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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramavtar Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 1 st OF APRIL, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 5571 of 2017
RAMAVTAR SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
None for petitioner.
Shri K.K. Prajapati - learned Government Advocate for
respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been
filed seeking the following reliefs:-
" i- That order dated 19.06.17 (Annexure P/1) and other
consequential action/order may kindly be quashed and respondent
may kindly be directed to permit to joining of petition on the post
of Constable Driver and send him for training.
ii- Any relief which deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court in the fact
and circumstances of the case may kindly be awarded in favour of
petitioner.
iii- Cost may be awarded in the interest of justice. "
2. As per the averments made in the petition, petitioner participated in
the Constable (SAF) Recruitment Test, 2016 conducted by the Professional
Examination Board, Bhopal, and successfully passed the written
examination. After his selection in the said recruitment process, petitioner
filled up the attestation form and clearly disclosed that he had faced one
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criminal trial before the Trial Court. Thereafter, a show cause notice
regarding his character verification was issued to the petitioner by the
Superintendent of Police, Bhind, vide order dated 13.05.2017. In response,
petitioner submitted a reply stating that although he had a criminal
antecedent, he had been acquitted by the Trial Court. Petitioner was involved
in Crime No. 221/2012 registered at Police Station Gormi, District Bhind,
under Sections 325, 324, 323, 294, 506-B, 149 and 148 of the IPC. In Case
No. 860/2012 arising out of the said crime, the learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Mehagaon, District Bhind, acquitted the petitioner. The acquittal
was partly on the basis of compromise between the parties in respect of
certain offences and for the remaining offences, petitioner was acquitted by
the Trial Court. Thereafter, the Screening Committee considered the case of
petitioner in the light of the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Commissioner of Police and Another v. Mehar Singh , (2013) 7 SCC
685 and Avtar Singh v. Union of India , (2016) 8 SCC 471 but wrongly
rejected the candidature of the petitioner. There is no absolutely non
application of mind and there is no consideration in relation to the case
which has been registered in which acquittal has been granted. The
impugned order Annexure P/1 is cryptic order and do not state about any
reason which is not sustainable. Respondents are bound to assign the reason
more particularly they are bound to assign the reason behind its act and its
decision. Petitioner has been granted honourable acquittal by the trial Court
but the respondents have illegally deprived the petitioner from his right of
employment.
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3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State submits that the
decision contained in order Annexure P/1 dated 19.06.2017 was taken
pursuant to screening committee decision. The screening committee has also
provided personal opportunity of being heard to the petitioner on 16.05.2017
and committee has considered all the relevant record and judgment and the
candidature of petitioner was rejected being ineligible for police service. It is
further submitted by learned counsel for the respondent/State that the
petitioner was involved in Crime No. 221/2012 registered at Police Station
Gormi, District Bhind, under Sections 294, 323/149, 325, 149 and 506-B of
the IPC. It is submitted that a compromise was arrived at between the parties
in respect of the offences under Sections 324/149 and 148 of the IPC, and the
petitioner was acquitted by the Trial Court.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors.
Vs. Methu Meda reported in (2022) 1 SCC in paragraph 21 has held as
under:-
"21. As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If a person
is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an
offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned
hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment,
that too in disciplined force. The employer is having a right to
consider his candidature in terms of the circulars issued by the
Screening Committee. The mere disclosure of the offences alleged
and the result of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, the
employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to the
candidate. Both the Single Bench and Division Bench of the High
Court have not considered the said legal position, as discussed
above in the orders impugned. Therefore, the impugned orders
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Methu
Meda v. Union of India and the Division Bench in Union of India
v. Methu Meda are not sustainable in law, as discussed
hereinabove."
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6. The issue of considering the candidature of a candidate for
appointment in view of his involvement in the criminal case has been
considered, time and again, by the Apex Court as also by this Court. Similar
issue was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of
Police and Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh, 2013 (7) SCC 685 . It was also a case
wherein the incumbent was acquitted based upon compromise, the Court held
that it is still open to the Screening Committee to examine the suitability of
the candidate and take a decision. The Court held in paragraphs 22, 23, 33,
34, 35 as under :
"22. Clause (3) of the comprehensive policy delineated in the
Standing Order is material for the present case. It refers to the
Screening Committee comprising high police officers. After a
candidate, who has disclosed his involvement, is acquitted or
discharged, the Committee has to assess his/her suitability for
appointment. Clause (6) states that those against whom serious
offences or offences involving moral turpitude are registered and
who are later on acquitted by extending benefit of doubt or
because the witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by
the accused person shall not generally be considered suitable for
government service. However, all such cases will be considered
by the Screening Committee manned by senior officers. In our
opinion, the word "generally" indicates the nature of discretion.
