Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bhupendra Singh Tomar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 March, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 WP. No. 1121 of 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 1st OF MARCH, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 1121 of 2015
BHUPENDRA SINGH TOMAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Raj Bahadur Singh Tomar - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri G. K. Agrawal - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
against orders dated 10.07.2014 and 17.12.2014 passed by Superintendent of
Police, Gwalior and DIG, Gwalior Range, Gwalior, respectively.
2. It is the case of petitioner that petitioner is working as Police Constable.
Charge-sheet was issued on the allegation that on 27.09.2013 between one to two
pm, he had made illegal recoveries from the Trucks and the aforesaid conduct of
petitioner is contrary to Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and Paragraph 64 of
Police Regulations.
3. Departmental enquiry was conducted and it appears that Enquiry Officer
submitted his report that department has failed to prove the allegations. Since
disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer, therefore, issued a show cause notice to petitioner and ultimately by order
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dated 10.07.2014 punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative
effect was imposed by Superintendent of Police, Gwalior. Being aggrieved by the
said order, petitioner preferred an appeal which too has been dismissed by order
dated 17.12.2014 passed by DIG, Gwalior Range, Gwalior (M.P.).
4. Challenging the orders of punishment, it is submitted by counsel for
petitioner that in fact Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, has held petitioner guilty
on the basis of findings recorded in the preliminary enquiry whereas in the
departmental enquiry all the witnesses have turned hostile. Therefore, it is
submitted that the case in hand is based on no evidence.
5. Per contra, petition is vehemently opposed by counsel for the State.
6. Counsel for the State has also produced photocopy of proceedings of
departmental enquiry.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for petitioner, this
Court would like to consider the scope of interference by this Court in
departmental matters.
The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs.
N. Gangraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:
"8. We find that the interference in the order of
punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High
Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial
review is confined to the decision-making process. The
power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional
court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate
authority.
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC
1723, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the
High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a
public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf,
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and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,
and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution a court of appeal over the decision
of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant : it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is
held by an authority competent in that behalf,
and according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with
the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and
which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty
of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226
to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence."
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC
749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge Bench
of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not
an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in
which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the
court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review
does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on
the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60,
paras 12-13)
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which
the decision is made. Power of judicial review
is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the
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conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of
misconduct by a public servant, the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the inquiry was held by a competent
officer or whether rules of natural justice are
complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act
nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined
therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When
the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review
does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry
or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority is based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such
as no reasonable person would have ever
reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with
the conclusion or the finding, and mould the
relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge
of facts. Where appeal is presented, the
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appellate authority has co-extensive power to
reappreciate the evidence or the nature of
punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that
evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel,
(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364, this
Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers
from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued."
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil,
(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144, this Court
held that interference with the decision of departmental
authorities is permitted if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles of natural
justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing
the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as
under : (SCC p. 423, para 16)
"16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S.
Patil v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC
OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the
High Court seems to have approached the case
as though it was an appeal against the order of
the administrative/disciplinary authority of the
High Court. Interference with the decision of
departmental authorities can be permitted,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such
enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
vitiated by considerations extraneous to the
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evidence and merits of the case, or if the
conclusion made by the authority, on the very
face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that
no reasonable person could have arrived at such
a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the
above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is
the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has
been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal evidence
on which the findings can be based, then
adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is
not a matter for canvassing before the High
Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226
of the Constitution."
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584:(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721,
this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate
court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has
been fairly and properly held and the findings are based
on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or
the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
The Court held as under:(SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10)
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not
act as an appellate court and reassess the
evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If the
enquiry has been fairly and properly held and
the findings are based on evidence, the question
of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere
with findings of fact recorded in departmental
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enquiries, except where such findings are based
on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have
arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the
material on record. The courts will however
interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or
statutory regulations have been violated or if
the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious,
mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union
of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
80, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997)
7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806 and Bank
of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5
SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036, High Court
of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC
416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144].)
* * *
10. The fact that the criminal court
subsequently acquitted the respondent by
giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any
way render a completed disciplinary
proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the
finding of guilt or consequential punishment.
The standard of proof required in criminal
proceedings being different from the standard
of proof required in departmental enquiries, the
same charges and evidence may lead to
different results in the two proceedings, that is,
finding of guilt in departmental proceedings
and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in
the criminal proceedings. This is more so when
the departmental proceedings are more
proximate to the incident, in point of time,
when compared to the criminal proceedings.
