Madras High Court

K.Lokanatha Rao vs E.N.Harinath Singh on 27 September, 2023

                                                                                      CRP No.2515 of 2023

                                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                                                         DATED: 27.09.2023

                                                             CORAM:

                                   THE HON'BLE Mrs.JUSTICE V.BHAVANI SUBBAROYAN

                                          Civil Revision Petition No.2515 of 2023 and
                                                    C.M.P.No.15558 of 2023


                     K.Lokanatha Rao                                                ...Petitioner

                                                                Vs.

                     E.N.Harinath Singh                                             ...Respondent

                                  Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Consitution of

                     India to allow the present Revision and set aside the Judgment and Decree

                     dated 23.11.2022 passed in R.L.T.A.No.26 of 2022 by the learned VI

                     Additional District Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai [Rent Tribunal, Chennai]

                     confirming the fair and decreetal order passed in R.L.T.O.P. No. 454 of

                     2020 dated 09.12.2021 by the learned XII Judge, Court of Small Causes at

                     Chennai [Rent Court, Chennai]

                                        For Petitioner      : Mr.Ashok Menon

                                        For Respondent      : Mr.V.Sivakumar for
                                                              M/s.P.B.Ramanujam Associates

                                                             ORDER

The present petition has been filed to set aside the Judgment and

Decree dated 23.11.2022 passed in R.L.T.A. No.26 of 2022 by the learned

VI Additional District Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai [Rent Tribunal, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

Chennai] confirming the fair and decreetal order passed in R.L.T.O.P. No.

454 of 2020 dated 09.12.2021 by the learned XII Judge, Court of Small

Causes at Chennai [Rent Court, Chennai]

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:-

Originally a petition in R.L.T.O.P. No.454 of 2020 has been filed by

the respondent/landlord under Sections 21(2)(a), 21(2)(b), 21(2)(d) and 21

(2) (g) of the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Rights and Responsibilities of

Landlords and Tenants Act, 2017 [for brevity, hereinafter referred to as Act]

for repossession of the tenanted premises on the ground of failure to enter

into an agreement, default in payment of rent, misuse of premises and own

use and occupation against the petitioner / tenant. Before the trial court,

on either side, no witness was examined and no exhibit was marked. Upon

hearing the arguments on both sides and upon perusing the documents,

the Rent Court allowed the application under Section 21(2)(a) of the Act

and the petitioner was directed to vacate the premises and handover the

same to the respondent within one month from the date of order passed in

the said RLTOP. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/tenant had filed an

appeal in R.L.T.A.No.26 of 2022 before the appellate authority. After

considering the agreements the appellate authority had dismissed the

appeal. Challenging the same, the petitioner/tenant had filed the present

Revision before this Court.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the

petitioner is the tenant originally under the father of the respondent,

namely, Mr.Nara Singh in the year 1986 in respect of a small building

consisting of ground and first floor on a monthly rent of Rs.3,500/-. After the

death of the said Nara Singh, the petitioner is paying monthly rent to the

respondent. The present monthly rent is Rs.1,00,000/- p.m. apart from

electricity charges. The respondent and his family informed the petitioner

that there is no need to enter into lease agreement as the same is not

required under the old law and thus petitioner continued the tenancy by

paying the rent to them. Even after the commencement of this Act, the

respondent did not issue any notice, letter or orally, calling upon the

petitioner to enter into agreement. The petitioner is always willing to enter

into agreement and he has never evaded to enter into agreement.

4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner

before this Court is that petitioner/tenant is running a hotel business in the

petition premises and the term 'Hotel' is exempted from the definition of

premises defined under Section 2(f) of the Act. Further, taking shelter of

Biswas Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary, he would contend that 'Hotel'

includes a refreshment room, a boarding-house, a lodging-house, a coffee-

house and a cafe.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

5. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the following

Judgments to substantiate his case and pleaded to set aside the orders

passed by the trial court and the appellate court as well.

(i) Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court [Sushil Kumar Metha Vs.

Gobind Ram Bohra] on 10.11.1989 in Civil Appeal No.4599 of 1989.

