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The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Rammilan Pandey
2025 Latest Caselaw 3334 MP

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 3334 MP
Judgement Date : 27 January, 2025

Madhya Pradesh High Court

The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Rammilan Pandey on 27 January, 2025

         NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040




                                                               1                                  WA-1730-2023
                             IN     THE         HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                      AT JABALPUR
                                                         BEFORE
                                        HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT,
                                                      CHIEF JUSTICE
                                                            &
                                            HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
                                                 ON THE 27 th OF JANUARY, 2025
                                                  WRIT APPEAL No. 1730 of 2023
                                      THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
                                                       Versus
                                                  RAMMILAN PANDEY
                          Appearance:
                                Shri B.D. Singh - Deputy Advocate General for appellants/State.
                                Shri Vijay Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent.

                                                                ORDER

Per: Hon'ble Shri Justice Suresh Kumar Kait, Chief Justice This appeal has been filed by the appellants/State under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 challenging the order dated 10.02.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.4217/2020 whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner was allowed with all consequential benefits. The appellants seeks the

following reliefs:-

"1. Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order dated 10.02.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Single Bench in W.P. No.4217/2020.

2. Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the W.P. No.4217/2020.

3. Any other suitable relief deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted in favour of the appellant."

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

2 WA-1730-2023

2. Respondent/writ petitioner was a Constable at the relevant time in Police Department and when he was posted at Police Station Jiyawan, District Sidhi, he was found involved alongwith one A.S.I. Shri Parmatma Singh charging entry fees from the truck drivers in the light of 26.05.1998. They were trapped by the then Superintendent of Police, Sidhi and the amount collected by them towards the entry fees was also recovered from them. A preliminary enquiry was conducted on the said incident and thereafter a charge-sheet was also issued to the petitioner and also to Parmatma Singh jointly on 05.06.1998. One Shri R.L. Prajapati, Additional Superintendent of Police was appointed as enquiry officer but no presenting officer was appointed. The enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report in which petitioner was exonerated. The said enquiry report dated 31.12.1998 is available on record as Annexure P-2. As per the petitioner the enquiry report

reveals that the statements of witnesses, who were examined during the course of enquiry, were considered and then only the petitioner and other officer named above were given the clean chit by the enquiry officer. Thereafter, the said report was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Sidhi who after examining the enquiry report disagreeing with the same remitted back the same to the enquiry officer on 23.01.1999 saying that during the course of enquiry statement of Superintendent of Police, Sidhi, who was the main prosecution witness of the incident, was not recorded as a prosecution witness. The Superintendent of Police also directed to submit a report again after examining the remaining witnesses. Thereafter enquiry officer after recording the statement of Superintendent of Police had again submitted a report on 03.06.1999 (Annexure P-3) in which he found the charges against Parmatma Singh partly proved and fully proved against the petitioner. Thereafter, on direction of the Inspector General of Police enquiry was ordered again directing that the witnesses who were declared hostile they be

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

3 WA-1730-2023

again examined as on earlier occasion the enquiry officer did not examine them properly. The Additional S.P., Waidhan namely K.C. Agrawal was appointed as a new Enquiry Officer who again conducted an enquiry and submitted his report on 19.02.2000 (Annexure P-4) in which also the petitioner was found guilty as the charges levelled against him were found fully proved. Thereafter, on 30.05.2000 (Annexure P-5) final order was passed terminating the services of the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order which was also dismissed on 22.02.2001.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, petitioner preferred a writ petition which was registered as W.P. No.17067/2003. The said writ petition was allowed setting aside the orders dated 30.05.2000 and 22.02.2001 and the matter was remitted back to the disciplinary authority by directing him to communicate the petitioner the reasons of disagreeing with the findings of enquiry officer and provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

4. In pursuance to the order passed in the said writ petition, the disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 08.04.2018 (Annexure P-

8) directing him to submit his reply to the said show cause notice within a period of 10 days. Petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice denying the allegations made therein. Thereafter vide letter dated 27.04.2018 the petitioner was also given a personal hearing. The disciplinary authority i.e the Inspector General of Police passed the impugned order dated 31.05.2018 (Annexure P-11) inflicting punishment of removal from service upon the petitioner.

