Madhya Pradesh High Court

Dharmveer vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 June, 2025

Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke

Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke

          NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12411




                                                               1                                 WP-27263-2018
                               IN     THE      HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                     AT GWALIOR
                                                          BEFORE
                                        HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
                                                    ON THE 20 th OF JUNE, 2025
                                                 WRIT PETITION No. 27263 of 2018
                                                      DHARMVEER
                                                         Versus
                                        THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
                          Appearance:
                                Shri Jai Prakash Kushwah - Advocate for the petitioner.
                                Shri M S Jadon - G.A. for the respondent/State.

                                                                ORDER

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner seeking following reliefs:-

"A. impugned orders Annexure P/1, dtd. 10-03-2017, passed by the respondents No4, Annexure P/2 dtd. 21-03-2018 passed by Respondent No.3 and Annexure P/3 dtd. 21/08/2018, passed by the I.G. of Police, may kindly be quashed, B. Respondents may kindly be directed to reinstate the petitioner from his earlier post along with all ancillary benefits.

C. Respondents may kindly be directed to give subsistence allowance from the period of departmental inquiry.

D. Any other direction that this Hon'ble Court may deemed fit and proper, may be pass in favour of the petitioners."

2. In brief, the facts of the case after that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable vide order dated 22.4.13. The petitioner on 28.02.2016 was sent for service of notice from Police Line, Sheopur to Gwalior and Bhind and since the said date, the petitioner remained absent from duty till his removal from service for approximately 376 days without any intimation. Since the petitioner continuously remained absent from duty, therefore, Reserve Inspector, Police Line

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2 WP-27263-2018 Sheoupr sent a notice to the petitioner on 31.3.16 to immediately join the duty, failing which he was warned that stern action would be taken against him. The said notice was received by the petitioner on 31.316, but even then the petitioner did not turned up, therefore, a second notice dated 25.4.16 was issued to him. Since the petitioner remained absent without any information for long period, therefore, a notice dated 7.616 was given to the petitioner with regard to initiation of departmental inquiry by Reserve Inspector, Police Line, Sheopur which was received by the petitioner on the very same day, but inspite of receiving notice, the petitioner remained absent in preliminary inquiry and accordingly, the inquiry was conducted and report was submitted before the Superintendent of Police Sheopur on 25.6.16 mentioning that the petitioner had remained absent unauthorizedly since 29.2.16. Thereafter, charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 5.7.16

which was duly received by him on 8.7.16. Thereupon, on 9.8.16 an order was passed to conduct departmental inquiry and on 23.1.17 report was submitted wherein all the charges were found to be proved against him. After receiving enquiry report, S.P. District Sheopur sent a notice dated 13.2.17 to the petitioner for filing reply and thereafter on 2.3.17 a reminder notice was also sent to the petitioner, which was served on the petitioner on 6.3.17 but since the petitioner did not turn up, the final punishment order dated 10.3.17 (Annexure P/1) was passed against him by S.P. District Sheopur whereby the petitioner was directed to be removed from service as he willfully remained absent from the service. Against the said order dated 10.3.17, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the I.G. Chambal Range, Morena which was dismissed vide order dated 14.3.18 (Annexure P/2). Aggrieved by the said order dated 14.3.18, a mercy petition was also filed by the petitioner which was also dismissed vide order dated 21.8.18 (Annexure P/3). Hence, assailing the order dated 10.3.17 (Annexure P/1), order dated 14.3.18

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(Annexure P/2) and order dated 21.8.18 (Annexure P/3), the present petition has been filed.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has invited the attention of this Court to the materials available on record and submitted that on account of the illness suffered by his wife and children, as they were admitted in hospital and there was no other family member to look after them in hospital he remained absent and that was the sole reason for his absence and in any event, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority ought to have sympathetically taken into consideration of the said fact and instead of imposing major penalty of removal from service, ought to have imposed some other minor penalty. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Punjab & ors. Vs. Dharam Singh 1997 AIR (SC) 1905, Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India & Anr. passed in Civil Appeal No. 2106 of 2012 decided on 15.2.12, the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Ashok Kumar Mishra Vs. State of M.P. & ors. reported in (2005) 4 MPLJ 589, Rasheed Ahmed Vs. Union of India & ors. reported in (2014) 2 MPWN 191 and Santosh Kumar Vs. Union of India & ors. (2018) 2 MPJR 151.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted that admittedly, the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent since 29.02.2016 for approximately 376 days and though the Disciplinary Authority was entitled to imposed the punishment of dismissal from service, taking into consideration facts of the circumstances of the case, has passed the order of removal from service, which was confirmed in the appeal, this Court, under normal circumstances, may not interfere with the order of punishment, in the exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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5. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of removal from service is a fit and proper punishment and accordingly, it was imposed and thus prays for dismissal of this writ petition.

6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. It is not in serious dispute that the petitioner was absent from duty since 29.2.16 for a period approximately 376 days and the explanation offered by him is that his wife and children were suffering from illness and were admitted in hospital and he had to look after them which resulted in his absence. The petitioner was issued with a charge memo which was received by him on 8.7.16 by putting the receiving note at the top of the charge-sheet, but he did not participate in the disciplinary proceedings and the Disciplinary Authority, after observing due formalities, has imposed the punishment of removal from service. The petitioner's appeal before the Appellate Authority has also ended in dismissal. It is a well settled position of law, this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, normally do not interfere with the punishment, unless the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority are perverse.

8. It is also a trite law that in departmental punishment matters, Courts should interfere when there is violation of principles of natural justice, statutory rules or when the punishment is deemed arbitrary or grossly disproportionate to the offence. Specifically, interference is warranted if the disciplinary authority acted without jurisdiction or was biased or if the findings are based on no evidence or are wholly perverse.

9. It is well settled proposition of law that Courts are not supposed to act as an Appellate Court and re-assess the evidence led in a departmental enquiry, nor would interfere on the ground that another view was possible on the material

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available on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of evidence or reliable nature of evidence will be no ground for interfering with. However, when the finding of fact recorded is based on no evidence or where it is clearly perverse, then it will invite the intervention of the Court.

10. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors . Vs. Bhupendra Singh decided in Civil Appeal No. 8546-8549 of 2024 has held as under:-

23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'Constitution') in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated:

'7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.

Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a 18 petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.' (emphasis supplied)

24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State Bank of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249 . Three learned Judges

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6 WP-27263-2018 of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:

'21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723: (1964) 3 SCR 25: (1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against 19 him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

xxx

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence

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7 WP-27263-2018 led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See : Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64].

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no 21 reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.

xxx

26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.' (emphasis supplied)

25. In State Bank of India v S K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 , two learned Judges of this Court held:

'28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] , the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable -- a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : 1985 AC 374, HL] where 22 the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing -- applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called -- that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding -- which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public interest or the

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8 WP-27263-2018 interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity". To illustrate --

take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66: (1963) 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid -- or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980 AC 574: (1979) 2 All ER 440: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, 23 without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it would be a case falling in the latter category -- violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice -- in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct -- in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.'

26. In Union of India v K G Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794 , it was opined:

'14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223: (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.

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15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.' (emphasis supplied)

27. The legal position was restated by two learned Judges in State of Uttar Pradesh v Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310:

'15. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. The court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the evidence as if it was a court of appeal. The approach of the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court in accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the matter back to the High Court.'

11. In the light of the aforesaid, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority had taken into consideration, all the material aspects and had rightly reached the conclusion that the order of removal from service is a fit and proper punishment to be imposed on the petitioner.