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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bhupendra Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 26 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10559
1 WP. No. 6102 of 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 26th OF MARCH, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 6102 of 2016
BHUPENDRA SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THR AND OTHERS
Appearance:
None for petitioner.
Shri K.K. Prajapati - learned Government Advocate for the
respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been
filed seeking the following relief (s):
"i- The order impugned annexure P/1 may kindly be
quashed.
ii- Respondents may kindly be directed to send the
petitioner on training and thereafter he be permitted to join
on the post of constable in the respondents departments.
Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the
facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be
granted."
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2. According to memo of petition, examination was conducted by the
respondents for filling up the post of 'Constable' and petitioner proved his
merit therein. Thereafter, an appointment letter was issued to petitioner by
the respondents vide Annexure P/2. Petitioner disclosed in the verification
form that one criminal case (Crime No. 26/2010) was registered against him
under Sections 341, 294, 323, 324, 147, 148, and 149 of the IPC at Police
Station Noorabad, District Morena. The trial court passed acquittal order
dated 22.07.2010, partly on the basis of compromise and partly on merits. It
is submitted that the Home Department issued a circular listing certain
offences under the category of moral turpitude. Despite acquittal of
petitioner, respondents held that petitioner failed in character verification
and declared him to be unfit for service, thereby cancelling his selection.
Further, it is mentioned in the petition that similarly situated candidates who
were either involved in cases or acquitted on compromise have been granted
appointment. Petitioner had earlier filed Writ Petition No.74/2014
challenging the rejection order which was disposed of on 9.2.2016 with
following directions:-
"1. That, the petitioner shall submit a fresh representation
within two weeks from the date of receiving the certified copy
of this order to the competent authority along with Division
Bench Judgement of this Court as well as Supreme Court
judgments.
2. On presentation of such representation, it would be
considered and decided within one month. If the case of the
petitioner is found similar to the judgment of Division Bench
and other judgments then appropriate order of appointment be
passed otherwise assigning the reasons and affording an
opportunity of hearing the claim of petitioner be rejected.
3. Needless to observe here that if petitioner feels aggrieved by
said oder then he may take recourse of law afresh."
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Thereafter, impugned order has been passed by the respondents. While
doing so, respondents relied upon Para 64 of the Police Regulations and held
that offences under Sections 148 and 149 IPC involve moral turpitude and
thus are of serious nature. They further observed that acquittal on the basis
of compromise cannot be treated as acquittal on merits and that the conduct
of petitioner shows an offensive attitude, making him unfit for a disciplined
force like the police. It is the averment in the petition that such action of the
respondents is illegal and unsustainable in the eyes of law, as it overlooks
the acquittal order passed by the competent court. Sections 148 and 149 IPC
are supplementary in nature and cannot be considered in isolation to
conclude moral turpitude. Moreover, acquittal based on compromise is a
valid acquittal in view of Section 320(8) Cr.P.C. It is further mentioned in
the petition that the circular issued in the year 2003 is arbitrary and
unsustainable in law as it includes offences without any rational basis under
the category of moral turpitude. The respondents have applied the said
circular mechanically, without conducting a case-wise assessment of the
petitioner's role. Thus, the refusal of character verification is arbitrary,
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as it
deprives petitioner of his right to employment. Therefore, the impugned
order dated 16.05.2016 (Annexure P/1) is liable to be quashed. To
strengthen the abovesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the
judgment by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Panna
Mehta vs. State of M.P., reported in 2002 (4) M.P.H.T. 226 mentioning
that similar matters have been allowed on the basis of the said judgment.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents while
supporting the impugned order submits that petitioner was found involved in
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the criminal case. His acquittal, in the said case was not honourable and was
only based upon the compromise between the parties and therefore, the
Screening Committee was entitled to consider the petitioner's conduct while
judging his suitability for the post. Learned counsel also placed reliance
upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner
of Police, New Delhi and another Vs. Mehar Singh, reported in (2013)7
SCC 685, State of M.P. & others Vs. Parvez Khan reported in (2015)2
SCC 591, as also in the case of State of M.P. & others Vs. Bhupendra
Yadav, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1181 and ultimately prays for
dismissal of instant petition.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The issue of considering the candidature of a candidate for
appointment in view of his involvement in the criminal case has been
considered time and again by the Apex Court as also by this Court. Similar
issue was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Mehar Singh
(Supra). It was also a case wherein the incumbent was acquitted based upon
compromise, the Court held that it is still open to the Screening Committee
to examine the suitability of the candidate and take a decision. The Court
held in paragraphs 22, 23, 33, 34, 35 as under :
"22. Clause (3) of the comprehensive policy delineated in
the Standing Order is material for the present case. It refers
to the Screening Committee comprising high police
officers. After a candidate, who has disclosed his
involvement, is acquitted or discharged, the Committee has
to assess his/her suitability for appointment. Clause (6)
states that those against whom serious offences or offences
involving moral turpitude are registered and who are later
on acquitted by extending benefit of doubt or because the
witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the
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accused person shall not generally be considered suitable
for government service. However, all such cases will be
considered by the Screening Committee manned by senior
officers. In our opinion, the word "generally" indicates the
nature of discretion. As a matter of rule, such candidates
have to be avoided. Exceptions will be few and far
between and obviously must be substantiated with
acceptable reasons.
