Madras High Court
M/S.Sreedevi Video Corporation vs M/S.Saregama India Ltd on 19 November, 2025
Author: G.Jayachandran
Bench: G.Jayachandran
OSA (CAD) No.20 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 15.10.2025 Pronounced on : 19.11.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MUMMINENI SUDHEER KUMAR
OSA (CAD) No.20 of 2022
M/s.Sreedevi Video Corporation
Rep. By its Partner Mr.Ghanshyam Hemdev
Old No.14, New No.2, Vidhyodaya 2nd Cross Street,
T.Nagar, Chennai – 600 014. ... Appellant(s)
Vs.
1.M/s.SaReGaMa India Ltd.
Door No.2,3,4 & 5,
3rd Floor, Kasi Arcade,
No.116, Thyagaraja Road,
T.Nagar, Chennai – 600 017.
2.M/s.Poornodaya Movie Creations,
No.35, Kamdar Nagar, Nungambakkam,
Chennai – 600 034.
3.M/s.Poornodaya Art Creations,
No.35, Kamdar Nagar, Nungambakkam,
Chennai – 600 034. ... Respondent(s)
Prayer: Appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
r/w Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act to set aside the judgement
Page 1 of 26
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OSA (CAD) No.20 of 2022
and decree dated 07.02.2022 in the C.S.(Comm.) No.331 of 2014 and to
allow the above appeal.
For Appellant(s) : Mr.K.Harishankar,
For R1 : Mr.P.R.Raman, Senior Counsel
for Mr.Abishek Jenasenan.
For R2 & R3 : No appearance
JUDGMENT
MUMMINENI SUDHEER KUMAR, J
This Original Side Appeal is at the instance of Appellant/Plaintiff
against the judgment and decree dated 07.02.2022 in the Civil Suit (Comm.)
No.331 of 2014 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing
the said suit on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation.
2. The brief and relevant facts that are necessary for disposal of this
appeal are stated hereunder:
2.1. The parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit for the
sake of convenience.
2.2. The plaintiff claimed that it had entered into the two assignment
agreements with the defendants 2 & 3 on 17.07.2008 which are marked as
Exhibits P1 & P2 acquiring the exclusive and irrevocable copyright in the
works relating to the entire sound tracks in the films namely 1) Seetha
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KokaChilaka (Telugu), 2) Sitara (Telugu), 3) Sagara Sangamam (Telugu), 4)
Sagara Sangamam (Malayalam), 5) Salangai Oli (Tamil), 6) Shankara
Bharanam (Telugu) & 7) Thayaramma Bangarayya (Telugu) (hereinafter
referred to as 'Schedule Films') and claiming to be the sole and absolute
owner of the audio copyrights in the Schedule Films and also claiming to
have been exploiting the rights in the said audio works since the date of
acquiring the same under Exhibits P1 & P2, i.e.17.07.2008.
2.3. While so, the plaintiff received a letter dated 06.08.2010 from
the 1st defendant which is marked as Exhibit P3 informing the plaintiff that
the 1st defendant is the sole and absolute owner of the copyright and other
related rights in and to the sound recordings and the underlying musical and
literary works in the songs pertaining to the Schedule Films and calling upon
the plaintiff to cease and desist from exploiting the sound recordings.
However, the plaintiff did not choose to respond to the said letter of the 1st
defendant and offered an explanation in the plaint stating that the plaintiff, on
receipt of the said letter dated 06.08.2010, has contacted the defendants 2 & 3
and the defendants 2 & 3 informed the plaintiff that they have assigned the
audio rights in respect of the Schedule Films in favour of M/s.Sea Records
for a period of 25 years and that the said period had expired. It is further
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claimed that the plaintiff was also informed by the defendants 2 & 3 that they
have already addressed a letter to the 1st defendant on 13.04.2005 which is
marked as Exhibit P6 informing the 1st defendant that the period of
assignment given in favour of M/s.Sea Records had come to an end and the
1st defendant was called upon to pay royalty to the defendants 2 & 3 for
exploiting the audio rights in the Schedule Films. On receipt of the said
letter Exhibit P6, the 1st defendant, through its letter dated 17.08.2005 marked
as Exhibit D8 appears to addressed the defendants 2 & 3 denying the claim
made by the defendants 2 and 3 in their letter Exhibit P6. There was further
reference in the Exhibit D8 letter to the legal notice dated 18.10.2000 and the
reply thereto dated 04.11.2000. But the further elaborate reference to the said
letters may not be necessary for disposal of this appeal.