5. We note on perusal of the impugned order that the petitioner had filed rejoinder along with the documents showing that in the third round of enquiry

when Shri K.C. Agrawal was appointed as an enquiry officer there was no

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

4 WA-1730-2023 presenting officer and Shri Agrawal acted as a presenting officer also and cross- examined the witnesses and, therefore, the report of the said enquiry is contrary to law as enquiry officer cannot act as a presenting officer because a person cannot be a judge of his own cause.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the scope of interference in the matter of disciplinary enquiry is very limited because in the present case proper opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner after examining the witnesses. The enquiry officer reached the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner were found fully proved and, therefore, disciplinary authority inflicted the punishment of dismissal from service upon the petitioner and that order was approved by the appellate authority.

7. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that there is nothing wrong in the view taken by the authorities and the procedure adopted by the appellants are proper, therefore, the present appeal deserves to be allowed.

8. On perusal of the impugned order, it is observed by the writ court that from a perusal of the documents filed along with the rejoinder it is evident that Shri K.C. Agrawal, Additional Superintendent of Police was appointed as an enquiry officer asking him to cross-examine the witnesses who were declared hostile but no separate presenting officer was appointed and Shri Agrawal himself acted as a presenting officer conducting the chief-examination of the prosecution witnesses as well as cross -examination of prosecution as well as defence witnesses. The enquiry was conducted examining and cross-examining the delinquent government servants by the enquiry officer himself as such he not only cross- examined the witnesses but also acted as a presenting officer and as such in the third round of enquiry, nobody was acting as a presenting officer.

9. In a similar circumstances, the High Court in the case of Sujat Kabir S/o

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

5 WA-1730-2023 Abdul Wahid vs. State of M.P. and others - W.P. No.2201/2008 decided on 18.03.2019 while relying upon the case of K.C. Bhargava vs. State of M.P., 2012(4) M.P.L.J. 244 and Ram Prakash Gaya Prasad vs. State of M.P., 2008 (4) M.P.L.J. 35 has held as under:-

"9. In these case, no Presenting Officer was appointed and the inquiry was initiated by the Enquiry Officer as Presenting Officer to present the case of prosecution, therefore, this Court has quashed the entire proceedings.

10. In the case of Ram Prakash (Surpa) para 6 to 12 are relevant, which reads as under:-

"6. The petitioner has raised various grounds before this Court assailing the order of reversion and the order passed by the appellate authority. It has been urged by the petitioner that no Presenting Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority and the Enquiry Officer himself has acted as the Presenting Officer conducting the chief examination of prosecution witnesses and cross-examination the defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer himself has conducted the examination and cross-examination of the petitioner.

7. From the bare perusal of the enquiry proceedings which took place before the Enquiry Officer, it is evident that the Enquiry Officer has acted as the Presenting Officer conducting the chief examination of the prosecution witnesses as well as cross- examination of the defence witnesses. The enquiry has been conducted examining and cross-examining the delinquent Government servant by the Enquiry Officer.

8. Rule 14 of the CCA Rules of 1966 provides procedure for imposing penalties. Relevant Rule 14(5)(c) reads as under:- "Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as the "Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support of the article of charge."

9. The Presenting Officer appointed under Rule 14(5)(c) of the CCA Rules of 1966 is in fact is a person appointed like a prosecutor and the person has to prove the misconduct before the Enquiry Officer. It is the Presenting Officer who conducts the chief examination of the prosecution witnesses as well as cross- examination of the defence witnesses. It is again the Presenting Officer who conducts the cross-examination of the delinquent Government servant in order to arrive at a finding of guilt. In the present case after going through the record minutely, it is evident

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

6 WA-1730-2023 that the Enquiry Officer has conducted the chief examination and he has conducted the cross-examination of the defence witnesses as well as cross-examined the delinquent Government servant. Thus, the Enquiry Officer himself has played the role of the prosecutor.

10. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi and others vs. Mohd. Naseem Siddiqui, 2005 (1) LLJ 931 in paragraph 16 has held as under:-

We may summarise the principles thus:

(i) The Inquiry Officer, who is in the position of a Judge shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who is in the position of a prosecutor.

(ii) It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry. Non-appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will not vitiate the inquiry.