As a matter of rule, such candidates have to be avoided.
Exceptions will be few and far between and obviously must be
substantiated with acceptable reasons.
23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the
Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved
in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if
they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or
discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The
Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the
candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on
some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the
result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced
officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge
whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to
similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee
will have to consider the nature and extent of such person's
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involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause
for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining
it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not
merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be
to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the
police force.
*** *** ***
33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case
appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal
recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a
disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this
submission. Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to
bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by
according a quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also
to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of
pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be brought in
here. In order to maintain integrity and high standard of police
force, the Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of
a compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening
Committee cannot be faulted for that.
34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact that
in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed
their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact
improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the
application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An
aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and
integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The
respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie
points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to
the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding
whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and
who was later on acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a
post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the
offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a
clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because
the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the
prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in
similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only
be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by
the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee's decision is not
mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot
be questioned.
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great
responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the
society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be
worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police
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force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have
impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order
will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely
exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to
the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police
force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of
taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The
decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless
it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is
tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward
manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter
of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating.
In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and
efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by
the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its
credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the
Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust
reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand."
7. Again in the case of State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan, 2015
(2) SCC 591, the Apex Court reiterated the same legal proposition holding as
under :
"13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a
candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of
confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must
have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely
exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the
police ought not to enter the police force. No doubt the Screening
Committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this
Court, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the
respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has
gone into the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the
appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala fides against
the person taking the said decision nor the decision is shown to be
perverse or irrational. There is no material to show that the
appellant was falsely implicated. Basis of impugned judgment
[Parvez Khan v. State of M.P., Writ Appeal No. 262 of 2010,
decided on 20-3-2012 (MP)] is acquittal for want of evidence or
discharge based on compounding."
8. The Apex Court reiterated the same legal proposition in the case
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of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & others Vs. Pradeep Kumar
& another, reported in (2018)1 SCC 797 held in para - 13 as under :
"13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not
automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is
open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine
whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From the
observations of this Court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases,
it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must
be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably
acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening
Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala
fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the
importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate
with utmost character."
9. In view of the aforesaid legal pronouncement of law by the Apex
Court, it is now settled that the jurisdiction to judge the suitability of a
candidate for appointment, lies with the Screening Committee only. The
Apex Court in para 22 of Mehar Singh case, held that as a rule such
candidates should be avoided. It is further held in para 33, that the decision
of the Screening Committee can be interfered with only when the same is
malafide or is actuated with some extraneous consideration. Further, in para
35, the Apex Court held that the decision of Screening Committee has to be
accepted unless it is malafide. Looking to the facts of present case, it is found
that the petitioner has not alleged malafide against the Screening Committee.
Thus, the discretion exercised by the Screening Committee needs to be
accepted.
10. As seen from above, a candidate should be held as suitable firstly if
he is tried for trivial offence(s) and secondly he is acquitted. No doubt
petitioner was tried for compoundable offences, but his acquittal was not
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honourable. The term 'acquitted' used in aforesaid clause has to mean
acquitted on merits otherwise undue benefit would be acquired by candidates
who may be involved in criminal activities. Somewhat similar clause was
under consideration before Apex Court in the case of Anil Bhardwaj Vs. The
Hon'ble High Court of M.P. and Ors., 2020 (9) SCR 442. The Apex Court
while dealing with similar provision held that the acquittal should be on
merits. Para 27 being relevant is quoted hereunder :
"27. Clause (viii) on which the reliance is placed contemplates that
the candidate who has been acquitted on merit by the Court will be
eligible for the Government service. The aforesaid contemplation
relates to at the time of character verification. Thus, at the time of
character verification, if a candidate is found to be acquitted on
merits by the Court, the candidate shall be treated to be eligible for
Government Service. The above clause (viii) as quoted above
cannot come to the rescue of the appellant who at the time of
character verification or at the time of consideration of the case of
the appellant by the committee on 18.07.2018 had not been
acquitted. Had the appellant in column 12 had mentioned about
the acquittal or at the time of character verification it was found
that the candidate has been acquitted on merit by the Court, Clause
6(viii) would have been attracted but in the present case the said
clause is not attracted since at the time of character verification the
appellant had not been acquitted and he was acquitted after more
than a year from rejection of his candidature."
