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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Archana Dangi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 31 March, 2026
1 W.P.NO. 24696/2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
WRIT PETITION NO. 24696 OF 2021
ARCHANA DANGI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
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Appearance:
Shri Sankalp Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri K.K. Prajapati - GA for the respondents/State.
RESERVED ON: 20/03/2026
ORDER PASSED ON: 31/03/2026
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O R D E R
The petitioner Archana Dangi was originally a resident of District
Jalaun in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Her parents belong to Dangi
community, which is notified as OBC in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The
petitioner holds an OBC caste certificate issued by the competent authority
of District Jalaun (Uttar Pradesh) on 18/08/2005. She was married to one
Majbut Singh Dangi, who is a resident of District Datia in Madhya Pradesh.
Accordingly, after her marriage, she shifted to District Datia in the State of
Madhya Pradesh. Her husband also belongs to Dangi community, which is
notified as OBC in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
2. The petitioner participated in the Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak
Eligibility Test-2018 conducted by the School Education Department for
appointment to the post of Uchcha Madhyamik Shikshak. The petitioner
successfully qualified the test. She was called for document verification by
the District Education Officer, Datia. Upon verification of the documents,
her candidature was rejected on the ground that her caste certificate
belonged to another State. A copy of the documents verification slip dated
3/7/2020 in this regard has been placed on record as Annexure P/2 in the
writ petitions.
3. Challenging their disqualification, the petitioner has filed this writ
petition praying for the following reliefs:
"i) Annexure P/2 may kindly be quashed in the interest of justice,
ii) Petitioner be declared to be duly qualified candidate holding
due caste certificate and Respondent be directed to appoint
Petitioner on the post of Sanskrit teacher;
iii) Respondent be directed to conduct re-verification of the
documents of the Petitioner
iv) Any other relief deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of
the case may also be kindly granted,
Cost may also be awarded."
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner
belongs to Dangi community, which is recognized as OBC in the State of
Uttar Pradesh. Her caste certificate has been issued by the competent
authority of District Jalaun (U.P.). He then submitted that the aforesaid caste
is recognized as OBC in the State of Madhya Pradesh also and, therefore,
the petitioner could not have been denied the benefit of reservation in the
matter of selection.
5. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner migrated to the
State of Madhya Pradesh on account of her marriage. Her husband also
belong to the same caste and, therefore, by virtue of her marriage also, the
petitioner is entitled to be treated as member of the OBC community in the
State of Madhya Pradesh. Learned counsel thus submitted that the action of
the respondents in denying the appointment to the petitioner to the post in
question is illegal and deserves to be set aside. In support of his
submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon decision of a Coordinate
Bench of this Court at Indore in the case of Smt. Anusuiya Prajapati Vs.
State of M.P. & Ors., in W.P. No.10277/2021.
6. On the other hand, counsel for respondents supported the action of the
respondents. It is his submission that the petitioner is admittedly holding the
caste certificate which is issued by the authority of the State of Uttar
Pradesh. It is his submission that by virtue of her marriage, the petitioner
would not become the member of a particular caste in M.P. only because her
husband belongs to the said caste. As per his submission, the petitioner's
caste would be determined based on her birth and not on her marriage.
Learned counsel submitted that the instructions have been issued by the
General Administration Department vide circular dated 06/04/2021
providing that migration to the State of M.P., after marriage, the petitioner
would not be entitled to benefit of her caste by virtue of caste certificate
issued by the Competent Authority of State of Uttar Pradesh. In support of
his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the Division Bench
judgment in the case of Seema Devi Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported
in 2024(2) MPLJ 71. He also relied upon the decision of this Court in the
case of Sadhna Sau Vs. State of M.P. and Ors., in W.P. No.81/2023.
7. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
8. The facts which are not disputed in this case are that the petitioner
holds OBC caste certificate issued by the competent authority of District
Jalaun in the State of Uttar Pradesh. She migrated to the State of Madhya
Pradesh on account of her marriage. It is also not in dispute that the Dangi
caste is recognized as OBC in State of U.P. as also in M.P.
