Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Chhotelal on 22 September, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA YADAV
ON THE 22 nd OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
WRIT APPEAL No. 2168 of 2025
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
CHHOTELAL
Appearance:
Shri Ankur Mody, Additional Advocate General for appellants/State.
Shri Surya Pratap Singh, Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Heard on I.A.No. 8701/2025, which is an application for condonation of
delay in filing this appeal.
2. For the reasons mentioned therein, the I.A. is allowed and delay in filing
this appeal is hereby condoned.
3. This appeal, under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed
against the order dated 22/4/2024 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.
No.11988/2019.
4. It is conceded by counsel for respondent that the case in hand is covered
by order passed today by this Court in W.A. No.2460/2025 (State of M.P. Vs.
Rakesh Manjhi).
5. This Court in the case of Rakesh Manjhi (Supra) has held as under:-
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"This writ appeal under Section 2 (1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khandnyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been
filed against the order dated 22.04.2024 passed by learned Single Judge
in W.P. No. 11198/2019, by which order of termination of service of
the respondent has been set aside on the ground of non-compliance of
principles of natural justice. However, liberty has also been granted to
appellants to pass a fresh order after conducting a full-fledged
departmental inquiry.
2. IA No. 10096/2025 has been filed for condonation of delay.
3. It is the case of appellants that on 22-04-2025, respondent filed an
application along with certified copy of the impugned order, only then
appellants came to know about the passing of the impugned order.
Accordingly, they took opinion from the Additional Advocate General,
and after completing the formalities, appeal was filed on 20-8-2025.
Thus, it is submitted that the delay in filing the appeal may be
condoned.
4 . Per contra , the application is vehemently opposed by counsel for
respondent. It is submitted that the explanation given by the State is not
satisfactory, and thus, the appeal be dismissed as barred by time.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties on the question of condonation
of delay.
6. It appears that the impugned order was passed on 22-4-2024, but it
was uploaded on 4-10-2024. Thus, the submissions made by counsel
for appellants that the appellants came to know about passing of the
impugned order only on 22-4-2025, when an application was filed by
respondent, appears to be bona fide and correct.
7. Under these circumstances, where the order was passed on 22-4-
2024, but it was uploaded on 4-10-2024, this Court is of considered
opinion that sufficient ground has been made out by the appellants for
condonation of delay.
8. Accordingly, IA No. 10096/2025 , for condonation of delay, is
allowed, and delay in filing this appeal is hereby condoned.
9. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that
an advertisement was issued for appointment on the post of Constable
(GD) in the Department of Police. Respondent/petitioner applied for a
grant of caste certificate in the office of SDO, Ater, and according to
respondent, caste certificate was issued in the year 2005-2006. On the
basis of the said caste certificate, respondent/petitioner applied for the
post of Constable (GD) in the Department of Police against the reserved
post for Scheduled Caste. On the basis of aforesaid caste certificate,
respondent/petitioner got selected after due process of law, and
thereafter, he was given appointment on 31-07-2014 on the post of
Constable (GD). Appointment of respondent/petitioner was subject to
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verification of the caste certificate. The caste certificate was verified
from the concerning authority, and it was reported by the SDO, Ater,
that the caste certificate has been issued from his office. Later on, on a
complaint made by one Rajni Batham, the caste certificate was again
got verified, and the SDO, Ater, wrote a letter that the caste certificate
was never issued from his office. Accordingly, by order dated 27-05-
2019, services of the respondent/petitioner were terminated without
giving any show-cause notice or conducting any further enquiry as
contemplated under the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Respondent/petitioner filed WP No.
11198/2019 challenging the order of termination. While challenging
the order of termination, it appears that petitioner did not go into the
merits of the case and merely dwelled upon the non-adherence to the
principles of natural justice. The aforesaid fact is mentioned in
paragraph 8 of the impugned order.
10. Even during the course of arguments, counsel for respondent did
not dispute the fact that respondent/petitioner had not challenged the
merits of the case, and had merely confined his arguments to the
question of non-adherence to the principles of natural justice.
