[Cites 27, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rekchand vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 12 January, 2026
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1 W.P. No.6656/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE JAI KUMAR PILLAI
WRIT PETITION No.6656 of 2025
REKCHAND AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHER
Appearance:
Shri Sankalp Kochar - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Bhuwan Deshmukh - Government Advocate for the
respondents No.1 and 2/State.
Shri Bharat Singh - Advocate alongwith Shri Kaustubh
Pathak - Advocate for the respondent No.3.
___________________________________________________________
Reserved on : 18/12/2025
Post on : 12/01/2026
_______________________________________________________
ORDER
The petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India seeking following relief :-
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―7.1 Allow this petition with costs and declare
that the proceedings initiated under Old Land
Acquisition Act have lapsed;
7.2 Allow Respondent to initiate fresh land
acquisition proceedings, if so desired under
the provisions of New Land Acquisition Act,
2013.
7.3 Allow this petition with costs.
7.4 Any other or further orders as deemed fit to
this Hon'ble Court in the facts and
circumstances of the case may kindly be
passed in favour of the petitioners.‖
2. It is the case of the petitioners that they are the owners,
occupiers and persons in possession of land situated at Village
Nanakheda, Tehsil Kothi Mahal, District Ujjain comprising Survey
Nos.657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2, and 658/3, admeasuring in total 1.723
hectares. The said land was sought to be acquired for Scheme
No.23 framed by respondent No.3 - Ujjain Development Authority
(UDA). The present writ petition has been filed through a duly
executed Power of Attorney dated 10/02/2025. The petitioners'
ownership and possession are reflected in the Bhu Adhikar Evam
Rin Pustika and continuous revenue records for more than ten
years, which stand annexed. The petitioners assert that they remain
in uninterrupted possession till date.
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3. Records reveal that a notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 16/02/1979, followed by a
declaration under Section 6 dated 13/04/1979 for Scheme No.23.
However, the subject land forming part of the present petition was
not included in the Section 6 notification. Only certain other survey
numbers belonging to the petitioners were covered under the
acquisition proceedings. The exclusion of the subject land from the
statutory declaration is clearly borne out from the notification
placed on record.
4. Subsequently, a reference under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was decided on 19/12/1984, wherein the
petitioners sought compensation even for the excluded land on
the ground that it had become unusable. The Reference Court
rejected this claim. Aggrieved thereby, First Appeals bearing
Nos.40/1985 and 281/1985 were preferred before this Hon'ble
Court. By order dated 15/09/1995, the appeals were allowed and
the matter was remanded for fresh consideration. Upon remand,
the Reference Court again declined to award compensation for
the subject land by order dated 17/03/1998.
5. The dispute thereafter culminated in cross appeals,
namely FA No.311/1998 filed by the Ujjain Development
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Authority and FA No.500/1998 filed by the petitioners. Both
appeals were decided by this Court by a common order dated
27/07/2017. This Court categorically observed that the subject
land was not included in the original award dated 21/04/1980,
yet held the petitioners entitled to compensation restricted to
Rs.80,000/-. The appeal filed by the Ujjain Development
Authority was dismissed, whereas the appeal of the petitioners
was allowed. Despite the said binding directions, the
compensation has not been disbursed till date.
6. It is further stated that the petitioners continue to remain
in actual possession of the land. In February 2025, officials of
the District Administration allegedly attempted to measure the
land, asserting that it stood acquired under Scheme No.23.
Objections were raised by the petitioners. Invoking Section
24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013,
the petitioners contended that as neither compensation has been
paid nor possession taken for more than five years, the
acquisition proceedings stand lapsed. Reliance is also placed
upon an identical decision rendered in Rajesh kumar tiwari v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported in W.P.
No.11203/2015 by principle seat of this Court.
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7. Per contra, On the other hand, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents/State submits that the writ petition has been
filed alleging inaction in complying with the order dated
27/07/2017 and by wrongly invoking Section 24 of the Act of
2013. It is contended that the petitioners have suppressed
material facts. According to the respondents, Scheme No.23 was
introduced in 1979 covering a total area of 3.186 hectares,
including the land in question. The award was passed and
possession was taken in the year 1979 itself. It is further
contended that compensation for a major portion of the acquired
land was duly paid to the original Bhoomiswami along with
solatium. With respect to the remaining land, enhanced
compensation was determined by the Reference Court by order
dated 17/03/1998, fixing the total compensation at Rs.1,94,158/.
