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Bachan Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2025 Latest Caselaw 2557 MP

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 2557 MP
Judgement Date : 9 January, 2025

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Bachan Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 January, 2025

Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
                                     1

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                AT G WA L I O R
                                      BEFORE
      HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
                MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No.54358 of 2024
                              Smt. Girja Devi & Others
                                          Vs.
                                State of M.P. & Others
                MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No.54366 of 2024
                                    Bachan Singh
                                          Vs.
                                State of M.P. & Others
APPERANCE
        Shri Pallav Tripathi - Advocate for the petitioners.
        Shri K.K. Prajapati - Public Prosectuor for the State.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Reserved on                           :      20/12/2024
        Delivered on                          :      9/1/2025
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        This petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming
on for pronouncement this day, the Hon'ble Shri Justice Milind
Ramesh Phadke pronounced/passed the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         ORDER

[This order shall govern final disposal of M.Cr.C. No.54366 of 2024 and M.Cr.C. No.54358 of 2024.] The present petition, under Section 482/528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/B.N.S.S., has been preferred by the petitioners for quashment of F.I.R. bearing Crime No.0152 of 2024 registered at Police Station Gormi, District Bhind (M.P.) for the offences punishable under Sections 306, 34 of the Indian Penal Code

with all consequential criminal proceedings thereto.

2. Brief facts leading to filing of the instant petition are that on 11.06.2024, deceased Mamta, wife of Bachan Singh, had committed suicide by consuming poisonous substance on account of instigation made by her husband as well as her in-laws as she was being mentally and physically tortured by them. On such allegation, Merg No.31 of 2024 under Section 174 of CrPC was registered at Police Station Gormi, District Bhind and during merg inquiry, statements of mother, father and brother of the deceased were recorded. After completion of enquiry, an F.I.R. vide Crime No.0152 of 2024 was registered. After completing the investigation, challan was filed against the petitioners before the concerned Court.

3. Challenging the impugned FIR, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the FIR has been registered without any basis, rather the registration of FIR against the petitioners is illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in the eyes of law. Hence, same deserves to be quashed in the interest of justice.

4. It was further argued that since the very provisions of Sections 107 and 306 of IPC which relate to abetment of a thing and abetment of suicide are not attracted, the registration of crime under aforesaid sections is per se illegal. It was argued that as for abetment of a thing there should be some instigation to any person to do that thing or there should be engagement of one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing and if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or the said person intentionally aided, by any of his act or illegal omission, for doing of that thing, then only it can be said that the

person has abetted a thing and if the ingredients of Section 107 of IPC are not fulfilled, then the provisions of Section 306 of IPC which speaks of abetment of commission of such suicide, cannot be said to be attracted.

5. It was further submitted that as there is no instigation on the part of the present petitioners, therefore, no case is made out under Section 306 of IPC. Neither there is any iota of evidence about instigation against them nor there is any ingredient of Section 107 of IPC. Dying declaration is also not implicative to the petitioner.

6. While placing reliance in the matter of Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 371, it was argued that the liability of an accused facing investigation and prosecution under Section 306 of IPC in the context of Section 107 thereof was considered and it was held that the word 'instigate' denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite, further holding that presence of mens rea, therefore, was a necessary concomitant of instigation. To bolster his submission, learned counsel had further placed reliance on judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matters of S.S. Chheena Vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan reported in (2010) 12 SCC 190 and Kumar @ Shivakumar vs State Of Karnataka passed in Cr.A.No.1427 of 2011, decided on 01.03.2024.

7. On the strength of the aforesaid arguments, it is prayed to quash the impugned FIR along with all consequential proceedings.

8. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent/State had vehemently opposed the prayer so made by counsel for the petitioners and while taking this Court through the case

diary wherein in specific terms, the deceased had mentioned the names of present petitioners to have indulged in certain acts, which had caused the deceased mental and physical harassment, thus, it was submitted that the act of present petitioners can be said to be of instigation which had compelled the deceased to commit suicide. It was thus prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

9. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the documents available on record.