11. The reliance placed upon by the petitioner's counsel on the
judgment of Division Bench of this Court passed in W.A.No.7 of 2020 in the
case of Rohit Singh Raghuvanshi Vs. State of M.P. and Ors. is also
misplaced inasmuch as the facts of that case were entirely different. In the
said case, only offence was registered against the petitioner but there was no
final verdict by the Court. In that context, the Division Bench laid down
certain criteria to be looked into by the competent authority. However, in the
present case, criminal case has already been closed.
12. Recently, the Apex Court has passed the order in the case of State
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of M.P. Vs. Bhupendra Yadav, (2023) SCC online SC 1181 wherein in
similar circumstances, the Court has approved the decision of the Screening
Committee in cancelling the candidature of the candidate who was acquitted
in criminal case on the basis of compromise. In the said case also, the
candidature was cancelled based upon the compromise between the parties.
The Apex Court held as under:
"16. As can be discerned from the above decision, an employer
has the discretion to terminate or condone an omission in the
disclosure made by a candidate. While doing so, the employer
must act with prudence, keep in mind the nature of the post and
the duties required to be discharged. Higher the post, more
stringent ought to be the standards to be applied. Even if a truthful
disclosure has been made, the employer is well within its right to
examine the fitness of a candidate and in a concluded criminal
case, keep in mind the nature of the offence and verify whether the
acquittal is honourable or benefit has been extended on technical
reasons. If the employer arrives at a conclusion that the incumbent
is of a suspect character or unfit for the post, he may not be
appointed or continued in service."
13. The Full Bench of this Court has also considered the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in
such matters in the case of Ashutosh Pawar Vs. State of M.P., reported in
2018(2) MPLJ 419, wherein in para 32 & 40, it has been held as under:
"32. Therefore, in respect of the Questions No. 1, 4 and 5 we hold
that decision of Criminal Court on the basis of compromise or an
acquittal cannot be treated that the candidate possesses good
character, which may make him eligible, as the criminal
proceedings are with the view to find culpability of commission of
offence whereas the appointment to the civil post is in view of his
suitability to the post. The test for each of them is based upon
different parameters and therefore, acquittal in a criminal case is
not a certificate of good conduct to a candidate. The competent
Authority has to take a decision in respect of the suitability of
candidate to discharge the functions of a civil post and that
mere acquittal in a criminal case would not be sufficient to infer
that the candidate possesses good character. Division Bench
judgment of this Court in W.P.No.5887/2016 (Arvind Gurjar vs.
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State of M.P.) is overruled. Another Division Bench judgment in
W.A. No.367/2015 (Sandeep Pandey vs. State of M.P. and others)
is also overruled. Jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is to examine the
decision-making process than to act as Court of appeal to
substitute its own decision. In appropriate case, if the Court finds
decision-making process is arbitrary or illegal, the Court will
direct the Authority for reconsideration rather than to substitute
the decision of the competent Authority with that of its own.
xxx xxx xxx
40. In view of the law laid down in above said judgments, there is
no doubt that in exercise of power of judicial review under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, this Court only examines the
decision-making process and does not substitute itself as a Court
of appeal over the reasons recorded by the State Government. We
find that the decision of the State Government holding that the
petitioner is not suitable, is just, fair and reasonable keeping in
view the nature of the post and the duties to be discharged."
14. In view of the aforesaid legal position settled by the Apex Court as
also by this Court, it is loud and clear that the interference in such matters
can be made only on the ground of malafides. Further, this Court can
examine only the decision making process and not the merits of the case. The
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case lies within the exclusive
domain of the Screening Committee. Further, as a rule, decision of Screening
Committee needs to be accepted unless it is shown to be malafide or based
on some extraneous consideration.
15. In view of aforesaid discussion, if the facts of this case are
considered in the light of the judicial pronouncement in various judgments, it
is clear that a criminal offence was registered against the petitioner wherein
specific allegations against the petitioner in the FIR were made. Under these
circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Screening
Committee was competent to consider the petitioner's candidature vis-a-vis
his involvement and role in criminal incident. In absence of any malafide
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and/or involvement of any extraneous consideration, the decision of
Screening Committee does not warrant interference by this Court.
16. Consequently, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
Ahmad