An amount of Rs.90,297/- was deposited before the Trial Court
in 1999. According to the respondents, the petitioners
themselves failed to pursue the execution proceedings, resulting
in the matter being consigned to the record room.
8. The respondents further submit that while FA
No.311/1998 was dismissed and FA No.500/1998 was allowed
on 27/07/2017, the petitioners thereafter failed to appear before
the executing court. It is asserted that the respondents are ready
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and willing to comply with the directions of the Court, subject
to proper execution proceedings. The applicability of Section 24
of the Act of 2013 is specifically denied on the ground that
compensation was deposited and possession had already been
taken.
9. In rejoinder thereto, the petitioners submit that the reply
filed by respondent No.3 is misleading and contrary to the
judicial record. It is asserted that the subject land bearing
Survey Nos.657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2, and 658/3 was never
included in the award dated 21/04/1980. This fact stands
conclusively recorded in the Reference Court's order dated
17/03/1998 and was expressly admitted by the respondent itself
in First Appeal No.311/1998. The petitioners further assert that
the claim regarding taking possession on 13/07/1979 is
unsupported by any contemporaneous documentary evidence.
On the contrary, revenue records continuously reflect the names
of the petitioners, establishing their possession. Mere assertions
cannot displace settled possession. It is contended that the
failure to pay compensation despite the final order of this
Hon'ble Court dated 27/07/2017 clearly attracts the
consequences contemplated under Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013.
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10. It is also contended that the respondent authority is
estopped from taking a stand contrary to its own admissions
made before this Court in earlier proceedings. Such
contradictory pleadings are stated to be an abuse of the process
of law. Reliance is also placed upon the Colony Hastantaran
Patra, which indicates that the left-out land was to vest with the
Nagar Nigam and not with the Ujjain Development Authority.
11. In reply to the rejoinder, learned counsel for the
respondents reiterates that the allegations levelled by the
petitioners are incorrect and misleading. It is denied that
compensation has not been paid or that possession remains with
the petitioners. It is submitted that mere continuation of names
in revenue records does not confer title or possession. The
respondents reiterate that Section 24 of the Act of 2013 has no
application to the present case. It is further submitted that the
petitioners have selectively quoted portions of judicial orders
and suppressed material facts. The respondents deny any
attempt to mislead the Court and submit that all proceedings are
part of the judicial record. According to the respondents, the
writ petition is a misuse of the extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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12. Having heard both parties at length and examined the
entire record available.
13. This Court is of the considered opinion that the core issue for
consideration is whether the land which was mentioned in the
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but
was not specifically included in the declaration under Section 6, can
be treated as legally acquired. The answer to this issue depends
upon the mandatory nature of Section 6 and its role in completing
the acquisition process. Under the scheme of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, a notification under Section 4 only shows the intention of
the State to acquire land. It does not result in acquisition by itself.
The declaration under Section 6 is the most important statutory step,
as it finally identifies the specific land required for a public purpose.
In absence of a Section 6 declaration, the acquisition proceedings
remain incomplete and have no legal effect.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu
Prasad Sharma, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 211 : (1966) 3 SCR 557 :
(1966) 2 SCJ 231 : AIR 1966 SC 1593 has clearly held that land
which is not covered under a declaration issued under Section 6
cannot be treated as acquired. The Court observed that the
declaration under Section 6 is the legal foundation of acquisition
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and without it, the State acquires no right, title or interest in the
land. The operative part of the judgement reads as follows:-
"16. As we have said already, the process of acquisition
always begins with a notification under Section 4(1). That
provision authorises the appropriate government to notify
that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed
for any public purpose. It will be noticed that in this
notification the land needed is not particularised but only
the locality where the land is situate is mentioned. As was
observed by this Court in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of
Bombay [(1961) 1 SCR 128] a notification under Section 4
of the Act envisages a preliminary investigation and it is
only under Section 6 that the Government makes a firm
declaration. The purpose of the notification under Section
4(1) clearly is to enable the Government to take action
under Section 4(2) in the matter of survey of land to decide
what particular land in the locality specified in the
notification under Section 4(1) it will decide to acquire.
Another purpose of the notification under Section 4(1) is to
give opportunity to persons owning land in that locality to
make objections under Section 5-A. These objections are
considered by the Collector and after considering all
objections he makes a report containing his
recommendation on the objections to the appropriate
government whose decision on the objections is final.
Section 5-A obviously contemplates consideration of all
objections made to the notification under Section 4(1) and
one report thereafter by the Collector to the Government
with respect to those objections. The Government then
finally decides those objections and thereafter proceeds to
make a declaration under Section 6."
