Madhya Pradesh High Court
Krishna Kumar Pandey vs The New India Assurance on 21 July, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
1 WP-10837-2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
ON THE 21 st OF JULY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 10837 of 2022
KRISHNA KUMAR PANDEY
Versus
THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Aditya Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Shrinivas Gajendragadkar - Advocate for the respondents.
ORDER
The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, challenging the order dated 05.08.2020 (Annexure P-1), whereby
punishment of reduction in the pay scale by three stages has been imposed upon
him with a further direction that the period of his suspension shall not be treated as
on duty and he is not entitled to the salary for the period of suspension on the
principle of "no work no pay".
2. The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner was
initially appointed as Record Clerk in the respondent, New India Assurance
Company Ltd. (herein after referred to as "Company"). He retired on attaining the
age of superannuation w.e.f. 31.08.2020.
3. The daughter-in-law of the petitioner lodged a complaint with the police
against him and other family members as a result of which a criminal case was
registered against them for offence punishable under Section 498-A/34 of IPC and
under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The petitioner was convicted for the
said offences vide judgment dated 30.01.2012 passed by Judicial Magistrate First
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
2 WP-10837-2022
Class, Gwalior in Criminal Case No.7534/2008 and the punishment of one year RI
along with fine of Rs.1,000/- was imposed upon him.
4. The petitioner challenged the judgment of conviction by filing a criminal
appeal which also suffered dismissal by the judgment, dated 05.06.2012, passed
by 10th Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior in Cr.A. No.70/2012. As a result of
petitioner's conviction by the Appellate Court also, he was taken into custody on
05.06.2012. The petitioner challenged the order of conviction by filing a criminal
revision before this Court which was subject matter of Cr.R. No.402/2012. This
Court suspended the sentence vide order dated 11.06.2012. Subsequently, the
criminal revision was partly allowed vide order dated 29.06.2012 (Annexure P/3).
This Court upheld the conviction however, reduced the sentence to the period
already undergone by the petitioner and the amount of fine was enhanced to
Rs.5,000/-. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. (M.Cr.C. No.8951/2012) praying for clarification by this Court's order to
the effect that the conviction in the aforesaid criminal case may not affect his
service career. This Court vide order dated 23.11.2012 disposed of the aforesaid
M.Cr.C. by observing that the conviction of the petitioner in the aforesaid criminal
case shall not affect his service career adversely in any manner.
5. This time the Company got aggrieved by the order, dated 23.11.2012,
and challenged the same before Apex Court by filing SLP(Cr.) No.8499/2014. The
Apex Court vide order dated 06.12.2019 allowed the SLP and set aside the order
passed by this Court in M.Cr.C. No.8951/2012. The Apex Court was of the view
that the order passed by the High Court is beyond the scope of revision under
Section 397 & 401 of Cr.P.C. inasmuch as under those Sections, the High Court
was not exercising the power of superintendence over the employer of the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
3 WP-10837-2022
petitioner. The Apex Court finally disposed of the SLP by making following
observations :
"13. It is true that the respondent entered service way back in the year
1985 and it may certainly cause serious prejudice, if the conviction
under Section 498A IPC at the instance of his daughter-in-law also
shakes the very foundation of his employment. But the respondent can
certainly seek protection against such action only before an appropriate
forum, if and when the employer chooses to initiate any action. It is not
necessary that the employer in all such cases will invariably initiate
disciplinary proceeding. The employer may certainly take note of the
long service rendered by the respondent, apart from the fact that the
conviction had nothing to do with the discharge of his duties officially.
In any case, if the employer chooses to take action, the employee has a
host of remedies available in law. But the High Court, in a revision
arising out of conviction, could not have sealed the right of the
employer to take action on the basis of conduct which led to the
conviction of an employee, within the parameters of the service Rules."
6. Taking help from the observations made by the Apex Court, the
petitioner made a representation to the respondent - Company on 28.01.2020,
whereby requesting for revocation of his suspension and for release of all his
service benefits. Considering the representation made by the petitioner, the
respondents - Company has passed the impugned order, dated 05.08.2020,
(Annexure P/1) whereby following order is passed :
(1) Because of the conviction of the petitioner in the aforesaid criminal
case, he is punished with the reduction of three stages in time scale
under Rule 23(f) of the Rules of 2014;
(2) The period of suspension of the petitioner from 21.06.2012 till
05.08.2020 (date of order) is confirmed and the petitioner shall not be
eligible for salary benefits other than subsistence allowance already
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
4 WP-10837-2022
paid for the period of suspension on the principle of no work no pay.
7. Challenging the impugned order, the learned counsel for the petitioner
challenging the impugned order submitted that even though the petitioner is
convicted in the aforesaid criminal case, he was imposed with the punishment of
sentence already undergone by him which was from 05.06.2012 till 21.06.2012.