9. Thus, the issue for determination is as to whether, on the basis of the
caste certificate issued by the competent authority in the State of Uttar
Pradesh, the petitioner is entitled to claim the benefit of the OBC category
in the State of Madhya Pradesh ?
10. This issue is no more res integra. The Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Seema Devi (supra) has considered such issue and after referring
to various decisions of Hon. Supreme Court, held in para 6 & 7 as under:-
"6. From the aforesaid, it is lucid that a person, who migrates
from one State to the other does not carry his caste status to the
migrating State, even if the same caste is recognized as OBC in
both States. The reason is not far to see. There may be caste or
sub caste of same name, which are recognized in more than one
States in India. However, merely because the caste known by a
particular name is recognized in more than one States cannot
extend the benefit of reservation in both the States. The
recognition of a caste in a particular State as OBC is directly
relatable to social, economic and educational backwardness
faced by that caste in the home State. This geographical, social
and educational backwardness existing in the home State cannot
necessarily be the same in the other State.
6.1 Thus, it is not the similarity of name of a particular caste in
two or more States, which is the deciding factor but it is the
social, economic and educational backwardness of that particular
caste in a particular State, which recognizes that caste to be a
scheduled caste/OBC. The social, economic and educational
backwardness are factors, which are never identical or even
similar in two different States.
7. Accordingly, the prayer for quashment of Annexure P/1 & P/2,
which are executive instructions issued by Government of India
and Government of M.P. respectively do not have any force since
the principle behind these impugned instructions are in line with
law laid down by Apex Court in aforesaid decisions.
7.1 The other ground of petitioner that caste is relatable to birth
is not disputed. However, in the given facts and circumstances
where a person migrates from one State to the other, he does not
carry with him his caste status to the migrating State. This has
been explained repeatedly by Apex Court in aforesaid decisions
as extracted above.
7.2 The other ground of petitioner that concept of reservation
would be defeated, if Annexure P/1 & P/2 are upheld also has no
water to hold. The concept of reservation is undoubtedly
recognized Constitutionally. However, reservation in public
services is always Statewise and does not have a Pan India
sweep. The presidential orders which notified the list of
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and O.B.C. are published
separately for each State. There is no singular list of S.C., S.T.
and O.B.C. by a presidential order for the entire country. Thus,
there is no question of concept of reservation being defeated on
migration.
7.3 The last ground of learned counsel for petitioner that law laid
down by Apex Court is not in consonance with provisions of
Constitution is heard to be dismissed at the very outset. Under
Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by Apex Court is
binding on all Courts situated within the territory of India.
Aforesaid extracted judgments which lay down the law in respect
of caste status of a person migrating from one State to the other is
binding on this Court."
11. It is profitable to refer to the Apex Court judgment rendered in the
case of Bir Singh Vs. Delhi Jal Board, reported in (2018)10 SCC 312 on
this issue. The observations made by Apex Court in para 34 being relevant,
are reproduced hereunder:
"34. Unhesitatingly, therefore, it can be said that a person
belonging to a Scheduled Caste in one State cannot be deemed to
be a Scheduled Caste person in relation to any other State to
which he migrates for the purpose of employment or education.
The expressions "in relation to that State or Union Territory" and
"for the purpose of this Constitution" used in Articles 341 and
342 of the Constitution of India would mean that the benefits of
reservation provided for by the Constitution would stand confined
to the geographical territories of a State/Union Territory in
respect of which the lists of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
have been notified by the Presidential Orders issued from time to
time. A person notified as a Scheduled Caste in State 'A' cannot
claim the same status in another State on the basis that he is
declared as a Scheduled Caste in State 'A'."
12. The similar view has been taken by Coordinate Benches of this Court
in the case of Smt. Pratibha Goswami Vs. State of M.P. & others, in W.P.
No.3508/2022, Smt. Rajni Singh Vs. State of M.P. & others, in W.P.
No.5713/2013 & Anita Lilhare Vs. State of M.P. & others, in W.P.
No.28968/2022.