The findings by the criminal court will have no
effect on previously concluded domestic
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enquiry. An employee who allows the findings
in the enquiry and the punishment by the
disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-
challenge, cannot after several years, challenge
the decision on the ground that subsequently,
the criminal court has acquitted him."
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)
554, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence
the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters
as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the
disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in
accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience."
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the
respondent relies upon the judgment reported
as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2
SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335, wherein this Court
held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding
that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a
finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court
could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary
proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of
that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere
with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority.
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It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are
perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of
misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground
that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the
Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not
make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has
appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of
the enquiry officer and had passed an order of
punishment. An appeal before the State Government was
also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by
the departmental authority, in exercise of power of
judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not
interfere with the findings of facts recorded by
reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate
authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not
noticed the larger Bench judgments in State of A.P. v. S.
Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 and B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996
SCC (L&S) 80 as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders
passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from
patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law."
The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others Vs.
Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 has held a under:
"6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this
stage that it is unfortunate that the High Court has acted
as an Appellate Authority despite the consistent view
taken by this Court that the High Court and the Tribunal
while exercising the judicial review do not act as an
Appellate Authority:
"Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined
to correct errors of law or procedural error, if
any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice
or violation of principles of natural justice.
Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on
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merit by reappreciating the evidence as an
Appellate Authority." (See Govt. of
A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan [(2006) 2 SCC
373 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 316], SCC p. 379, para
11.)
9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate
the evidence which had been considered by the inquiry
officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate
Authority. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs
to the teeth of the evidence on record.
12. From the facts collected and the report submitted by
the inquiry officer, which has been accepted by the
disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority, active
connivance of the respondent is eloquent enough to
connect the respondent with the issue of TDRs and
overdrafts in favour of Bidaye.
15. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC
618 : (1972) 2 SCR 218] it is held as under: (SCC p.
623, para 15)
A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial.
The standard proof required is that of
preponderance of probability and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that
lender was a person likely to have official
dealings with the respondent was one which a
reasonable person would draw from the proved
facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a
court of appeal over a decision based on it. The
Letters Patent Bench had the same power of
dealing with all questions, either of fact or of
law arising in the appeal, as the Single Judge of
the High Court. If the enquiry has been
properly held the question of adequacy or
reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed
before the High Court. A finding cannot be
characterised as perverse or unsupported by any
relevant materials, if it was a reasonable
inference from proved facts. (SCR p. 219)
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16. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda [(1989) 2 SCC
177 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 303 : (1989) 10 ATC 30] it is
held at SCC p. 189, para 27 as under:
"27. We must unequivocally state that the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the
disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be
equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The
Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of
the inquiry officer or competent authority
where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse.
It is appropriate to remember that the power to
impose penalty on a delinquent officer is
conferred on the competent authority either by
an Act of legislature or rules made under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If
there has been an enquiry consistent with the
rules and in accordance with principles of
natural justice what punishment would meet the
ends of justice is a matter exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If
the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is
imposed on the proved misconduct, the
Tribunal has no power to substitute its own
discretion for that of the authority. The
adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is
certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to
concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot
interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of
the inquiry officer or the competent authority is
based on evidence even if some of it is found to
be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter."
17. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan [(1998) 4
SCC 310 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1129] this Court held at
SCC p. 315, para 12 as under:
"12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are
of the firm view that all the four charge-sheets
which were enquired into relate to serious
misconduct. The respondent was unable to
demonstrate before us how prejudice was
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caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiry
authority's report/findings in the present case. It
needs to be emphasised that in the banking
business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity
and honesty needs to be preserved by every
bank employee and in particular the bank
officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of
the public/depositors would be impaired. It is
for this reason, we are of the opinion that the
High Court had committed an error while
setting aside the order of dismissal of the
respondent on the ground of prejudice on
account of non-furnishing of the enquiry
report/findings to him."
