Madhya Pradesh High Court
State Of M.P. vs Hariram on 7 May, 2025
Author: Anil Verma
Bench: Anil Verma
1
CRA NO.183/2007
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.183 OF 2007
(STATE OF M.P.
Vs.
HARIRAM AND ANOTHER)
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Appearance:
SHRI APS TOMAR - PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR THE APPELLANT/STATE.
SHRI VILAS TIKHE WITH SHRI UTKARSH TIKHE - ADVOCATE FOR THE
RESPONDENTS.
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Reserved on : 01.05.2025
Delivered on : 07.05.2025
JUDGMENT
Per: ANIL VERMA J.
Appellant has preferred this criminal appeal under Section 378 of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short Cr.P.C.) after obtaining leave vide
order dated 28.2.2007 from this Court under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C.
against the judgment of acquittal dated 27.10.2006 passed by Special
Judge (SC/ST Act) Guna in Special Case No.34/2004 for the offence
under Section 3 (1)(10) and 3(1)(11) of SC/ST Act and under Section
506 Part-II and 324 of IPC.
2. As per prosecution story on 5.1.2004 the prosecutrix lodged an
FIR at Police Station AJAK Guna by stating that on 4.1.2004 when she
was irrigating her field, at that time respondent/accused persons came
there and told her that this is our field, they abused her in filthy language
and also used caste related humiliated word. Accused Laxman torn her
blouse with bad intention and accused Hariram put the hot iron rod on
the back of Ramratibai, when the prosecutrix cried, then Naval Singh
and Hariom came there for intervention. Accused persons threatened that
if you come again in this field, they will kill her. Prosecutrix narrated the
whole incident to her husband and thereafter on the next day she lodged
the FIR. After completion of investigation, charge sheet has been filed.
3. The Trial Court after due appreciation of entire evidence available
on record, came to conclusion that that the prosecutrix has failed to
establish the charges framed against respondent/accused persons beyond
reasonable doubt and by the impugned judgment acquitted the
respondent/accused from all the aforesaid charges.
4. Being aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondents/accused,
appellant has preferred this appeal against the impugned judgment of
acquittal.
5. Learned Public Prosecutor for the appellant submits that the Trial
Court has not properly appreciated the evidence and wrongly acquitted
the respondent/accused from the charges leveled against him.
6. Statement of prosecutrix (PW-1) has been duly supported by
eyewitness Naval Singh and Hariom and her statement is also supported
by Dr. Raghuvanshi (PW-8) and MLC report but the Trial Court
committed error in not believing the testimony of the prosecutrix and
wrongly acquitted the respondents/accused. Hence, he prays that the
impugned judgment of acquittal of respondents/accused be set aside.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/accused opposed
the prayer and prayed for its rejection by supporting the impugned
judgment passed by the Trial Court.
8. Both the parties are heard and perused the record with due care.
9. On due consideration of the arguments advanced by learned
Public Prosecutor for the appellant and the impugned judgment as well
as the finding recorded by the Trial Court in paras 17 to 31 of the
impugned judgment it appears that although the prosecutrix (PW-1)
deposed against the respondents/accused persons regarding the aforesaid
offences but eyewitness Naval Singh (PW-3) and Hariom (PW-4) did not
mention anything in their statement that the accused persons torn the
blouse of the prosecutrix with bad intention. There is a material
contradictions and omissions in the statement of Naval Singh (PW-3)
and his police statement Ex.D/6 and also in the statement of Hariom
(PW-4) and his police statement.
10. Raju (PW-5) has also been examined as an eyewitness but he has
turned hostile and not supported the statement of prosecutrix.
11. Prakash (PW-7) has also been examined as an eyewitness. There
are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of Prakash
(PW-7) and his police statement Ex.D/7 regarding the injuries sustained
by the prosecutrix by fire.
12. Dr. Y.S. Raghuvanshi (PW-8) admits in his cross-examination that
burn injury marks found on the body of the prosecutrix were more wider
than Article B.
13. It is also remarkable that Gappalal (PW-2) who is husband of the
prosecutrix also admits that he did not inform the village Chowki or
Kotwar and did not lodge any report nearby Police Station Bajranggarh.
