Madhya Pradesh High Court
Arunendra @ Sanjay Paroha vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 18 March, 2025
Author: Maninder S. Bhatti
Bench: Maninder S. Bhatti
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MANINDER S. BHATTI
ON THE 18th OF MARCH, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 18239 of 2016
ARUNENDRA @ SANJAY PAROHA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Arun Kumar Nema - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Nupur Dhamija - Dy. Govt. Advocate for the State.
Ms. Anjana Kuraria - Advocate for the respondent No.2.
ORDER
Assail in the present petition filed under Section 482 of the CrPC is
to the FIR/Crime No.184/2016 registered at the Police Station, Gohalpur
District Jabalpur and ensued proceedings thereon.
2. As per averments made in the petition, respondent No.2 approached
the Police by way of a complaint which is at page No.7 of the memo of
petition. In the said complaint allegations were levelled that the complainant
came in touch with the present petitioner five years back. They were in
relationship and thereafter, under the garb of false promise of marriage, the
petitioner persuaded the prosecutrix to enter into sexual relationship.
However, later on, the present petitioner while taking recourse to a complete
volt-face, refused to enter into wedlock with the respondent No.2, and as
such the complaint was filed. On the basis of the complaint the impugned
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FIR was registered against the petitioner. After registration of the FIR, trial
v i d e S.T. No.138/2016 (State vs. Arunendra @ Sanjay Paroha) was
conducted before the VII Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur. Thus,
assailing the FIR and the ensued proceedings thereon the instant petition is
filed.
3. The counsel for the petitioner contends that the FIR and the entire
proceedings thereon deserve to be quashed, inasmuch as in the present case,
apparently, as per the complaint itself the present petitioner and the
prosecutrix came in contact and established physical relationships five years
ago, sometimes in the year 2011. It is contended by the counsel that there is
no explanation in the complaint as regards inaction on the part of the
prosecutrix in not lodging the FIR. It is also contended by the counsel that
firstly, there was no false promise of marriage; and secondly, even if there is
subsequent refusal by the petitioner to adhere to the promise, the same
cannot be brought within the ambit and sweep of Section 376(2)(n) of the
IPC.
4. It is strenuously urged by the counsel for the petitioner that this
aspect has already been appreciated by the Courts of Law in catena of
decisions. To buttress his submissions the counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance on the decisions of this Court rendered in the cases of Senjeet
Singh vs. State of M.P. and another, 2020(1)MPLJ (Cri) 260 and Udham
Singh vs. State of M.P. and another, 2023(2)MPLJ (Cri) 328 . Thus, it is
contended by the counsel that the present petition deserves to be allowed,
inasmuch as the impugned FIR was lodged against the petitioner in order to
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wreak vengeance and settle personal score, which the law does not
countenance.
5. The counsel for the State as well as respondent No.2 have opposed
the prayer and vehemently contended that the FIR contains direct allegations
against the petitioner and the said allegations are required to be sifted and
evaluated by the trial Court, after evidence is adduced by the parties. At this
premature stage, the FIR and the ensued proceedings thereon, cannot be gone
into and ascribing any finding thereto by this Court would have bearing on
the trial, to be conducted by the trial Court. Hence, the counsels contend
that the instant petition deserves dismissal.
6. Heard submission and perused the records.
7. A perusal of the records reflects that the following complaint was
lodged by the complainant against the petitioner :
'' ीमान थाना भार महोदय
थाना गोहलपुर जबलपुर
वषयः- अ णे उफ संजय पर हा ारा शाद का झांसा दे कर मेरे साथ लगातार दे हक
शोषण करने के संबंध म।
महोदय,
िनवेदन है क मै कु. आरती उपा याय पता व. गोवधन उपा याय उ 23 साल ाम थाना
थाना ढ मरखेडा जला कटनी क िनवासी हू ं मेर बहन संगीता कुर रया के घर कृ णा कालोनी
मूित नगर दमोहनाका जबलपुर म पछले पांच सालो से मेरा आना जाना है म पढाई के संबंध म
अपनी बहन के यहां आती जाती रहती हू ं मेर बहन के घर के सामने अ णे पर हा रहता है
अ णे परोहा म पांच साल पहले मुझसे कहा क म तु ह पसंद करता हू ं तुमसे शाद करना चाहता
हू ं और जब म बहन के घर म अकेली थी तो मेरे साथ शार रक संबंध बनाया म रोने लगी तो बोला
क घबराओ मत म तुमसे शाद क ं गा इसके बाद अ णे कभी भी मेरे गांव घाना मेरे मो. नं.