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15. In the present case, it is clear that Survey Nos.657/2, 658/1/2,
658/2/2 and 658/3 admeasuring 1.723 hectares were not included in
the declaration under Section 6 dated 13/04/1979. Consequently, the
award dated 21/04/1980 also did not include the said land. This
position was repeatedly recorded by the Reference Court and by this
Court in earlier appellate proceedings.
16. Once this Court reaches the conclusion that the acquisition
itself was not legally completed, it necessarily follows that all
subsequent proceedings founded upon such defective acquisition
stand vitiated. The reference proceedings under Section 18, the
remand orders, the subsequent reference order dated 17/03/1998, the
appellate judgment dated 27/07/2017 and the directions relating to
compensation are all consequential and cannot survive
independently.
17. Further, since no survey number of the subject land was
mentioned in the declaration under Section 6, neither the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 nor the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 can be made applicable to such land. Both statutes
operate only where acquisition has been initiated and completed in
accordance with law.
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18. Upon perusal of the award dated 21/04/1980 (Annexure R/1),
it is evident that the subject land bearing Survey Nos.657/2,
658/1/2, 658/2/2 and 658/3 was neither included in the award nor
was any compensation prescribed for the said land. The award
clearly indicates that compensation amounting to Rs. 45,956/-, as
reflected at Serial No. 11, was granted only in respect of the land of
the petitioners which was actually acquired. No compensation
whatsoever was awarded for Survey Nos.657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2
and 658/3, for the reason that the said land was never acquired by
the respondents.
19. This position stands further fortified from the orders dated
19/12/1984 (Annexure P/5) and 17/03/1998, wherein it has been
categorically recorded that the award dated 21/04/1980 was passed
in respect of the land of the petitioners excluding Survey
Nos.657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2 and 658/3. The operative portion of the
order dated 19/12/1984 reads as under :-
―प्रकरण के नननविवाद तथ्य इस प्रकार है नक प्राथीगण की नानाहे डा स्थित
भूनम सवे 657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2, 658/3 तथा 659/2 कुल रकबा
3.186 हे क्टर भूनम के अर्िन के नलए भू-अर्ि न अनधननयम की धारा-4 के
तहत नोनिनिकेशन प्रकानशत नकया गया। यह भी नननविवाद है नक पू री
भूनम का कब्जा प्रकरण से नदनाां क 13-07-1979 को ले नलया गया। यह
भी नननविवाद है नक कलेक्टर भू नम सां पादन उज्जैन ने नदनाां क 21-04-1980
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को र्ो अवार्ि नदया, उसमें भू नम सवे नांबर 657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2
और 658/3 की भूनम छोडकर शे ष भू नम के नलए अवार्ि पाररत नकया
गया।‖
20. Thus, it is clear beyond any doubt that Survey Nos. 657/2,
658/1/2, 658/2/2 and 658/3 were never acquired in accordance with
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Consequently, the
order dated 19/12/1984, insofar as it declined to grant compensation
for the said land, was legally correct and in consonance with the
statutory scheme.
21. Moreover, upon perusal of the order dated 17/03/1998, it is
noticed that while dealing with Issue No. 5, the Reference Court
recorded that it was now accepted that the State, despite taking
possession of the remaining land, neither paid nor determined its
compensation, and that both parties agreed that the Court could
determine such compensation. The Reference Court recorded the
following reasoning:-
―अब यह स्वीकृत है नक राज्य ने कुछ भू नम का कब्जा लेने के
बावर्ूद उसका मुआवर्ा न तो अदा नकया और न ही ननधाि ररत
नकया तथा उभय पक्ष इस बात से सहमत थे नक यह न्यायालय
मुआवर्ा तय कर सकता है , अतएव वादप्रश्न क्र. 1 व 2 में इस भू नम
का मुआवर्ा भी तय कर नदया गया है । इस वादप्रश्न पर अतः मेरा
ननष्कषि है नक शे ष भूनम, नर्सका कब्जा ले नलया गया था, का
मुआवर्ा भी उपरोक्तानु सार नदलाया र्ाता है ।‖
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22. On this premise, the Court proceeded to hold that
compensation for the remaining land was also awarded while
deciding Issues Nos.1 and 2. Similarly, while deciding Issue No. 2,
the Court proceeded on the assumption that the said land had been
acquired by the respondents and, therefore, compensation was liable
to be granted. This reasoning of the Reference Court is wholly
unsustainable in law, as it is not supported by any cogent reason or
documentary evidence. It is a settled principle of law that where a
statute prescribes a specific procedure for acquisition of land, such
procedure must be strictly followed. Mere admissions or consent of
parties cannot substitute or cure the absence of mandatory statutory
requirements. Acquisition of land cannot be inferred merely on the
basis of assumptions or alleged admissions.