2.4. The plaintiff, having kept quiet on receipt of the Exhibit P3,
letter dated 06.08.2010 for about 4 years, filed the present suit on 13.05.2014.
The 1st defendant contested the suit by denying the claim and rights of the
plaintiff over the Schedule Films and also asserting that the 1st defendant is
the absolute owner of the said rights over the Schedule Films. However, no
counter-claim is made against the plaintiff, though plaintiff has specifically
averred in the plaint that it has been exploiting the claimed rights in the
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Schedule Films since the date of their assignment in the year 2008. The
defendants 2 & 3 filed the written statement supporting the case of the
plaintiff. Basing upon the rival contentions, the learned Single Judge framed
the the following issues:
a) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
b) Whether the second and third defendants had assigned
copyrights in the suit pictures in favour of the first
defendant's predecessor M/s. Sea Records, for a period of
60 years as alleged by the first defendant?
c) Whether the first defendant is entitled to exploit the
rights after a period of 25 years of assignment in favour of
its predecessor M/s. Sea Records?
d) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of
Copyrights in its favour ?
e) Whether the agreement entered into between M/s. Sea
Records and defendants 2 and 3 were limited to a period of
25 years?
f)Whether the plaintiff could have filed this suit after a
lapse of 14 years from the date on which the first legal
notice was issued ?
g) Whether the second and third defendants could have
assigned the rights to the plaintiff?
2.5. On behalf of the plaintiff, P.W1 was examined and Exhibits P1
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to P6 were marked. Whereas, on behalf of the 1st defendant, D.W1 was
examined and Exhibits D1 to D8 were marked.
2.6. In the light of the objections raised by the 1st defendant on the
ground of limitation on the maintainability of the suit and in the light of
framing of a specific issue on this aspect, the learned Single Judge took up
the same for consideration as a preliminary objection and came to the
conclusion that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 58 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 on the ground that the title of the plaintiff was denied
and challenged by the 1st defendant as early as on 06.08.2010 under Exhibit
P3 and whereas, the suit in question was filed on 13.05.2014 i.e., beyond the
period of 3 years. Thus, the learned Single Judge, having answered the first
issue namely 'whether the suit is barred by limitation?' opined that there is no
requirement to go into the other contentions raised by the learned counsel
appearing on either side and to go into the merits of the case to decide the
other issues and accordingly dismissed the suit.
3. Heard Mr.Harishankar, learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant
and Mr.P.R.Raman, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr.Abishek
Jenasenan learned counsel for the 1st defendant/1st respondent.
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4. Mr.Harishankar, learned counsel, though initially made an
attempt to contest the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge on
the ground of limitation as such, but did not choose to pursue the said ground
insofar as the relief of declaration sought in the suit is concerned, perhaps by
realising that it is difficult to sustain. However, he contended that the learned
Single Judge is not right in dismissing the suit in its entirety by only deciding
the issue of limitation only in respect of the relief of declaration is concerned.
According to him, notwithstanding the fact that the relief of declaration
sought in the suit is barred by limitation, the suit is maintainable insofar as
the relief of injunction, which is sought as an independent relief in the suit.
He also further contended that the relief of injunction sought in the suit is not
as a consequential relief but as an independent relief the same was sought for
and separate Court fee is paid under Section 27(c) of Tamil Nadu Court Fees
and Suits Valuation Act. Thus, he contended that the learned Single Judge
gravely erred in coming to the conclusion that the entire suit is barred by
limitation.