9617311489 म अपने मो. नं. 9977338285 से संपक कर आ जाता था और मुझे घर म अकेला
पाकर मेरे साथ शार रक संबंध बनाता था अ णे अिधकतर मुझसे िसलौड गांव म आकर
िमलता था इस तरह लगातार मेरे साथ पछले पांच साल से मेरा दै हक शोषण कया जब भी म
शाद करने के िलये कहती तो मुझसे कहता क नौकर लग जाये तब शाद करग ले कन जब नौकर
लग गई उसके बाद मैने कहा क अब शाद कर लेते है तो कहने लगा क प रवारवालो से चचा करते
हुये शाद कर लगे काफ समय बीत जाने के बाद दनांक 07/03/16 को अ णे पुनः मुझसे
िसलौड गांव म िमला और मेरे साथ शार रक संबंध बनाया जब मैने शाद करने क बात कह तो
टाल मट ल करने लगा इसी बात को लेकर हमारे बीच ववाद होने लगा और अ णे बोला क म
तुमसे शाद नह क ं गा जो करना हो कर लो तब मैने सार बात अपनी बड़ बहन संगीता तथा मामी
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िन शु ला मामा संतोष शु ला से बताई तब उनके ारा भी पूण प से शाद संबंध बनाने हे तु पहल
क गई उसके बाद भी अ णे नह ं माना है इस कार अ णे पर हा ारा मुझे शाद का झांसा
दे कर मेरे साथ लगातार दै हक शोषण करता रहा है इसिलये मै अ णे पर हा के व कायवाह
हे तु आवेदन तुत करती हू ं कायवाह क जाय।''
A bare perusal of the complaint reflects that the respondent No.2
mentioned that she came in contact with the present petitioner in the year
2011 and since then they were in relationship. Later on, the present
petitioner used to say, that he would enter into wedlock with the complainant
and they had physical relationship when the prosecutrix was at her sister's
place. However, the subsequent part of the complaint alleges that under the
garb of false promise of marriage, on number of occasions, the petitioner
pursued the prosecutrix to enter into physical relationship, and as such the
offence, as alleged, was committed by the petitioner.
8. To deal with the aforesaid allegations, if the statement of the
prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC is perused, it emanates a
different picture. As per paragraph No.1 of the statement of the prosecurix,
it is evident that the present petitioner refused to enter into wedlock with the
prosecutrix, as his parents were not agreeing for the said marriage. As
relationship of the present petitioner and the prosecutrix was not being
approved of by the parents of the petitioner, hence there was refusal by the
petitioner to enter into the wedlock. Paragraph No.1 of the statement of the
prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC is reproduced :
'' मूत नगर जबलपुर म द द एवं जीजी जी रहते है और मेरा उनके यहां 5 साल से आना जाना है ।
मेर द द के घर के सामने एक लड़का अ णे परौहा रहता है । हम दोन के बीच यार हुआ। जब
मेर द द और जीजा घर पर नह थे तब 12 नव बर 2011 को पहली बार मेर द द के घर रात म
आया और हम दोन के बीच शार रक संबंध हुआ। उसने मुझ शाद का लोभन दे कर शार रक
संबंध बनाया। अ णे मेरे गांव म भी आने जाने लगा और जब मेरे घर पर कोई नह रहता था तब
मेरे घर पर आता था और मुझे शाद का लोभन दे कर शार रक संबंध बनाता था। इसके बाद जब
मने उससे शाद क बात क तो उसने कहा क नौकर लग जाने दो म नौकर लगने के बाद शाद
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क ं गा। जब उसक नौकर लग गई तब मने कहा क शाद कर तो उसने कहा क घर वाल से बात
करके बताता हू।ं जब उसके घर वाले नह माने तब उसने शाद करने से मना कर दया। जब मने
कहा क तुम ऐसा नह कर सकते तो उसने कहा क तु ह जो करना है कर लो मेर शाद लग चुक
है । इसिलए म उसके खलाफ कायवाह चाहती हू।ं ''
9. The factum of subsequent rape on the promise of marriage, has also
been taken note of by the High Courts and the Apex Court in series of
decisions. The Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Gulati vs. State of
Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071 has held as under:-
''18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between
rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to
marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls
within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at
an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and
whether the consent involved was given after wholly,
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence.