11. Learned Single Judge has set aside the order of termination on the
ground of non-adherence to the principles of natural justice.
12. Now, the only question for consideration is as to whether the
appellants were under obligation to issue any show-cause notice or to
conduct any full-fledged departmental inquiry prior to terminating the
services of respondent or not?
13. Appellants had filed their return. It is the case of appellants that
respondent belongs to Batham caste, which comes under the category
of OBC in district Shivpuri, and the caste certificate of Manjhi (ST),
relied upon by the respondent, is a forged document which was never
issued by the department concerned. It was submitted that where the
appointment was obtained by relying on forged documents, then no
departmental inquiry was required, and the principles of natural justice
were not required to be adhered to. Even otherwise, a preliminary
inquiry was conducted, and it was found that the documents relied upon
by the respondent were forged. It was further submitted that even in the
appointment order dated 31-7-2014, it was specifically mentioned that
in case if any adverse report is received with regard to the marksheet or
caste certificate, then services of the employee can be terminated
without any inquiry or notice.
14. Per contra , counsel for respondent has vehemently opposed the
appeal. It is submitted that after the respondent was given appointment,
then termination of his service without giving any formal show-cause
notice or without conducting a departmental inquiry is bad in law, and
the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the order of termination
with liberty to appellants/State that if so advised, then they may
conduct a full-fledged departmental inquiry.
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15. Heard learned counsel for parties.
16. In nutshell, it is the case of respondent that he filed an application
for appointment on the post of Constable (GD) against the reserved
post meant for Scheduled Tribe candidates, as he belonged to Manjhi
caste. Before issuing the order of appointment, caste certificate of the
respondent was got verified from the office of SDO, Ater, who had
informed that the caste certificate has been issued from his office.
However, on a complaint made by Rajni Batham, who is the wife of
respondent, the caste certificate was once again got verified from the
office of SDO, Ater, and it was opined that the earlier verification
report was a manipulated one and the word "Nahi" (Not) was erased,
and it was specifically reported by SDO, Ater, that the caste certificate
of Manjhi was not issued from his office.
17. Under these circumstances, the only question for consideration is as
to whether the authorities were under obligation to comply with the
principles of natural justice after conducting a full-fledged departmental
inquiry or not?
18. As already pointed out, respondent did not challenge the order of
termination on merits. He did not file a certified copy of the registration
register to show that in fact, the caste certificate was issued from the
office of SDO, Ater. The allegations that the caste certificate was not
issued from the office of SDO, Ater, were not challenged by the
respondent while arguing the petition, and confined his arguments only
to the question of non-adherence to the principles of natural justice.
19. Now the only question for consideration is that where the order of
termination has been passed on the ground that appointment order was
obtained by playing fraud on the authorities, then whether the question
of adherence to the principle of natural justice would apply or not?
20. Single Bench of this Court, by judgment passed in the case of
Shailesh Singh Bhadouriya Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others in WP No. 4715/2014 had held that adherence to the principles
of natural justice in a case of fraud is not necessary. The said judgment
was challenged by filing WA No. 1038/2025 , and Coordinate bench of
this Court, by order dated 15-4-2025, passed in the case of Shailesh
Singh Bhadouriya Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, has
upheld the order passed in WP No. 4715/2014. The Coordinate Bench
of this Court, while upholding the order passed by the Single Judge in
WP No. 4715/2014, has held as under:
"1. The present appeal under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya
Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal)
Adhiniyam, 2005 is preferred by the appellant being crestfallen
by the order dated 24.03.2025 passed by learned Single Judge
in Writ Petition No.4715 of 2014, whereby the writ petition
filed by the appellant has been dismissed.
