[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bhanu Pratap Singh Alias Amit Chandel vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 27 January, 2026
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 30507 of 2023
BHANU PRATAP SINGH ALIAS AMIT CHANDEL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rajmani Bansal - Advocate for the applicant.
Ms. Kalpana Parmar - Public Prosecutor for the State.
Shri Abhishek Tiwari - Advocate for the respondent No.2.
RESERVED ON :- 19/01/2026
DELIVERD ON :- 27/01/2026
ORDER
The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 has been preferred by the petitioner seeking quashment of
FIR bearing Crime No. 73 of 2020, registered at Police Station Ingerganj,
District Gwalior, for offences allegedly committed under Sections 376(2)(n)
and 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 3(2)(v) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,
as well as for quashment of the consequential charge-sheet filed pursuant
thereto
As per the prosecution case, the complainant/prosecutrix came into
contact with the accused, Bhanupratap Singh Chandel alias Amit, through a
social networking site. Initially, their acquaintance was only online. The
accused represented himself as a prospective groom and repeatedly promised
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the complainant/prosecutrix that he intended to marry her. Trusting his
assurances, the complainant/prosecutrix agreed to meet him in person. The
accused came to Gwalior and met the complainant/prosecutrix at Hotel
Relax, Shinde Ki Chhawni, Gwalior. During this meeting, he forcibly
engaged in sexual relations with her despite her refusal. When she resisted,
the accused claimed that such acts were permissible as they were to be
married. Thereafter, the accused continued to meet the complainant and
during this period, she became pregnant. The accused repeatedly delayed
marriage, claiming that he could not marry immediately due to military
duties, but assured her that the marriage would happen later. In October
2019, the complainant/prosecutrix was compelled to undergo an abortion in
Gwalior. Her friend, Nitin Shakya, accompanied her to the hospital and is
aware of the procedure. A few days later, the accused falsely informed
complainant/prosecutrix that his phone had been stolen and blackmailers had
accessed their private photos. He demanded ₹70,000 from her. On 17
November 2019, when the accused came to Gwalior, the
complainant/prosecutrix paid him the demanded amount, consisting of
₹20,000 from her personal savings and ₹50,000 borrowed from Raju Bhai.
Despite repeated requests for marriage, the accused avoided any discussion
of it and continued to coerce the complainant/prosecutrix into sexual
relations multiple times without her consent. Most of their meetings occurred
at Hotel Relax, Shinde Ki Chhawni, Gwalior. From 16 February 2020, the
accused stopped answering the complainant/prosecutrix's calls. She later
learned from the accused's family that he had married another woman. The
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complainant/prosecutrix alleged that the accused deliberately misled her with
false promises of marriage, sexually exploited her, coerced her into an
abortion, extorted money under threat of blackmail, and caused her
significant physical, emotional, and financial harm. On the basis of such
allegations, the present FIR has been registered against the accused.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the allegations
levelled against the petitioner in the present FIR and the consequential
proceedings are entirely false, baseless, malicious, and motivated, as the
prosecution has been initiated with a clear ulterior motive and constitutes a
gross abuse of the process of law and even if the allegations contained in the
FIR are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, no cognizable
offence is made out against the petitioner and the continuation of the
criminal proceedings would result in grave miscarriage of justice.
It was further submitted that the petitioner never misled the
complainant with a false promise of marriage or coerced her into any sexual
relationship and any relationship between the petitioner and the complainant,
if at all, was purely consensual and between two adults acting out of their
own free will. There is no material on record to suggest that the petitioner
never intended to marry the complainant at the inception of the relationship,
which is a sine qua non for attracting the offence under Section 376 of the
Indian Penal Code on the ground of false promise of marriage and mere
delay in marriage, particularly when attributable to personal and professional
constraints including military service, cannot by itself give rise to criminal
liability under Section 376 IPC.
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It was further submitted that the allegations relating to abortion are
patently false and stand conclusively demolished by unimpeachable medical
evidence, as the statement of the doctor concerned clearly established that the
complainant who introduced herself to her as wife of one Dharma Singh had
voluntarily consumed abortion pills prior to approaching the hospital and the
subsequent medical procedure was carried out only for the management of
an incomplete abortion. The said procedure was performed with the informed
consent of the complainant in a duly authorised hospital and strictly in
accordance with established medical protocol. There was no allegation, much
less any evidence, to suggest that the petitioner forced or induced the
complainant to undergo any illegal or coerced abortion.
