Madras High Court
Dhanaraj N.Kochar vs The State Rep. By Inspector Of ... on 14 September, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated : 14.09.2023
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr.Justice V.SIVAGNANAM
Crl.O.P.No.19281 of 2021
and Crl.M.P.No.10578 of 2021
1.Dhanaraj N.Kochar
2.Inderchand
...Petitioners
Versus
1.The State Rep. by Inspector of Police,
Central Crime Branch – 1 (FPP),
Vepery, Chennai District.
Crime No.511 of 2018
2.A.Raja
...Respondents
This Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C
praying to call for the records of Crime No.511 of 2018 dated 10.12.2018
for the alleged offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI
Act 2003 pending on the file of the respondent police and quash the same.
For Petitioners : Mr.Ramesh,
Senior Counsel
For Respondent – 1 : Mr.V.J.Priyadarsana
Government Advocate (Crl.Side)
For Respondent – 2 : Mr.R.Narendran
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
ORDER
This criminal original petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking
to quash the FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 dated 10.12.2018 for the alleged
offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act 2003
pending on the file of 1st respondent police.
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
The 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant obtained a sum of
Rs.40,00,000/- as loan from the petitioners on various dates viz.,
Rs.30,00,000/- on 02.10.2016; Rs.7,00,000/- on 22.10.2016 and
Rs.3,00,000/- on 20.12.2016 respectively by depositing the original title
deeds vide Document Nos.1566/2001, 1151/2003, 3222/2003, 3223/2003,
5196/2006, 423/2007, 6315/2007, 7511/2007, 421/2008, 602/2008,
717/2008, 2473/2008, 402/2009, 1101/2009, 465/2012, 466/2012,
467/2012 & 537/2012 and some other documents along with signed blank
cheque, promissory notes and green sheets. According to the 2 nd
respondent/de-facto complainant, during the month of January 2018, he
approached the petitioners and stated that he is ready to repay the loan
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
amount of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest and hence, he requested the
petitioners to return the original documents, cheques, stamp papers and
promissory notes to him. However, the petitioners demanded the 2nd
respondent/de-facto complainant to pay an additional amount of
Rs.79,00,000/- and take back the original documents and also, they
demanded the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant to register his land in
their names. Though the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant agreed to
repay the loan amount of Rs.40,00,000/- and interest (excluding the interest
amount of Rs.7,00,000/- which was already paid by him), the petitioners
threatened him that if he does not pay the demanded amount, they would
murder him. Therefore, the aggrieved 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant
lodged a complaint to the 1st respondent police seeking to take appropriate
action against the petitioners & one Naveen (son of 2 nd petitioner). On the
basis of said complaint, on 10.12.2018, the 1 st respondent police registered
the FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 against the petitioners & said Naveen for
the offence under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of Tamil
Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003 (hereinafter
referred to as 'TNPCEI Act'). Hence, the petitioners have filed the present
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
petition before this Court.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that initially, the
FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 was registered for the offence under Sections
406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act, but, later, the 1 st
respondent police had altered the said FIR under Sections 506(i) of I.P.C
r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act.
3.1. The learned counsel submitted that Section 2(6)(vi) of the Tamil
Nadu Money-Lenders Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'TNML Act'),
states that “loan” means an advance whether of money or in kind at
interest, and includes any transaction which the Court finds in substance to
amount to such an advance, but does not include an advance made on the
basis of a negotiable instrument and defined in the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (Central Act XXVI of 1881), exceeding Rs.10,000/-. In the
present case, the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant had received
Rs.40,00,000/- as loan from the petitioners. Hence, as per Section 2(6)(vi)
of TNML Act, the amount of Rs.40,00,000/- obtained by the 2 nd
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
respondent/de-facto complainant from the petitioners will not come under
the definition of loan. He also submitted that Section 2(8) of TNML Act
states that “money lender” means a person whose main or subsidiary
occupation is the business of advancing and realizing loans, but excludes a
bank or a co-operative society. Since the amount borrowed by the 2 nd
respondent/de-facto complainant from the petitioners is not come under the
definition of loan, the petitioners cannot be termed as money-lenders.
Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the TNML Act is not
applicable to the petitioners' case.
3.2. Further, the learned counsel submitted that it is pertinent to
extract Section 12 of TNPCEI Act hereunder:
“12. Application of provisions of Tamil Nadu Money-
lenders Act – Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
provisions of the Money-lenders Act, insofar as they are
applicable to Money-lenders shall mutatis mutandis apply to
a person referred to in Section 3 of this Act.
Explanation. - Where an act of a person constitutes
offences under this Act and under the Money-lenders Act,
prosecution shall be launched under this Act.”
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
A reading of the above provision makes it clear that subject to the
provisions of TNPCEI Act, the provisions of TNML Act and rules made
thereunder are applicable to money-lenders are also equally apply to the
persons who are charging exorbitant interest on loan advance by them.