The incident took place on 4.1.2004 at about 5:00 PM and FIR Ex.P/1
has been lodged on the next day about 10:00 AM. Prosecutrix (PW-1)
and her husband Gappalal (PW-2) did not give any satisfactory
explanation for the aforesaid delay, therefore, on the basis of delay in
FIR the entire prosecution story appears to be doubtful.
14. Apart from above, Gappalal (PW-2) husband of the prosecutrix
admits in his cross-examination that it is true that Hariom and Imrat filed
a civil suit against them and in that, order Ex.D/2 has been passed and
the Court has prevented them to enter into the disputed land. They have
filed an appeal against that order and Ex.D/3 is the order of Appellate
Court. Gappalal (PW-2) has also admitted in his cross-examination that
he along with his wife and other persons filed a civil suit Ex.D/4 against
Imrat Singh, Hariram, Dhanram and Mohanlal and later on they have
dismissed their own suits but the civil suit filed against them is still
pending and accused persons also filed proceeding for cancellation of
their lease deeds. Gappalal (PW-2) in his statement of para 20 admits
that he wants to take his land but accused persons do not agree for it. On
the basis of aforesaid statement of Gappalal (PW-2), it is true that there
is a property dispute between both the parties prior to the incident and on
the basis of aforesaid land dispute, there is a possibility of false
implication of respondents/accused persons by the complainant as
mentioned by learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment and on the
basis of aforesaid, entire prosecution story appears to be doubtful.
15. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Arvind Joshi reported in 2008 (2)
Crimes 228 (M.P.), this Court has held as under:
"10. Thus, the court has found that the prosecution has
failed to prove the charges and allegations against the
respondent by producing evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. After considering the evidence as well as the
findings of the trial court, we are also of the view that
the prosecution evidence is doubtful and with a firmness
it cannot be held that the evidence of all the remaining
three eye-witnesses is reliable or that they made the
truthful version of the incident or narrated the story
correctly in the court or that the findings of acquittal are
liable to be reversed merely on their evidence.
According to us, the trial court has not committed any
illegality in recording the findings of acquittal against
the respondent.
11. It is settled principle under law that normally
unless the finding of acquittal is totally perverse and
wholly unreasonable, the appellate court should not
interfere in the finding of acquittal simply on the ground
that other views is also possible from the same set of
evidence.
12. In a case of State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran and
Anr. (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162 the Hon. Supreme Court
has held that: "While exercising the powers in an appeal
against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would
not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless
the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some
manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would
not be arrived at by any reasonable person and,
therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse.
Merely because two views are possible, the court of
appeal would not take the view, which would upset the
judgment delivered by the court below. However, the
appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is
of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is
perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of
law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty
is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances,
to re appreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision
on the basis of material placed on record to find out
whether any of the accused is connected with
commission of the crime he is charged with."
13. In a case of Peerappaand Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 586, their Lordships
recalled the observations made by His Lordship of the
Supreme Court, in a case of Kashiram v. State of M.P.
(2002) 1 SCC 71, as observed, thus: "Though the High
Court while hearing an appeal against an acquittal has
powers as wide and comprehensive as in an appeal
against a conviction and while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction the High Court can reappraise the evidence,
arrive at findings at variance with those recorded by the
trial court in its order of acquittal and arrive at its own
findings, yet, the salutary principle which would guide
the High Court is -if two views are reasonable possible,
one supporting the acquittal and the other recording a
conviction, the High Court would not interfere merely
because it feels that sitting as a trial court its view would
have been one of recording a conviction. It follows as a
necessary corollary that it is obligatory on the High
Court while reversing an order of acquittal to consider
and discuss each of the reasons given by the trial court
to acquit the accused and then to dislodge those reasons.
Failure to discharge this obligation constitutes a serious
infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. That
obligation has not been discharged by the High Court in
the instant case. On the reasons given by the trial court
while appreciating the evidence have not been dealt with
by the High Court."
16. Now, so far as the present appeal against the judgment of acquittal
is concerned, it is settled law that High Court would not ordinarily
interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower
appellate Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality. Merely because
two views are possible, the High Court would not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the lower appellate Court as held in the decision of
State of M.P. Vs. Ramcharan and others, 1985 MPLJ 714.
17. Taking this view of the matter, no interference is called for in the
judgment of acquittal dated 27.10.2006 passed by the lower appellate
Court. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the State is accordingly
dismissed.
18. The respondents are on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand
discharged.
(ANIL VERMA)
JUDGE
(alok)
