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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gajendra Singh Kushwah vs Madhya Pradesh Rajya Kr4Ishi Vipanan ... on 24 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:10144
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 24th OF MARCH, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 5763 of 2017
GAJENDRA SINGH KUSHWAH
Versus
MADHYA PRADESH RAJYA KR4ISHI VIPANAN BOARD THR. AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Dharmendra Singh Raghuwanshi, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Shyam Prakash Jain, Advocate for respondents
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been
filed seeking the following reliefs:-
"i) That, the present petition filed by petitioner may kindly be
allowed
ii) That, the impugned order dated 13.7.2017 Annexure P/1 passed
by the respondents may kindly be directed to be set aside
iii) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief, which this
Hon'ble Court deems fit, may also kindly be granted to the
petitioner. Costs be awareded in favour of petitioner"
2. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that petitioner was holding
the post of Grade C Secretary in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti,
Madhusudangarh, District Guna. That, at the relevant point of time, in the
year 2013 petitioner was posted in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Bhind. At that
time 20 gate passes in number were issued by M/s Sanjana Traders and from
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Bhander in the name of M/s Ganesh Trading Company Bhind. Charge-sheet
was issued to the petitioner on 28.01.2016 and charge was levelled against
the petitioner that 20 gate passes were forged. Petitioner submitted reply to
the charge-sheet and denied allegations. Thereafter, Enquiry Officer has been
appointed and Enquiry Officer completed enquiry and thereafter disciplinary
authority has supplied the copy of enquiry report and asked the reply of
petitioner and thereafter petitioner submitted reply to the enquiry report.
Thereafter, disciplinary authority has imposed punishment whereby 10% of
pension of petitioner has been stopped for three years and except payment of
subsistence allowance other benefit of petitioner during suspension period
has been forfeited. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that
petitioner has submitted a detailed reply to the show cause notice dated
15.03.2017 and various facts and grounds have been mentioned in his reply
dated 01.05.2017 and submitted that disciplinary authority has not considered
reply dated 01.05.2017 and imposed punishment by order dated 13.07.2017.
Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that facts and grounds
mentioned in the reply dated 01.05.2017 has been mentioned in the
impugned order, but there is no consideration upon the facts and grounds
mentioned by petitioner in his reply and without considering the facts and
grounds mentioned in the reply, non-speaking and unreasoned impugned
order has been passed by respondents.
3 . Per contra, learned counsel for respondents submitted that after
taking into consideration the entire facts and material on record including the
submissions made by petitioner in his representation/reply, the order dated
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13.07.2017 has rightly been passed by competent authority and rightly the
penalty of stoppage of 10% pension of petitioner for the period of three years
has been inflicted on the petitioner with a further direction that petitioner will
not be entitled to get any other amount/allowances except subsistence
allowance for the period he remained under suspension dated 31.12.2015.
4. Heard both the counsels and perused the record.
5. Important part of the punishment order dated 13.07.2017 is quoted
herein below :-
" य प संयु संचालक संभागीय कायालय वािलयर ारा क गई जांच
एवं तुत कये गये जांच ितवेदन म ी कुशवाह को फज अनु ा जार
करने के संबंध म सीधे उ रदायी नह ं माना है पर तु िन कष म उ लेख
कये गये ब द ु अनुसार ी कुशवाह फज अनु ा प जार करण म
उ रदायी ह। उ से प है क ी कुशवाह ारा मु यालय से जार
दशा िनदश अनु प कायवाह वलंब से क गई जसके िलए ी कुशवाह
दोषी है । अत: ी गजे िसंह कुशवाह (सेवािनवृ ) सिचव को उपरो
कदाचरण को दोषी मानते हुये म. . रा य म ड बोड सेवा विनयम,
1998 के विनयम 30 (सात) के अ तगत 10 ितशत पशन, तीन वष
तक, के िलए रोकने क शा त अिधरो पत करते हुए वभागीय जांच
करण एत ारा समा कया जाता है । ी कुशवाह क िनलबंन अ वध
मा पशन योजन के िलए कत य अविध मा य क जाती है । िनलंबन
अविध म ा जीवन िनवाह भ े के अित र शेष अ य वेतन भ को
ा करने क पा ता नह ं होगी। "
6. From perusal of the punishment order issued by the Disciplinary
Authority dated 13.07.2017, it is clear that the Disciplinary Authority while
passing an order imposing punishment upon the petitioner, is exercising
quasi judicial power and even the quasi judicial order must be a speaking
order. The Disciplinary Authority must apply its mind to the entire facts and
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ground mentioned in the reply and circumstances and record valid and
justifiable reason and all grounds in support of its conclusion.
