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Rahul Surana vs The Assistant Director
2025 Latest Caselaw 8719 Mad

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8719 Mad
Judgement Date : 19 November, 2025

Madras High Court

Rahul Surana vs The Assistant Director on 19 November, 2025

Author: S.M.Subramaniam
Bench: S. M. Subramaniam, Mohammed Shaffiq
    2025:MHC:2623



                                                                                              CRL RC No. 1541 of 2025

                                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                                         RESERVED ON                      : 04.11.2025

                                         PRONOUNCED ON                    : 19.11.2025

                                                       CORAM

                                  THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE S. M. SUBRAMANIAM
                                                     AND
                                  THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMED SHAFFIQ

                                             CRL RC No. 1541 of 2025


                  Rahul Surana
                  S/o.Shri Dinesh Chand Surana,
                  Male aged about 36 years,
                  A-34, 6th Street, Anna Nagar (East),
                  Chennai – 600 102.

                                                                                        Petitioner(s)

                                                               Vs

                  1. The Assistant Director,
                  Directorate of Enforcement,
                  Chennai Zonal Office-I,
                  Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance,
                  No.2, Kushkumar Road,
                  BSNL Administrative Building,
                  5th and 6th Floor, Nungambakkam,
                  Chennai - 600 034.
                  ECIR No.CEZO-1/05/2019

                                                                                        Respondent(s)




                  1/27




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                                                                                          CRL RC No. 1541 of 2025



                  PRAYER
                  To call for the records and set aside the impugned order dated 17.02.2025
                  in Spl.C.C.No.9 of 2022 on the file of the XIV Additional Special Court for
                  CBI Cases, Chennai.



                                  For Petitioner(s):      Mr.Shree Singh
                                                          for Mr.Vishnu Vardhan.J
                                                          and Mr.Mayank Pandey

                                  For Respondent(s): Mr.N.Ramesh
                                                     Special Public Prosecutor For ED Cases


                                                          JUDGMENT

S.M.Subramaniam,J.

The Criminal Revision Case is directed against docket order, dated

17.02.2025 in Spl.C.C.No. 9 of 2022 on the file of XIV Additional Special

Judge for CBI cases/ Special Court for Trial of offences under Prevention of

Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).

I. FACTS:

2. The case of the prosecution is that Surana Industries Limited

orchestrated a criminal conspiracy to defraud public sector banks of

Rs.1,301 Crores through misappropriation, fraud, and manipulation of

accounts. As per the Respondent, the modus operandi included creation of

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a web of shell and dummy companies to siphon loan funds via fictitious

transactions, which were then layered and ultimately invested in movable

and immovable properties as the alleged proceeds of crime.

3. The Enforcement Directorate filed a Main Prosecution Complaint

under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA before the Special Court, Chennai on

09.09.2022 against 8 accused persons for offences punishable under

Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA, 2002. The Special Court took cognizance of

the said Main Complaint on 25.11.2022 and registered the matter as Spl.

C.C.No.9 of 2022. Subsequently, a First Supplementary Prosecution

Complaint was filed on 11.6.2024 against 19 additional accused persons.

The said complaint was taken on file on 06.08.2024.The present petitioner,

Shri Rahul Surana, was not arrayed as an accused either in the Main

Complaint or in the First Supplementary Complaint. A Second

Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 06.11.2024 against 15

additional accused persons, including the present petitioner (shown as

Accused No. 42). The said complaint was taken on file and process was

issued on 17.02.2025.The petitioner has now challenged the order dated

17.02.2025 primarily on the ground that he was not afforded an opportunity

of being heard before the Special Court took cognizance, as allegedly

required by the proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS.

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4. In order to derive the essence behind the proviso to Section 223(1)

of BNSS, it becomes imperative to discuss the meaning and character of

the phrase ‘taking cognizance’ in the light of various decisions rendered by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

II.COGNIZANCE MEANING:

5. Cognizance essentially means that the Judge should have applied

his judicial mind and prima facie be satisfied that the allegations in the

complaint, if proved, would constitute an offence.

6. Various decisions rendered by the Courts of law have explained the

significance of the term cognizance. In R.R.Chari Vs State of Uttar

Pradesh1, in para 8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India stated that the

word “cognizance” is used by the Court to indicate the point when

Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. Therefore, it is

understood that cognizance of an offence takes place, when a Judicial

Magistrate applies his mind and takes judicial notice of the offence.

