Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rinku Choudhari vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 March, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 1 st OF MARCH, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 8134 of 2025
RINKU CHOUDHARI AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ravi Bhargava - advocate for applicant.
Dr. Anjali Gyanani - Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1/State.
ORDER
This application under Section 528 of BNSS has been filed for
quashment of F.I.R. in Crime No.71/2024 as well as for quashment of all the
subsequent proceedings.
2 . According to prosecution case, respondent No.2 lodged an F.I.R.
alleging that on 11.07.2024 at about 05:00 pm, her husband Balli Chaudhary
and younger brother-in-law (Devar) Rinku Chaudhary demanded Rs.10,000/-
from her. When she replied that she does not have money, then she was
abused filthily in the name of mother and sister. When it was objected by
her, then they threatened that in case, if money is not given, then they will not
allow her to stay in the house and if she comes out of her house, she would
be killed. It is alleged in the F.I.R. that incident was witnessed by her son-in-
law Shayam Sundar Dubey and daughter Nisha.
3. It is submitted by counsel for applicants that respondent No. 2 is the
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wife of applicant No.2. Since applicant No.2 has filed two civil suits thereby
challenging the registered gift deed and for declaration of title and
permannent injuction, therefore with an intention to pressurize the applicants
to withdraw those civil suits, F.I.R. in question has been lodged. It is
submitted that applicants have also prayed for supply of CCTV footage of
Police Station to show that in fact, he was victim and not an accused
4. Heard learned counsel for applicants.
5. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for applicants,
this Court would like to consider the scope of interference at the stage of
Section 528 of BNSS.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Private
Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401
has held as under :-
"13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the
decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [King
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29 :
(1943-44) 71 IA 203 : AIR 1945 PC 18], the following
principles of law emerge: 13.1. Police has the statutory right and
duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure contained in Chapter
XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable
offences. 13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation
into the cognizable offences. 13.3. However, in cases where no
cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first
information report the Court will not permit an investigation to
go on. 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised
sparingly with circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The
rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing
under Section 482 CrPC is not to be confused with
the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death
penalty, as explained previously by this Court.) 13.5. While
examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the
Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR/complaint. 13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be
scuttled at the initial stage. 13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR
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should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. 13.8.
Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of
the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two
specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is,
however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the
above of the process by Section 482 CrPC. 13.9. The functions
of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not
overlapping. 13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-
interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and
the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences. 13.11.Extraordinary and inherent
powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.
13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopedia which
must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.
Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress,
the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the
FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During
or after investigation, if the investigating officer
finds that there is no substance in the application
made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which
may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with
the known procedure. 13.13. The power under Section 482 CrPC
is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to
be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
Court. 13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks
fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-
restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid
down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab,
1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal
[State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 426], Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) has the jurisdiction to quash the
FIR/complaint. 13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is
made by the alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the
power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether or
not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits
whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and
the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to
investigate the allegations in the FIR."
7. In the light of judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the cases
of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337 , State of Tamil
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Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 , Ajay Kumar Das
v. State of Jharkhand , reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319 , Mohd. Akram
Siddiqui v. State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350 , State of A.P. v.
Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226 , M. Srikanth v. State of
Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373 , CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported
i n (2019) 10 SCC 686 , State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated
30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021 , Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan ,
reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678 , Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in
(2014) 15 SCC 221 , State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan , reported in
(2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal reported in (2019) 2 SCC
336 , Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 , Padal
Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012)
12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9
SCC 682, thus, it is clear that this Court can quash the proceedings only if the
uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence.
8. It appears that a family dispute is going on between the applicant
No.2 and respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 had also lodged an F.I.R.
against the applicants on 09.11.2022 which was registered as F.I.R.
No.183/2022 at Police Station Karhiya, District Gwalior. Another F.I.R. was
lodged on 10.11.2022 in Crime No.184/2022 at Police Station Karhiya,
District Gwalior whereas civil suits were filed subsequent to registration of
these F.I.Rs. Whether F.I.R. in question is by way of counterblast in order to
pressurize the applicants to withdraw the civil suit or the civil suit filed by
applicants were by way of courterblast to the F.I.Rs. which were filed by
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respondent No.2 in the year 2022 is a disputed question of fact which canot
be decided by this Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
9. So far as mafafides are concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of
Renu Kumari Vs. Sanjay Kumar and others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346
has held as under:-
"9."8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a case of this
nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer
any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power
which the Court possessed before the enactment of CrPC. It
envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction
may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC,
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The
courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of
functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine
which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether
civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do
the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of
justice on the principle of quandolexaliquidalicuiconcedit,
concederevidetur et id sine quo res ipsaeesse non potest (when the
law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising the powers under the section, the
court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is
to be exercised ex debitojustitiae to do real and substantial justice for
the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the
power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court
to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent
promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court
or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed,
it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report
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has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto. 9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab
[AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and should be
exercised to quash the proceedings: (i) where it manifestly appears
that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g.
want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the
allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence
adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove
the charge. (AIR p. 869) 10. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there
is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is
legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC,
the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That
is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The court should
be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should
take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before
issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a
private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed
over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its
sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482
CrPC and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise
its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were
set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. BhajanLal
[1992 Supp (1) SCC335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] .
A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The
illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC
pp. 378-79, para 102) '(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused.(2) Where the
allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations
in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
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officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the
FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)
Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.' 11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude
of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be
careful to see that its decision, in exercise of this power, is based on
sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to
stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,
more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,
are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
[See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC305 : 1993 SCC
(Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of
Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1].] It would not be proper
for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light
of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would
be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the
proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the
material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be
proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the police station
and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant
would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during
the investigation and evidence led in the court which decides the fate
of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the
informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the
basis for quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar [1990 SuppSCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] , State
of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
192] , RupanDeol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC
194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999)
2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304] , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma
[(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497] , Rashmi Kumar v.
Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415],
SatvinderKaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 :
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1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi
[(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]" The above position
was again reiterated in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa
[(2002) 3 SCC89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh
Kishore Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353] and State
of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC
(Cri) 272] , SCC pp. 547-50, paras 8-11."
Thus, it is clear that if the F.I.R. discloses the commission of
cognizable offence, then the malafides of informant becomes secondary.
10. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court is considered opinion that no case is made out warranting
interference.
11. The application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
AK/-
