on the eastern side. Thereafter, the defendant’s mother in turn settled
the property in favour of the defendant under Ex.A8. Thus the vendors
of the defendant’s mother had conveyed an extent larger than what they
were lawfully entitled to, a fact which also stood admitted during the
cross-examination of D.W.1.
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9. The defendant further contended that the plaintiff had no direct
access to the disputed strip of land and, therefore, could not assert any
right over it.
10. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence, held that the 2’ strip formed part of the plaintiff’s
purchase under Ex.A5, and accordingly decreed the suit in favour of the
plaintiff by granting a declaration, a decree of permanent injunction, and
a mandatory injunction directing removal of the constructions/
encroachment.
11. On appeal, the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment of
the Trial Court. Relying on the recital ‘common lane’ in Ex.A5, it held
that the 2’ passage constituted a common lane available to the plaintiff
and two other owners on the western side, but not to the defendant. On
that reasoning, it declined to grant a declaration in favour of the plaintiff
and consequently refused both the declaration and the relief of
mandatory injunction.
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12. Upon consideration of the rival pleadings and the evidence on
record, this Court is of the view that the approach adopted by the First
Appellate Court is legally unsustainable for the following reasons:
(i) Nature of the 2’ passage – The description in Ex.A5 shows
that the plaintiff purchased property measuring 47’ x 35’ with a building
thereon. The construction of his house admittedly extends only to 33’
North–South axis, leaving the 2’ strip. Thus the total extent of 35’
claimed under Ex.A5 necessarily includes the said 2’ lane. The recital of
‘common lane’ therein indicates that the passage was to be enjoyed
commonly by the plaintiff and two others situated on the western side. At
no stage has the defendant established any right over this passage. The
First Appellate Court therefore erred in denying a declaration in favour
of the plaintiff.
(ii) Effect of Commissioner’s reports – The Advocate
Commissioner inspected the suit property on three occasions, namely,
04.12.2009, 19.12.2009, and 06.02.2010, and filed reports. It is evident
that subsequent to the institution of the suit, and even after the
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appointment and first visit of the Commissioner, the defendant proceeded
with further constructions. He raised a compound wall on the western
side of the passage, projected sunshades into the lane, laid pipelines for
discharge of drainage water, and otherwise encroached upon the common
lane. These acts were recorded by the Commissioner as subsequent
developments. The conduct of the defendant in carrying on construction
despite caveat, police complaints, and the pendency of the suit is
squarely hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
(iii) Plea of acquiescence – The First Appellate Court erred in
invoking the principle of acquiescence. From the very inception, the
plaintiff consistently opposed any construction in the passage by lodging
police complaints, raising objections during the Commissioner’s
inspection, and resisting the same before the Court. In these
circumstances, the doctrine of acquiescence is wholly inapplicable.
The observation of the First Appellate Court that the relief sought
by the plaintiff is barred under Section 41(g) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963, on the ground of acquiescence, is wholly untenable. The evidence
on record clearly establishes that the plaintiff, far from remaining
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passive, had opposed the defendant’s unlawful acts from the very
inception. Immediately upon commencement of construction, the
plaintiff lodged a complaint before the North Dindigul Town Police and
obtained CSR receipt Ex.A11, which serves as contemporaneous proof of
his objection. Anticipating further legal proceedings, the defendant
himself filed a caveat under Ex.A13, thereby admitting his knowledge of
the plaintiff’s resistance. The plaintiff thereafter instituted the present
suit without delay, and even after the appointment of an Advocate
Commissioner and his first inspection, the defendant, in defiance of
judicial process, persisted with the construction despite the plaintiff’s
protests. The plaintiff’s conduct thus demonstrates continuous and
consistent opposition at every stage, leaving no scope for waiver,
consent, or “sitting by,” which alone would constitute acquiescence
within the meaning of Section 41(g).
A mere delay in asserting rights does not, by itself, constitute
acquiescence. Furthermore, when the plaintiff has consistently registered
protest, the restriction under Section 41(g) is inapplicable. In light of
these principles, the finding of acquiescence by the first appellate court is
untenable, and the plaintiff remains entitled to the equitable relief sought.
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(iv) Irreparable injury – The constructions carried out by the
defendant in the common lane are not structurally integral to the main
building. They consist of independent additions such as sunshades, a
western boundary wall, and pipelines. The removal of these structures
would not result in any irreparable harm to the defendant. However,
allowing them to remain would permanently obstruct the plaintiff and
other co-owners from accessing and fully enjoying the use of the
common lane.
(v) Equitable considerations – A party who knowingly
undertakes construction on another’s property during the pendency of
legal proceedings cannot invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court.
The defendant’s actions were high-handed and deliberate, and he cannot
be allowed to retain the benefits derived from his wrongful conduct.
Accordingly, the substantial questions of law framed in this second
appeal are answered in favour of the appellant.
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13. For all the reasons stated above, this Court holds:
a) The plaintiff is hereby declared to be the owner of the suit
schedule property and also one of the co-owners, along with the other
entitled parties, of the common lane measuring 47 feet × 2 feet situated
on the northern side of his property.
b) The finding of the first appellate court denying declaration is set
aside and the declaration granted by the trial court is modified as above.
c) The judgment of the trial court decreeing permanent injunction
and mandatory injunction is restored.
d) The defendant is restrained from interfering with the plaintiff’s
use and enjoyment of the common lane by putting up construction or
otherwise.
e) The defendant shall remove the constructions put up in the
common lane, as identified in Ex. A12 in red colour, together with all
other constructions made by the defendant in the said common lane,
which have been recorded by the Advocate Commissioner in his report.
(Commissioner’s Report marked as C.W.2), within a period of three
months from the date of this judgment.
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14. In the result the Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and
decree of the first appellate court are set aside. The decree of the trial
court is modified to the limited extent that the plaintiff is declared as
co-owner of the common lane measuring 47’ x 2’. All other reliefs of
injunctions permanent and mandatory stand restored. No costs.
Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
26.09.2025
NCC : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No Index : Yes / No LS
To
1.The Principal Sub Judge, Dindugal.
2.The Additional District Munsif, Dindugal.
3.The Section Officer, VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
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DR.A.D. MARIA CLETE,J.
LS
Pre-delivery Judgment made in
26.09.2025
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