23. It is also necessary to observe that the judgment passed by
this Court in First Appeal No. 311/1998, decided on 27/07/2017,
whereby compensation of Rs.80,000/- was directed to be paid to the
petitioners, cannot be sustained in law. The said judgment
proceeded on the premise that the subject land had been acquired by
the State and that compensation was payable thereof. However, as
discussed hereinabove, the Reference Court had already committed
a fundamental error in law by granting compensation in respect of
Survey Nos.657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2 and 658/3, despite the admitted
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and established fact that the said land was never included in the
declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and
was never the subject matter of a valid award 21/04/1980
(Annexure R/1). The Reference Court further erred in accepting the
assumption that the land stood acquired by the State without there
being any statutory foundation or documentary evidence to support
such a conclusion.
24. Since the judgment dated 27/07/2017 in FA No.311/1998 is
entirely founded upon the erroneous reasoning and incorrect legal
premise adopted by the Reference Court, the consequential
directions issued therein for payment of compensation also stand
vitiated. Once the foundational finding regarding acquisition itself
is found to be legally unsustainable, any appellate affirmation or
modification based upon such flawed reasoning cannot survive.
Accordingly, the reasoning adopted by this Court in FA
No.311/1998, insofar as it relates to grant of compensation for the
said land, is also unsustainable in the eyes of law.
25. Further, the revenue records, including the Khasra entries
(Annexure P/2), continue to reflect the names of the petitioners in
respect of the subject land, thereby clearly establishing that the land
remained recorded in their ownership and possession. In the absence
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of actual taking of possession, the acquisition cannot be said to have
been completed in accordance with law. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1
SCC 792, has categorically held that:-
"26. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) and Gupta,
J., who constituted the majority did not agree with
Untwalia, J. and observed as under: (Balwant
Narayan Bhagde case [(1976) 1 SCC 700] , SCC
pp. 711-12, para 28)
"28. ... We think it is enough to state that when
the Government proceeds to take possession of the
land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, it must take actual possession of the land,
since all interests in the land are sought to be
acquired by it. There can be no question of taking
„symbolical‟ possession in the sense understood by
judicial decisions under the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper
be enough. What the Act contemplates as a
necessary condition of vesting of the land in the
Government is the taking of actual possession of
the land. How such possession may be taken would
depend on the nature of the land. Such possession
would have to be taken as the nature of the land
admits of. There can be no hard-and-fast rule
laying down what act would be sufficient to
constitute taking of possession of land. We should
not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute
and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot
and making a declaration by beat of drum or
otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of
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possession of land in every case. But here, in our
opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there
was no crop on it at the material time, the act of
the Tahsildar in going on the spot and inspecting
the land for the purpose of determining what part
was waste and arable and should, therefore, be
taken possession of and determining its extent, was
sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It
appears that the appellant was not present when
this was done by the Tahsildar, but the presence of
the owner or the occupant of the land is not
necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It
is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal
requirement that notice should be given to the
owner or the occupant of the land that possession
would be taken at a particular time, though it may
be desirable where possible, to give such notice
before possession is taken by the authorities, as
that would eliminate the possibility of any
fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of
mere paper possession, without the occupant or the
owner ever coming to know of it."
26. The Reference Court, therefore, exceeded its jurisdiction in
directing payment of compensation for land which was never
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The Court has no
authority to award compensation in respect of land that has not been
acquired in accordance with law. The statutory procedure for land
acquisition being mandatory in nature, any deviation therefrom
renders the consequential directions legally untenable. The said
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legal position stands fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Kundan Singh, 1963 SCC
OnLine SC 160 : (1964) 3 SCR 382 : AIR 1964 SC 350, wherein
it has been categorically held that:-
"15. Thus, it would be seen that the scheme of Section 49 is
that the owner has to express his desire that the whole of his
house should be acquired before the award is made, and
once such a desire is expressed, the procedure prescribed by
Section 49 has to be followed. This procedure is distinct and
separate from the procedure which has to be followed in
making a reference under Section 18 of the Act. In the
present case, the respondent, have taken no steps to express
their desire that the whole of their house should be acquired,
and so, it was not open to the High Court to allow them to
raise this point in appeal which arose from the order passed
by the District Judge on a reference under Section 18. That
being our view, we do not think necessary to consider the
respondents' contention that what is acquired in the present
proceedings attracts the provisions of Section 49(1).