It was further submitted that the scientific evidence collected during
the course of investigation further exonerates the petitioner and the DNA
report is negative and does not establish any biological link between the
petitioner and the alleged pregnancy or foetal material. The negative DNA
report strikes at the very root of the prosecution case and conclusively
disproves the allegation that the petitioner was responsible for the pregnancy
or abortion of the complainant.
It was further submitted that the allegations of blackmail, extortion, or
coercion based on alleged objectionable photographs are wholly imaginary,
fabricated, and unsubstantiated. Despite a thorough investigation, no
photographs, videos, electronic data, or any incriminating material
whatsoever have been recovered from the petitioner and there was no
documentary or credible evidence to support the claim that the petitioner
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ever demanded money or threatened the complainant. Any amount allegedly
paid by the complainant, assuming without admitting, were purely voluntary
and without any coercion. The complete absence of supporting material
rendered these allegations inherently improbable and exposes the malicious
intent behind the prosecution.
It was further submitted that the FIR has been lodged after an
unexplained and inordinate delay of more than six months from the date of
the alleged incident and no plausible explanation for such delay has been
offered. The delay assumes great significance in the present case as it casts
serious doubt on the veracity and genuineness of the allegations and strongly
suggests that the FIR is an afterthought, embellished, and motivated. Filing
of the charge sheet under these circumstances is arbitrary, illegal, and
contrary to settled principles of law.
It was further submitted that the impugned proceedings squarely fall
within the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in [(1992) SCC (Cri.) 42],
wherein it was held that criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed where
the allegations are frivolous, vexatious, maliciously instituted, or where the
uncontroverted material does not disclose the commission of any offence.
Reliance is also placed on the order dated 13.10.2025 passed by this Court in
the matter of Ashish Gautam vs. State of M.P. & Others (M.Cr.C. No. 26099
of 2024), wherein similar proceedings were quashed on analogous facts.
In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, it was prayed that
the impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings initiated therefrome
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against the petitioner be quashed.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State,
assisted by learned counsel for the complainant, submitted that the present
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is wholly misconceived and is an attempt
to prematurely terminate a lawful prosecution, as the FIR and the charge-
sheet have been filed after a fair and thorough investigation in which
statements of the complainant and witnesses were recorded and medical as
well as scientific evidence was collected. The allegations in the FIR, when
taken at face value, clearly disclose cognizable offences and raise serious
triable issues which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
It was further submitted that the complainant has consistently stated
that she was induced into a physical relationship on a false promise of
marriage and the petitioner developed a relationship with her through social
media, gained her confidence, and repeatedly established physical relations
on the assurance of marriage, which later proved to be false when she learnt
that the petitioner was planning to marry another woman. Consent obtained
by deception does not constitute valid consent in law, and the intention of
the petitioner at the inception of the relationship is a matter to be determined
at trial.
It was further submitted that the complainant further alleged that she
became pregnant due to the relationship and had to undergo abortions, and
the petitioner continued the relationship even thereafter before abandoning
her and the medical and forensic evidence collected during investigation
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lends corroboration to her version, including the forensic report recording
semen stains and the presence of human spermatozoa on the undergarment of
the complainant. The evidentiary value of such material cannot be assessed at
the stage of quashing.
It was further submitted that the complainant has also alleged that the
petitioner took ₹70,000/- from her and subsequently threatened her with
uploading her photographs online if the case was not withdrawn. Delay in
lodging the FIR has been adequately explained by emotional trauma and
false assurances and is not fatal in cases of this nature.