5. He further contended that the observations of the learned Single
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Judge at Paragraph No.26 of the judgement, stating that the relief of
permanent injunction cannot stand independently and the same is dependent
on the relief of declaration and the same is in the nature of consequential
relief, is totally erroneous and not sustainable in the facts and circumstances
of the case. He also further contended that the rights that are claimed by the
1st defendant and asserted under Exhibit P3 and the demand that was made by
the 1st defendant under Exhibit P3, have not been denied by the plaintiff and
the plaintiff has been exercising its claimed rights in the Schedule Films
continuously and exploiting the same. Therefore, it is for the 1st defendant to
take steps, if at all the 1st defendant has got any right over the Schedule Films.
But the 1st defendant has not taken any such steps as on date.
6. He also further contended that the defendants 2 & 3 got issued a
notice under Exhibit P6 dated 13.04.2005 disputing the rights claimed by the
1st defendant over the Schedule Films, but the 1st defendant failed to initiate
any proceedings against the defendants 2 & 3 till date. He also further
contended that under Section 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the plaintiff is
entitled to seek an independent relief of injunction for the infringement of
copyright without seeking the relief of declaration. Thus, he contended that
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the learned Single Judge gravely erred in dismissing the suit in its entirety
and prayed for setting aside of the order under appeal.
7. Mr.Harishankar, learned counsel, in support of his contentions,
placed reliance on the decisions in C.Mohammed Yunus Vs. Syed Unnissa
and others reported in AIR 1961 SC 808 and Shri Sayad Ahmed Kabuli
reported in 1972 SCC OnLine Bom 141.
8. On the other hand, Mr.P.R.Raman, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the 1st defendant contended that the suit was rightly dismissed
by the learned Single Judge as barred by limitation, as the same was filed
beyond the period of limitation of 3 years prescribed under Article 58 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 and the relief of declaration sought is intrinsically
connected to the relief of permanent injunction, and therefore once the relief
of declaration is lost either on merits otherwise, the relief of permanent
injunction does not stand. He also further contended that no document has
been produced by the plaintiff to show as to how the cause of action arose to
the plaintiff in the year 2014. He also placed reliance on decisions of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of PADHIYAR PRAHLADJI CHENAJI
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(Deceased) through legal representatives Vs. MANIBEN JAGMALBHAI
(Deceased) through legal representatives and Others reported in (2022) 12
SCC 128. He further contended that the 1st defendant being the exclusive
owner of all the rights in the Schedule Films is alone is entitled to exploit the
same and the plaintiff has no right over the Schedule Films of whatsoever
nature.
9. Though learned Senior Counsel narrated in detail about the
manner in which the 1st defendant acquired the rights that are being claimed
by the 1st defendant rooting the same to the defendants 2 & 3, it is not
necessary to refer to the same for consideration and disposal of this appeal, as
the suit was dismissed only on the ground of limitation and we are not going
deep into the matter on merits.
10. We have carefully considered the submissions made on either
side and also perused the entire material on record.
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11. The learned Single Judge considered the issue of limitation in
Paragraph Nos.25 to 31 of judgement under appeal. A perusal of the same
would disclose that the learned Single Judge has taken the date of receipt of
Exhibit P3 letter dated 06.08.2010, as the starting point of limitation on the
ground that the cause of action for the first time arose for the plaintiff to file
the suit. He also further came to the conclusion that the relief of declaration
sought by the plaintiff is governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963
which prescribes 3 years limitation from the date of accrual of first cause of
action. Thus, he arrived at a conclusion that the cause of action for the relief
of declaration for the first time arose on 06.08.2010 and the suit was filed
only on 13.05.2014 and therefore, the same is barred by limitation.
12. Having arrived at such a conclusion on limitation insofar as
relief of declaration is concerned, the learned Single Judge at Paragraph
No.26 of the judgement observed that the relief of permanent injunction
cannot stand independently even though it is claimed as a separate relief and
the relief of permanent injunction is dependent on the relief of declaration.