23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude
that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep
persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of
the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if
it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical
grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee will
be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate
if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in
the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of
material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced
officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to
judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is
likely to revert to similar activities in future with more
strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police
force. The Screening Committee will have to consider the
nature and extent of such person's involvement in the
crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for
worsening the law and order situation rather than
maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the
Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this
Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons
with impeccable character enter the police force.
33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his
case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that
acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be
treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the
purpose of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We
see no merit in this submission. Compromises or
settlements have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful
and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a
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quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also to
reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the
agony of pending litigation. But these considerations
cannot be brought in here. In order to maintain integrity
and high standard of police force, the Screening
Committee may decline to take cognizance of a
compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The
Screening Committee cannot be faulted for that.
34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the
fact that in their application and/or attestation form they
have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We do
not see how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of
these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential
requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts
honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of
the police force. The respondents should not, therefore,
expect to score any brownie points because of this
disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in
issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding
whether a person against whom a criminal case was
registered and who was later on acquitted or discharged
should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is
relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his
involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or
an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the
witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in
the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to
indulge in similar activities in future. This decision, in our
opinion, can only be taken by the Screening Committee
created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the
Screening Committee's decision is not mala fide or
actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be
questioned.
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the
great responsibility of maintaining law and order and
public order in the society. People repose great faith and
confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A
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candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person
of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character
and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will
not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge
order will have to be examined to see whether he has been
completely exonerated in the case because even a
possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat
to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order,
therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in
these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of
the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is
mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is
tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a
wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain
and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police
force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not
like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism
like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police
to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility
do not enter the police force. At the same time, the
Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of
the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an
even hand."
6. Again, in the case of Parvez Khan (Supra), the Apex Court reiterated
the same legal proposition holding as under :
"13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear
that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must
be worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost
rectitude and must have impeccable character and
integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit
in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it
cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated.
Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police
ought not to enter the police force. No doubt the Screening
Committee has not been constituted in the case considered
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by this Court, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel
for the respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent
of Police has gone into the matter. The Superintendent of
Police is the appointing authority. There is no allegation of
mala fides against the person taking the said decision nor
the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational. There is
no material to show that the appellant was falsely
implicated. Basis of impugned judgment [Parvez Khan v.
State of M.P. , Writ Appeal No. 262 of 2010, decided on
20-3-2012 (MP)] is acquittal for want of evidence or
discharge based on compounding."
7. The Apex Court reiterated the same legal proposition in the case of
Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & others Vs. Pradeep Kumar
& another, reported in (2018)1 SCC 797 and held in para - 13 as under :
"13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case
does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the
post. Still it is open to the employer to consider the
antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for
appointment to the post. From the observations of this
Court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases, it is clear
that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must
be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having
criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if
he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that
he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The
decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as
final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening
Committee also must be alive to the importance of the
trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with
utmost character."
8. In view of the aforesaid legal pronouncements of law by the Apex
Court, it is now settled that the jurisdiction to judge the suitability of a
candidate for appointment lies with the Screening Committee only. The
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Apex Court in para 22 of Mehar Singh (supra) held that as a rule such
candidates should be avoided. It is further held in para 33 that the decision of
the Screening Committee can be interfered with only when the same is based
on mala fide or is actuated with some extraneous consideration. Further, in
para 35, the Apex Court held that the decision of Screening Committee has
to be accepted unless it is based on mala fide. Looking to the facts of present
case, it is found that petitioner has not alleged any mala fide against the
Screening Committee. Thus, the discretion exercised by the Screening
Committee needs to be accepted.
9. As seen from above, a candidate should be held as suitable first if he
is tried for trivial offence(s) and secondly he is acquitted. No doubt
petitioner was tried for compoundable offences but his acquittal was not
honourable. The term 'acquitted' used in aforesaid clause has to mean
acquitted on merits otherwise undue benefit would be acquired by
candidates who may be involved in criminal activities. Somewhat similar
clause was under consideration before Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Anil Bhardwaj v. Hon'ble High Court of M.P. and others AIR 2020 SC
4971. The Apex Court while dealing with similar provision held that the
acquittal should be on merits. Para 27 being relevant is quoted hereunder :
"27. Clause (viii) on which the reliance is placed
contemplates that the candidate who has been acquitted
on merit by the Court will be eligible for the Government
service. The aforesaid contemplation relates to at the time
of character verification. Thus, at the time of character
verification, if a candidate is found to be acquitted on
merits by the Court, the candidate shall be treated to be
eligible for Government Service. The above clause (viii)
as quoted above cannot come to the rescue of the
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appellant who at the time of character verification or at
the time of consideration of the case of the appellant by
the committee on 18.07.2018 had not been acquitted.
