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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Anand Kumar Pandey vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 31 March, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE B. P. SHARMA
ON THE 31st OF MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 18501 of 2025
ANAND KUMAR PANDEY
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Priyank Upadhyay and Shri Anadi Kumar Taylor - Advocate
for the petitioner.
Shri Dinesh Prasad Patel, GA for respondent/State.
ORDER
The present petition has been preferred assailing the order dated
10.01.2025 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Itarsi,
whereby, in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the petitioner has been summoned to face trial as an
additional accused.
2. As per the prosecution case, accused Sanjeev Shrivastava, in
connivance with a service provider Yusuf Ali Raja Saify, allegedly forged
the map of a scheme of the Municipal Council, Itarsi, and on the basis
thereof sold a non-existent plot through a lease deed dated 20.03.2018, which
was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Itarsi. At the relevant time,
the petitioner was posted as Sub-Registrar and was discharging his official
duties in connection with the registration of documents. The lease deed dated
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20.03.2018 was registered by the petitioner in the ordinary course of his
official functions. The departmental authorities also examined the matter,
and vide communication dated 18.06.2019, the Senior District Registrar,
District Hoshangabad addressed letters to the Collector, Hoshangabad and
the Superintendent of Police, Hoshangabad, confirming that the registration
of the document had been carried out in accordance with the applicable
provisions.
3. However, during the course of trial, the learned trial Court, exercising
powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C., summoned the present petitioner as an
additional accused on the premise that the lease deed in question allegedly
suffered from certain defects and, therefore, the petitioner ought to have
returned the document for rectification before registering the same.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order summoning him as an additional accused,
the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order
passed by the learned trial Court is legally unsustainable and contrary to the
settled principles governing the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
It is contended that at the relevant time the petitioner was functioning as the
Sub-Registrar and was performing his statutory duties under the Registration
Act, 1908. Under the scheme of the said Act, the Sub-Registrar is not
empowered to refuse registration of a document merely on the ground that
the executant does not possess valid title over the property. Once the
executant appears and the document is presented in accordance with law, the
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Sub-Registrar is obliged to register the same.
5. It is further submitted that in the present case the executant of the
document had appeared before the Sub-Registrar along with an order
(Pradhikar Patra) dated 20.03.2018 issued by the C.M.O., and the document
was presented by the ARI of the Municipal Council, Itarsi, who had earlier
also been appearing before the Sub-Registrar for execution and registration
of lease deeds of other plot holders under the same scheme. In such
circumstances, there was no occasion for the petitioner to refuse registration
of the document.
6. Learned counsel further submits that the observation of the learned
trial Court that the lease deed contained certain defects and ought to have
been returned for rectification is wholly erroneous. It is pointed out that a
true copy of the map was duly uploaded along with the lease deed at the time
of its registration, which is evident from Ex. P-17 (Original Registry) and
Ex. C-12 (Uploaded Lease Deed). Therefore, by no stretch of imagination
could the petitioner have refused to register the document, and no question of
dereliction of duty arises.
7. It is also submitted that the allegation in the complaint dated
12.06.2019, to the effect that the petitioner had asked whether the premium
amount had been paid, was subsequently not reiterated during the evidence
before the learned trial Court. On the contrary, the complainant merely stated
that the premium amount had been paid to Sanjeev Shrivastava and the
service provider prior to the registration of the document. Thus, the
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allegations against the petitioner are vague and do not disclose the
commission of any offence.
8. It is further contended that even if the statement that the premium
amount was paid in the presence of the petitioner is accepted for the sake of
argument, the same does not satisfy the stringent standard required for
invoking powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The evidence on record does not
indicate the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence. Learned
counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta, (2025) 5 SCC 481 ,
wherein it has been held that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. must be
exercised sparingly and only when strong and cogent evidence emerges
against a person sought to be summoned.
9. Learned counsel also submits that the departmental authorities, vide
letters dated 18.06.2019, categorically recorded that the registration of the
lease deed was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the
Registration Act, 1908 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and that the
petitioner had not committed any error or negligence in the discharge of his
duties.
10. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner is a public servant, and the
acts attributed to him are directly connected with the discharge of his official
duties. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the
case of K. Gopi vs. Vs. Sub-Registrar [2025 SCC OnLine SC 740] and
Gurmeet Kaur (supra) prior sanction for prosecution was a sine qua non for
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proceeding against the petitioner. In the absence of such sanction, the
learned trial Court could not have exercised powers under Section 319
Cr.P.C. to summon the petitioner as an accused. In view of the it is prayed
order passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has supported the order
passed by the trial Court and submitted that during the course of trial, upon
appreciation of certain documentary material and handwriting expert's
report, the learned trial Court has proceed to invoke jurisdiction under
Section 319 of Cr.P.C. and summoned the applicant as an accused. Hence,
no interference is required in the order passed by the trial Court and this
petition may be dismissed.