Thus, he arrived at a further conclusion that the relief of permanent
injunction sought is only in the nature of a consequential relief. For better
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appreciation, the said Paragraph No.26 is extracted hereunder:
“26.In the present case, the relief of permanent injunction,
cannot stand independently even though it is claimed
separately as a relief. The relief of permanent injunction is
dependent on the relief of declaration. In other words, it is
in the nature of a consequential relief. If for instance the
present suit was filed only for the relief of permanent
injunction without there being any dispute over the right
and title on the audio copyrights,there will be no difficulty
in tracing the limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation
Act and this Article specifically provides that it will be
three years from the time when the right to sue accrues.
Consciously the term "first" is not used in this Article. This
means that every time when there is exploitation of
copyright, the right will accrue and the suit can be filed
within three years. Unfortunately, the present case does not
fall under Article 113 of the Limitation Act since the relief
of permanent UR injunction is dependent upon the relief of
declaration.”
13. From the above, it is noticed that the learned Single Judge came
to the conclusion that the relief of permanent injunction is dependent upon
the relief of declaration and therefore, the same does not fall under Article
113 of the Limitation Act and it is only in case the suit for permanent
injunction is filed without there being any dispute over the right and title on
the audio copyrights claimed, the same would have fallen under Article 113
of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the same could have been filed as and when
there was cause of action or on the recurring cause of actions unlike under
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Article 58 of the Limitation Act. Except the reasoning assigned at Paragraph
No.26 which is extracted herein above, there is no other discussion or
reasoning on this aspect in the entire judgement.
14. From the perusal of the above Paragraph No.26, it is not
discernible as to how and on what basis and for what reasons the learned
Single Judge came to the conclusion that the relief of permanent injunction
sought by the plaintiff is dependent on the relief of declaration. Admittedly,
the plaintiff sought for an independent relief of permanent injunction duly
paying a separate Court fees and has not sought for the same as a
consequential relief of declaration. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to
examine whether the unreasoned conclusion arrived at by the learned Single
Judge is justified or not in the facts and circumstances of the case.
15. Both the plaintiff and the 1st defendant are claiming their right
and title over the respective claimed rights in the Schedule Films by different
ways but sourcing the same to the defendants 2 and 3 only. In other words,
the rights that are alleged to have been derived by the plaintiff and the 1st
defendant are only from the defendants 2 and 3. Admittedly, the defendants
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2 and 3 denied the right and title asserted by the 1st defendant by issuing a
notice dated 13.04.2005 under Exhibit P6. So also, the right and title claimed
by the plaintiff over the Schedule Films is denied by the 1st defendant by its
letter dated 06.08.2010. Thus, there is denial of right and title of both the
plaintiff and defendant. The correctness or otherwise of the right and title
claimed by the plaintiff is not examined on merits by the learned Single
Judge. But the relief of declaration sought is held to be time barred thereby
denying the remedy to the plaintiff.
16. By now it is well settled that the law of limitation only takes
away the remedy, but the same does not have the effect of extinguishing the
right if any otherwise possessed by any party. Even in case if the remedy is
barred, it is always open for the party claiming a particular right, though
barred by limitation, to assert such right and defend itself from any action
vis-a-vis any third party. In case, if any such proceedings are initiated against
the plaintiff, it is always open for the plaintiff to defend itself by asserting its
rights over the Schedule Films and in such an event, the question of
limitation does not arise. This is on the principle that an expiry on the period
of limitation, it is only the remedy is barred, but there will not be any
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extinguishment of right.