16. In our opinion, however, the scheme of Section 49 is
clear. Section 49(1) has imposed a ban on taking any further
action under any of the provisions of the Act where the
owner expresses a desire that the whole of his house should
be acquired, and that clearly indicates that after the relevant
notifications are issued under Sections 4 and 6, if it appears
to the owner of the land under acquisition that a part of his
house is being acquired, he has to express his desire before
an award is made under Section 11; otherwise if the owner
allows proceedings to be taken under the provisions of the
Act and an award follows, it would lead to unnecessary
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complications if the owner is allowed to express his desire
under Section 49(1) and the reference is then required to be
made under the second proviso to Section 49(1). Logically, if
an enquiry has to be made as contemplated by Section 49, it
must precede any further action under the other provisions
of he Act, and that is the main basis of the mandatory
prohibition prescribed by 49(1). The said prohibition
coupled with the first proviso to Section 49(1) leads to the
conclusion that the owner cannot take recourse to Section
49 after an award is made under Section 11 of the Act. In
our opinion, therefore, the High Court did not correctly
interpret the effect of Section 49(1) when it held that the said
section did not require the claimant to put forward his claim
before the award was made."
27. The respondents' claim of having taken possession is also
unsupported by any documentary evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal,
(2011) 5 SCC 394, has held that possession must be actual, physical
and supported by contemporaneous records. Mere assertions cannot
dislodge settled possession reflected in revenue records.
28. Moreover, without prejudice to the findings recorded
hereinabove, this Court holds that the public purpose for which
acquisition was proposed under Scheme No.23 has already been
achieved and now stands exhausted. It is an admitted position that
Khasra Nos.657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2 and 658/3 were never acquired
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in accordance with the provisions of the land acquisition law. Once
the purpose of acquisition is fulfilled, and particularly where the
lands in question were never lawfully acquired, the State or its
authorities have no legal right to retain such lands, as the same do
not form part of any valid acquisition proceedings. The law on this
issue is well settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dev Sharan
and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in
(2011) 4 SCC 769, has held that the Land Acquisition Act confers
an expropriatory power on the State and, therefore, its provisions
must be strictly construed. The concept of public purpose cannot be
applied mechanically or continued beyond its necessity. The
relevant operative paragraphs read as under:-
"15. Admittedly, the Land Acquisition Act, a
preconstitutional legislation of colonial vintage is a drastic
law, being expropriatory in nature as it confers on the State
a power which affects person's property right. Even though
right to property is no longer fundamental and was never a
natural right, and is acquired on a concession by the State, it
has to be accepted that without right to some property, other
rights become illusory. This Court is considering these
questions, especially, in the context of some recent trends in
land acquisition. This Court is of the opinion that the
concept of public purpose in land acquisition has to be
viewed from an angle which is consistent with the concept of
a welfare State.
16. The concept of "public purpose" cannot remain
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static for all time to come. The concept, even though sought
to be defined under Section 3(f) of the Act, is not capable of
any precise definition. The said definition, having suffered
several amendments, has assumed the character of an
inclusive one.
17. It must be accepted that in construing "public
purpose", a broad and overall view has to be taken and the
focus must be on ensuring maximum benefit to the largest
number of people. Any attempt by the State to acquire land
by promoting a public purpose to benefit a particular group
of people or to serve any particular interest at the cost of the
interest of a large section of people, especially of the
common people, defeats the very concept of public purpose.
Even though the concept of public purpose was introduced
by preconstitutional legislation, its application must be
consistent with the constitutional ethos and especially the
chapter under fundamental rights and also the directive
principles."
29. This Court further holds that all subsequent proceedings,
including reference proceedings, appellate proceedings,
compensation directions, deposit of amounts, execution attempts
and measurement actions, being founded on an invalid acquisition,
stand vitiated and are liable to be set aside. This Court is fortified in
its view by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183, wherein it has been
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categorically held that once the foundational acquisition
proceedings are held to be invalid or vitiated by non-compliance
with statutory mandates, all consequential proceedings including
reference proceedings, appellate proceedings, compensation
directions, deposit of amounts, execution attempts and measurement
actions being founded on an invalid acquisition, stand vitiated and
are liable to be set aside.