7. On perusal of the punishment order, it does not appear to be a
speaking one.
8. It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is vested in an
authority to exercise a particular power, the same is required to be exercised
with due diligence, and in reasonable and rational manner. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in catena of decisions has reiterated time and again the
necessity and importance of giving reasons by the authority in support of its
decision. It has been held that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial
authority or even by an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties
must speak. The affected party must know how his case or defence was
considered before passing the prejudicial order.
9. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Punjab v/s. Bandip Singh and others reported in (2016) 1 SCC 724 is
relevant to quote. In the said decision it had been held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that every decision of an administrative or executive nature
must be a composite and self-sustaining one, in that it should contain all the
reasons which prevailed on the official taking the decision to arrive at his
conclusion.
10. In the same judgment in paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
clarifies that the Government does not have carte blanche to take any
decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced
decision. Its decision must be informed and impregnated with reasons.
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Paragraph 7 of the said decision is quoted as under:-
"7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun
v. State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 382.
However, we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not
have a carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot
take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision
must be informed and impregnated with reasons.
This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of
this Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N
Publications Ltd (1993) 1 SCC 445, Tata Cellular v. Union of
India (1994) 6 SCC 651, Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International
Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 617, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair
Coal Services Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 548 and Jagdish Mandal v.
State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517"
11. Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another v/s Masood Ahmed Khan and others
cited in (2010) 9 SCC 496 highlights this point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in paragraph 15 opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi judicial
authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties,
must speak. It must not be like the inscrutable face of a sphinx. In paragraph
47 the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized its discussion. The relevant
subparagraphs of the said summary are quoted as under:-
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component
of a decisionmaking process as observing principles of natural
justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative
bodies.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of
law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned
decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of
judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the
soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these
decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by
reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered.
This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice
delivery system.
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(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the
broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was
considered part of Stasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz torija v.
Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University
of Oxford 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred
to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which
requires,"adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for
judicial decisions".
12. As disciplinary authority has issued a non-speaking and
unreasoned order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Oryx Fisheries
Pvt.Ltd vs Union Of India & Ors; (2010) 13 SCC 427 has held as under:-
"41. In M/s Kranti Associates (supra), this Court after considering
various judgments formulated certain principles in para 51 of the
judgment which are set out below
a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons,
even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone
prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider
principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also
appear to be done as well.
d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any
possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasijudicial or even
administrative power.
e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the
decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of
a decision making process as observing principles of natural
justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative
bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior
Courts.
h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of
law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned
decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of
judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the
soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these
decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by
reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered.
This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice
delivery system.
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j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough
about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to
know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to
be equated with a valid decision making process.
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision
making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone
to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See
David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward
Law Review 731-737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the
broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement
is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered
part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562
para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405,
wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of
Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons
must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all common law
jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents
for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of
giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a
part of "Due Process".
42. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons.
However, absence of reasons in the original order cannot be
compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate order.
43. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna
and others,(1986) 4 SCC 537, it has been held:
"......after the blow suffered by the initial decision, it is
difficult to contemplate complete restitution through an
appellate decision. Such a case is unlike an action for
money or recovery of property, where the execution of
the trial decree may be stayed pending appeal, or a
successful appeal may result in refund of the money or
restitution of the property, with appropriate
compensation by way of interest or mesne profits for
the period of deprivation. And, therefore, it seems to us,
there is manifest need to ensure that there is no breach
of fundamental procedure in the original proceeding,
and to avoid treating an appeal as an overall substitute
for the original proceeding."
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44. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court quashes the
show cause notice as also the order dated 19.03.2008
passed by the third respondent. In view of that, the
appellate order has no legs to stand and accordingly is
quashed."
13. In view of the above discussions and the facts and circumstances
of the case, I am left with no choice but to set aside impugned punishment
order dated 13.07.2017.
14. Consequently respondents are directed to give all consequential
benefits to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of
receipt of certified copy of this order and as petitioner has already retired and
aged 69 years, therefore, no liberty is granted to the respondents to take
action against the petitioner.
15. With aforesaid observations and directions, preset Writ Petition is
hereby disposed of.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
"R"
