[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dayaram Male vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10152
1 WP-7088-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 16th OF APRIL, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 7088 of 2026
DAYARAM MALE
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Vibhor Khandelwal - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Viraj Godha - Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed
feeling aggrieved by adverse stigmatic remarks against the petitioner in
impugned judgment dated 24.07.2024 passed by the Special Judge
[SC/ST(PA) Act], Shajapur in Special Sessions Case No. SCATR/139/2022.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the petition submits that stigmatic adverse remarks were passed
against the petitioner, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner. Learned counsel referred to para-25, 31 and 42 of the impugned
judgment to contend that the accused in the matter was acquitted for failure
of prosecution to establish the guilt and the accusation was found to be false
on appreciation of evidence. However, the trial Court passed stigmatic
adverse remarks against the petitioner in para-25 of the impugned judgment
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10152
2 WP-7088-2026
that he did not perform his duties and shielded the accused by not forwarding
the source samples of the complainant and the accused for DNA
examination. Learned counsel, referring to the circular no. (पु०मु०/म०अप०/W-
2/3765/2018)dated 30.06.2025 and circular No. (एफएसएल/िनदे /िनस/439/2023)
dated 29.04.2023contended that the prosecution, in the case in question, does
not fall within the categories enumerated in the circular, wherein DNA
examination must be conducted, therefore, the petitioner (Investigation
Officer) did not forward the source material of the complainant and the
accused for DNA examination.Despite the absence of any deliberate breach
of duty on the part of the petitioner, the learned trial Court recorded stigmatic
adverse remarks imputing non-performance of duty and directed initiation of
departmental enquiry, without issuing any notice to the petitioner or
affording him an opportunity of hearing or cross-examining him on the said
issue.The respondent no.2 and 3 initiated departmental enquiry against the
petitioner in furtherance of the remarks by the trial Court. Therefore, it is
prayed that adverse stigmatic remarks in the impugned order dated
24.07.2024 be expunged. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the
Order dated 26.08.2015 passed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case
o f Kamal David and Ors. vs. State of M.P.,2015 SCC Online MP 7726 to
buttress his contentions.
3. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent/State submitted that the
trial Court, on consideration of over all circumstances of the case and
material on the record, found deliberate non-performance of duty on part of
the petitioner.Hence,certain remarks were made in the impugned judgment.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10152
3 WP-7088-2026
Learned counsel further submits that this Court in exercise of writ
jurisdiction may not grant the relief directed against the judgment passed by
the competent Court of law. The petition is meritless.
4. Heard, learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record.
5. In case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim reported in (1964) 2 SCR
363 , it was held that it has been judicially recognised that in the matter of
making disparaging remarks against the persons or authorities, whose
conduct is in question is before the Court, it is relevant to consider-
(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court,
had any opportunity of explaining or defending himself;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct,
justifying the remarks; and
(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral
part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct.
6. In matter of Samya Sett v. Shambhu Sarkar , reported in (2005) 6 SCC
767, it was observed that-
9. This Court has, in several cases, deprecated the practice on the part of judges in
passing strictures and in making unsavoury, undeserving, disparaging or derogatory
remarks against parties, witnesses as also subordinate officers.
*******
11. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566 disparaging and
derogatory remarks were made by the High Court against the State Government.
When the matter came up before this Court and a complaint was made against these
remarks, it was observed by this Court that the remarks were "totally unjustified and
unwarranted".
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10152
4 WP-7088-2026
12. Bhagwati, C.J. stated:
"43. We may observe in conclusion that judges should not use strong and
carping language while criticising the conduct of parties or their witnesses.
They must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. They must have the
humility to recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and
disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may be mistaken
and unjustified and if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and
result in injustice."
13. In A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta (1990) 2 SCC 533 which was an
offshoot of Nandlal Jaiswal certain observations were made by the High Court
against the conduct of the Advocate General of the State. Quoting Justice Cardozo
and Justice Frankfurter, the Court stated that the judges are flesh and blood mortals
with individual personalities and with normal human traits. Still judicial restraint
and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint should be the constant theme of
the judges, observed the Court:
"This quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges to
command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary."
14. The Court further added:
"14. The Judge's Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges have power to
make binding decision, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other
officials. The judges have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the
court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate
comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or
witnesses. We concede that the court has the inherent power to act freely
upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but
it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made
against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration
unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on
their conduct."