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2. Precisely stated facts of the case are that appellant was
appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk vide order dated
15.07.1988 passed by the Chief Medical and Health Officer,
Narsinghpur. Thereafter, vide order dated 31.05.1989, the
services of petitioner were absorbed in the office of Chief
Medical and Health Officer Morena in Universal Immunization
Center, Morena. In compliance thereof, he joined at Morena on
09.06.1989. Since then he was working in the department.
3. It appears that some complaints were made to Lokayukta
and inquiry started by Lokayukta organization with regard to
his appointment. Therefore, a show cause notice dated
09.05.2014 was issued by respondent No.4-Joint Director,
Health Services, City Center, Gwalior alleging foul play in
appointment of petitioner. Name and address of father of
appellant in the appointment order were not mentioned. Even it
was found that appointment order of appellant does not bear the
signatures of the then Chief Medial and Health Officer who was
the appointing authority and interestingly, no record pertaining
to the appointment of petitioner was also found in the office of
CMHO, Narsinghpur. His service book was also missing.
4. Appellant filed reply and claimed that his appointment is
proper. However, impugned order was passed on 24.07.2014 by
the Additional Director (Administration) Directorate of Health
Services /respondent No.3. The appointment order dated
15.07.1988 was found to be null and void and his services were
terminated. appellant challenged the said termination order in
writ petition. Vide impugned order, writ Court dismissed the
petition. Therefore, appellant is before this Court.
5. It is the submission of learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of appellant that to arrive to the conclusion that fraud
has been committed, departmental inquiry was required to be
conducted. No such inquiry was conducted therefore, impugned
order is vitiated. It is further submitted that initial show cause
notice was issued purportedly under Rule 10 (4) of The M.P.
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966
which is for inflicting minor penalty. However, petitioner was
visited with major penalty of termination of service. This is bad
in law.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents/State opposed the
prayer and submits that learned writ Court rightly considered
the case on the basis of fraud being perpetrated by the appellant
while getting appointment on the basis of forged and fabricated
documents. Since, fraud has not been committed in respect of
any action during the course of employment and the very
appointment was based upon forged documents as well as the
fact that no documents was produced regarding his appointment
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therefore, there was no requirement existed to conduct
departmental inquiry. Appellant obtained appointment
fraudulently. He refers four points referred by the authority in
show cause notice dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure P-6).
7. The said points were raised in inquiry conducted by the
Divisional Joint Director, Health Services, Gwalior. On the
basis of those four points, show cause notice was answered by
the appellant and after considering the reply, he has been
terminated. Learned counsel for the respondents/State relied
upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of The State Of
Bihar and Ors. vs Kirti Narayan Prasad (2019) 13 SCC 250. He
prayed for dismissal of appeal.
8. Heard the rival submissions.
9. This is the case where services of appellant were
terminated on the ground that he obtained appointment through
forged documents/fraud.
10. Show cause notice was issued to the appellant by the
Additional Director (Administration) Directorate of Health
Services, M.P. The said show cause notice was in pursuance to
complaint lodged at the Office of Lokayukta Organization and
vide letter dated 03.08.2013, inquiry report was placed. The
four points surfaced in the inquiry report are important and
worth reproduction for bringing clarity into the issue, which
are:-
जाँच ितवेदन म संभागीय संयु संचालक वा य सेवाय,
वािलयर अवगत करवाया है क:-
1. यह क आपके ारा सेवा म िनयु आदे श क मूल ित,
जाँच/कथन के दौरान जाँचकता अिधकार को सम म तुत नह ं
कये गये ब क आपके ारा िनयु आदे श क व मा णत
छाया ित तुत क गई जो कसी भी राजप त अिधकार ारा
स या पत नह ं होने क वजह से संदोहा पद है ।
2 जाँचकता अिधकार के सम , आपके ारा िनयु आदे श क ित
तुत क गई जसम आपके पता का नाम एवं िनवास के पते का
सह उ लेख होना, नह ं पाया गया।
3. िनयु कता अिधकार , त कालीन मु य िच क सा एवं वा य
अिधकार नरिसंहपुर ( दनांक 15.07.1988 म) के ह ता र का उनके
मूल ह ता र से िमलान होना नह ं पाया गया तथा मु य िच क सा
एवं वा य अिधकार कायालय एवं जला मले रया अिधकार
कायालय नरिसंहपुर से आपक िनयु / उप थित तथा भुगतान से
संबंिधत कोई रकाड जॉच उपरा त िमलना नह ं पाया गया।
4. यह क आपक िनयु दनांक 21.07.1988 से दनांक
08.06.1989 तथा दनांक 08.07.1990 से दनांक 31.03.1995
तक साथ ह विभ न अविधय का सेवा स यापन, जॉच उपरा त,
आपक सेवापु तका म होना नह ं पाये जाने तथा दनांक 15.07.