7. In Fakhruddin Ahmad Vs. State of Uttaranchal2, the Hon’ble

1 1951 SCC 250 2 (2008) 17 SCC 157

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Supreme Court of India observed as follows:

“17. Nevertheless, it is well settled that before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or in the police report or the information received from a source other than a police report, as the case may be, and the material filed therewith. It needs little emphasis that it is only when the Magistrate applies his mind and is satisfied that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence and decides to initiate proceedings against the alleged offender, that it can be positively stated that he has taken cognizance of the offence. Cognizance is in regard to the offence and not the offender."

8. So this observation points out two main characteristics of the words

‘taking cognizance’. One is that, the application of mind plays a pivotal role

to fulfil the process of taking cognizance. So this procedure shall not be an

empty formality. Second point is that cognizance is taken with regard to the

offence and not the offender.

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III.COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCE OR COGNIZANCE OF ACCUSED:

9. It is a well settled principle of criminal law that cognizance is taken

of an offence and not of the offender. This principle has been further

elaborated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit vs State of Maharastra3. The

relevant portion is extracted below:

“74. …While cognizance is already taken of the main offence against the accused already arrayed, the supplementary charge-sheet may provide scope for taking cognizance of additional charges or against more accused with reference to the offence already taken cognizance of and the only scope would be for the added offender to seek for discharge after the filing of the supplementary charge-sheet against the said offender.

75. In CREF Finance Ltd Vs. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Limted4, this Court has held:

'Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender and, therefore, once the court on perusal of the complaint is satisfied that the complaint discloses the commission of an offence and there is no reason to reject the complaint at that

3 (2015) 7 SCC 440 4 (2005) 7 SCC 467

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stage, and proceeds further in the matter, it must be held to have taken cognizance of the offence. One should not confuse taking of cognizance with issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate peruses the complaint with a view to ascertain whether the commission of any offence is disclosed.” In State of Andra Pradesh Vs. Pastor P. Raju5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph 13 as follows:

“13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of a process.

Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint…”

10. Hence, these aforementioned judicial decisions clearly reinforces

the legal principle that cognizance is of the offence and not the offender.

11. Also Explanation (ii) to Section 44 of PMLA specifically provides

for supplementary complaints. The Explanation (ii) to Section 44 clarifies

5 (2006) 6 SCC 728

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that the prosecution complaint shall be deemed to include any subsequent

complaint in respect of further investigation that may be conducted to bring

any further evidence, oral or documentary, against any accused person

involved in respect of the offence, for which complaint has already been

filed, whether named in the original complaint or not.

12. Hence, the language of the Section makes it clear that

supplementary complaint is not a fresh or independent complaint but is

deemed to be part and parcel of the main complaint in respect of which

cognizance has already been taken. Taking multiple cognizance of the

same offence would render the judicial process redundant and result in

delay in the justice delivery process. Once cognizance of an offence is

taken, any further supplementary prosecution complaint is considered as

flowing from the main prosecution complaint for which the Court has already

taken cognizance. So adding multiple layers of procedure to an already

cognized complaint is a futile exercise.

13. In the present case, cognizance of the offence was already taken

on 25.11.2022 and so the Second Supplementary Complaint does not

involve taking cognizance afresh;

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14. The daily order dated 17.02.2025, which states that "Cognizance

of the complaint as against the accused 28 to 42 taken can be understood

as merely an error and can be ignored for the reason that cognizance

cannot be taken again for the (i) 2nd time (ii) as against the accused. It shall

be read as the Second Supplementary Complaint was taken on file on

17.02.2025, it was being added to the existing proceedings in Spl. C.C.

No.9 of 2022 where cognizance had already been taken.

15. This cannot be construed as a material or substantive error. It is

mere curable error of expression. This curable error can neither go to the

extent of vitiating the entire proceeding nor can it result in miscarriage of

justice.

16. The impugned order of the learned Trial Judge sufficiently

demonstrates application of mind on the part of the learned Trial Judge. The

order adequately showcases that materials placed before was perused and

that prima facie opinion to the Trial Judge’s satisfaction was formed to

proceed further. Hence, this shows that the learned Trial Judge has applied

his judicial mind and issued summons as a consequence of taking

cognizance. When the intent of the order is issuance of process based on

the complaint, there does not arise a need for an elaborate or reasoned

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order. Brief Orders which convey the intent and satisfaction of the Learned

Trial Judge on perusal of the materials before him is sufficient to pass the

litmus test as laid down in law.

