Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rakesh Jatav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 January, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
1 M.Cr.C. No.1729 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 29th OF JANUARY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 1729 of 2025
RAKESH JATAV
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Bhagwan Das Mahour - Advocate for applicant.
Dr. Anjali Gyanani - Public Prosecutor for respondent/State.
ORDER
This application, under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., 2023, has been filed
for quashment of FIR in Crime No.29 of 2024 registered at Guna Mahila Police
Station, Guna for offences under Sections 85, 115(2) and 351(3) of BNS, 2023
and RCT No.2190 of 2024 pending in the court of JMFC, Guna.
2. Applicant is husband of respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 lodged an FIR
that she got married to applicant on 16.12.2012. She was blessed with a boy,
namely, Suryansh and from the month of March 2024 she is residing along with
her son in Guna. About one month back. at about 12:00 noon, she was in her
room and her friend Aashu Parmar had come to meet. At that time, applicant came
there and started shouting. When she and her friend came out of the house then
applicant started claiming that he would take custody of his son and on that issue
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
he started quarrelling with respondent No. 2. When it was objected by her then it
is alleged that he assaulted her by fist and blows. The incident was witnessed by
Aashu who intervened in the matter. While feeling away, her husband challenged
that today she has been spared, otherwise she would be killed. On 23.09.2024 she
had gone to the court to attend the case. When she was standing out of the court
room, her husband also came there and started pressurizing her to withdraw the
case otherwise he would kill her and he also threatened that he would defame her
in the society which may compel her to leave her job.
3. Challenging the FIR lodged by respondent number 2, it is submitted by
counsel for applicant that applicant had made an application to the Inspector
General of Police, Gwalior alleging that respondent No.2 has forcibly taken away
his son from the house of applicant and whenever he requests her to allow him to
talk to his son then she always threatens him by using abusive language. It was
further alleged in the complaint that respondent No.2 has filed the case of divorce
in respect of which M.P. NO.3833 of 2024 is pending in the High Court.
Similarly, one case under Section 7 and 8 of Guardian and Wards Act is also
pending in the Family Court. It was alleged that whenever applicant goes to
Guna, then he always finds that Govinda Sengar who is also a constable in GRP is
on visiting terms with responding No.2. It was alleged that respondent no. 2 and
Govinda Sengar are having illegal relationship, as a result they always restrain
applicant to attend the court proceedings. Thus, it is submitted by counsel for
applicant that in fact FIR has been lodged out of mala fide, as applicant had made
a complaint to Inspector General of Police.
4. Heard learned counsel for applicant.
5. So far as the mala fide is concerned, merely because applicant had sent a
complaint to Inspector General of Police on 13.9.2024, the same cannot be a
ground to disbelieve the allegations made in the FIR. Even otherwise in the light
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
of judgment passed by the supreme court in the case of Renu Kumari Vs.
Sanjay Kumar and others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346 if the complaint
discloses cognizable offence, then mala fide of the complainant becomes
secondary. The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari (supra) has held
as under:-
9. "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a case
of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section
does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only
saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of CrPC. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
namely, (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC, (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases
that may possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have
inherent powers apart from express provisions of law
which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine
which finds expression in the section which merely
recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High
Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the
right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration
of justice on the principle of
quandolexaliquidalicuiconcedit, concederevidetur et id
sine quo res ipsaeesse non potest (when the law gives a
person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot
exist). While exercising the powers under the section, the
court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to
be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex
debitojustitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of
the court exists for advancement of justice and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent
promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court
would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process
of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise
serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by
the report, the court may examine the question of fact.
When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to
look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations
are accepted in toto.
9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866
: (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and should
be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is
no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p. 869)
10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to
bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is
no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is
clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case
where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may
or may not support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and
judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before
issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands
of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any
person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of
exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC and the
categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its
power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court
in State of Haryana v. BhajanLal [1992 Supp (1) SCC335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as
follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
'(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.'
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision,
in exercise of this power, is based on sound principles. The
inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a
prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude
and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be
laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR
1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of
Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1].] It would not
be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and
on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the
proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to
assess the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information
is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered,
then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary
importance. It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in the court which decides
the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala
fides against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the
proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna
Kumar [1990 SuppSCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] , State
of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 192] , RupanDeol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh
Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of
Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC
(Cri) 304] , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC
705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
415], SatvinderKaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503]
and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC
259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]"
The above position was again reiterated in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC89 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore
Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353] and State
of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540 :
(2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] , SCC pp. 547-50, paras 8-11."
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2223
6. If the allegations made in the FIR are seen, then it is clear that family
dispute is going on between the parties. Respondent No.2 has filed a petition for
divorce whereas applicant has filed an application for custody of his child. The
application under Section 7/8 of Guardian and Wards Act appears to have been
filed by applicant on 11/9/2024 whereas according to FIR the first incident took
place in February, 2024, when applicant threatened to take away custody of his
child. Admittedly, applicant has no order in his favour by which it can be said that
he was legally entitled to take custody of his child. No one can be permitted to
forcibly take away custody of the child.
7. Since allegations made in the FIR make out a cognizable offence, therefore,
no case is made out warranting interference.
8. Application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
(and)