1988 को जार कये गये दो िनयु आदे श म लगभग 3000 से
अिधक जावक कमांक का अ तर होना, करण को संदेहा पद बनाता
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है ।
11. This show cause notice was based upon inqiury
conducted against the petitioner and issued in respect of
commission of misconduct under Rule 3(1)(ii)(iii) of The M.P.
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. In the show cause notice,
he was asked to bring all documents in original in the
Directorate.
12. In pursuance to show cause notice, petitioner filed his
response and attached certain documents. After the inquiry,
conducted by Joint Director Health Services, Gwalior,
impugned order has been passed. Therefore, proper opportunity
of hearing was provided to the appellant and thereafter,
impugned order has been passed.
13. So far as preliminary inquiry is concerned, it conducted
threadbare. Ever after issuance of show cause notice, petitioner
was asked to bring all the documents in original before the
authority but he failed to produce original appointment order
and other documents. Surprisingly, service book of petitioner
was not available. He was appointed at District Narsinghpur
and from there somehow, he managed to join at Morena, a
District place, more than 500 KMs away from original place of
posting (Narsinghpur).
14. The impugned order also contained one peculiar fact that
appointment order of appellant contains No.18896-900 whereas
one G.P. Upadhyay who was appointed on same day bears
No.15800-04. In one day, 3092 outward numbers are
impossible to be endorsed in office of authority at District
Narsinghpur. Not only this, it was specifically mentioned in the
inquiry report that appointment order does not bear signatures
of Dr. N.K.Naik who was working as C.M.H.O. at the relevant
point of time, his signature does not match with the signature
over the appointment order (photocopy) of appellant. Despite
giving sufficient opportunity to present his case with
documents, appellant was failed to do so.
15. It is not a case where petitioner did anything during the
course of employment; in fact, he obtained employment by
preparation of forged documents. Therefore, question of holding
departmental inquiry does not arise. He can not get the benefit
of Article 311 of the Constitution or any other statutory rule.
Departmental inquiry is held in respect of delinquent employee
or civil servant who committed misconduct during the course of
employment/service. Here, appointment of petitioner was void
ab initio and rightly termed as null and void while obtaining
through fraud.
16. In the case of Kirti Narayan Prasad (supra) Hon'ble
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Supreme Court has given guidance in a very categorical terms:-
17. In the instant cases the writ petitioners have
filed the petitions before the High Court with a
specific prayer to regularize their service and to set
aside the order of termination of their services. They
have also challenged the report submitted by the
State Committee. The real controversy is whether
the writ petitioners were legally and validly
appointed. The finding of the State Committee is
that many writ petitioners had secured appointment
by producing fake or forged appointment letter or
had been inducted in Government service
surreptitiously by concerned Civil Surgeon-cum-
Chief Medical Officer by issuing a posting order.
The writ petitioners are the beneficiaries of illegal
orders made by the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief
Medical Officer. They were given notice to establish
the genuineness of their appointment and to show
cause. None of them could establish the genuineness
or legality of their appointment before the State
Committee. The State Committee on appreciation of
the materials on record has opined that their
appointment was illegal and void ab initio. We do
not find any ground to disagree with the finding of
the State Committee. In the circumstances, the
question of regularisation of their services by
invoking para 53 of the judgment in Umadevi
(supra) does not arise. Since the appointment of the
petitioners is ab initio void, they cannot be said to
be the civil servants of the State. Therefore, holding
disciplinary proceedings envisaged by Article 311 of
the Constitution or under any other disciplinary rules
shall not arise.