(iii) The Inquiry Officer, with a view to arrive at the truth or to obtain clarifications, can put questions to the prosecution witnesses as also the defence witnesses. In the absence of a Presenting Officer, if the Inquiry Officer puts any questions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit the facts, he should thereafter permit the delinquent employee to cross-examine such witnesses on those clarifications.

(iv) If the Inquiry Officer conducts a regular examination-in-chief by leading the prosecution witnesses through the prosecution case, or puts leading questions to the departmental witnesses prégnant with answers, or cross-examines the defence witnesses or puts suggestive questions to establish the prosecution case employee, the Inquiry Officer acts as prosecutor thereby vitiating the inquiry.

(v) As absence of a presenting Officer by itself will not vitiate the inquiry and it is recognized that the Inquiry Officer can put questions to any or all witnesses to elicit the truth, the question whether an Inquiry Officer acted as a Presenting Officer, will have to be decided with reference to the manner in which the evidence is led in any recorded in the inquiry. Whether an Inquiry Officer has merely acted only as an Inquiry Officer or has also acted as a Presenting Officer depends on the facts of each case. To avoid any allegations of bias and running the risk of inquiry being declared as illegal and vitiated, the present trend appears to be to invariably appoint Presenting Officers, except in simple cases. Be that as it may.

11. In the present case, it is evident from a perusal of the enquiry proceedings that no Presenting Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority. The evidence on behalf of the disciplinary authority has been presented by the Enquiry Officer, by conducting a regular examination-in-chief of prosecution witnesses by taking them through the prosecution case. The Enquiry Officer has also conducted in the present case regular cross-examination of the defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer has also conducted the

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

7 WA-1730-2023 cross-examination of the delinquent government servant. It is not a case where the Enquiry Officer in the absence of the Presenting Officer has simply put clarificatory questions to the delinquent government servant.

12. Thus, in the present case, the Enquiry Officer has acted as the Presenting Officer which is evident from the departmental enquiry proceedings, and therefore, relying upon the principle laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi and others (supra) and adverting to the sacred principle that no man can be a good judge of his own cause, the enquiry proceedings stand vitiated. Resultantly, the order of reversion dated 29th November, 1997 (Annexure A/13) passed by the disciplinary authority and the order passed by the appellate authority dated 5th February, 1998 (Annexure A/14) are quashed. However, the respondents are free to resume the enquiry proceedings from the stage of appointing the Presenting Officer and conclude the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner in accordance with law."

11. Similar view has also been taken by this Court in K.C. Bhargava (Supra) in para 10 and 11, which reads thus:

"10 : Learned counsel for the petitioner putting his reliance heavily in the case of Mohd. Yunus Khan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(2010) 10 SCC 539], contended that in view of such facts, the bias of the authorities initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were proved. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that imposing the punishment by holding a disciplinary proceedings is in fact in the nature of quasi judicial proceedings and though the technical Rules of Code of Civil Procedure and Evidence Act are not applicable, but the principles of natural justice are required to be observed. It is contended that there was flagrant violation of the Rules of natural justice and, as such, the order impugned was bad in law. Further, placing reliance in the case of Balveer Singh Vs. State of M.P. and others [2010 (2) M.P.H.T. 374], it is contended that if there is violation of the provisions of the Rules and the Enquiry Officer has acted as Presenting Officer as well as Enquiry Officer, the enquiry proceedings are vitiated and, as such, the penalty could not have been imposed on the petitioner. This Court in the case of Balveer Singh (supra) has examined the procedure laid down under the Rules and has also examined whether could it be said that by not appointing the Presenting Officer any illegality was committed or not. Placing reliance in the case of Shishir Raizada Vs. Union of India and others [2008 (2) MPWN 59], this Court has held that the Presenting Officer appointed under Rule 14(5)(c) of the CCA Rules, is in fact a person appointed like prosecutor and a person who has to prove the misconduct before the Enquiry Officer. It is the Presiding Officer, who conducts the chief examination of the prosecution witnesses as well as the cross examination of the