It was further submitted that the petition raised disputed questions of
fact and relied on defence material which cannot be examined under Section
482 Cr.P.C., as quashing the proceedings at this stage would amount to pre-
judging the case and would result in miscarriage of justice. It was, therefore,
prayed that the petition be dismissed and the trial be allowed to proceed in
accordance with law.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The law with regard to consent obtained on a false promise of
marriage is now well settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Anurag Soni Vs. State of Chhattisgarh , reported in AIR 2019 SC 1857 in
para 10 has held as under:
"10. While considering this appeal on merits further,
some of the decisions of this Court on Section 375 and
Section 90 of the IPC and on the consent/consensual sex are
required to be referred to and considered:
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10.1 In the case of Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala
(2013) 9 SCC 113, this Court has explained the essentials
and parameters of the offence of rape. In the said decision, in
para 12, this Court observed and held as under:
"12. Section 375 IPC defines the expression "rape",
which indicates that the first clause operates, where the
woman is in possession of her senses, and therefore, capable
of consenting but the act is done against her will; and second,
where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and
fifth, when there is consent, but it is not such a consent as
excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her on
any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of
hurt. The expression "against her will" means that the act
must have been done in spite of the opposition of the
woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only
based on evidence or probabilities of the case. "Consent" is
also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It
denotes an active will in the mind of a person to permit the
doing of an act complained of. Section 90 IPC refers to the
expression "consent". Section 90, though, does not define
"consent", but describes what is not consent. "Consent", for
the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation
not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the
knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act
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but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance
and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be
ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant
circumstances. (See State of H.P. v. Mango Ram (2000) 7
SCC 224"
10.2 In the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana
(2013) 7 SCC 675, this Court observed and held in
paragraphs 21 and 24 as under:
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is
an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind
weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side.
There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex
and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine
whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim,
or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to
this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between
the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was
made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the
accused; and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees
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to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion
for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an
accused on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable
to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be
convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that
the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had
clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial
stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of
keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of
course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various
unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise
made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons
that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not
always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the
fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC
cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act
of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other,
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unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry
her."
10.3 In the case of Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of
A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 615, this Court also considered the
amendment made in the Indian Evidence Act - Section 114A
of the Evidence Act. In that case, the sexual intercourse was
committed with the prosecutrix by the accused. As per the
prosecutrix, the accused used to come to her sister's house in
between 11 a.m. and 12 noon daily and asked her for sexual
intercourse with him. She refused to participate in the said
act but the accused kept on persisting and persuading her.
She resisted for about 3 months. On one day, the accused
came to her sister's house at about 12 noon and closed the
doors and had sexual intercourse forcibly, without her
consent and against her will. When she asked the accused as
to why he spoiled her life, he gave assurance that he would
marry her and asked her not to cry, though his parents were
not agreeing for the marriage. It was found that on the basis
of the assurance given by the accused this process of sexual
intercourse continued and he kept on assuring that he would
marry her. When she became pregnant, she informed about
the pregnancy to the accused. He got certain tablets for
abortion but they did not work. When she was in the third
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month of pregnancy, she again insisted for the marriage and
the accused answered that his parents are not agreeable. She
deposed that had he not promised, she would not have
allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. The
question was raised before the Panchayat of elders and the
prosecutrix was present in the Panchayat along with her
sister and brotherinlaw. The accused and his father both
attended the Panchayat and the accused admitted about the
illegal contacts with the prosecutrix and causing pregnancy.
The accused asked for two days' time for marrying the
prosecutrix and the Panchayat accordingly granted time. But
after the Panchayat meeting the accused absconded from the
village and when the accused did not fulfil his promise which
was made before the Panchayat, the prosecutrix lodged the
complaint. Considering the aforesaid facts and after
considering Section 90 of the IPC, this Court convicted the
accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. While
convicting the accused, this Court in paragraphs 9, 10,15 and
16 observed and held as under:
"9. The question in the present case is whether this
conduct of the accused apparently falls under any of the six
descriptions of Section 375 IPC as mentioned above. It is
clear that the prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with the
accused on the representation made by the accused that he
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would marry her. This was a false promise held out by the
accused. Had this promise not been given perhaps, she would
not have permitted the accused to have sexual intercourse.
Therefore, whether this amounts to a consent or the accused
obtained a consent by playing fraud on her. Section 90 of the
Penal Code says that if the consent has been given under fear
of injury or a misconception of fact, such consent obtained,
cannot be construed to be a valid consent. Section 90 reads
as under:
"90. Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception.--A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given
by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of
fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to
believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such
fear or misconception; or [Consent of insane person] if the
consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of
mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and
consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or
[Consent of child] unless the contrary appears from the
context, if the consent is given by a person who is under
twelve years of age."