13. The Apex Court was considering the issue as to whether, a non-tribal
woman, upon marriage with a tribal man, would acquire the status of a
member of tribe, in the case of Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara
Swamy reported in (2005)2 SCC 244. Answering the issue, the Court held
as under:
"10.What then remains is the fact that the appellant though
assigned the caste of her father Murahari Rao, namely, the Sistu
Karnam community, had married a tribal belonging to the
Bhagatha community. On the basis of this marriage, it is argued
that she must be taken to have acquired membership in the
community of her husband and consequently treated as a member
of that community. It is in that context that the decision in Horo
[(1972) 1 SCC 771 : AIR 1972 SC 1840] was relied on. It is also
contended that the decision in Horo [(1972) 1 SCC 771 : AIR
1972 SC 1840] related to an election dispute and consequently,
the ratio of that decision should govern the present case. We have
already indicated that there is nothing to show that the marriage
of the appellant with Appala Raju was sanctioned or approved by
the elders of the Bhagatha community or the Panchayat
concerned or was in tribal form or that the formalities attending
such a tribal marriage were observed and the marriage was
performed after obtaining the approval of the elders of the tribe.
Even otherwise, we have difficulty in accepting the position that
a non-tribal who marries a tribal could claim to contest a seat
reserved for tribals. Article 332 of the Constitution speaks of
reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes in Legislative
Assemblies. The object is clearly to give representation in the
legislature to Scheduled Tribe candidates, considered to be
deserving of such special protection. To permit a non-tribal under
cover of a marriage to contest such a seat would tend to defeat
the very object of such a reservation. The decision of this Court in
Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University [(1996) 3 SCC 545 : 1996
SCC (L&S) 772 : (1996) 33 ATC 713] supports this view. Neither
the fact that a non-backward female married a backward male
nor the fact that she was recognised by the community
thereafter as a member of the backward community, was held to
enable a non-backward to claim reservation in terms of Article
15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution. Their Lordships after noticing
Bhoobum Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry [(1865)
10 MIA 279] and Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy Cassidass Moolchund
v. Cassibai [(1879-80) 7 IA 212 : ILR 5 Bom 110] held that a
woman on marriage becomes a member of the family of her
husband and thereby she becomes a member of the caste to which
she has moved. The caste rigidity breaks down and would stand
as no impediment to her becoming a member of the family to
which the husband belongs and to which she gets herself
transplanted. Thereafter, this Court noticed that recognition by
the community was also important. Even then, this Court
categorically laid down that the recognition of a lady as a
member of a backward community in view of her marriage would
not be relevant for the purpose of entitlement to reservation under
Article 16(4) of the Constitution for the reason that she as a
member of the forward caste, had an advantageous start in life
and a marriage with a male belonging to a backward class would
not entitle her to the facility of reservation given to a backward
community. The High Court has applied this decision to a seat
reserved in an election in terms of Article 332 of the Constitution.
We see no reason why the principle relating to reservation under
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) laid down by this Court should not be
extended to the constitutional reservation of a seat for a
Scheduled Tribe in the House of the People or under Article 332
in the Legislative Assembly. The said reservations are also
constitutional reservations intending to benefit the really
underprivileged and not those who come to the class by way of
marriage. To the extent the decision in Horo [(1972) 1 SCC 771 :
AIR 1972 SC 1840] can be said to run counter to the above view,
it cannot be accepted as correct. Even otherwise, in the absence
of evidence on the relevant aspects regarding marriage in tribal
form and acceptance by the community, the decision in Horo
[(1972) 1 SCC 771 : AIR 1972 SC 1840] cannot come to the
rescue of the appellant. On a consideration of the relevant
aspects, we are of the view that whether it be a reservation
under Articles 15(4) or 16(4) or 330 and 332, the said
reservation would benefit only those who belong to a Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe and not those who claim to acquire
the status by marriage, like the appellant in this case. Thus, in
our view, the High Court was fully justified in coming to the
conclusion that the appellant could not claim the right to contest
a seat reserved for a Scheduled Tribe in terms of Article 332of the
Constitution merely by virtue of her marriage to a person
belonging to a Scheduled Tribe."
