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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Akash Singh Thakur vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 23 March, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
ON THE 23rd OF MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 11536 of 2026
AKASH SINGH THAKUR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Mukesh Kumar Pandey - Advocate for the applicant.
Shri Sushil Kumar Mishra - Advocate for complainant.
Shri Aditya Gupta - P.L. for State.
ORDER
This is first application filed by the applicant under Section 483 of the
Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for grant of regular bail relating to
FIR/Crime No.130/2026 registered at Police Station - Patan, District -
Jabalpur for the offences punishable under Sections 69 of BNS. Applicant is
in detention since 01.03.2026.
2. As per prosecution story, on 28/02/2026 the complainant, aged about 23
years old, lodged an F.I.R. against the applicant alleging that on the false
promise of marriage, the applicant was having physical relationship with her
on several occasions.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is 27 years
of age and the victim is 23 years of age and both were having physical
relationships for more than three years with consent. Both are major and due
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to some difficulties either of the parties, the marriage could not be taken
place, which is not a ground for filing of FIR. The relationship was
developed on the basis of consent and under the alleged false promise of
marriage, the offence is made out under Section 69 of BNS, 2023, which is
not in consonance with law. There is no criminal antecedent against the
applicant. The applicant is permanent resident of Jabalpur District and,
therefore, he will be available in each date of trial and there is no chance of
his fleeing away. It is prayed that considering the fact that applicant is behind
bar since 01.03.2026, investigation is likely to be concluded within short
time and charge-sheet is going to be filed, therefore, applicant may be
released on bail.
4. Learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer made by the
learned counsel for the applicant.
5. I have considered the rival submission made at the Bar and perused the
case diary.
6. This Court has considered similar matter in M.Cr.C. No.12004/2026
(Jitendra Thakur Vs. State of M.P. ) decided on 16.03.2026, wherein the
relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinunder:
"4. Heard the submissions made at the bar and perused the case
diary and also considered section 69 of BNS, which is reproduced
as under:-
"Section 69- Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means etc.
Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry a
woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, and has sexual
intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the
offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also
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be liable to fine."
5. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Samadhan Vs. State if
Maharashtra in Cr.A. No.5001/2025 , in para 34 to 40 has held as
under:
"34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation
that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled
respondent No.2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does
it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on
the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore,
the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of
her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It
is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant
brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself
opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of
respondent No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties
was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is
devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in
Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197,
whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in
a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its
nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such
relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false
promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man
cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The
relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under:
"33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the
complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns.
The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure
whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a
police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual
relations were under duress or were being established under a false
assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed
herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the
allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right
from the inception of the relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the
complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place
of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship
between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without
the existence of any element of deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop
Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she
was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It
is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they
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should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her
and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation
then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this
incident.
However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the
complainant that the appellant was getting married to another
woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid
complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that
she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage
must be stopped.
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the
offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual
relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can
agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and
passion for the accused." (underlining by us)
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court
observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was
consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by
him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was
merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High
Court on the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2013) 7 SCC 278, wherein this Court had stated that unless there
was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence
cannot be inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to
appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals
that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual,
inasmuch as respondent No.2 met the appellant whenever he
expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2,
being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated
with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own
volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the
marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In light of the
foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the
material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the
parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised
in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when
the same can be otherwise clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court
in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made:
"29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise
to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section
90 IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an
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intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical
relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was
given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated
and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana,
(2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in which it was held
as follows: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between
rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to
marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls
within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at
an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and
whether the consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence.
There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which
he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was
unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for
rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the
accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the
accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a
person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim
owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The 'failure to keep
a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to
reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does
not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact
must have an immediate relevance'. Section 90 IPC cannot be
called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in
entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court
is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had
never really intended to marry her." (underlining by us)
39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
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this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now
Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not
necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to
the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may
be appropriate:
"102. xxx (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
xxx"
40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur
with the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the
present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of
respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship
devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation
as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In
our opinion, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction
under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained
of in the present case occurred within the contours of a
relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The
continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing
short of an abuse of the court machinery."
7. It transpires that the applicant is aged about 27 years and the
complainant is aged about 23 years and they were having relationships for
for more than three years and on different occasions, they have made
physical relationships. Considering the totality of the facts and
circumstances and considering the fact that applicant is behind bar since
01.03.2026, more particularly the applicant has no criminal antecedent, I
deem it a fit case to release the applicant on bail. Therefore, the application is
allowed.
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7. It is directed that applicant be released on bail on his furnishing a
personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) with
one solvent surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court, for
his regular appearance before the trial Court during trial with a condition that
he shall remain present before the concerned Court on all the dates fixed by
it during trial. He shall abide by all the conditions enumerated under Section
480(3) of BNSS, 2023. He will not indulge in any such activity which
affects the process of investigation process of trial in any manner. He will
not try to influence any of the witnesses during the course of trial.
8. He shall strictly follow all above mentioned conditions. He shall not
violate any of the conditions otherwise it will be open for the prosecution to
pray for cancellation of bail.
9. This order shall be effective till the end of the trial. However, in case of
bail jump and breach of any of the conditions of bail, it shall become
ineffective.
Certified copy as per rules.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
Biswal