(ii) Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court [A.V.G.P. Chettiar & sons

and Others vs. T.Palanisamy Gounder] reported in (2002) 5 Supreme

Court cases 337.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would submit

that the respondent is the absolute owner of the property situated at

No.13/8, 4th Avenue, Ashok Nagar Main Road, Kodambakkam, Chennai

600 024 and the petitioner is a tenant in respect of the entire property on a

contractual monthly rent of Rs.1,00,000/-. The purpose of tenancy is non

residential in nature and according to the English Calendar month, the

respondent has been paying monthly rent at the rate of Rs.25,000/- during

the year 2011. Thereafter, with periodic increase, the monthly rent was

enhanced to Rs.1,00,000/- during October 2019. Since there is no written

agreement on the date of commencement of the Act and considering the

conduct of the Petitioner in discharging his legal obligations and a clear

failure to enter into an agreement as contemplated under Section 4(2) r/w https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

Section 21(2)(a) of the Act, the respondent/lanlord had filed RLTOP for

recovery of possession on the ground of failure to enter into a tenancy

agreement.

7. That apart, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord would

submit that the petitioner is running only a cafe in the petition premises and

hence it is not exempted from the Act and the petitioner himself agreed to

vacate the premises before the court below on or before 30.06.2023,

however, failed to honour his commitment and preferred the Revision. The

learned counsel for the respondent seeks in aid of the following judgments

and pleaded to dismiss the present Revision.

(i) Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court [Babu Ram Gupta

Vs.Sudhir Bhasin & Anr.,] reported in (1980) 3 SCC 47.

(ii) Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court [P.B.Nayak and Ors. Vs.

Managing Director, Shilai Steel Plant and Ors.] reported in

MANU/SC/0982/2021.

(iii) Judgment of this Court [M.S.Mohd., Arif Vs. M.Devadoss]

reported in (2013) 4 LW 60.

8. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the

documents placed on record.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

9. Now, the First Point which arise for consideration before this Court

is, 'Whether the term 'Hotel' under Section 2(f)(ii) of the Act includes a

restaurant or eating house?

The word 'Premises' is defined under Section 2(f) of the Act, which is

as follows:-

'Premises' means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for the purpose of residence or for commercial or for educational use, except for industrial use and includes— (i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of the building; (ii) any fitting to such building or part of the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include Hotel, lodging house, dharamshala or inn, or the like;” But, the learned counsel for the petitioner by relying on the above said

definition submitted that the petitioner / tenant is running a hotel in the

petition mentioned premises and the same is exempted from the Act.

10. It is relevant to note that the word 'Hotel' is nowhere defined in

the Act. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Associated

Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. R.N. Kapoor (19.05.1959 -SC) : reported in

MANU/SC/0168/1959 had interpreted the word 'Hotel' and held as follows:

“The word 'Hotel' is not defined in the Rent Control Act. It is defined in a cognate Act called the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bom. 57 of 47). The definition therein says that a hotel or lodging house means a building or a part of a building where lodging with or without board or other service is https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

provided for a monetary consideration. I do not pause here to decide whether that definition should be adopted for the purpose of interpreting s. 2(b) of the rent Control Act. It is sufficient to state that in its ordinary connotation the word 'Hotel', means a house for entertaining strangers or travellers : a place where lodging is furnished to transient guests as well as one where both lodging and food or other amenities are furnished.”

11. Further Section 2 in the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 defines 'Hotel' as

follows:-

(d) “hotel or lodging house” means a building or a part of a building where lodging, with or without board or other services, is provided for a monetary consideration;

12. Also, Section 2(14) and 2(15) of the Tamilnadu Shops and

Establishments Act, 1947 defines ‘Residential Hotel´ and ‘Restaurant´ as

follows:

“(14)‘Residential Hotel´ means any premises in which business is carried on bona fide for the supply of dwelling accommodation and meals on payment of a sum of money to a traveller or any member of the public or class of the public;

(15) ‘Restaurant´ or ‘Eating House' means any premises in which is carried on wholly or principally the business of the supply of refreshments or meals to the public or a class of the public for consumption on the premises but does not include a restaurant attached to a theatre.”

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

13. Besides the above, Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Tax on

Luxuries in Hotels and Lodging Houses Act, 1981 Act defines 'Hotel' as

follows:-

“2(f) “Hotel” means a building or part of a building where residential accommodation with or without board is by way of business provided for a monetary consideration and includes a lodging house.”