Further, where an act of a person constitutes an offence under TNPCEI Act
and also, under TNML Act, then, prosecution shall be launched under the
TNPCEI Act only and not under the TNML Act. Therefore, the learned
counsel submitted that since TNML Act is not applicable to the petitioners'
case, Section 3 of TNPCEI Act is also not applicable.
3.3. The learned counsel also submitted that since Section 3 of
TNPCEI Act is not applicable to the petitioners, the penalty specified under
Section 4 of TNPCEI Act is also not applicable to them. Hence, it is crystal
clear that the petitioners have not committed any offence under Sections 3 &
4 of the TNPCEI Act. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel
placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Sri Kalpatharu Financiers Vs. V.Natarajan reported in
(2012) 4 MLJ 187, wherein, it had held as follows:
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
“67. Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:
“3. Prohibition of charging exorbitant interest:
No person shall charge exorbitant interest on any loan
advanced by him.
68. Section 4 deals with penalty which reads as follows:
“4. Penalty:- Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Money-Lenders Act, whoever contravenes the provisions
of Section 3 or molests or abets the molestation of any debtor
for recovery of any loan shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extent to three years and
also with a 1 fine which may extent to thirty thousand
rupees.”
69. Therefore, contravention of the provisions of Act 38
of 2003 calls for a penalty u/s 4 subject to the provisions of
Money Lenders Act. u/s 2(8) of the Tamil Nadu Money
Lenders Act 1957, ''Money Lender'' means a person whose
main or subsidiary occupation is the business of advancing
and realising loans but excludes a bank or a cooperative
society.
70. Section 2(6) defines loan which reads as follows:
““loan” means an advance whether of money or in
kind at interest, and includes any transaction which the Court
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
finds in substance to amount to such an advance, but does not
include
(i)....
(ii)...
(iii)...
(iv)...
(v)...
(vi) an advance made on the basis of a negotiable
instrument and defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (Central Act No. XXVI of 1881), exceeding rupees (ten
thousand);”
71. Therefore, when a loan is on the basis of a
Negotiable Instrument viz., a promissory note which exceeds
Rs. 10,000/-, it is not covered under the Money Lenders Act
1957.”
3.4. The learned counsel also submitted that the ingredients required
for the offence punishable under Section 506(i) of I.P.C are not made out
against the petitioners herein and that apart, the allegation referred in the
FIR is not enough to punish the petitioners under Section 506(i) of I.P.C.
Therefore, the learned counsel prayed this Court to quash the FIR in Crime
No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st respondent police.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
4. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd
respondent/de-facto complainant submitted that though the 2nd
respondent/de-facto complainant was ready to repay the loan amount of
Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest, the petitioners refused to return the
original documents, cheques, stamp papers and promissory notes to him.
Further, the petitioners demanded the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant to
pay a sum of Rs.79,00,000/- and also, demanded him to register his land in
their names and that apart, they threatened him that if he does not pay the
demanded amount, they would murder him. He further submitted that 2nd
petitioner's son Naveen had filed a suit in O.S.No.37 of 2019 before the
District Munsif Court, Chengalpattu, seeking to grant a decree for
permanent injunction directing the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant, his
men, agents, servants, attorneys, successors from any way encumbering or
alienating the suit property to anybody other than the plaintiff. However,
the said suit is pending. He also submitted that though this Court vide order
dated 12.01.2023 referred the matter to Mediation, the petitioners refused to
settle the issue. The only intention of the petitioners is to grab more money
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
from the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant and hence, they demanded
exorbitant interest from the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant. Therefore,
the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of this petition.
5. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) appearing for the 1 st
respondent police submitted that after the FIR was registered in Crime
No.511 of 2018 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 406,
420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act, the 1st respondent police
had enquired the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant. The statement of 2nd
respondent/de-facto complainant reflects that the petitioners have cheated
him. Hence, the 1st respondent police had altered the said FIR under
Sections 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act. Thereafter, the 2 nd
respondent/de-facto complainant sought time to produce the documents
regarding the repayment and demand of exorbitant interest, but, after that,
he did not came for enquiry.
6. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials
available on record.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
7. From a perusal of FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st
respondent police, it is seen that the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant had
obtained a sum of Rs.40,00,000/- as loan from the petitioners and he had
handed over his original property documents, signed blank paper, blank
cheques, promissory note and green sheets to the petitioners. It is also seen
that though the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant was ready to repay the
loan amount of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest (excluding the interest of
Rs.7,00,000/- which was already paid by him), the petitioners had
demanded the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant to pay a sum of
Rs.79,00,000/- and also, they had demanded him to register his land in their
names. Moreover, the petitioners had threatened the 2nd respondent/de-facto
complainant that if he does not pay the demanded amount, they would
murder him. Hence, the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant had lodged a
complaint to the 1st respondent police.