12. Heard the parties and perusal of the records. At the outset, it is
necessary to discuss here that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. does not
contemplate a casual or mechanical addition of an accused merely on the
basis of conjectures, surmises, or weak and inferential material. The test is
one of strong and cogent evidence, which, if left unrebutted, would
reasonably lead to take cognizance against the person sought to be
summoned.
13. In the present case, a careful perusal of the impugned order reveals
that the learned trial Court has proceeded to summon the petitioner primarily
on the premise that certain alleged defects existed in the document which
was registered and that the petitioner, being the Sub-Registrar, ought to have
returned the same for rectification. Such reasoning, in the considered view of
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this Court, falls substantially short of the standard required for invoking
jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
14. Perusal of the record reflects that, a non-existence plot was sold by
charge-sheeted accused Sanjeev Shrivastava along with a service provider
Yusuf Ali Raja vide a lease deed dated 20.03.2018 registered at the office of
sub-registrar, Itarsi. The petitioner being a Sub-registrar was performing his
duty and registered aforesaid lease deed. Being a sub-registrar, he cannot
even refuse to register aforesaid document because all the documents for
registration available and provided by the charge-sheeted accused persons. In
this regard, department has also confirmed the same vide its letter written by
the senior district registrar, District Narmadapuram dated 18.06.2019
addressed to the collector and superintendent of police Narmadapuram,
wherein it is clearly mentioned that, after due consideration the registration
of the aforesaid document registered by following the rules and regulations
and no negligence was found on the part of the petitioner.
15. Accused of the main case Sanjeev Shrivastava was possessing
appropriate rights with the aid of Section 92(2) of the Municipalities Act by
the then CMO and he had gone and appeared before the Sub-Registrar for
executing and registering the lease deed by giving pradhikar patra (order of
the C.M.O. dated 20.03.2018), the same leaves no space for the sub-registrar
as per the scheme of the act of 1908 to refuse a document which is executed
by a government official i.e. the ARI of Municipal Council Itarsi, who had
not only come for this specific purpose but rather had been appearing
frequently to execute lease deed of other plot holders of the subject scheme.
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16. The observation of the Ld. Trial Court to the effect that on account of
the subject lease deed suffering from any defects, the Petitioner ought to
have returned the document for rectification of the same, in this regard it is
essential to mention here the Section 21(4) of the Registration Act, 1909,
which is reproduced as under:
"21. Description of property and maps or plans.
............
(4) No non-testamentary document containing a map or
plan of any property comprised therein shall be accepted
for registration unless it is accompanied by a true copy of
the map or plan, or, in case such property is situate in
several districts, by such number of true copies of the
map or plan as are equal to the number of such districts."
17. Perusal of the record reflects that a true copy of the map was uploaded
with the lease deed, for its registration, as apparent from Ex. P-17 (Original
Registry) and Ex. C-12 (Uploaded lease deed), therefore, by no stretch of
imagination, could the Petitioner refuse to register the subject lease deed, and
thus no question of even dereliction of duties by the Petitioner can arise.
18. Besides the above, the allegation initially raised in the complaint dated
12.06.2019 preferred by the complainant before the police authorities, was to
an effect that the petitioner at the time of registration of the subject lease
deed had asked a question to this effect that whether have you paid the
amount towards the premium, was later on completely and consistently
omitted in his statement before the Ld. Trial Court during his evidence,
whereby the same complainant only stated that the aforesaid premium
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amount was given to Sanjeev Shrivastava and Service Provider before the
Petitioner. Thus, if the said allegation that the amount was given before the
Petitioner has to be tested on the touchstone of the provision of Section 319
CrPC, the same completely fails to demonstrate any offence under the law,
being committed by Petitioner.
19. Furthermore, the Ld. Trial Court has assigned a completely different
meaning to the evidence of the instant Petitioner (DW-3) vide paragraph no.
32 of his cross examination, by observing that he has given false statements
in respect of comparing the pradhikar patra (Ex. D-8) by himself, especially
by excluding his unhindered testimony that he had not compared and rather
had only seen the pradhikar patra which Sanjeev had brought. Thus, the very
foundation for invoking the powers under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. by the
Ld. Trial Court was flawed since inception, and the impugned order is
wholly unsustainable in the eyes of the law.
20. The material on record, including the deposition and documentary
evidence referred to during trial, does not disclose any direct or substantive
role attributable to the petitioner in the alleged commission of the offence.
The entire basis of summoning appears to be founded upon a presumption
regarding what the petitioner "ought to have done" rather than what he
demonstrably did in furtherance of any criminal design. Criminal liability
cannot be fastened on the basis of such presumptive reasoning. The evidence
on record does not establish any meeting of minds, conspiracy, or active
participation on the part of the petitioner with the principal accused persons.
When this court examined the prosecution witnesses in this case, no one
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gave any evidence which reflects direct or indirect involvement of the
petitioner in any manner whatsoever.