18. Therefore, the Civil Appeals filed by the writ
petitioners in the aforesaid batch of appeals are
hereby dismissed. The Civil Appeals filed by the
State of Bihar are allowed and the writ petitions
filed before the High Court of Patna in the said cases
are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to
costs.
17. Beside that fraud vitiates all solemn proceedings. It is
well settled principle of law that Fraud Vitiates Everything.
This principle has been dealt with by the Apex Court in its
various judgments viz. in the case of R. Ravindra Reddy Vs. H.
Ramaiah Reddy, (2010) 3 SCC 214, Badami Bai (D) Tr. L.R.
Vs. Bhali, (2012) 11 SCC 574, Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. Vs.
Sant Singh, (2016) 11 SCC 378, K.D. Sharma Vs. SAIL, (2008)
12 SCC 481, Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India,
(1986) 1 SCC 133, DDA Vs. Skipper Construction, (2007) 15
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SCC 601 and in the case of Jai Narain Parasrampuria Vs.
Pushpa Devi Saraf, reported in (2006) 7 SCC 756.
18. In view of the above discussion, learned writ Court has
rightly discussed in correct perspective and passed the
impugned order. Thus, no case for interference is made out.
19. Appeal stands dismissed."
21. Furthermore, the principle of natural justice has undergone a lot of
changes. Once the order on merits was not challenged, then under the
facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of considered opinion
that grant of opportunity of hearing is nothing but a useless formality.
The Supreme Court in the case of Nirma Industries Limited and another
Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2013) 8 SCC
20 has held as under :-
"30. In B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S)
1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] , having defined the meaning of
"civil consequences", this Court reiterated the principle that
the Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order
of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished
to the employee. It is only if the Court or Tribunal finds that the
furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the
result in the case that it should set aside the order of
punishment. In other words, the Court reiterated that the person
challenging the order on the basis that it is causing civil
consequences would have to prove the prejudice that has been
caused by the non- grant of opportunity of hearing............
35. Mr Venugopal has further pointed out that apart from the
appellants, even the merchant bankers did not make a request
for a personal hearing. He submitted that grant of an
opportunity for a personal hearing cannot be insisted upon in all
circumstances. In support of this submission, he relied on the
judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corpn.
[(1996) 4 SCC 69] The submission cannot be brushed aside in
view of the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid
judgment, which are as under: (SCC pp. 74-75, para 5)
"5. The High Court has primarily considered the
question as to whether denying an opportunity to the
appellant to be heard before his prayer to dispense with
the deposit of the penalty is rejected, violates and
contravenes the principles of natural justice. In that
connection, several judgments of this Court have been
referred to. It need not be pointed out that under
different situations and conditions the requirement of
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compliance with the principle of natural justice vary.
The courts cannot insist that under all circumstances
and under different statutory provisions personal
hearings have to be afforded to the persons concerned.
If this principle of affording personal hearing is
extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with
the power to exercise discretion in connection with
statutory appeals, it shall lead to chaotic conditions.
Many statutory appeals and applications are disposed of
by the competent authorities who have been vested with
powers to dispose of the same. Such authorities which
shall be deemed to be quasi- judicial authorities are
expected to apply their judicial mind over the
grievances made by the appellants or applicants
concerned, but it cannot be held that before dismissing
such appeals or applications in all events the quasi-
judicial authorities must hear the appellants or the
applicants, as the case may be. When principles of
natural justice require an opportunity to be heard
before an adverse order is passed on any appeal or
application, it does not in all circumstances mean a
personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by
affording an opportunity to the person concerned to
present his case before such quasi-judicial authority
who is expected to apply his judicial mind to the issues
involved. Of course, if in his own discretion if he
requires the appellant or the applicant to be heard
because of special facts and circumstances of the case,
then certainly it is always open to such authority to
decide the appeal or the application only after affording
a personal hearing. But any order passed after taking
into consideration the points raised in the appeal or the
application shall not be held to be invalid merely on the
ground that no personal hearing had been afforded."
