Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 3134 MP
Judgement Date : 22 January, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:3251
1 MCRC-53467-2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MANINDER S. BHATTI
ON THE 22nd OF JANUARY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 53467 of 2020
ASHISH SHARMA AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prashant Shrivas - Advocate for petitioners.
Shri C.K. Mishra - Govt. Advocate for State.
Shri Y.K. Chaurasia - Advocate for respondent No.2.
WITH
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 14967 of 2021
RAJSREE SHARMA
Versus
RAJESH SHARMA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Y.K. Chaurasia - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Prashant Shrivas - Advocate for respondent No.1.
Shri C.K. Mishra - Govt. Advocate for State.
ORDER
Both the petitions, being interlinked, were heard analogously and they are disposed of by a common order. For the sake of clarity and convenience the facts adumbrated in M.Cr.C. No.53467/2020 are taken note of.
2. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the CrPC assailing the order dated 20-08-2020 passed in Cr.R. No.432/2020 by the Additional
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2 MCRC-53467-2020 Sessions Judge, Patan District Jabalpur, arising out of the order dated 06-02- 2020 passed in R.C.T. No.538/2019 (State of M.P. vs. Ashish Sharma and others) by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patan District Jabalpur.
3. The counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioner No.1 is husband, petitioner No.2 is father-in-law, petitioner No.3 is mother-in-law, petitioner No.4 is brother-in-law and petitioners No.5 and 6 are sister-in-laws of the respondent No.2. After marriage of the petitioner No.1 with the respondent No.2, on 02-12-2015 certain disputes cropped up and a complaint was lodged against the petitioners under sections 498-A, 323, 34 and 506 of the IPC and under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. After filing of the charge-sheet, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges against
the petitioners. The order framing charges was assailed by the petitioners by filing a revision before the revisional Court and the revisional Court has dismissed the revision.
4. The counsel for the petitioners contends that the FIR, if is read minutely, it would reveal that the entire allegations against the petitioners are baseless, vague, omnibus and general. It is contended by the counsel that if the allegations pertaining to alleged demand of dowry are seen, it would reveal that the allegations are general and omnibus. It is nowhere stated by the complainant in the FIR, that on which date and on what time and place, she was subjected to demand of dowry or alleged cruelty. There are no mention of specific instances so far as the present petitioners are concerned. It is contended by the counsel that there is abnormal serge in cases against the family members of the husband, and following the same trend,
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3 MCRC-53467-2020 respondent No.2 has made an attempt to implicate the present petitioners. The petitioners No.2 to 6 have been implicated only on the ground, that they are relatives of the petitioner No.1, who is husband of the respondent No.2.
5. It is further contended by the counsel that an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by the respondent No.2 and the said application was allowed and a decree of divorce was passed on 02- 07-2022. After passing of the decree of divorce on 02-07-2022, the respondent No.2 - wife entered into second wedlock on 09-07-2022 and the judgment and decree divorce is under challenge in the appeal before this Court. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioners that in such circumstances, the order impugned as well as proceedings pending against the petitioners deserve to be quashed.
6. To buttress his submissions the counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of K.V. Prakash Babu vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2016 SC 5430; Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. and ors, (2014) 2 SCC 1; Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam and others vs. State of Bihar and others, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 141; Ravikant Dubey vs. State of M.P., 2014 (2) MPHT 449; and Shakson Belthissor vs. State of Kerala and another, (2009) 14 SCC 466. In order to substantiate his contentions, the counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the cases of K.V. Prakash Babu (supra) while submitting that even if the husband is living in adultery, the same ipso facto does not amount to causing 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC.
7. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that the
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4 MCRC-53467-2020 present petition deserves to be dismissed. It is contended by the counsel that charges against the present petitioners were framed by the trial Court and the revisional Court, meticulously considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and ultimately passed the order rejecting the revision. It is contended by the counsel that though the revision in respect of another co-accused, Rajesh Sharma has been allowed, but even against Rajesh Sharma, charges ought to have been framed. Assailing the said part by which charge against Rajesh Sharma has been quashed, the connected M.Cr.C. No.14967/2021 has been preferred by the respondent No.2.