Thus, the court also took a lenient view in the matter taking into account the facts
and circumstances of the case. He submitted that, looking to the gravity of the
matter, the punishment imposed by the respondent Company is harsh and
disproportionate inasmuch as the petitioner is punished not only with reduction in
pay scale by three stages, but also with denial of pay and allowances for the period
of suspension which is more than eight years. Further, this period has not been
counted for purposes of his retiral dues which has caused perpetual damage to the
petitioner. The learned counsel also submitted that the punishment imposed is in
violation of Rule 25 of the Rules 2014, inasmuch as the procedure for imposing
major punishment is not adopted by the Company before passing the impugned
order. He also submitted that the respondents - Company failed to afford
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. The
learned counsel for the respondents also points out that now daughter-in-law of the
petitioner is living with the petitioner's son and compromise has reached between
the couple in the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C and under Section 13 of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The documents in this regard have been placed on
record as Annexure P/8. He thus submits that the impugned order is liable to be
set aside and the petitioner is entitled to all the benefits for the period of
suspension.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
5 WP-10837-2022
impugned order and raised a preliminary objection that against the impugned order
of punishment, the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy of filing an
appeal under Rules 41 of Rules, 2014. He thus submitted that instant petition is
not maintainable on the aforesaid ground. He further submitted that since the
petitioner's conviction has been upheld upto this Court, the respondents were not
required to adopt a detailed procedure of conducting departmental enquiry by
virtue of Rule 30(i) of Rules, 2014. He further submitted that the petitioner was
convicted for the offence under Sections 498-A/34 of IPC and under Section 4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act, which are serious in nature and, therefore, the punishment
imposed by the respondents - Company is commensurate with the gravity of the
charge. He also submitted that merely because subsequently there is a compromise
between the petitioner's son and daughter-in-law, the effect of conviction would
not be wiped out and the petitioner do not get any benefit from the compromise
reached between the coupled. The learned counsel for the respondents also
submitted that since the petitioner was placed under suspension because of his
detention in custody, the suspension of the petitioner cannot be said to be wholly
unjustified and, therefore, the direction of the authority in treating the said period
not on duty cannot be said to be illegal and he is not entitled for any benefit for the
aforesaid period. He therefore, prays for dismissal of the petition.
9. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
10. So far as the petitioner's contention that no opportunity of hearing was
granted to him before passing the impugned order is concerned, it be seen that
after the order was passed by the Apex Court, he himself made a detailed
representation before respondent authority on 28.01.2020. This has been
considered by the respondents - Company while passing the impugned order.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not given opportunity of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
6 WP-10837-2022
representing himself before respondents - Company. Further under Rule 30 of
Rules, 2014 provides for special procedure in certain cases. Rule 30(i) being
relevant is reproduced as under :
"30. Special procedure in certain cases:-
Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 25 or 26 or 27, the
Disciplinary Authority may impose any of the penalties specified in
Rule 23 in any of the following circumstances:
(i) The employee has been convicted on a criminal charge, or on the
strength of facts or conclusions arrived at by a judicial trial, the
Disciplinary Authority may order appropriate penalty on an employee
who has been convicted in a criminal court, without holding
any inquiry in any form.
------"
11. Reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clears that the Rule do not
contemplate affording opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order
under the aforesaid Rule. A similar provision under the M.P. Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 was under consideration by the
Full Bench in the case of Laxmi Narayan Hayaran Vs. State of M.P. &
another reported in 2004(4) MPLJ 555 . After considering the provisions of Rule
19 of CCA Rules, the Full Bench has held that the opportunity of hearing is not
required to be given to an employee who has suffered conviction in the criminal
case. Paragraphs 10 & 11 of the judgment being relevant are reproduced as under :
"10. Rule 19 of the State CCA Rules is similar to Rule 14 of Railway
Rules considered in Challappan (supra) and unamended Rule 19 of
Central CCA Rules considered in Tulsiram Patel, which did not
provide for any opportunity of hearing in regard to the penalty to be
imposed. In Tulsiram Patel (supra), the Supreme Court has
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
7 WP-10837-2022
categorically held that no opportunity need be given to the employee
concerned, but the disciplinary authority, on consideration .of the facts
and circumstances (in the manner set out in Challappan and Tulsiram
Patel) may impose the penalty. It was also clarified that if the penalty
imposed was whimsical or disproportionately excessive, the same was
open to correction in judicial review. The subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar Sarkar (supra) dealt with the amended
Rule 19 of the Central CCA Rules which provided for a hearing.