14. Following the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court reiterated the same
legal position in the case of Sandhya Thakur v. Vimla Devi Kushwah
reported in (2005)2 SCC 731 as under:
"2. In the light of the decision in Valsamma Paul v. Cochin
University [(1996) 3 SCC 545 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 772 : (1996) 33
ATC 713] and our decision rendered today in Sobha Hymavathi
Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy [ CAs Nos. 4413-14 of 2003
dated 28-1-2005 reported at (2005) 2 SCC 244], which was heard
along with this appeal, it must be held that the appellant, who by
birth did not belong to a backward class or community, would not
be entitled to contest a seat reserved for a backward class or
community, merely on the basis of her marriage to a male of that
community. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the argument
that the appellant was entitled to contest a seat reserved for a
backward community merely because of her marriage to a person
belonging to the Namdev community or caste. We also see no
reason to differ from the High Court in its view that the circular
dated 12-3-1997 was not restricted in its operation to employment
and admission to an educational institution, but was also relevant
and applicable in elections to local bodies. It is, thus, found that
both the reasons given by the High Court for affirming the
decision of the District Judge setting aside the election of the
appellant are sustainable. In view of this we have no hesitation in
confirming the decision of the High Court and in dismissing this
appeal. Hence, we dismiss this appeal with costs."
15. In view of aforesaid pronouncement of law by the Apex Court as also
by Division Bench and Coordinate Benches of this Court, it is settled legal
position that a person, when migrates from one State to other, does not carry
with him, his caste status to the migrating State. Merely because the caste
with the same name is recognized in both the States would not ipso facto
entitle such person to get the benefit of his caste in the migrating State.
Similarly, a woman when moves from one state to another on marriage, also
would not acquire the status of caste of her husband.
16. The term sub silentio is a legal Latin term which means "under
silence" or "in silence". Further, the term per incuriam means "through
inadvertence". In the case of Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. Vs. State of
Orissa reported in (2015)2 SCC 189, the Apex Court dealt with doctrine of
sub silentio and per incuriam and held as under:
"47. Therefore, I am of the considered view that a prior decision
of this Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the
same points of law in a later case. In exceptional circumstances,
where owing to obvious inadvertence or oversight, a judgment
fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority
running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the
principle of per incuriam may apply. The said principle was also
noticed in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd.,
(2001) 6 SCC 356."
17. The Division Bench of this Court has also considered the doctrine of
sub silentio and per incuriam in the case of Ram Bharose Sharma vs. State
of M.P. & ors. reported in 2021(4) MPLJ 90, wherein the Division Bench
held as under:
"28. Therefore, cumulatively, the decision of Division Bench in
the case of A was Samasya Niwaran Sansthan (supra) as well as
in Ward Sudhar Samiti (supra), did not consider the interplay of
different provisions of the Act of 1956 and their resultant effect
in the light of principle of Public Policy, especially when
provisions of issuance of public notice and authority to impose
improvement charges lie with the Commissioner as per section
371 and 378 respectively of the Act of 1956 and both judgments
did not consider these provisions and point of law involved in
given factual set up, then both these judgments pass sub silentio
and cannot be relied upon being per incuriam on discussion
made and reasons stated above."
18. In support of his submission, petitioner's counsel has placed heavy
reliance upon the Coordinate Bench decision of this Court at Indore in the
case of Smt. Anusuiya Prajapati (supra). However, it is found that the
Apex Court decision rendered in the case of Bir Singh, Sobha Hymavathi
Devi, Sandhya Thakur (supra) as also the Division Bench decision of this
Court in the case of Seema Devi (supra), were not brought to the notice of
the Court in the case of Smt. Anusuiya Prajapati (supra). The view taken
by the Court in the case of Smt. Anusuiya Prajapati (supra) is found to be
not in consonance with the aforesaid decisions of Apex Court. Accordingly,
the decision of Coordinate Bench of this Court at Indore in the case of Smt.
Anusuiya Prajapati (supra) is found to be per incuriam and petitioner does
not get any help from the the said decision.
19. The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to claim the benefit of her
caste in State of Madhya Pradesh on the basis of her caste certificate issued
by the competent authority in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The action of the
respondents is, therefore, found to be just and proper and does not warrant
any interference by this Court. The same is upheld.
20. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
JPS/-