14. On a perusal of all the above definitions it could be construed

that the 'Hotel' is a place where accommodation is to be provided with or

without a eating house. Further, the petitioner had relied on the Biswas

Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary, for the definition of 'Hotel', which is nothing

but the definition of Hotel under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955,

which is as follows:

“Hotel” includes a refreshment room, a boarding house, a lodging house, a coffee house and a cafe”

15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to apply the principles of

'noscitur a sociis', which stipulates that a word is to be understood in the

light of the company it keeps. Under Section 2(f) of Act, the word 'Hotel' is

accompanied by the words lodging house, dharamshala or inn, or the like,

where every other word would mean a place where an accommodation is

provided. Hence the term 'Hotel' must also be construed in the same

manner.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

16. From the above, it is clear that a 'Restaurant' or a 'Eating house'

does not fall under the ambit of the term 'Hotel' under Section 2(f)(ii) of the

Act. Further, the 'Trade Licence' obtained by the petitioner from the Greater

Chennai Corporation would reveal that the petitioner is running a

cafe/restaurant in the petition mentioned premises. The first point is

answered accordingly. That apart, it is pertinent to mention here that the

petitioner has never raised the above said contention before the court

below.

17. The Second Point which arise for consideration before this Court

is, 'Whether the order of trial court is liable to be rejected on the ground

that the petitioner / tenant was ready to execute the rental agreement?

18. As far as the contention with regard to the fact that the

petitioner/tenant was ready and willing to execute the agreement is

concerned, it was the respondent/ landlord who had not entered into the

agreement, it has been already decided by this Court in S.Muruganandam

Vs. J.Joseph, in Civil Revision Petition (NPD) Nos.3056, 3061, 3062, 3063,

3067 and 3094 of 2021 dated 04.02.2022 wherein this Court held as

follows:-

“8. Let us now examine the effect of the provisions of the New Act, in the light of the above principles of statutory interpretation. The definition of tenant under Section 2(n) includes a person who continuous in possession after termination of the tenancy, whether https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

before or after the commencement of the Act. Sub Section (3) of Section 5 restricts renewal of tenancy which has expired to a maximum period of six months. Section 21(2) (a) makes failure on the part of the tenant or the landlord to enter into a written agreement of tenancy a ground for repossession by the landlord. Section 21(2) (a) does not specify as to the reason for failure to enter into an agreement in writing.

9. It gives the right to the landlord to sue for repossession dehors the fact that the landlord may be at fault and he may be the reason for non-renewal or failure to enter into an agreement in writing. It is not open to a tenant to contend that despite his request, the landlord did not execute an agreement in writing and therefore, the landlord cannot invoke Section 21(2)(a) seeking repossession. This anomaly or the deficiency throws up several new challenges, before the Rent Courts. Various situations emerge under which the Rent Court has to consider the effect of absence of an agreement in writing.

13. From the instances that had arisen in these six revisions, the different types of cases that may arise before the Rent Court can be broadly classified as follows:

i. Written tenancy created prior to and expired prior to the commencement of the Act (Tenant holding over under an oral tenancy);

ii. Oral tenancies created prior to the New Act and no written agreement entered into;

iii. Written tenancies created prior to the New Act and the period expired after the commencement of the Act;

iv. Written tenancies entered after the commencement of the New Act not registered but subsisting;

v. Written tenancies created after the commencement of the New Act and had presently expired (either registered or unregistered) vi. Oral tenancies created after the New Act.

…….

16. I have enumerated the six possible contingencies that would arise in respect of either execution of a written agreement or registration thereof under the provisions of the New Act. As far as the first three contingencies are concerned, it can straight away be concluded without much difficulty that all of them will be covered by Section 4(2) and its proviso. Thus the landlord would have the right to invoke Section 21(2)(a) of the New Act, in respect of contingencies 1 and 2 and all other clauses of Section 21(2) in the respect of the third contingency to seek eviction of such tenants where the agreement expired after the commencement of the New Act…..” From the above it is clear that when there is no valid agreement between https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

CRP No.2515 of 2023

the landlord and tenant, the respondent / landlord has right in invoking

Section 21(2)(a) of the New Act. The trial court as well as the appellate

court are right in rendering the order and Judgment respectively, which

cannot be found fault with. The second point is answered accordingly and

the present Revision is liable to be dismissed.

19. Before parting with the case, considering the submission of the

learned counsel for the petitioner that with the consent of the respondent,

the petitioner has put up construction in the vacant land abutting the

smaller building initially let out to him on its backside, put up compound

walls, sump, overhead tank on all four sides, besides the 2nd floor, this

Court is inclined to grant a period of three months to the petitioner to