17. In this connection it would be relevant to refer to the decision of
Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Sayad Ahmed Kabuli vs. The State
of Maharashtra reported in 1972 SCC Online Bom 141, wherein it was held
as under:
“13. But the question as to whether suit for injunction
simpliciter in the event of declaratory relief becoming time-
barred could be maintainable or not was not considered in
three of these four cases. Tarkunde, J. in his order dated
June 11, 1969 did consider the question and held in the
affirmative. But neither his order nor the order of Nain, J.
dated January 14, 1972 contemplated referring this
question to the Full Bench. We have already Indicated how
Tarkunde, J. appears to have referred the question of
limitation to the Full Bench even when in the opinion of the
Bench the suit for injunction could still be entertained. We
do not see why the reliefs of injunction cannot be granted
in the present case, even if the suit for declaratory reliefs is
held to have become time-barred. It is well-settled that
Limitation Act only bars remedy and does not destroy the
substantive rights, excepting as provided under s. 28 (of
1908 Act) with regard to the rights in immovable
properties. Status of a person as citizen of India cannot be
said to have been extinguished merely because his remedy
for getting declaration to that effect is lost due to the bar of
limitation. A suit for possession by a rightful owner filed
within 12 years of dispossession cannot be held as time-
barred merely because his remedy for declaration of his
title had become barred due to the expiry of six years. Such
rightful owner can still establish his title and succeed in
getting the possession, if the suit for possession is within
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time. We are not here dealing with cases where relief of
injunction is claimed by way of consequential relief and
grant of which relief is dependent on the relief for
declaration. Suits for declaratory reliefs on voidable
transactions are illustrative of such cases. We have already
made reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court to
indicate the nature of right of a citizen in such matter. In
our opinion, the relief for declaration in such kinds of suits
is not only ancillary as held by the Calcutta High Court in
Gowardilandas v. Calcutta Municipality in a different
context but is superfluous Indeed. Every citizen is entitled
to protection against deportation and the investigation of
his being a citizen under art. 5 of the Constitution is
implicit in the claim for relief for injunction without regard
to whether declaratory suit for the same has become
barred by limitation. Such Investigation of title or status
does not depend on claiming declaratory relief. See V.P.
Sugar Works v. C.I. of Stamps, U.P.12 Implications of the
above three judgments of the Supreme Court also go to
fortify this conclusion of ours.”
18. So also, in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co.,
Ltd., vs State of Bombay and others reported in 1957 SCC online SC 7
(AIR 1958 SC 328) wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
“12. It will be observed that the definition of "unpaid
accumulations" takes in only payments due to the
employees remaining unpaid within a period of three years
after they become due. The intention of the legislature
obviously was that claims of the employees which are
within time should be left to be enforced by them in the
ordinary course of law, and that it is only when they
become time-barred and useless to them that the State
should step in and take them over. On this, the question
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arises for consideration whether a debt which is time-
barred can be the subject of transfer, and if it can be, how
it can benefit the Board to take it over if it cannot be
realised by process of law. Now, it is the settled law of this
country that the statute of Limitation only bars the remedy
but does not extinguish the debt. Section 28 of the
Limitation Act provides that when the period limited to a
person for instituting a suit for possession of any property
has expired, his right to such property is extinguished. And
the authorities have held - and rightly, that when the
property is incapable of possession, as for example, a debt,
the section has no application, and lapse of time does not
extinguish the right of a person thereto. Under Section
25(3) of the Contract Act, a barred debt is good
consideration for a fresh promise to pay the amount. When
a debtor makes a payment without any direction as to how
it is to be appropriated, the creditor has the right to
appropriate it towards a barred debt. (Vide Section 60 of
the Contract Act). It has also been held that a creditor is
entitled to recover the debt from the surety, even though a
suit on it is barred against the principal debtor. Vide
Mahant Singh v. U Ba Y, Subramania Aiyar v. Gopala
Alyar and Dil Muhammad v. Sain Das. And when a
creditor has a lien over goods by way of security for a
loan, he can enforce the lien for obtaining satisfaction of
the debt, even though an action thereon would be time-
barred. Vide Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dasi. That is
also the law in England. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England
(Hailsham's Edn.). Vol. 20, p. 602, para 756 and the
observations of Lindley L.J. in Carter v. White and of
Cotton L.J. in Curwen v. Milburn, In American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 34, p. 314, the law is thus stated:
"A majority of the courts adhere to the view that a statute
of limitations, as distinguished from a statute which
prescribes conditions precedent to a right of action, does
not go to the substance of a right, but only to the remedy. It
does not extinguish the debt or preclude its enforcement,
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unless the debtor chooses to avail himself of the defence
and specially pleads it. An indebtedness does not lose its
character as such merely because it is barred; it still
affords sufficient consideration to support a promise to
pay, and gives a creditor an insurable interest."