7. In case of S.K. Viswambaran v. E. Koyakunju , reported in (1987) 2
SCC 109, relying on Mohammad Naim (supra), the Supreme Court held as
under-
13. We have also to point out a grievous procedural error committed by the High
Court. Even assuming for argument's sake that for expunging the remarks against
Respondents 2 and 3 the conduct of the appellant required scrutiny and merited
adverse comment, the principles of natural justice required the High Court to have
issued notice to the appellant and heard him before passing adverse remarks against
him if it was considered necessary. By its failure the High Court has failed to render
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10152
5 WP-7088-2026
elementary justice to the appellant.
14. Yet another serious infirmity contained in the impugned order is that the High
Court has failed to bear in mind the well-settled principles of law laid down by this
Court in more than one case that should govern the courts before disparaging
remarks are made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into
consideration before courts of law in cases arising before them for decision. In State
of U.P. v. Mohn. Naim (1964) 2 SCR 363, it was held as follows:
"If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of
justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and
Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their
functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody,
even by this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in
expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by
considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that
sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It
has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging
remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into
consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is
relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is
before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying
the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as
an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been
recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and
should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve."
This ratio has been followed in R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan (1975) 2 SCC
466 and Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar (1986) 2 SCC 569. Judged in the light
of the above tests, it may be seen that none of the tests is satisfied in this case. It is
indeed regrettable that the High Court should have lightly passed adverse remarks
of a very serious nature affecting the character and professional competence and
integrity of the appellant in purported desire to render justice to Respondents 2 and
3 in the petition filed by them for expunction of adverse remarks made against
them.
8. In case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar , reported in (2000)
8 SCC 382, it was observed that-
41. Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not make any reference to any
particular omission or lacuna in the investigation. Castigation of investigation
unfortunately seems to be a regular practice when the trial courts acquit the accused
in criminal cases. In our perception it is almost impossible to come across a single
case wherein the investigation was conducted completely flawless or absolutely
foolproof. The function of the criminal courts should not be wasted in picking out
the lapses in investigation and by expressing unsavoury criticism against
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10152
6 WP-7088-2026
investigating officers. If offenders are acquitted only on account of flaws or defects
in investigation, the cause of criminal justice becomes the victim. Effort should be
made by courts to see that criminal justice is salvaged despite such defects in
investigation. Courts should bear in mind the time constraints of the police officers
in the present system, ill-equipped machinery they have to cope with, and the
traditional apathy of respectable persons to come forward for giving evidence in
criminal cases which are realities the police force have to confront with while
conducting investigation in almost every case. Before an investigating officer is
imputed with castigating remarks the courts should not overlook the fact that
usually such an officer is not heard in respect of such remarks made against them. In
our view the court need make such deprecatory remarks only when it is absolutely
necessary in a particular case, and that too by keeping in mind the broad realities
indicated above.
9. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated
propositions of law.
10. The tenor of the impugned judgment reveals that the learned trial
Court, on appreciation of the evidence, found that the prosecution has failed
to establish the veracity of accusation. The trial Court in para 52 of the
judgment has outlined the reasons for acquittal of the accused and concluded
that the complainant was a consenting party. The prosecution has failed to
establish the guilt of accused beyond doubt. The failure of the Investigation
Officer to forward the source material of the complainant and accused for
DNA examination has not been enumerated as one of the reason for acquittal
of the accused in para 52 of the impugned judgment. Thus, the disparaging
remark on the Investigation Officer - D.R. Male in para 25 was neither
necessary for the decision of the case nor it was considered as one of the
reason for acquittal of the accused. The Investigation Officer - D.R. Male
was not cross-examined or asked any question according him opportunity to
explain the reason for non-performance of DNA verification during
investigation. The Investigation Officer was not given any notice or accorded
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10152
7 WP-7088-2026
opportunity of explaining his conduct regarding failure to conduct DNA
Examination. Thus, there was no justification for recording disparaging
stigmatic remark in para 25 of the impugned judgment.
11. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that aforestated
stigmatic remark deserves to be expunged for the ends of justice. The
petition is allowed and the disparaging stigmatic remark that the
petitioner/Investigation Officer D.R. Male did not perform his duty to shield
the accused, is set aside.
12. With the aforesaid observation, petition is disposed off.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
sh