21. This Court is also constrained to observe that the summoning of an
additional accused has serious consequences, both in terms of personal
liberty and the course of the trial. Therefore, the satisfaction required under
Section 319 must be recorded with due care and supported by clear reasons
demonstrating how the evidence meets the requisite threshold. The impugned
order, in its present form, does not satisfy this requirement.
22. Now, the point for consideration of this court is that, the shelter of 197
CrPC is applicable to the petitioner. In Amal Kumar Jha vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and another, (2016) 6 SCC 734, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
authoritatively held that even if the act is in excess of duty, so long as there
exists a reasonable connection with official duty, the protection under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. cannot be denied. Similarly, in Jagdish Singh Meena and
another vs. Sagar Mogia and another, 2020 SCC OnLine MP 27, wherein this
Court reiterated that acts of police officials performed during duty, even
involving use of force, would attract the protection under Section 197
Cr.P.C. if reasonably connected with official duty.
23. Additionally, in K. Kalimuthu vs. State, (2005) 4 SCC 512 , Manorama
Tiwari vs. Surendra Nath Rai, (2016) 1 SCC 594 , and State of M.P. vs.
Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617, wherein the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the test is whether the act has reasonable nexus with
official duty and that even acts done in purported discharge of duty fall
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within the ambit of Section 197 Cr.P.C. In Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari,
(1955) 2 SCC 388 and State of Orissa vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8
SCC 40 to contend that the expression "official duty" must receive a broad
interpretation and that the act complained of need not be strictly within the
duty, but must be reasonably connected with it. Further, in State through CBI
vs. B.L. Verma, (1997) 10 SCC 772 , wherein it has been held that sanction
under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory and goes to the root of jurisdiction,
and in absence thereof, cognizance is vitiated.
24. In Anjani Kumar vs. State of Bihar 2008 CrLJ 2558 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has emphasized that the applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C.
must be determined with reference to the nature of the act and its nexus with
official duty, and that even at a subsequent stage, if such nexus is established,
the proceedings cannot continue without sanction. The principles laid down
in Matajog Dobey, and Sheetla Sahai (supra) consistently reiterate that there
must be a reasonable connection between the act and official duty and that
the provision cannot be construed narrowly so as to defeat its object. It has
been repeatedly held that even acts done in excess of duty would fall within
the protective ambit if they are reasonably connected with official functions.
25. In Amal Kumar Jha and Ganesh Chandra Jew (supra) , it has been
further clarified that the test is whether omission to perform the act would
have exposed the public servant to a charge of dereliction of duty. If the
answer is in the affirmative, the act must be held to be connected with
official duty. Similarly, in B.L. Verma (supra) it has been categorically held
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that the requirement of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory and
goes to the root of jurisdiction, and cognizance taken without such sanction
is unsustainable in law.
26. In the considered opinion of this Court the legal position regarding the
applicability of Section 197 of the CrPC is well settled. The expression
"official duty" appearing in the said provision has consistently been
interpreted in a broad and pragmatic manner by the Supreme Court. The
settled principle emerging from the decisions of the Supreme Court is that if
the act complained of is reasonably connected with the discharge of official
duty, the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. would be attracted. The act
complained of need not be strictly within the limits of official duty and even
acts done in excess of duty or in purported discharge of official duty would
fall within the protective ambit of the provision so long as there exists a
reasonable nexus between the act and the official duty performed.
27. In this regard it has repeatedly been emphasized by the Supreme Court
that the true test is whether omission to perform the act complained of would
have exposed the public servant to a charge of dereliction of duty. If the
answer to that question is in the affirmative, the act must necessarily be
regarded as having been performed in the course of official duty. The
Supreme Court has also consistently held that sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C. is not a mere procedural requirement but a condition precedent which
goes to the root of jurisdiction and that in absence of such sanction the
prosecution of a public servant for acts connected with official duty cannot
be sustained.
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28. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this
Court is of the view that the alleged acts attributed to the petitioners arose
during the course of registration of the sale deed by the petitioner in his
official capacity as a sub-registrar. The acts complained of therefore bear a
clear and reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duties by the
petitioners. The role of the petitioner was to register the lease deed under the
provision of registration act, 1908 and stamp act, 1899 with the discharge of
his official duty. The act of the petitioner is directly involved with the
official function.
29. In such circumstances the protection available under Section 197 of
the Cr.P.C. becomes applicable to the petitioner and sanction from the
competent authority becomes a mandatory prerequisite before taking
cognizance under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioner. The trial
court had committed error while taking cognizance against the petitioner.
30. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the essential ingredients for invoking the power under Section
319 were not made out against the petitioner. The evidence on record does
not disclose any such incriminating material which could justify his
summoning as an accused. The order passed by the learned trial Court,
therefore, suffers from legal infirmity and is liable to be interfered with.
31. Consequently, and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the present
petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated
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10.01.2025 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Itarsi,
whereby the petitioner has been summoned as an additional accused in
exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C., is hereby set aside.
32. The petition is accordingly allowed and disposed off.
(B. P. SHARMA)
JUDGE
SM