The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, State Bank of India and
another Vs. M.J. James reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301 has held as
under :-
"31. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v.
Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 : 2020 SCC OnLine
SC 847] referring to the aforesaid cases and several other
decisions of this Court, the law was crystallised as under : (SCC
para 42)
"42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus
reveals:
42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the
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hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases
to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi
alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without
more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is
thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive
provisions of law embody the principles of
natural justice, their infraction per se does not
lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here
again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant,
except in the case of a mandatory provision of
law which is conceived not only in individual
interest, but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person
complaining of the breach of natural justice
where such person does not dispute the case
against him or it. This can happen by reason of
estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of
non-challenge or non-denial or admission of
facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts
that no real prejudice can therefore be said to
have been caused to the person complaining of
the breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be
admitted or indisputable, and only one
conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass
futile orders of setting aside or remand when
there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This
conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an
appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the
authority who denies natural justice to a
person.
42.5. The "prejudice" exception must be more
than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable
suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a
matter of fact, or be based upon a definite
inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing
from the non-observance of natural justice."
The Supreme Court in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs.
Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and others reported
in (2015) 8 SCC 519 has held as under :-
"20. Natural justice is an expression of English Common
Law. Natural justice is not a single theory--it is a family of
views. In one sense administering justice itself is treated as
natural virtue and, therefore, a part of natural justice. It is also
called "naturalist" approach to the phrase "natural justice" and
is related to "moral naturalism". Moral naturalism captures the
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essence of commonsense morality--that good and evil, right
and wrong, are the real features of the natural world that human
reason can comprehend. In this sense, it may comprehend virtue
ethics and virtue jurisprudence in relation to justice as all these
are attributes of natural justice. We are not addressing ourselves
with this connotation of natural justice here.
21. In Common Law, the concept and doctrine of natural
justice, particularly which is made applicable in the decision-
making by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, has assumed a
different connotation. It is developed with this fundamental in
mind that those whose duty is to decide, must act judicially.
They must deal with the question referred both without bias and
they must give (sic an opportunity) to each of the parties to
adequately present the case made. It is perceived that the
practice of aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead to doing
justice. Since these attributes are treated as natural or
fundamental, it is known as "natural justice". The principles of
natural justice developed over a period of time and which is still
in vogue and valid even today are: (i) rule against bias i.e. nemo
debet esse judex in propria sua causa; and (ii) opportunity of
being heard to the party concerned i.e. audi alteram partem.
These are known as principles of natural justice. To these
principles a third principle is added, which is of recent origin. It
is the duty to give reasons in support of decision, namely,
passing of a "reasoned order".
***
38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the
principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner
mentioned above, at the same time, the courts have also
repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are
very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any
straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions
performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be
affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid
principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For
example, the courts have held that it would be sufficient to
allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may
not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending
upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing
but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as a
necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice.
Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by
way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and
full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules
as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an
admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held,
the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this
reason, in certain circumstances, even post- decisional hearing
is held to be permissible. Further, the courts have held that
under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may
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even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place,
the apprehended danger and so on.
40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other exception
which has been carved out to the aforesaid principle by the
courts. Even if it is found by the court that there is a violation
of principles of natural justice, the courts have held that it may
not be necessary to strike down the action and refer the matter
back to the authorities to take fresh decision after complying
with the procedural requirement in those cases where non-grant
of hearing has not caused any prejudice to the person against
whom the action is taken. Therefore, every violation of a facet
of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that the order
passed is always null and void. The validity of the order has to
be decided on the touchstone of "prejudice". The ultimate test is
always the same viz. the test of prejudice or the test of fair
hearing.