18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial
Bank v. P.C. Kakkar [(2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC
(L&S) 468] this Court held at SCC pp. 376-77, para 14
as under:
"14. A bank officer is required to exercise
higher standards of honesty and integrity. He
deals with the money of the depositors and the
customers. Every officer/employee of the bank
is required to take all possible steps to protect
the interests of the bank and to discharge his
duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion
and diligence and to do nothing which is
unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct
and discipline are inseparable from the
functioning of every officer/employee of the
bank. As was observed by this Court
in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional
Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9
SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no
defence available to say that there was no loss
or profit resulted in case, when the
officer/employee acted without authority. The
very discipline of an organisation more
particularly a bank is dependent upon each of
its officers and officers acting and operating
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within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond
one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline
and is a misconduct. The charges against the
employee were not casual in nature and were
serious. These aspects do not appear to have
been kept in view by the High Court."
19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal [(2003)
3 SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] it was pointed out as
under: (SCC p. 614, para 10)
"If the charged employee holds a position of
trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt
requirements of functioning, it would not be
proper to deal with the matter leniently.
Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with
iron hands. Where the person deals with public
money or is engaged in financial transactions or
acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree
of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and
unexceptionable."
20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G.
Thirugnanasambandam [(2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC
(L&S) 395] this Court at SCC p. 247, para 15 held:
"15. It is now a well-settled principle of law
that the principles of the Evidence Act have no
application in a domestic enquiry.""
9. This Court, in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India,
cannot act as an Appellate Authority and cannot substitute its own findings by
reversing the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. This Court can
interfere with the findings of fact, provided they are based on no evidence.
10. Now, the only question for consideration is as to whether the findings
recorded by disciplinary authority are based on no evidence or not?
11. Although it is the contention of counsel for petitioner that finding of guilt
recorded by disciplinary authority is based on preliminary enquiry report and
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none of the departmental witnesses have supported the departmental case, but
after going through the record of the departmental enquiry it is clear that the
aforesaid submission is misconceived.
12. Mohammad Yousuf Qureshi, ASP, has stated in the departmental enquiry
that at the relevant point of time he was working as Additional Superintendent of
Police. He received an information that illegal recoveries are being made by
police personnel at Badnapura Triangle. Accordingly, he immediately went to
Badnapura Triangle. When he enquired from the bystanders, then they informed
that police party was making illegal recoveries and Abdul Saeed also showed him
the photograph of police personnel on his mobile. Immediately, the police
personnel of Badnapura check point were called at Purani Chhawani Police
Station and their identification from Abdul Saeed was got done. Abdul Saeed
informed that both the police personnel were involved in illegal recovery. When
the names of police personnel were asked, then one of them informed that he is
Bhupendra (petitioner) having badge no.1665 and another police personnel
disclosed his name as Preetam Singh having badge no.1709. It was further stated
by this witness that when he enquired from these two police personnels with
regard to illegal recovery then they accepted their guilt and assured that the
aforesaid mistake shall not be repeated in future. Accordingly, he immediately
informed the incident to Superintendent of Police, who on telephone itself
directed to place the police personnel under suspension and accordingly, both the
police personnel were suspended. This witness was cross-examined in detail but
they did not put a single question with regard to statement made by this witness in
examination-in-chief that both the police personnels including petitioner had
admitted their guilt and had also assured that they would not repeat the said
mistake in future.
13. The record of departmental enquiry was also shown to counsel for
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petitioner and he was requested to verify as to whether any question was put to
this witness with regard to the admission made by petitioner before this witness or
not. After going through the statement of Mohammad Yousuf Qureshi, it was
admitted by Shri RBS Tomar that the statement of Mohammad Yousuf Qureshi in
the examination-in-chief to the effect that petitioner and another police personnel
had admitted before him about their mistake and had also assured that said
mistake will not be repeated in future, was never challenged by putting any
question to this witness.
14. Under these circumstances, it is clear that finding of guilt recorded by
Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, is not based on no evidence but it is based on
the evidence of Mohammad Yousuf Qureshi, Additional Superintendent of Police.
Furthermore, the degree of proof in departmental enquiry is not as strict as it is
required in criminal case. The departmental enquiries are decided on
preponderance of probability and if extra-judicial confession was made by
petitioner before the Additional Superintendent of Police, then in absence of any
challenge to the said evidence, this Court is of considered opinion that the
Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, did not commit any mistake by holding that
petitioner was guilty of making illegal recoveries from the Trucks.
15. Accordingly, no case is made out warranting interference. Petition fails and
is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
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