8. The counsel for the respondent No.2 contends that the FIR speaks volume about the act of cruelty at the behest of the present petitioners. There was continuous demand of dowry and specific instances of demand of dowry has been mentioned. It is specifically mentioned that when after the marriage, the respondent No.2 after visiting her parental house and again went to matrimonial house, she was subjected to demand of dowry. Thereafter, again there was demand of a four wheeler by the father-in-law and mother-in-law. It is further alleged in the FIR that the petitioner No.1 was in extramarital affair with a woman and the said woman used to visit the matrimonial house, and whenever the said woman used to visit, the respondent No.2 was locked in a room, and she was not allowed to speak. The respondent No.2 was not in a position to communicate with that woman. Later on, the said woman informed the respondent No.2 that she was in relationship with the petitioner No.1.
9. It is further contended by the counsel for the respondent that the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:3251
5 MCRC-53467-2020 petitioner No.1 had no physical relationship with the respondent No.2 also, and the petitioners were torturing the respondent No.2.
10. Heard the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and perused the records.
11. A perusal of the record reflects that the respondent No.2, who is the wife of the petitioner No.1, lodged an FIR with the police, alleging that after her marriage with the petitioner No.1 on 02-12-2015, she was subjected cruelty under the garb of demand of dowry. In the FIR it is mentioned that certain household articles, jewelries and two-wheeler etc. were given at the time of the marriage. After the marriage, there was a demand by the petitioners for a four wheeler. Later on, the respondent No.2 came to know, that the petitioner No.1 was having extramarital affairs with a woman. The said woman was frequently visiting the matrimonial house, where the respondent No.2 was residing with the petitioners and whenever the said woman used to visit, the respondent No.2 was locked in a separate room. The petitioners were aware about the relationship with the petitioner No.1 with the said woman.
12. It is further mentioned in the FIR that the said woman used to go to market along with the mother-in-law as well as both the sister-in-laws. Identity of the said woman was being not disclosed to the respondent No.2. Later on, somehow the respondent No.2 talked to the said woman and she informed that she was in relation with the petitioner No.1. She also provided a photograph in which she was there with the petitioner No.1. In the later part of the FIR, there is again demand of a four wheeler.
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6 MCRC-53467-2020
13. It is further alleged in the FIR that during a prolong period of three years, there was intercourse hardly on 10-12 occasions. The petitioner No.1 used to avoid intercourse and even, a separate room in which respondent No.2 along with the petitioner No.1 was staying, was let out to a tenant. Therefore, entire family members were sharing two rooms and thus, there was no physical relationship. According to respondent No.2, this was intentionally done by the petitioners.
14. Denial to enter in sexual intercourse by a spouse also amounts to cruelty, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, wherein in para 101 it ruled thus :
"101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of "mental cruelty". The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive:
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.
(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party.
(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of
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7 MCRC-53467-2020 deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.
(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.
(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical
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8 MCRC-53467-2020 reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.
(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty."
[Emphasis supplied]
15. In the present case, it is undisputed that the FIR clearly reveals that the petitioner No.1 was having extramarital affairs. The fact of extramarital affair, as per first information report, was well known to the petitioners No.2 to 6. The petitioner No.1 intentionally let out the room in which the petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 were residing. Thus, there was refusal by the petitioner No.1 to cohabit with the respondent No.2. In the detailed FIR it is clearly mentioned that the lady with whom the petitioner No.1 was in extramarital affairs, was visiting the house of the petitioners frequently and during those visits the respondent No.2 was made to stay in a locked room, and these facts were in the knowledge of the petitioners.
16. The aforesaid acts of the petitioner, in the light of the law laid
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9 MCRC-53467-2020 down in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (supra) prima facie amount to "cruelty" and therefore, the trial Court did not commit any error in framing the charge against the present petitioners. The revisional Court also has not committed any error in passing the impugned order and has rightly allowed the revision, so far as the same pertains to the co-accused Rajesh Sharma. So far as the co-accused Rajesh Sharma was concerned, there were no allegations of causing any cruelty except the fact, that he was instrumental in arranging the marriage of the respondent No.2 with the petitioner No.1. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners are distinguishable on facts.
17. In view of the preceding analysis, this Court does not find any merit in the instant petitions preferred by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and the same being sans substance, deserve to be and are hereby dismissed.
(MANINDER S. BHATTI) JUDGE
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