17. This can be further substantiated by the order of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Pramila Devi & Others Vs State of Jharkhand6, wherein

a question arose as to whether detailed reasons should be recorded while

taking cognizance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

“14. Time and again it has been stated by this Court that the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.

15. In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC 722: 2000 SCC (Cri) 303] the following passage will be apposite in this context:

(SCC p. 726, para 12)

"12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out

6 2025 INSC 560

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measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. It a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process. remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial."

(emphasis supplied)

16. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] this Court held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. It was further held that in deciding whether a process should be issued, the Magistrate can take into consideration improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. It was further held that: (SCC p. 741, para 5)

"5. ... Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate

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or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused."

17. In Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal [(2003) 4 SCC 139: 2003 SCC (Cri) 788] this Court, in para 9, held as under: (SCC pp. 145-46)

"9. In determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. This question was considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 745] and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC 722: 2000 SCC (Cri) 303] it was held as follows: (U.P.Pollution case [(2000) 3 SCC 745], SCC p. 749, para 6)

“6. The legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while

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issuing summons. The process issued to the accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a speaking order.'"

18. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Bhupendra Kumar Modi [(2009) 2 SCC 147: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 679] this Court, in para 23, held as under: (SCC p. 154)

"23. It is a settled legal position that at the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused."

19. This being the settled legal position, the order passed by the Magistrate could not be faulted with only on the ground that the summoning order was not a reasoned order.' (emphasis supplied)

17. The view in Bhushan Kumar (supra) was reiterated in Mehmood Ul Rehman v Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420 and State of Gujarat v Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta, (2019) 20 SCC 539. This Court in Rakhi Mishra v State of Bihar, (2017) 16 SCC 772 restated the settled proposition of law enunciated in Sonu Gupta v Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424, as under:

'4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court

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erred in allowing the application filed by Respondents 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and quashing the criminal proceedings against them. A perusal of the FIR would clearly show that the appellant alleged cruelty against Respondents 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. This Court in Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265] held as follows: (SCC p. 429, para 8)

"8. ... At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence ... to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor is he required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials would lead to conviction or not."

5. The order passed by the trial court taking cognizance against R-2 and R-4 to R-9 is in conformity with the law laid down in the above judgment. It is settled law that the power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised by the High Court only in exceptional circumstances only when a prima facie case is not made out against the accused. The test applied by this Court for interference at the initial stage of a prosecution is whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish a case.' (emphasis supplied)”

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18. Hence, the language of the impugned order does not show any

irregularity and so the objection raised by the Petitioner at this stage cannot

be entertained.

IV.PRE-COGNIZANCE HEARING:

19. The averments of the Petitioner that the benefit of pre-cognizance

hearing as prescribed under proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 223 of

BNSS was not given to the petitioner, cannot be applied to the present case,

as it does not involve taking cognizance of the Main Prosecution Complaint

for the first time. The issue before us is a challenge to the impugned order

dealing with supplementary complaint. And as already discussed above the

Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only for the first time.

20. Pre-cognizance hearing cannot be equated with a mini- trial. It is

only for the Court to satisfy itself on jurisdiction and related procedural

aspects. Any further delving into the factual defences or evidences at this

stage should not be entertained.

21. Further reliance was placed by the Petitioner on the judgement

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rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme court in Kushal Kumar Agarwal Vs

Enforcement Directorate7, where the Hon'ble Court had made it crystal

clear that the pre-cognizance hearing afforded to the accused is a

mandatory procedure as stipulated under proviso to Section 223(1) of

BNSS. So this admitted position of law does not stand disputed.

22. However, the facts in Kushal kumar case is clearly distinguishable

from the present case. In Kushal kumar case, the Court was dealing with a

fresh complaint and no prior cognizance had been taken of any offence.

Therefore, the mandatory procedure as prescribed under proviso to Section

223(1) of BNSS was squarely applicable. But in the present case,

cognizance was already taken on the main complaint filed on 09.09.2022

and as already discussed above supplementary complaint is considered as

part and parcel of main complaint as per Explanation (ii) to section 44 of

PMLA and hence taking fresh cognizance of the supplementary complaint

has not arisen here so the procedure stipulated under proviso to Section

223(1) of BNSS finds no relevance to the present case.

V. STALE MATERIAL VS NEW MATERIAL:

23. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Purpose of

7 2025 SCC OnLine 1221

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Explanation (ii) to Section 44, PMLA is two-fold:

(a) Read with Section 44(1)(b), PMLA, it explicitly confers the Special

Court with the power to take cognizance of a complaint filed by the

Enforcement Directorate. Both the CrPC and the BNSS only confer

Magistrates with the power of cognizance; and

(b) It explicitly recognizes supplementary complaints that are the

result of "further investigation" to bring "further evidence, oral or

documentary, against any accused person".