10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per
the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not
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honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till
she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the
accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was
under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to
marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse
with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he
had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the
testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of
elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused
made a false promise that he would marry her.Therefore, the
intention of the accused right from the beginning was not
bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the
accused, completely being misled by the accused who held
out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by
the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and
persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her
and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under
total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent. .......
15. In this connection reference may be made to the
amendment made in the Evidence Act. Section 114A was
introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the
absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section
114A
reads as under:
"114A. Presumption as to absence of consent in
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certain prosecutions for rape.--In a prosecution for rape
under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) or
clause (e) or clause (g) of sub section (2) of Section 376 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse
by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was
without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped
and she states in her evidence before the court that she did
not consent, the court shall presume that she did not
consent."
16. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the
accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of
the prosecutrix and she states in her evidence before the court
that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did
not consent. Presumption has been introduced by the
legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities
committed against women and in the instant case as per the
statement of PW 1, she resisted and she did not give consent
to the accused at the first instance and he committed the rape
on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would marry
her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant
and it became clear that the accused did not wish to marry
her."
10.4 In the case of State of U.P. v. Naushad (2013) 16
SCC 651, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case,
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this Court reversed the acquittal by the High Court and
convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of
the IPC. This Court observed and held as under:
"17. Section 376 IPC prescribes the punishment for the
offence of rape. Section 375 IPC defines the offence of rape,
and enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The
description "secondly" speaks of rape "without her consent".
Thus, sexual intercourse by a man with a woman without her
consent will constitute the offence of rape. We have to
examine as to whether in the present case, the accused is
guilty of the act of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix
"against her consent". The prosecutrix in this case has
deposed on record that the accused promised marriage with
her and had sexual intercourse with her on this pretext and
when she got pregnant, his family refused to marry him with
her on the ground that she is of "bad character".
18. How is "consent" defined? Section 90 IPC defines
consent known to be given under "fear or misconception"
which reads as under:
"90.Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception.--A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given
by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of
fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to
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believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such
fear or misconception;" (emphasis supplied) Thus, if consent
is given by the prosecutrix under a misconception of fact, it is
vitiated.
19. In the present case, the accused had sexual
intercourse with the prosecutrix by giving false assurance to
the prosecutrix that he would marry her. After she got
pregnant, he refused to do so. From this, it is evident that he
never intended to marry her and procured her consent only
for the reason of having sexual relations with her, which act
of the accused falls squarely under the definition of rape as
he had sexual intercourse with her consent which was
consent obtained under a misconception of fact as defined
under Section 90 IPC. Thus, the alleged consent said to have
been obtained by the accused was not voluntary consent and
this Court is of the view that the accused indulged in sexual
intercourse with the prosecutrix by misconstruing to her his
true intentions. It is apparent from the evidence that the
accused only wanted to indulge in sexual intercourse with
her and was under no intention of actually marrying the
prosecutrix. ........."
10.5 Even in the case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar
Sonar (supra), upon which reliance has been placed by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, in
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paragraph 23, this Court has observed that there is a clear
distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in
such cases, must very carefully examine whether the
complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had
mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect
only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of
cheating or deception, this Court observed and held as under:
"23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and
consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully
examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to
marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a
false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later
falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also
a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not
fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the
promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to
indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape.
There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the misconception
created by accused, or where an accused, on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which
were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite
having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated
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differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention
and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape.
The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between
the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376
of the IPC."
10.6 The High Court of Delhi in Sujit Ranjan v. State
[Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2011 decided on 27.01.2011],
after referring to and considering several decisions of this
Court, ultimately in paragraph 16, observed and held as
under:
"16. Legal position which can be culled out from the
judicial pronouncements referred above is that the consent
given by the prosecutrix to have sexual intercourse with
whom she is in love, on a promise that he would marry her
on a later date, cannot be considered as given under
"misconception of fact". Whether consent given by the
prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary or whether it is
given under "misconception of fact" depends on the facts of
each case. While considering the question of consent, the
Court must consider the evidence before it and the
surrounding circumstances before reaching a conclusion.