41. In ECIL [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 :
(1993) 25 ATC 704] , the majority opinion, penned down by
Sawant, J., while summing up the discussion and answering the
various questions posed, had to say as under qua the prejudice
principle: (SCC pp. 756-58, para 30)
"30. Hence the incidental questions raised above
may be answered as follows:
***
(v) The next question to be answered is what
is the effect on the order of punishment when
the report of the enquiry officer is not
furnished to the employee and what relief
should be granted to him in such cases. The
answer to this question has to be relative to the
punishment awarded. When the employee is
dismissed or removed from service and the
inquiry is set aside because the report is not
furnished to him, in some cases the non-
furnishing of the report may have prejudiced
him gravely while in other cases it may have
made no difference to the ultimate punishment
awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement
of the employee with back wages in all cases is
to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical
ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity
and the principles of natural justice have been
evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist
the individual to vindicate his just rights. They
are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to
be performed on all and sundry occasions.
Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to
the employee or not on account of the denial to
him of the report, has to be considered on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Where,
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14 WA-2168-2025
therefore, even after the furnishing of the
report, no different consequence would have
followed, it would be a perversion of justice to
permit the employee to resume duty and to get
all the consequential benefits. It amounts to
rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and
thus to stretching the concept of justice to
illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to
an 'unnatural expansion of natural justice'
which in itself is antithetical to justice."
44. At the same time, it cannot be denied that as far as courts
are concerned, they are empowered to consider as to whether
any purpose would be served in remanding the case keeping in
mind whether any prejudice is caused to the person against
whom the action is taken. This was so clarified in ECIL [(1993)
4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] itself
in the following words: (SCC p. 758, para 31)
"31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's
report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in
the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and
tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be
furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not
already secured it before coming to the
court/tribunal and given the employee an
opportunity to show how his or her case was
prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report.
If after hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes
to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report
would have made no difference to the ultimate
findings and the punishment given, the
court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of
punishment. The court/tribunal should not
mechanically set aside the order of punishment on
the ground that the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present. The courts should
avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the
courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind
to the question and give their reasons for setting
aside or not setting aside the order of punishment,
(and not any internal appellate or revisional
authority), there would be neither a breach of the
principles of natural justice nor a denial of the
reasonable opportunity. It is only if the
court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report
would have made a difference to the result in the
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15 WA-2168-2025
case that it should set aside the order of
punishment."
The Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank and others v. Debasis
Das and others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 has held as under :-
"22. What is known as "useless formality theory" has received
consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India
[(1999) 6 SCC 237] . It was observed as under: (SCC pp. 245-
47, paras 22-23)
"22. Before we go into the final aspects of this
contention, we would like to state that cases relating
to breach of natural justice do also occur where all
facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute.
In the context of those cases there is a considerable
case-law and literature as to whether relief can be
refused even if the court thinks that the case of the
applicant is not one of 'real substance' or that there
is no substantial possibility of his success or that the
result will not be different, even if natural justice is
followed see Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 2
All ER 1278 : (1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] (per Lord
Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele
University [(1971) 2 All ER 89 : (1971) 1 WLR
487] , Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority
[(1980) 2 All ER 368 : (1980) 1 WLR 582 (CA)]
and other cases where such a view has been held.
The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing
Magistrates' Court, ex p Fannaran [(1996) 8 Admn
LR 351] (Admn LR at p. 358) [see de Smith, Suppl.
p. 89 (1998)] where Straughton, L.J. held that there
must be 'demonstrable beyond doubt' that the result
would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v.
McMahon [(1987) 1 All ER 1118 : 1987 AC 625 :
(1987) 2 WLR 821 (CA)] has also not disfavoured
refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of
natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy
v. Grant [1959 NZLR 1014] however goes halfway
when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is
sufficient for the applicant to show that there is 'real
likelihood -- not certainty -- of prejudice'. On the
other hand, Garner's Administrative Law (8th Edn.,
1996, pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the
result would have been different is sufficient. On the
other side of the argument, we have apart from
Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66
: (1963) 2 WLR 935 (HL)] , Megarry, J. in John v.
