Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pritapal Singh Anand vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 22 July, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 22nd OF JULY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 27557 of 2025
PRITAPAL SINGH ANAND
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Sitaram Garg - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Shri Abhishek Singh - Govt. Advocate for the respondents / State.
Shri Krishna Sharma - Advocate for the respondent no. 3 / Union of India.
ORDER
The present petition is not filed challenging any order but the
petitioner is aggrieved by the inaction of the respondents whereby despite
directions having been issued by this Hon'ble Court in W.P.No.8787/2016
vide order dated 13.5.2016, he is not being paid ex-gratia amount and other
assistance as per para 1 (vi) of the Rehabilitation Package of Union of India.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is the sufferer of
riots of 1984 and suffered a commercial loss of Rs.95000/- in Jabalpur
district and the Task Force Constituted by the State Government certified his
commercial loss and a certificate of loss was issued by the Relief Officer,
Jabalpur. The Collector Jabalpur did not correctly follow the Circular No.
U.13018/46/2005-Delhi-I (NC) Dated 16-01-2006 by which the Union of
India had sanctioned the rehabilitation package for riot victims and circulated
to the State Governments through the Chief Secretaries of the States to
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sanction ex-gratia amount and other assistance to the victim of 1984 riots, as
per the criteria fixed in the Circular. According to the clause -1 (vi) of the
Circular, the petitioner is entitled to 10 Times of his commercial loss but the
Collector, Jabalpur did not invoke the provisions of this sub-para and instead,
he operated sub-para 1 (v) which is meant for domestic losses and did not
pay any amount to the petitioner and thus caused great loss to the petitioner.
It is further the case of the petitioner that the Collector, Jabalpur also did not
follow the orders of respondent No.01 in relation to notification of the
scheme and proceedings. The Govt. made a view on the basis of letter issued
by Union of India dated 30-04-2014 stating that the scheme has been closed
from 30-06-2012. This letter of Govt. of India which is being termed as
closure of "SCHEME OF REHABILITATION PACKAGE" is being
misinterpreted, its subject matter and para 1 to 3 are in the favor of Riot
victims.
3. It is also the case of the petitioner that the petitioner made an
application before the authority for granting him compensation in accordance
with the Policy. When the application of the petitioner was not decided by
the authority, he also filed a petition i.e. W.P.No.8787/2016 which was
disposed of vide order dated 13.5.2016 directing the respondents to take
necessary steps to process the application of the petitioner and decide the
claim expeditiously in accordance with law preferably within a period of four
months from the date of filing of copy of the order passed today along with a
copy of the petitioner on the respondents. Immediately thereafter, in
pursuance to order dated 13.5.2016 passed in W.P.No.8787/2016 the
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petitioner filed an application before the District Collector, Jabalpur on
18.5.2016 along with copy of the order and highlighted that the provisions of
para (vi) of MHA order No. U.13018/46/2005-Delhi-I (NC) Dated 16.1.2006
were not invoked by the respondent authority i.e. the Collector, Jabalpur as
on the basis of that petitioner is entitled. However, nothing has been done in
the case of the petitioner and he is deprived of his legitimate claim as per the
Policy.
4. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is
entitled to ex-gratia payment of 10 times the amount as certified by the
competent authority in certificate. The Collector, Jabalpur determined the
petitioner's claim wrongly, incorrectly, without basis is per se illegal,
erroneous and contrary. It is pertinent to mention here that order passed in
PIL (WP-2134/2001) for property loss followed by the Collector in the case
but petitioner case is for uninsured commercial loss demanded before
Collector and this Hon'ble Court's order (Annxure-P-6) are on the basis of
rehabilitation package 16-01-2006 of U.O.I., wherein it has been directed
that the claim of victim of riot 1984 should be given by enhancing 10 times.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the several orders
passed by this Hon'ble Court on the similar issue and prayed that the petition
be allowed.
5. On the contrary, counsel appearing for the respondents submitted
that the case of the petitioner has rightly been considered. The petitioner has
not challenged the order passed by the authorities before this Court and there
is a huge delay in approaching the Court and that too no explanation has
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been tendered by the counsel for the petitioner in this regard. They have
prayed for dismissal of the petition.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. Record indicates that the case of the petitioner was considered and
decided in terms of an order passed in PIL W.P.No.2134/2001 parties being
S. S. Ahluwalia vs. Union of India dated 24.1.2006. The petitioner has kept
quiet for a considerable period and he preferred a petition i.e.
W.P.No.8787/2016 which was disposed of vide order dated 13.5.2016 with a
direction to decide the claim expeditiously in accordance with law preferably
within a period of four months. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a
representation and kept quiet. There is no explanation tendered by the
petitioner in para 4 (Delay, if any in filing the petition and explanation
thereof) of the petition in approaching the Court. The authorities had issued a
notice to the petitioner asking him to submit a detailed particulars regarding
damages of the articles and the property relating to him and how much
compensation was earlier paid to him and on what date. There is nothing on
record placed by the petitioner to show that he had ever furnished any
information to the authorities. The petitioner has claimed relief merely on the
basis of the similar orders being passed by this Court directing the authorities
to decide the representation. But the fact remains that there is already an
order in favour of the petitioner. However, the petitioner has himself kept
quiet for a considerable period. The petitioner is trying to reopen the stale
claim based upon the circular issued by the Union of India on 16.1.2006. The
petitioner has not placed on record any documents to show that since 2006
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what action he has taken for claiming the benefits except filing a petition in
the year 2016.
8. The law with respect to the sleeping litigant has been considered
by the Court in catena of cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
o f Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, has held as under :-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that
can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, nonpedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the courts are
not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to
remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are
basically elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be given
undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of
the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant
so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure
of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to
the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to
the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one
warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence
are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are
required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
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respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by
taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They
are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should
be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard
manner harbouring the notion that the courts are
required to condone delay on the bedrock of the
principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal
to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base
of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down
regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion,
yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and
collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made
as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity
can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be
curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr.
vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the
contention that a petition should be
considered ignoring the delay and laches in
case the petitioner approaches the Court after
coming to know of the relief granted by the
Court in a similar case as the same cannot
furnish a proper explanation for delay and
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laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep
slumber and claim impetus from the
judgment in cases where some diligent
person had approached the Court within a
reasonable time."
10. A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying upon
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible
conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and laches.
Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Others, AIR 2007
SC 1365 the Supreme Court has held that delay and
laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable
jurisdiction. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v.
Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court
has observed that discretionary relief can be provided to
one who has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to
his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an
indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali
Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held that
where third party rights are created, the High Court
should not interfere. Similarly, in Shiba Shankar
Mohapatra (supra) it has been held that the Court
exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage
agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties
crystallizes in the interregnum."
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as
follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise
their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may
refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
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time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is
involved the matter is still within the discretion of the
Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 :
AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd
[(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R.
Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v.
Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808
: AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
12. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ashok Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311
that :
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party who has
slept over his right since is not entitled to the
discretionary relief of the High Court."
13. If the abovementioned judgments with respect to delay and
latches are applied to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the
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petitioner has slept over his right for a considerable period. Even no
judgment is placed before this Court or no sufficient ground has been pointed
out in Para 4 of the petition to substantiate the arguments of delay in
approaching the Court.
14. Under these circumstances, this Court does not deem it
appropriate to entertain the present writ petition and the same is hereby
dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.
15. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
JP
