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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Parth Patel vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 13 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:20379
1 MCRC-11173-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
ON THE 13 th OF MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 11173 of 2026
PARTH PATEL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Siddharth Sharma along with Shri Mayank Upadhyay, Shri Satyam
Shukla and Shri Luvkush Rathore, learned counsel for applicant.
Shri Ashish Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent-objector.
Shri Sourabh Soni, learned Panel Lawyer for respondent/State.
ORDER
This is the first application filed on behalf of the applicant under Section
482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) for grant of
anticipatory bail apprehending his arrest in relation to Crime No.074/2026
registered at Police Station - Tilwara, District Jabalpur (M.P.) for the offence
punishable under Sections 69 and 351(2) of the B.N.S, 2023.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is innocent
and has been falsely implicated in the said offence. He further submits that the
applicant is 24 years old coming from a reputed and well educated family. As per
the case of the prosecution and affidavit filed by the prosecutrix herself, it
transpires that the applicant along with the prosecutrix had visited various places
ITC etc., and established physical relation with the prosecutrix. The relationship
continued for about 2 years and since due to some dispute between the parties now
the prosecutrix is demanding money to the tune of more than 1 crore and
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petitioner has tried to resolve the dispute but thereafter the prosecutrix filed this
complaint, which is as such not satisfying the requirement under Section 69 and
also considering the conduct of the applicant as well as conduct of the prosecutrix
also, the case of the applicant is required to be considered. He also submits that
even the case of the prosecutrix is having some contradiction by saying that the
applicant established physical relation with her under pretext of marriage. The
applicant is a young boy having no criminal antecedents. He will be available and
cooperate in the process of investigation. There is no need of custodial
interrogation of present applicant. The conclusion of trial will take considerable
time. In these circumstances, applicant may be granted anticipatory bail.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the objector has strongly opposed
the prayer by pointing out the affidavit file by the prosecutrix whereby the copy of
the Whatsapp chats are also produced, which indicates the false promise of
marriage.
4. Heard the submissions made at the bar and perused the case diary and
also considered sections 69 of BNS, which are reproduced as under:-
Section 69 - Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means etc.
Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry a woman
without any intention of fulfilling the same, and has sexual intercourse
with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.
5. Considering to the facts and circumstances of the case and also
considering that the present applicant is a young boy of 24 years of age and
prosecutrix is 23 years old. Both are adults and even considering the affidavit filed
by the prosecutrix by way of objection to consider the present application she has
stated that they are in relationship for about 2 years and visited various places like
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ITC, etc and have entered into physical relationship.
6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Samadhan Vs. State if Maharashtra in
Cr.A. No.5001/2025, in para 34 to 40 has held as under:
34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the
appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No.2 to
accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance
suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure
her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is
that respondent No.2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant
on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the
appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself
opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of
respondent No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties was
premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of
merit and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in
Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it
was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term
sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without
any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by
misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith
from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section
376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as
under:
"33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the
complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The
complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure
whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a
police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations
were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of
marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife
of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of
the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the
relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the
complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of
posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the
complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of
any element of deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop
Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was
in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged
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in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and
live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at
all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have
been registered immediately after this incident.
However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant
that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt
to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop
Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the
appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of
rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The
Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused."
(underlining by us)
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed
that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the
relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in
nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of
application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this
regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga
Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278, wherein this
Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual
relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that
a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship
between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent
No.2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her.
Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated
individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into
physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that,
at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In
light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the
material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the
parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in
the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same
can be otherwise clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in
Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made:
"29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to
amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC,
it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to
deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship.
Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a
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misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid
consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in which it was held as follows: (SCC pp.
682-84, paras 21 &
24) "21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind
weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a
clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had
actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had
made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter
falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the
consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love
and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which
were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused
can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the
intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine
motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show
that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no
intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best
of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various
unavoidable circumstances. The 'failure to keep a promise made with
respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception
of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception
of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance'. Section 90 IPC
cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl
in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never
really intended to marry her." (underlining by us)
39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this
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Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528
of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all
these parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set
out. The Court held that quashing may be appropriate:
"102. xxx (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
xxx"
40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with the
findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present case
pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No.2
clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion,
fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872. In our opinion, the High Court's refusal to exercise
its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts
complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a
relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The
continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of
an abuse of the court machinery.
7. Considering the judgment and facts of the present case as there is no
coercion is found even in the material available on record and keeping in view
conduct of the parties as well as status and age of the parties, without commenting
anything on the merits of the case, the anticipatory bail application filed by the
applicant is allowed. It is directed that if the applicant is arrested by the police
then he shall be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of
Rs.50,000/- (Rs. Fifty Thousand only) with one solvent surety of the like amount
to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer/Arresting Authority.
8. Applicant shall abide by the following conditions under Section 480 (2)
of Cr.P.C:-
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(a) Applicant shall make himself available for interrogation by a Police
Officer as and when required;
(b) He shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or
promise to complainant or witnesses;
(c) He shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;
(d) He shall not commit similar offence, of which, he is accused or
suspected.
9. However, it is being made clear that in case of bail jump and in
violation of any of conditions imposed herein above, this order shall become
ineffective and Investigation Officer/Trial Court shall be at liberty to proceed
against the applicant as per law.
Certified copy as per rules.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
RS