There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which
he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was
unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for
rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the
accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
10. In a recent judgment rendered in the case of Sonu @ Subhash
Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, AIR 2021 SC 1405 the
Supreme Court in para 11 held as under:-
''11.Bearing in mind the tests which have been enunciated in the
above decision, we are of the view that even assuming that all the
allegations in the FIR are correct for the purposes of considering
the application for quashing under Section 482 of CrPC, no
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offence has been established. There is no allegation to the effect
that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false
at the inception. On the contrary, it would appear from the
contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the part
of the appellant to marry the second respondent which gave rise to
the registration of the FIR. On these facts, we are of the view that
the High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition
under Section 482 of CrPC on the basis that it was only the
evidence at trial which would lead to a determination as to whether
an offence was established.''
11. In the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharastra
and another, (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903 ruled thus :
''14. In the present case, the "misconception of fact" alleged by the
complainant is the Appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically
in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that
there is a distinction between a false promise given on the
understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach
of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, this Court held:
(SCC para 12)
"12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions
would be that if it is established and proved that from
the inception the Accused who gave the promise to the
prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to
marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual
intercourse on such an assurance by the Accused that he
would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a
consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per
Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code and, in such a case,
such a consent would not excuse the offender and such
an offender can be said to have committed the rape as
defined Under Sections 375 of the Indian Penal Code
and can be convicted for the offence Under Section 376
IPC." Similar observations were made by this Court in
Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana ("Deepak Gulati"):
(SCC p.682, para 21)
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach
of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus,
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the court must examine whether that was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the
Accused....
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the
maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by
it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual
relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the
woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise,
the maker of the promise should have had no intention of
upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a
woman Under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
"misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis
for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this
Court observed: (SCC pp.682-84, paras 21 & 24)
'21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of
a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an early
stage a false promise of marriage by the Accused; and
whether the consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix
agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love
and passion for the Accused, and not solely on account
of misrepresentation made to her by the Accused, or
where an Accused on account of circumstances which
he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his
control, was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the
initial stage itself, the Accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances.
The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a
future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact",
the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90
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Indian Penal Code cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
Accused had never really intended to marry her.
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from
the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect
to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned
deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish
whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception
of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two
propositions must be established. The promise of
marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad
faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the
time it was given. The false promise itself must be of
immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
12. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, from a perusal of the
record it is evident that the petitioner agreed for marriage with the
prosecutrix five years back from the date of lodging of the complaint,
however his parents had disproved such relationship, hence there was
refusal. If the petitioner could not adhere to the promise made previously on
account of his parents denial, it cannot be said that the offence was
committed under the garb of false promise. Hence apparently, the FIR
against the present petitioner was lodged in order to wreak vengeance. It is
trite law, that if an FIR has been lodged in order to wreak vengeance,
interference by the Court is warranted.
13. At this juncture it is useful to refer to the celebrated decision of
the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Haryana and others v.
Bhajanlal and others [(1992) Supp 1 SCC 335 ] wherein the Apex Court has
reiterated that when allegations in the FIR do not constitute congnizable
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offence and the allegations have been levelled with an oblique motive to
wreck vengeance, the proceedings deserve quashment.
14. Thus, in view of the aforesaid sound exposition of law, this Court
has no hesitation to hold that the impugned FIR and ensued proceedings
thereon, against the petitioner are unsustainable and deserve to be quashed.
15. Ex-consequenti, the instant petition is allowed. The impugned
FIR/Crime No.184/2016 registered at the Police Station, Gohalpur District
Jabalpur and consequential proceedings thereon, vide S.T. No.138/2016
(State vs. Arunendra @ Sanjay Paroha) deserve to be, and are hereby
quashed.
16. The petitioner stands discharged. Bail bond and surety bond, if
any, also stand discharged.
(MANINDER S. BHATTI)
JUDGE
ac