24. It was also submitted by the Petitioner that the language used in

respect of investigation and supplementary complaints in Explanation (ii) to

Section 44, PMLA is identical to the language used in Section 173(8), CrPC

(corresponding to Section 193(9), BNSS) i.e., "further investigation" and

obtaining "further evidence, oral or documentary".

25. In respect of “further investigation” under section 173(8), CrPC,

the petitioner counsel placed reliance on Hon’ble Supreme Court

Judgement in Mariam Fasihuddin Vs State of Karnataka8, where it was

reiterated that the terms "further investigation" must concern "further

8 (2024) 11 SCC 733

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evidence, oral or documentary" that has been collected by the investigating

agency. Thus, the provision for submitting a supplementary report (or a

supplementary complaint) "infers that fresh, oral or documentary evidence

should be obtained rather than re-evaluating or reassessing the material

already collected and considered by the investigating agency while

submitting the initial police report".

26. Hence the Petitioner contended that in the present case, the 2nd

Supplementary Prosecution Complaint relies entirely on material dating

from 2021 to 2023 i.e., material prior to the 1st Supplementary Prosecution

Complaint and the Main Prosecution Complaint:

(a) The Petitioner's statements under PMLA were recorded on

04.02.2021 and 05.02.2021;

(b) The searches at the premises of M/s Vedanta Farms (A40), M/s

Sunrise Farms (A41) were conducted on 04.02.2021 and 05.02.2021.

(c) The Provisional Attachment Order No. 07/2023 by which

immovable properties in the name of the Petitioner's partnership firms (A40

and A41) is dated 29.05.2023 and the same was confirmed by Learned

Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 08.11.2023.

(d) The SFIO Complaint under Section 447, Companies Act, 2013,

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against the Petitioner and other accused filed on 09.09.2022 (SFIO

Complaint);

(e) The list of RUDs accompanying the 2nd Supplementary PC

contains witness statements and documents entirely dating from 2021 to

2023.

27. Thus, relying on the above facts, the learned counsel for the

Petitioner submitted that no fresh oral or documentary material has been

collected against the Petitioner; in fact, the Enforcement Directorate relies

entirely on material that was already collected and considered by the

Enforcement Directorate at the time of filing of the Main Prosecution

Complaint and the 1st Supplementary Prosecution Complaint. No

explanation has been given by the Enforcement Directorate for arraigning

the Petitioner in the 2nd Supplementary Prosecution Complaint based on

older material already in its possession at the time of filing of the previous

Prosecution Complaints.

28. On the contrary, Enforcement Directorate denied the contention of

the petitioner that only ‘stale material’ was referred to. The counsel for the

Enforcement Directorate submitted that the 2nd Supplementary Complaint

dated 06.11.2024 is based on the complaint filed by the Serious Fraud

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Investigation Office (SFIO) under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013,

before the Special Court at Chennai on 09.09.2022 (Spl.CC.No. 01/2023).

This SFIO complaint constitutes fresh and new material that forms the basis

of the present supplementary prosecution complaint under the PMLA.

29. The material particulars establishing that the SFIO complaint is

new material are as follows:

(a) The SFIO complaint was filed on 09.09.2022, which was after the

searches conducted in February 2021;

(b) The ECIR in the present case was initially registered on

27.12.2019 based on the CBI FIR;

(c) The ECIR was subsequently amended by way of Addendum dated

10.06.2024, specifically incorporating the SFIO Complaint as a scheduled

offence;

(d) The SFIO complaint brought forth new allegations regarding

corporate fraud, falsification of accounts, and violations under the

Companies Act, 2013, which constitute a separate scheduled offence under

the PMLA;

(e) The forensic audit report conducted by M/s.Haribhakti & Co.,

which forms part of the SFIO proceedings, constitutes fresh documentary

evidence.

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30. The Enforcement Directorate further submitted that the Petitioner

has failed to appreciate the distinction between "pre-existing evidence" and

"new material/fresh evidence." The SFIO complaint, though based on

transactions that occurred in the past, constitutes a new scheduled offence

that came into existence only on 09.09.2022. This is fresh material for the

purposes of the PMLA investigation.

