Madhya Pradesh High Court
Chintaman Vishwakarma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 January, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 24th OF JANUARY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 1800 of 2025
CHINTAMAN VISHWAKARMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ratna Bharat Tiwari - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Darshan Soni - Government Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed
seeking following reliefs:-
(I) It is therefore prayed that the Hon'ble court may
kindly be issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus,
thereby, directing respondent to decide the
representation and revised pay scale should be
provided.
(II) To grant any other relief, which this Hon'ble court
deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.
The record indicates that the Writ Petition has been filed after 5 to 6
years of retirement. The claim of the petitioner is with respect to the
correction of the pay scale initially granted in the year 1996 on the ground
that other similarly situated employees have been granted the higher pay
scale.
The fact remains that the pay scale granted to the petitioner was in the
year 1996. No efforts have been made by the petitioner even up to his
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retirement to get the pay scale corrected. Petitioner stood retired in the year
2017 and this petition is filed in the year 2025. There is no explanation under
paragraph 4 of the Writ Petition explaining the delay in approaching the
Court.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs.
Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention
that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay
and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court
after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court
in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper
explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake
up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the
judgment in cases where some diligent person had
approached the Court within a reasonable time."
A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying upon
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible
conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and laches.
Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Others, AIR 2007
SC 1365 the Supreme Court has held that delay and
laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable
jurisdiction. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v.
Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court
has observed that discretionary relief can be provided to
one who has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to
his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an
indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali
Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held that
where third party rights are created, the High Court
should not interfere. Similarly, in Shiba Shankar
Mohapatra (supra) it has been held that the Court
exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage
agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties
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crystallizes in the interregnum."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd.
vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise
their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may
refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is
involved the matter is still within the discretion of the
Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 :
AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd
[(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R.
Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v.
Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808
: AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
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relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as it
relates to the remedy.
It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok
Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311 that :-
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party who has
slept over his right since is not entitled to the
discretionary relief of the High Court."
If the aforesaid settled legal proposition of law is applied to the facts and
circumstance of the present case, this Court is not inclined to reopen the stale
claims.
Under these circumstances, no relief can be extended to the petitioner.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
Shbhnkr