Therefore, the principle laid down in Sunil Kumar Sarkar (supra) can
not be of any assistance in interpreting Rule 19 of the State CCA Rules
in the absence of an amendment in the State CCA Rules corresponding
to the amendment made in the Central CCA Rules. As the State CCA
Rules stand today, the law applicable is as laid down in Tulsiram Patel
(supra) and not as laid down in Sunil Kumar Sarkar.
11. We accordingly overrule the decisions of the Division Bench in
Tikaram (supra) and Sheetal Kumar Bandi (supra), insofar as they hold
that the delinquent employee should be given a notice giving an
opportunity to put forth his views as to the penalty proposed to be
imposed."
12. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the contention of the petitioner
that he was not afforded opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order
is not acceptable and the same is hereby rejected.
13. The second contention of the petitioner is with regard to the punishment
being disproportionate to the charges leveled. The conviction of the petitioner is
upheld upto this Court. He was convicted under Section 498-A/34 of IPC and
under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. These are serious offences. The
authority has considered this aspect in the impugned order and, thereafter, passed
the punishment of reduction in time scale by three stages. This does not appear to
b e disproportionate looking to the seriousness of the offence under which, the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
8 WP-10837-2022
petitioner was convicted.
14. Scope of interference by this Court in the matters of punishment in
disciplinary matter is well defined. It is only when the punishment imposed by
employer shocks the conscious of this Court, the relief can be appropriately
moulded. This has been so held by the Apex Court Court in the case of B.C.
Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Another, reported in (1995)6 SCC 749 wherein
the Court held in para 18 as under:
"18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-
finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with
a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to
impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising
the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to
shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases,
impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support
thereof."
15. Thus, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the
punishment imposed.
16. Then comes the direction issued by the respondents Company while
regularizing the period of suspension. It is seen that the petitioner was under
suspension w.e.f. 21.06.2012 till passing of the impugned order dated 05.08.2020
i.e. for more than 8 years. The respondents have directed firstly that the petitioner
shall not be entitled to full and allowances for the period of suspension. Secondly,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
9 WP-10837-2022
it has been directed that this period shall not be counted for any purpose including
for determining his retiral dues. In the considered opinion of this Court, not
counting the period of suspension, has serious consequence on the petitioner's
retiral dues also. It may be seen that the petitioner was placed under suspension on
account of his detention in custody. However, soon thereafter, he was enlarged on
bail on 21.06.2012. Under Rule 20(5) of Rules, 2014, the authority was required
to review petitioner's suspension order atleast once in three months. However,
from the record it does not appear that the authority undertook this exercise. Had
this exercise was conducted by the authority, the suspension of petitioner may
have been revoked earlier in view of suspension of sentence by the Court and later
on modification of punishment order by this Court in criminal revision. However,
the suspension continued for more than eight years for which there is no
justification offered by the Company.
17. It is further to be noted that the petitioner was suspended because of his
detention in jail as a result of his conviction. Therefore, once the order was passed
by this Court in criminal revision on 29.06.2012, the impugned order which is
passed on 05.08.2020 ought to have been passed immediately after passing of the
order in criminal revision by this Court. For this reason also, long suspension of
petitioner appears to be unjustified.
18. Further, the sentence was modified by this Court and he was punished
for the period already undergone, meaning thereby, this Court also did not find the
act of the petitioner serious enough to maintain the sentence. Apart from the
above, it is a fact available on record that subsequently, the petitioner's daughter-
in-law has entered into compromise with his son and both are living happily. The
respondents Company failed to take into account these facts while passing order
while regularizing petitioner's period of suspension.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15620
10 WP-10837-2022
19. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the direction of respondent
Company regarding not counting the suspension period towards petitioner's
service is harsh, disproportionate and unjustified in facts and circumstances of the
case. The petitioner has already been deprived of pay & allowance for the said
period. Therefore, not counting this period of suspension towards his retiral dues
has caused serious hardship to him. Therefore, direction of the respondent
Company in treating the period of suspension of the petitioner as not on duty, is
set aside. The respondents are directed to count the period of suspension of the
petitioner towards his service except for monetary benefits.
20. So far as the objection of the respondents' counsel regarding
maintainability of this petition is concerned, it is sufficient to note here that this
petition was admitted for final hearing on 05.07.2022 and, therefore, at this stage
this Court do not find it proper to relegate the petitioner to avail the alternative
remedy. This is so also for the reason that the facts of the case are not in dispute.
Accordingly preliminary objection raised by the counsel is rejected.
21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is partly allowed with
the direction to respondent Company to count the period of suspension of
petitioner towards his service for all purposes including for determining retiral
dues. To this extent, the impugned order, dated 05.08.2020, (Annexure P/1) is set
aside.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
bj/-