31. It was also submitted that money laundering is a continuing

offence and the very nature of this offence permits investigation into various

layers of transactions, shell companies, and interconnected entities that are

used to launder the proceeds of crime. The SFIO complaint revealed

additional entities, transactions, and modus operandi that were not part of

the original investigation based solely on the CBI FIR.

VI. RELIANCE ON MARIAM FASIHUDDIN CASE:

32. The aforesaid reply submitted by Enforcement Directorate was

further met with a contention by the Petitioner on the ground that

Enforcement Directorate had access to the SFIO Complaint for two years

prior to the filing of the 1st Supplementary Prosecution Complaint, in which

the Enforcement Directorate had decided not to arraign the Petitioner.

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Reliance was placed on Enforcement Directorate's averment in Paragraph

3.2 of the 1st supplementary PC (Page No. 476 of the Annexed set of

Documents - II ) which clearly states that the SFIO complaint formed the

basis of the said supplementary PC and also warranted an amendment

dated 10.06.2024 to the original ECIR.

33. Therefore, there was no fresh material against the Petitioner that

the Enforcement Directorate unearthed between the 1st Supplementary

Prosecution Complaint and the 2nd Supplementary Prosecution Complaint

and the law as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mariam Fashuddin

ought to apply in the present case as well.

34. However, Enforcement Directorate submitted that the decision in

Mariam Fashuddin is factually distinguishable. Emphasis was placed on

Para No.38 of the said judgment which reads as follows:

"38. It is a matter of record that in the course of 'further investigation, no new material was unearthed by the investigating agency. Instead, the supplementary charge-sheet relies upon the Truth Lab report dated 15-7-2013, obtained by Respondent 2, which was already available when

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the original charge-sheet was filed..."

34. It was further substantiated by Enforcement Directorate that facts

in Mariam Fashuddin are entirely different from the present case through the

below mentioned factual differences;

i) The supplementary charge sheet was based on a report (Truth Lab

report) that was already available at the time of filing the main charge-

sheet;

ii) There was mere re-evaluation of existing material without any fresh

investigation;

iii) No new evidence, oral or documentary, was brought on record.

35. In stark contrast, in the present case:

(a) The SFIO complaint itself is a new scheduled offence that was

registered on 09.09.2022;

(b) The forensic audit report by M/s Haribhakti & Co. constitutes fresh

documentary evidence;

(c) The investigation was extended based on this new scheduled

offence, not merely a re-appreciation of old material;

(d) The Addendum to ECIR dated 10.06.2024 specifically

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incorporated the SFIO complaint as a fresh predicate offence;

(e) The supplementary complaint reveals new entities (A-28 to A-42),

new transactions, and expanded scope of money laundering activities.

36. Hence the SFIO complaint is not a mere re-evaluation of existing

material but constitutes fresh evidence obtained during the course of further

investigation.

37. In light of the above submissions, this Court finds that the SFIO

complaint dated 09.09.2022 constitutes fresh and new material and that the

supplementary complaint is not based on stale material and that the

decision in Mariam Fashuddin is distinguishable and does not apply to the

facts of the present case and hence the supplementary complaint is legally

maintainable under Section 44(1) read with Explanation (ii) of the PMLA.

38. Therefore, from the above arguments, it can be deduced that the

underlying transactions or events occurred in the past does not render the

SFIO complaint "stale." Hence this court finds merit in the argument that the

scheduled offence itself (i.e., the SFIO complaint under Section 447 of the

Companies Act) is a new development and cannot be termed as stale

material.

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39. For the reasons aforesaid, we find that the impugned order dated

17.02.2025 in Spl.C.C.No.9 of 2022 on the file of the XIV Additional Special

Court for CBI cases need not be interfered with. Consequently, this Court

concludes that the revision is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be

dismissed. The trial Court shall proceed with the case on merits,

uninfluenced by the observations made on facts.

40. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.

Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, are closed. No

costs.

(S.M.SUBRAMANIAM J.)(MOHAMMED SHAFFIQ J.) 19-11-2025

gd Index:Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Internet:Yes Neutral Citation:Yes/No

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 19/11/2025 04:47:23 pm )

To

1.The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Chennai Zonal Office-I, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, No.2, Kushkumar Road, BSNL Administrative Building, 5th and 6th Floor, Nungambakkam, Chennai - 600 034.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 19/11/2025 04:47:23 pm )

S.M.SUBRAMANIAM J.

AND MOHAMMED SHAFFIQ J.

gd

CRL RC No. 1541 of

19.11.2025

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 19/11/2025 04:47:23 pm )

 
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