8. Based on the complaint given by the 2nd respondent/de-facto
complainant, the 1st respondent police had registered the FIR in Crime
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
No.511 of 2018 against the petitioners and 2nd petitioner's son, for the
offence under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI
Act. The petitioners are A1 & A2 in Crime No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st
respondent police. Though the FIR was initially registered for the offence
under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act, later,
the 1st respondent police had altered the said FIR under Sections 506(i) of
I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act.
9. As per Section 2(6)(vi) of TNML Act, an advance made on the
basis of a negotiable instrument exceeding Rs.10,000/- would not fall under
the definition of 'loan' and as per Section 2(8) of TNML Act, 'money
lender' is a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is business of
advancing and realizing loans. The proviso to Section 2(6)(vi) of TNML Act
makes it clear that the amount of Rs.40,00,000/- i.e., exceeding Rs.10,000/-
obtained by the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant from the petitioners
would not come under the definition of loan. Since the amount borrowed by
the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant itself is not a loan, it cannot be said
that the petitioners are money-lenders.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
10. It is pertinent to state that a money-lender who advances an
amount on the basis of a Negotiable Instrument viz., a promissory note
exceeding Rs.10,000/- is not a person referred to in Section 3 of TNPCEI
Act. So, the provisions of Section 3 of TNPCEI Act is not applicable to the
case on hand. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, when Section 3 of TNPCEI Act itself is not applicable to this
case, Section 4 of TNPCEI Act which deals with the penalty for a person
who contravenes the provisions of Section 3 of TNPCEI Act, is also not
applicable to the present case. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the
ingredients required for the offence under Sections 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act are
not made out against the petitioners.
11. So far as the offence alleged under Section 506 of I.P.C is
concerned, this Court feels that it would be appropriate to extract Sections
503 & 506(i) of I.P.C hereunder:
“503. Criminal intimidation.--Whoever threatens another
with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the
person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested,
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person
to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do
any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of
avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation. Explanation. - A threat to injure the reputation
of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section.”
“506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.--Whoever
commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. If threat
be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-- and if the threat be to
cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any
property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or
[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
12. The allegation against the petitioners is that though the 2 nd
respondent/de-facto complainant was ready to repay the loan amount of
Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest, they demanded him to pay a sum of
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Rs.79,00,000/-. When the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant expressed
his inability to pay such huge amount of Rs.79,00,000/-, the petitioners
threatened him and demanded him to register his land in their names.
However, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners have not committed
any offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C.
13. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has discussed in detail about the inherent powers of the High
Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C in the following cases:
(i) R.P.Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866
(ii) State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch.Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in
AIR 1992 SC 604
(iii) M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Limited Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 315
13.1. In the case of R.P.Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab reported in
AIR 1960 SC 866, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
“6. .................................................... It is well-established that
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to
quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused
person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the
High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable
or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern
the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may
indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction
can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There
may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take
the view that the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse
of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned
proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal
proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have
been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears
that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of
the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing
the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction
may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may
also arise where the allegations in the first information report or
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in
such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a
matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information
report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In
such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it
would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal
court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of
cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be
successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this
category the allegations made against the accused person do
constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence
adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of
cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case
where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which
is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made
and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation
may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not
embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and
ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High
Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable
appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
accused would not be sustained.”
13.2. Further, in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch.Bhajan
Lal & Ors. reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued
seven guidelines to be followed by the High Courts in the exercise of its
inherent power vested by Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the FIR/complaint,
which are as follows:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
13.3. Similarly, in the case of M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.
Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online SC
315, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:
“80. ............, our final conclusions on the principal/core
issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an
interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court
would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused
or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or
till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C.,
while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the
criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in
Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that
the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare
cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death
penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in
the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate
in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread
over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process
should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to
its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence
reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in
progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations
in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation.
It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if
the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the
application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may
file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate
which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance
with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious.
It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,
regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-
restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid
down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan
Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations
in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The
court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the
merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the
court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate
the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or
the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High
Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay
of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can
be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not
require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically.
Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are
hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High
Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the
interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted”
and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail
under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High
Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of
not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the
investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the
final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while
dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of
the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of
interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad
parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to
hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an
interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that
it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court
while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High
Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid
parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no
coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be
adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be
misunderstood and/or misapplied.”
14. It is to be noted that the present case duly meets the parameters
laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra.
15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and in the
light of the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
judgments cited supra, this criminal original petition is allowed and the FIR
in Crime No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st respondent police is hereby
quashed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
14.09.2023
mrr
Index: Yes/No
Speaking Order (or) Non-Speaking Order
To
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
1.The Inspector of Police,
Central Crime Branch – 1 (FPP),
Vepery, Chennai District.
2.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court, Madras.
V.SIVAGNANAM, J.
mrr
Crl.O.P.No.19281 of 2021
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
14.09.2023
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