30. Thus, it is declared that lands specifically included in the
declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were
legally acquired by the respondents. It is further declared that
Survey Nos. 657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2 and 658/3 were never legally
acquired. All proceedings treating the said land as acquired,
including compensation proceedings, are hereby quashed.
31. Moreover, although the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right, it continues to be a valuable constitutional right
under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, as well as a human
right. No person can be deprived of his property except by authority
of law, and any deprivation must strictly conform to the procedure
prescribed by law. Where the land has not been lawfully acquired,
the State cannot retain or take possession of such property,
particularly after the public purpose for which the land was sought
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:918
has already been fulfilled or exhausted. If the State still intends to
acquire the land, it is bound to initiate and complete a lawful
acquisition proceeding in accordance with the statutory mandate,
including compliance with the requirements of public purpose and
payment of just compensation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hari
Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 9 SCC
356, has categorically held that deprivation of property without
authority of law is impermissible and that Article 300-A embodies
the doctrine of eminent domain, which mandates acquisition only in
public interest and upon payment of reasonable compensation. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"96. The right to property may not be a fundamental
right any longer, but it is still a constitutional right under
Article 300-A and a human right as observed by this Court
in Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel. In
view of the mandate of Article 300-A of the Constitution of
India, no person is to be deprived of his property save by the
authority of law. The appellant Trust cannot be deprived of
its property save in accordance with law."
32. Similar principles have been reiterated in N. Padmamma v.
S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517, holding that
provisions divesting a person of property must be strictly construed,
and in Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2008) 1 SCC 728,
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wherein it has been held that the Land Acquisition Act, being an
expropriatory legislation, must be strictly interpreted and
scrupulously complied with. These authoritative pronouncements
leave no manner of doubt that unlawful deprivation or retention of
private property by the State is constitutionally impermissible. The
relevant operative paragraphs read as under:-
"42. It is furthermore trite that the Land Acquisition Act is
an expropriatory legislation. (See Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn.Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and Indore Vikas
Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd.) 43.
Expropriatory legislation, as is well known, must be strictly
construed. When the properties of a citizen are being
compulsorily acquired by a State in exercise of its power of
eminent domain, the essential ingredients thereof, namely,
existence of a public purpose and payment of compensation
are principal requisites therefore. In the case of acquisition
of land for a private company, existence of a public purpose
being not a requisite criterion, other statutory requirements
call for strict compliance, being imperative in character."
33. As far as the argument relating to the principle of estoppel is
concerned, it is well settled law that the doctrine of estoppel cannot
override or defeat the mandate of a statute. Once a specific
procedure is prescribed under law for acquisition of land, the same
must be strictly followed in letter and spirit. Any action taken in
violation of the statutory provisions is void and unsustainable in the
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eyes of law. Even an admission on the part of the respondents that
the land was acquired with the consent of the petitioner, without
following the due process of law, cannot validate such illegal
acquisition. The Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that
there can be no estoppel against statute. Reliance in this regard is
placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna
Rai (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. versus Banaras Hindu
University Through Registrar & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 4578-
4580 of 2022 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 31186-88 of 2016),
wherein it has been held as follows :--
"23. The case laws relied upon by the Division Bench
would have no application in the facts of the present case
as none of the judgments relied upon by the Division Bench
laid down that principle of estoppel would be above law. It
is settled principle that principle of estoppel cannot
override the law. The manual duly approved by the
Executive Council will prevail over any such principle of
estoppel or acquiescence."
34. Thus, this Court finds that lands which were specifically
included in the declaration under Section 6 Land Acquisition Act,
1894 and covered by the award dated 21/04/1980 were legally
acquired and the acquisition proceedings in respect thereof stand
concluded. However, with respect to Survey Nos.657/2, 658/1/2,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:918
658/2/2 and 658/3, this Court finds that no declaration under
Section 6 Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was ever issued.
Consequently, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the said
lands are void, nonest and without authority of law.
35. Consequently, all acquisition proceedings in respect of
Survey Nos.657/2, 658/1/2, 658/2/2 and 658/3 are hereby quashed.
The respondents are directed to forthwith release and restore
possession of the aforesaid lands to the concerned landholders, if it
is acquired by the respondents/State. The whole exercised be
completed within a period of 60 days.
36. However, it is clarified that in the event that respondents still
intend to acquire the said land, they shall be at liberty to initiate
fresh acquisition proceedings strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013, after following due process of law.
37. Accordingly, this writ petition is hereby allowed in terms of
the directions as indicated hereinabove.
38. Pending applications, if any, shall be disposed off
accordingly.
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(Jai Kumar Pillai)
Judge
Aiyer*PS