Rees [(1969) 2 All ER 274 : 1970 Ch 345 : (1969) 2
WLR 1294] stating that there are always 'open and
shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of
prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the
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16 WA-2168-2025
court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has
said that the 'useless formality theory' is a
dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural
justice must be followed. His Lordship observed
that 'convenience and justice are often not on
speaking terms'. More recently, Lord Bingham has
deprecated the 'useless formality theory' in R. v.
Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police
Forces, ex p Cotton [1990 IRLR 344] by giving six
reasons. (See also his article 'Should Public Law
Remedies be Discretionary?' 1991 PL, p. 64.) A
detailed and emphatic criticism of the 'useless
formality theory' has been made much earlier in
'Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof.
D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63)
contending that Malloch [(1971) 2 All ER 1278 :
(1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] and Glynn [(1971) 2 All
ER 89 : (1971) 1 WLR 487] were wrongly decided.
Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p.
323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596)
and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is
to be decided by the decision-making authority. de
Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says
courts have not yet committed themselves to any
one view though discretion is always with the court.
Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp.
526-30) says that while futile writs may not be
issued, a distinction has to be made according to the
nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases
other than those relating to admitted or indisputable
facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion
whether the applicant can be compelled to prove
that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to
prove a case of substance or if he can prove a 'real
likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief
even if there is some remote chance of success. We
may, however, point out that even in cases where
the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute,
there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can,
in exercise of their 'discretion', refuse certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though
natural justice is not followed. We may also state
that there is yet another line of cases as in State
Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 717] , Rajendra Singh v. State of
M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] that even in relation to
statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is
to be made between cases where the provision is
intended for individual benefit and where a
provision is intended to protect public interest. In the
former case, it can be waived while in the case of the
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17 WA-2168-2025
latter, it cannot be waived.
23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the
correctness or otherwise of the 'useless formality'
theory and leave the matter for decision in an
appropriate case, inasmuch as in the case before us,
'admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of
a writ will be in vain as pointed out by Chinnappa
Reddy, J."
23. As was observed by this Court we need not go into "useless
formality theory" in detail; in view of the fact that no prejudice
has been shown. As is rightly pointed out by learned counsel for
the appellants, unless failure of justice is occasioned or that it
would not be in public interest to dismiss a petition on the fact
situation of a case, this Court may refuse to exercise the said
jurisdiction (see Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P.
[AIR 1966 SC 828] ). It is to be noted that legal formulations
cannot be divorced from the fact situation of the case. Personal
hearing was granted by the Appellate Authority, though not
statutorily prescribed. In a given case post-decisional hearing
can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional
hearing. (See Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC
613 : AIR 1990 SC 1480] .)"
22. Under these circumstances, it is clear that once an order of
appointment was obtained by playing fraud by filing forged documents
and findings recorded by appellants/State that the caste certificate relied
upon by respondent was a forged document, was never challenged by
the respondent while arguing the writ petition before the Single Judge,
this Court is of considered opinion that it is a case of fraud, and under
these circumstances, it was not necessary for appellants to adhere to the
principles of natural justice. Furthermore, respondent has not pointed
out any prejudice which has been caused to him on account of non
grant of opportunity of hearing for the simple reason that he did not
challenge the order of termination on merits.
23. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this
Court is of considered opinion that the case in hand is duly covered by
the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Shailesh Singh Bhadoriya (supra) , and accordingly, learned Single
Judge committed a material illegality by setting aside the order dated
27-5-2019 passed by Superintendent of Police, Gwalior on the ground
of non-compliance of principles of natural justice.
24. Under these circumstances, the order dated 22.4.2024, which was
uploaded on 4-10-2024, passed by learned Single Judge in WP No.
11198/2019, is hereby set aside, and WP No. 11198/2019, filed by
respondent, is hereby dismissed.
25. With aforesaid observation, appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed."
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18 WA-2168-2025
6. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and order dated 22/4/2024 passed in
W.P. No.11988/2019 is hereby set aside.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA) (PUSHPENDRA YADAV)
JUDGE JUDGE
(and)