Had the appellant in column 12 had mentioned about the
acquittal or at the time of character verification it was
found that the candidate has been acquitted on merit by
the Court, Clause 6(viii) would have been attracted but in
the present case the said clause is not attracted since at
the time of character verification the appellant had not
been acquitted and he was acquitted after more than a
year from rejection of his candidature.
10. The reliance placed upon by the petitioner's counsel on the judgment
of Division Bench in the case of Rohit Singh Raghuvanshi (Supra) is also
misplaced inasmuch as the facts of that case were entirely different. In the
said case, only offence was registered against the petitioner but there was no
final verdict by the Court. In that context, the Division Bench laid down
certain criteria to be looked into by the competent authority. However, in the
present case, criminal case has already been closed.
11. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has passed the order in the case of
Bhupendra Yadav (Supra) wherein in similar circumstances, the Court has
approved the decision of the Screening Committee in cancelling the
candidature of the candidate who was acquitted in criminal case on the basis
of compromise. In the said case also, the candidature was cancelled based
upon the compromise between the parties. The Apex Court held as under:
"16. As can be discerned from the above decision, an
employer has the discretion to terminate or condone an
omission in the disclosure made by a candidate. While
doing so, the employer must act with prudence, keep in
mind the nature of the post and the duties required to be
discharged. Higher the post, more stringent ought to be
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the standards to be applied. Even if a truthful disclosure
has been made, the employer is well within its right to
examine the fitness of a candidate and in a concluded
criminal case, keep in mind the nature of the offence and
verify whether the acquittal is honourable or benefit has
been extended on technical reasons. If the employer
arrives at a conclusion that the incumbent is of a suspect
character or unfit for the post, he may not be appointed
or continued in service."
12. The Full Bench of this Court has also considered the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in
such matters in the case of Ashutosh Pawar Vs. State of M.P., reported in
2018(2) MPLJ 419, wherein in para 32 & 40, it has been held as under:
"32. Therefore, in respect of the Questions No. 1, 4 and 5
we hold that decision of Criminal Court on the basis of
compromise or an acquittal cannot be treated that the
candidate possesses good character, which may make him
eligible, as the criminal proceedings are with the view to
find culpability of commission of offence whereas the
appointment to the civil post is in view of his suitability
to the post. The test for each of them is based upon
different parameters and therefore, acquittal in a criminal
case is not a certificate of good conduct to a candidate.
The competent Authority has to take a decision in respect
of the suitability of candidate to discharge the functions
of a civil post and that mere acquittal in a criminal case
would not be sufficient to infer that the candidate
possesses good character. Division Bench judgment of
this Court in W.P.No.5887/2016 (Arvind Gurjar vs. State
of M.P.) is overruled. Another Division Bench judgment
in W.A. No.367/2015 (Sandeep Pandey vs. State of M.P.
and others) is also overruled. Jurisdiction of the High
Court in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution
of India is to examine the decision-making process than
to act as Court of appeal to substitute its own decision. In
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appropriate case, if the Court finds decision-making
process is arbitrary or illegal, the Court will direct the
Authority for reconsideration rather than to substitute the
decision of the competent Authority with that of its own.
xxx xxx xxx
40. In view of the law laid down in above said judgments,
there is no doubt that in exercise of power of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this
Court only examines the decision-making process and
does not substitute itself as a Court of appeal over the
reasons recorded by the State Government. We find that
the decision of the State Government holding that the
petitioner is not suitable, is just, fair and reasonable
keeping in view the nature of the post and the duties to be
discharged."
13. In view of the aforesaid legal position settled by the Apex Court as
also by this Court, it is loud and clear that the interference in such matters
can be made only on the ground of mala fides. Further, this Court can
examine only the decision making process and not the merits of the case.
The jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case lies within the exclusive
domain of the Screening Committee. Further, as a rule, decision of
Screening Committee needs to be accepted unless it is shown to be based on
mala fide or on some extraneous consideration.
14. In view of aforesaid discussion, if the facts of this case are considered
in the light of the judicial pronouncements in various judgments, it is clear
that a criminal offence was registered against petitioner wherein specific
allegations against petitioner in the FIR were made. Under these
circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Screening
Committee was competent to consider petitioner's candidature vis-a-vis his
involvement and role in criminal incident. In absence of any mala fide
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and/or involvement of any extraneous consideration, the decision of
Screening Committee does not warrant any interference by this Court.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion and the facts and circumstances of
the present case in their entirety, this petition, being bereft of substance, is
liable to be and is accordingly dismissed.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Ahmad