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 53, p. 922, we have the
following statement of the law:
"The general rule, at least with respect to debts or money
demands, is that a statute of limitation bars, or runs
"against the remedy and does not discharge the debt or
extinguish or impair the right, obligation, or cause of
action."
19. From the above, it is clear that the bar of limitation would only
bars the remedy and does not extinguish or impair the right, obligation or
cause of action. In the light of the settled legal position noted above, the
mere fact that the suit filed for relief of declaration is found to be barred by
limitation, the same will not have the effect of extinguishing the rights that
are being claimed by the plaintiff in the Schedule Films automatically. The
rights, if any, possessed by the plaintiff would remain intact not withstanding
the fact that the relief of declaration sought was found to be barred by
limitation.
20. Mere fact that the relief of declaration is declined on the ground
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of limitation, the same will not have the effect of conferring title on the 1 st
defendant. It is only in case the relief of declaration sought by the plaintiff is
declined by the Court on examining the rival case set up by the plaintiff and
defendant on merits, and in the event of arriving at a conclusion that the
plaintiff has failed to establish its right and title while the 1 st defendant is able
establish his right and title, the relief of permanent injunction sought by the
plaintiff cannot be granted. In other words, even in case if the plaintiff was
found to be not having right and title and the 1st defendant also found to be
not having any right and title also, it would be imperative on the part of the
learned Single Judge to independently examine as to whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief of permanent injunction, as the same was sought as an
independent relief. However, in a situation where the defendant was found to
be having right and title, the question of considering the relief of permanent
injunction does not arise as no injunction can be granted against the true
owner.
21. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff, Section 55 of the Copyright Act provides for a remedy by
way of injunction, damages, accounts, etc against any party infringing the
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Copyright. Section 55 of the Copyright Act,1957 reads as under:
“55.Civil remedies for infringement of copyright.-(1)
Where copyright in any work has been infringed, the owner
of the copyright shall, except as otherwise provided by this
Act, be entitled to all such remedies by way of injunction,
damages, accounts and otherwise as are or may be
conferred by law for the infringement of a right:
Provided that if the defendant proves that at the date of the
infringement he was not aware and had no reasonable
ground for believing that copyright subsisted in the work,
the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any remedy other than
an injunction in respect of the infringement and a decree
for the whole or part of the profits made by the defendant
by the sale of the infringing copies as the Court may in the
circumstances deem reasonable.
(2) Where, in the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or
artistic work, for, subject to the provisions of sub-section
(3) of section 13, a cinematograph film or sound recording,
a name purporting to be that of the author, or the
publisher, as the case may be, of that work, appears] on
copies of the work as published, or, in the case of an
artistic work, appeared on the work when it was made, the
person whose name so appears or appeared shall, in any
proceeding in respect of infringement of copyright in such
work, be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to be the
author or the publisher of the work, as the case may be.
(3) The costs of all parties in any proceedings in respect of
the infringement of copyright shall be in the discretion of
the Court.”
22. In the light of the above, the relief of permanent injunction
sought for by the plaintiff as an independent relief by duly paying a separate
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Court fee can be construed as a relief sought under Section 55 of the
Copyright Act, 1957, but not as a consequential relief of declaration.
Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have independently examined
whether the relief of permanent injunction sought for is also barred by
limitation or not.