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

8 WA-1730-2023 defence witnesses. It is again the Presenting Officer, who conducts the cross examination of the delinquent Government servant in order to arrive at a finding of guilt. Thus, the opinion is expressed by this Court that in case the Presenting Officer is not appointed and the Enquiry Officer has conducted the chief examination and has conducted the cross examination of defence witnesses as well as cross examination of the delinquent Government servant, the Enquiry Officer in fact has played the role of the prosecutor. The principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India through its Secretary Ministry of Railway, New Delhi and others Vs. Mohd. Nasim Sidduqui (2005 LLJ 331) are that the Enquiry Officer is in the position of a judge and shall not act as a Presenting Officer who is in the position of as a prosecutor. However, it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to appoint the Presenting Officer in each and every case and to ascertain whether the Enquiry Officer has in fact acted as the Presenting Officer or not, the proceedings of enquiry are required to be examined with reference to the manner in which the evidence is led and recorded in the enquiry. 11: For the aforesaid purposes, again the enquiry record is required to be examined. As has been referred hereinabove, the enquiry officer has noted down the fact relating to calling the petitioner to take part in the enquiry. As far as the evidence is concerned, it appears that examination in chief was done by the Enquiry Officer himself. The witness examined by the disciplinary authority had proved the documents with respect to issuing the orders to the petitioner, but could not explain whether any communication was sent to the petitioner rejecting his application for grant of leave or not. Same was the situation with respect to the other person examined as a witness. The defence witnesses were examined by the petitioner and they were cross examined by the Enquiry Officer. This itself is enough to demonstrate that in fact the Enquiry Officer himself has acted as the prosecutor. The enquiry proceedings were thus vitiated."

"9. In

proceedings.

entire quashed relevant, "6.The before and has Officer appointed authority disciplinary the actedIn been the these as the this petitioner was order the which and urgedbythe case by Court case, Presenting the passed of reads has assailing Enquiry no Presenting Ramraised petitioner as byPrakash Officer under:-

the Officer the various appellate order conducting that (Surpa) Officer himself grounds no of authority.

reversio Presenting was para has thappointe 6 toIt 12 are d n e and the inquiry wasinitiated by the Enquiry Officer as

10. In similar circumstances, Presenting the Supreme Officer to present the caseCourt in the case of Union of India of prosecution, therefore, and others this vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 670 , has held as Court under:- has "28. When the statutory rule does not contemplate appointment of Presenting Officer whether non-appointment of Presenting Officer ipso facto vitiates the inquiry? We have noticed the statutory provision of Rule 27 which does not indicate that there is any statutory requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in the disciplinary inquiry. It is thus clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question which needs

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

9 WA-1730-2023 to be answered in this case. We have noticed above that the High Court found breach of principles of natural justice in Enquiry Officer acting as the prosecutor against the respondents. The Enquiry Officer who has to be independent and not representative of the disciplinary authority if starts acting in any other capacity and proceeds to act in a manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence to punish an employee, the principle of bias comes into place."

"36. Thus, the question as to whether the Enquiry Officer who is supposed to act independently in an inquiry has acted as prosecutor or not is a question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and proceedings of a particular case. In the present case we have noticed that the High Court had summoned the entire inquiry proceedings and after perusing the proceedings the High Court came to the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer himself led the examination-in- chief of the prosecution witness by putting questions. The High Court further held that the Enquiry Officer acted himself as prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary enquiry. The above conclusion of the High Court has already been noticed from paras 9 and 10 of the judgment of the High Court giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2012."

11. It is not in dispute that K.C. Agrawal was appointed as an enquiry officer who cross-examined the witnesses also declared hostile but the fact that no separate presenting officer was appointed and Shri Agrawal himself acted as a presenting officer conducted the chief-examination of the witnesses as well as the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses as well as the defence witnesses. The enquiry was conducted cross-examining the delinquent government servant by the enquiry officer himself.

12. It is pertinent to mention here that where disciplinary authority itself enquires into any article of charge and appoints an enquiry officer for holding an enquiry into such charges the said authority should appoint a presenting officer. It is the presenting officer who conducts the chief examination of the prosecution witnesses as well as the cross examination of the defence witnesses. The

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

10 WA-1730-2023 presenting officer also conducted the cross examination of the delinquent in order to arrive at a finding of guilt or innocence.