Evidence adduced by the prosecution has to be weighed
keeping in mind that the burden is on the prosecution to
prove each and every ingredient of the offence. Prosecution
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must lead positive evidence to give rise to inference beyond
reasonable doubt that accused had no intention to marry
prosecutrix at all from inception and that promise made was
false to his knowledge. The failure to keep the promise on a
future uncertain date may be on account of variety of reasons
and could not always amount to "misconception of fact" right
from the inception."
The Apex Court in the case of Anurag Soni ( supra) as well as in other
cases has repeatedly held that consent must be free, voluntary and given with
full understanding. It must be a conscious and informed choice. If a woman
agrees because she is cheated, threatened, or misled, then such consent is not
valid consent in the eyes of law. Every physical relationship is not rape and if
two adults willingly and knowingly enter into a relationship, it is
consensual. However, if a man gets physical relations by lying, cheating or
giving a false promise, then it is not real consent. If a man never intended to
marry from the very beginning, and only pretended that he would marry the
woman to get physical relations, then the woman's consent is based on
misconception of fact. Such consent is invalid under Section 90 IPC. And
such sexual act amounts to rape under Section 375 IPC. It has also been held
that If the man honestly wanted to marry, but later could not marry due to
unavoidable circumstances, family pressure, or other reasons, then it is not
rape, even if the relationship breaks later. If from the start, his intention was
dishonest and only to exploit, then it is rape. If from the start, his intention
was genuine, but marriage failed later, then it is not rape. If a woman agrees
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to physical relations only because she believes the man will marry her, and
that belief is created by a lie, then: the consent is not voluntary. It is consent
under misconception of fact that it has no legal value and on that the
Court must look at full facts and conduct and must examine the conduct of
the accused, his behaviour before and after the incident, whether he tried to
avoid marriage, whether he ran away, refused, or made excuses, whether the
promise was just a trick from the beginning. Under Section 114-A of the
Evidence Act, in serious rape cases, if sexual intercourse is proved, and the
woman says she did not consent, then the Court will presume that there was
no consent. The prosecution must show that the promise of marriage was
false from the beginning, and the accused never intended to marry, and the
physical relationship was obtained only by cheating and the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that if sex is obtained by a false promise of marriage made
with dishonest intention from the beginning, it is rape and if sex is between
two consenting adults and marriage fails later for genuine reasons, it is not
rape. Each case depends on its own facts and evidence.
At the stage of exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this
Court is not required to conduct a roving enquiry or a mini trial. The Court
has only to see whether the allegations in the FIR and the material collected
during investigation disclose a prima facie case.
In the present case, the allegations made by the prosecutrix are serious
and specific. She has alleged that the petitioner induced her into a physical
relationship by giving a false promise of marriage, continued to exploit her,
compelled her to undergo abortion, extorted money and ultimately
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:2329
22 MCRC-30507-2023
abandoned her. These allegations, if taken at face value, clearly disclose the
commission of cognizable offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 506 and 323
IPC.
The defence raised by the petitioner regarding consent, medical
evidence, DNA report, delay in lodging FIR and alleged falsity of allegations
are all matters which require appreciation of evidence and adjudication
during trial. Such disputed questions of fact cannot be examined in
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the
order passed by this Court dated 13.10.2025 in the matter of Ashish Gautam
vs. State of M.P. ( supra) is misplaced, as the factual matrix of that case is
materially different from the present matter. Accordingly, the observations
and conclusions in that judgment cannot be invoked in support of the
petitioner's case.
This Court does not find that the present case falls within any of the
categories enumerated in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) warranting
quashment of proceedings. On the contrary, quashing the FIR at this stage
would amount to stifling a legitimate prosecution and would result in
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the present petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.
Consequently, the interim order granted by this Court on 26.10.2023
stands vacated.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:2329
23 MCRC-30507-2023
pwn*
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT
GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab301c34d631287f1b1cdd90b4
a49f265f02d9d593f, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR,CID - 7064434, postalCode=474001,
st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=61b9d129971d2ea4fd4455ed49ea436ea65e26164b
eeed89153191c56e98ce21, cn=PAWAN KUMAR
Date: 2026.01.28 11:41:08 +05'30'