23. From the perusal of Paragraph No.26 of the judgement under
appeal, it is evident that the learned Single Judge himself accepted that in
case, if the present suit was filed only for relief of permanent injunction
without there being any dispute over the right and title, there will be no
difficulty in tracing the limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act,
which provides for limitation of 3 years from the time when the right to sue
accrues, unlike the mandate under Article 58, where right to sue first accrues
is the criteria for taking the starting point of limitation. In the instant case, in
our considered view there is no impediment or obstruction for the plaintiff to
file a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter without seeking any relief of
declaration. The observation of the learned Single Judge that such a suit filed
for injunction simpliciter without there being any dispute over the title would
alone would fall under Article 113 is totally erroneous. Whether there is
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dispute over the right and title or not, it is for the plaintiff to decide as to the
nature of relief that he should pray for.
24. Merely because there is dispute over the title, that would not bar
the party from instituting a suit for permanent injunction basing on title. In
such an event, incidentally the issue of title would be gone into by the Court
while examining as to whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of permanent
injunction or not. We are unable to acknowledge the erroneous approach of
the learned Single Judge that it is only in case if there is no dispute over the
title, a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter can be filed and the same
would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. For instance, even
if there is a dispute over the title, and in case if any proceedings are initiated
against the plaintiff concerning the rights and title over the Schedule Films
being asserted by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the remedy in
respect of the same is barred for the plaintiff under the provisions of
Limitation Act, the plaintiff would always be entitled to assert its title and
defend itself and also to make counter-claim of seeking a permanent
injunction as the bar of limitation provided under the Limitation Act have no
application.
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25. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
PADHIYAR PRAHLADJI CHENAJI (Deceased) through legal
representatives Vs. MANIBEN JAGMALBHAI (Deceased) through legal
representatives and Others reported in (2022) 12 SCC 128 relied upon by
the learned Senior Court appearing for the 1st respondent, in our considered
view absolutely have no application to the case on hand. From the perusal of
paragraph No.12.2, 13 and 17 to 19 of the above said decision, it is evident
that the case that fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court is a
case where the relief of permanent injunction was sought as a consequential
relief and therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court, on arriving at a conclusion that
the relief of declaration is barred by limitation, the consequential relief also
be held to be barred by limitation. Further, that is a case where the relief of
permanent injunction was sought as a consequential relief and the defendant
therein was also found to be a true owner of the subject property and
therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that the relief of
permanent injunction cannot be granted in the facts and circumstances of the
said case. Therefore, the said decision absolutely has no application to the
case on hand.
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26. In the light of the above, we have no hesitation to say that the
learned Single Judge erred in holding that the relief of permanent injunction
sought for by the plaintiff is to be treated as a consequential relief and also
committed a grave error in coming to the conclusion that the entire suit is bar
by limitation without examining as to whether the relief of permanent
injunction is also barred by limitation or not independently.
27. In the light of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the
findings of the learned Single Judge insofar as declaring the relief of
declaration as barred by limitation, while setting aside the finding that the
suit in its entirety is barred by limitation. Consequently, the original side
appeal is partly allowed remanding the matter back to the learned Single
Judge for adjudicating the suit on merits excluding the relief of declaration
and to decide other issues are concerned. We make it clear that any of the
observations made in this order, shall not be construed as holding the relief of
permanent injunction as the one within the period of limitation and it is open
for the learned Single Judge to examine the same as to the entitlement or
otherwise of the plaintiff for relief of permanent injunction as sought for
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under relief at Paragraph No.9(b) of the plaint. Taking into consideration the
fact that the suit is of the year 2014, we request the learned Single Judge to
dispose of the matter on priority basis as expeditiously as possible.
28. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. Connected
miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.
(Dr.G.J.,J.) (M.S.K.,J.)
19.11.2025
dpa
Index : Yes / No
Speaking order / Non-speaking order
Neutral Citation : Yes / No
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Dr.G.JAYACHANDRAN, J.
and
MUMMINENI SUDHEER KUMAR, J.
dpa
Pre-Delivery Order made in
19.11.2025
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