13. In the present case, as observed by the learned writ court that the Enquiry Officer had conducted enquiry, chief examination of the prosecution witnesses as well as defence witnesses as also cross-examination of those witnesses. The learned counsel for appellants/State was not able to dispute or demolish factual finding in this regard as contained in para-14 of the order passed by the learned Single Judge.

14. It is trite law that if an enquiry officer acts as an enquiry officer as well as presenting officer, it depends on the facts of each case but in the present case there is no explanation on record as to why the presenting officer has not been appointed. The only argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the Police Rules it is the discretion of the authority to appoint the presenting officer or not. In the present case since it was not necessary the presenting officer was rightly not appointed. However, that would not entitle the enquiry officer to act as presenting officer.

15. The facts remains that in Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. vs. Jitendra Pd. Singh and another reported in (2001) 10 SCC 530 the Supreme Court has held and observed that such order of punishment is not permissible under the law because it clearly indicates that the employee has been discriminated and therefore the order under challenge is not sustainable in the eye of law and is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in the said case has held and observed as under:-

"2. On an enquiry being held, the enquiry authority found that the allegation of misconduct is proved and the disciplinary authority on consideration of the report of the enquiry authority and the other relevant material dismissed the first respondent from service. Thereafter, a reference to the Labour Court at the instance of the first respondent was made. The Labour Court though held on a

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

11 WA-1730-2023 preliminary question that the disciplinary enquiry conducted against the first respondent is valid came to the conclusion after perusing the documentary and oral evidence on record that the dismissal was not justified and held that he was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages with continuity in service and other consequential benefits. A writ petition was filed in the High Court which was allowed but on the basis of certain offer made, the learned Single Judge also directed that the appellant shall pay to the first respondent salary from the date of discharge till the date of the order in a lump sum of Rs.50,000. Thereupon both the management and the workman filed two appeals. In the appeals, several questions were raised as to whether the act attributed to the first respondent would amount to misconduct at all which will entail a disciplinary enquiry at the instance of the management to end up with his dismissal; strong reliance was placed on Glaxo Laboratories (1) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut [(1984) 1 SCC 1 : 1984 \SCC (L&S) 42 : (1984) 1 SCR 230] . Ultimately, however, the two learned Judges were agreed on one aspect of the matter that the question, whether on misconduct attributed to the workman there should have been causal connection between misconduct and employment of the workman may not be of much significance when such acts have taken place within the premises of the factory, should be decided in an appropriate case. What influenced the Court in deciding the matter is that:

"Since as many as three workmen on almost identical charges were found guilty of misconduct in connection with the same incident, though in separate proceedings, and one was punished with only one month's suspension, and the other was ultimately reinstated in view of the findings recorded by the Labour Court and affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, it would be denial of justice to the appellant if he alone is singled out for punishment by way of dismissal from service."

3. As the judgment is rested upon this position, whatever other views may have been expressed in the course of the judgment may be of no significance. In that view of the matter, we think there is no need to interfere with the order made by the High Court, that too in a proceeding arising under Article 136 of the Constitution. Hence we decline to interfere with the order made by the High Court. The appeals are dismissed accordingly."

16. It is not in dispute that in the first round of enquiry he was exonerated. However, disciplinary authority remanded the case back by stating that the statements of the witness (the then Superintendent of Police) was not recorded. It

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:4040

12 WA-1730-2023 is also not in dispute that the presenting officer was not appointed. Thus, there was prejudice caused to the delinquent as the disciplinary authority himself acted as the enquiry officer as well as presenting officer by cross-examining the witnesses.

17. In view of the above, we find no error or perversity in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Finding no merit in the appeal, the writ appeal is accordingly dismissed.

18. Admittedly, the dismissal order passed by the disciplinary authority has been set aside by the writ court only on the aforesaid ground. The respondent has not been exonerated on merit. We note that the writ court by allowing the writ petition directed the appellants to grant all consequential benefits to the respondent. Since he has not been exonerated on merit, however, on technical ground only, therefore, we deem it just and appropriate to modify the order dated 10.02.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge to the extent of grant of 50% back wages along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date amount fell due. The order passed by the learned writ court shall be complied with within four weeks from today.

19. The writ appeal is accordingly disposed of.

                                (SURESH KUMAR KAIT)                                   (VIVEK JAIN)
                                    CHIEF JUSTICE                                        JUDGE
                          psm

 
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