10. To resolve the controversy, it appears necessary first of all to have a look on the provisions of Sections 306 and 107 of IPC. Section 306 of IPC reads as under:-

"Section 306. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

11. The 'abatement' has been defined in Section 107 of the IPC, which reads as under:-

"Section 107. A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that

act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."

12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Sangarabonia Sreenu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 214, has held that the basis constituents of an offence under Section 306 of IPC, are suicidal death and abetment thereof. In the matter of Pallem Daniel Victoralions Victor Manter vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1997) 1 Crimes 499 (AP), it has been held that to attract the ingredients of abetment, the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide is necessary.

13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M. Mohan vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, reported in AIR 2011 SC 1238 has held as under :-

"Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the Legislature is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306, IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide."

14. Explanation 2 of Section 108 of IPC defines that to constitute an offence of abetment, it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should

be caused.

15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 734 has held as under:-

"17. The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC. However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation........''

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of M.P. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 371 has held as under :-

"6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing."

Further, in para 12 of the judgment, it is held as under:

"The word "instigate" denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation."

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishori Lal vs. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 10 SCC 797 has held in para 6 as under:-

"6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. "Abetted" in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence."

18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Parveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal reported in [2012 (1) JT 478], has observed that offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has been abetted. Abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under section 107 of the Code. However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot

be termed as instigation.

19. In the matter of Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401, a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court analyzed the precedent and culled out the relevant principles that govern the law on quashing of a First Information Report under Section 482 of the CrPC as under:-

"13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the following principles of law emerge:

13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences;

13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the 'rarest of rare cases'. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court); 13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;

13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482 Cr.P.C.

13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

13.13. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide,

but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

13.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal(supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and 13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR."

20. The parameters for quashing an FIR have been laid down by a two- Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 as under:-

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

21. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under:-

"482. Saving for inherent power of High Court ⓠ€Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

22. The powers of High Court under Section 482 of CrPC are partly administrative and partly judicial. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. Muniswami reported in AIR 1977 SC 1489 had held that the section envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, "to give effect to an order under CrPC, to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and to secure the ends of justice."

23. The jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is discretionary. The Court depending upon the facts of a given case, can always take note of any miscarriage of justice and prevent the same by exercising its powers under Section 482 of CrPC. It is true that the said powers are neither limited nor curtailed by any other provisions of the Code, however, such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

24. It is also settled law that the inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC has to be exercised for the ends of the justice and should not be

arbitrarily exercised to cut short the normal process of a criminal trial. Authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.

25. In light of the above pronouncements, for meticulous analysis of the matter, it is necessary to look into the contents of impugned F.I.R., the extract of which is reproduced herein below:

ज हहेक्‍तकत पडापकक्‍तक हतईक थथीक ददौरडानहेक जजचक उककक्‍तक मरर्गक डडायररीक जजचक ज कथननोक कहेक आधडारक परक पथम दृषकष्‍टयडाक आरनोपथीक रल त डाबक ससजह , गररजडाक दहेवथी, बचनक ससजहक वक बज ब हेनकन्‍द्रक ससजहक कहेक ववरूदधक अपरडाधक धडारडा ज 306,34 भडादवव. कडाकससदधकपडायडाकजडानहेक सहेक जजचकररपनोष्‍टर्ग ज क परकसहेक कडायमथीकककीकजडाक्‍तथीकहहैक जजचकपतक्‍तवहे दन हसकवहेजलक हहैक पतक्‍तक शथीमडानक थडानडाक पभडाररीक महनोदयक थडानडाक रनोरमथीक जजलडाक सभणकडक (म 0 प 0) ववषयथडानडा रनोरमथीककहेक मरर्गक क 0 31/24 धडारडाक174 जडा0 फदौ0 ममेंक अपरडाधकधडारडाक306,34 भडादवव. कडाकपजजथीकबदध करनहेक ककीकअनम त तक्‍तकपदडायककरनहेक बडावक्‍त त।कमहनोदयकतनवहेदनकहहैक कककमझ त कउपकतनररी. मनथीरडामकनडाददरककनो ज हहेक्‍तकत पडापकक्‍तक हतईक थथीक जजचक मरर्गक क 0 31/24 धडारडाक 174 जडा0 फदौ0 ककीक मरर्गक डडायररीक जजचक ज कहेक ददौरडानहे मतब क्‍तकडाक ममक्‍तडाक कहेक मडायकहेक पक्षक वपक्‍तडाक कहेदडारक ससजहक पतत्रक भथीकमक ससजहक नरवररयडाक उम्रक 63 सडालक भडाई पभडाकरक ससजहक पतत्रक कहेदडारकससजहक नरवररयडाकउम्रक 33 सडालक वक मजकज कहेशवक्‍तथीक पतकनथीक कहेदडारकससजहक नरवररयडा ज क पपछक्‍तडाछककरकपथककपथकककथनकसलयहेक रयहे , जजनकहन्‍होंनहे उम्रक55 सडालकतनवडासथीकरणकगडामकबडारडाकलजकसहे अपनहेक कथनन्‍होंक ममेंक बक्‍तडायडाककककमतब क्‍तकडाककडाकजहेठकरतलडाबकससजहकवकजहेठडानथीकगररजडाकदहेवथीकक्‍तथडाकपतक्‍तकबचकचन ससजह, दहेवरकबज ब हेनकन्‍द्रकससजहकआयहेकददनकमडारपथीष्‍टककरक्‍तहेकहहैक महेररीकलड़ककीकममक्‍तडाककनोकससरत डालकवडालहेक उककक्‍तकलनोर कनोक शडाररीररकक वक मडानससकक रूपक सहेक पक्‍तडाडडक्‍तक करक्‍तहेक थहेक पक्‍तडाडनडाओक सहेक परहेशडानथीक सहेक क्‍तजरक आकरक महेररी लड़ककीकममक्‍तडाकनहेक ददनडाजकक11.06.2024 कनोकजहररीलडाकपदडाथर्गक खडाकसलयडा, जजसककीकउसककीकमतब कयकत हनोकरई, समकपण ज सहेक रल प र्गक मरर्गक जजचक त डाबक ससजह, गररजडाक दहेवथीक , बचनक ससजहक वक बज ब हेनकन्‍द्रक ससजहक कहेक ववरूदधक अपरडाध धडारडाक 306,34 भडादवव. कडाक ससदधक पडायडाक जडानहेक सहेक अपरडाधक पजजथीबदधक करनहेक ककीक अनम त तक्‍तक पडापकक्‍तक कर अपरडाधक कडायमक करक वववहेचनडाक ममेंक सलयडाक रयडा, ददौरडानहेक वववहेचनडाक एफआईआर, नककशडाक मदौकडा, कथन, पथी.एम. ररपनोष्‍टर्ग, गररफक्‍तडाररी, जपकक्‍तथी, मडाननथीयकउचकचकनकयडायडालयककहेक आदहेशककहेक पडालनकममेंक आरनोपथीरणककनो एकक एकक लडाखक रूपयहेक कहेक मच त लकहेक परक अगगमक जमडानक्‍तक परक ररहडाक ककयडाक रयडा, जपकक्‍तक सद त डाक मडालक कडा ज डडाफष्‍टकक्‍तहैयडारककरडाकरकक्षहेत्रथीयकनकयडायडा. ववजडानकपयनोरशडालडाकगकवडासलयरकजजचकहहे ज क्‍तकत भहेजडाकरयडा, जजचकररपनोष्‍टर्ग अपडापकक्‍तकहहैक जनोकपडापकक्‍तकहनोनहेक परकपथककसहेक पहेशकककीकजडावहेरथी, आददकसमकपपणर्गक वववहेचनडाकसहेक आयहेक सडाककयककहे आधडारकपरकआरनोपथीकरतलडाबकससजहक पतत्रकनडाथकत ससजहक उम्रक 60 सडाल, आरनोवपयडाकशथीमक्‍तथीकगररजडाकदहेवथीकपतकनथी रतलडाबक ससजहक उम्रक 55 सडाल,आरनोपथीकवज ब हेनकन्‍द्रक ससजहक पतत्रकनडाथकत ससजहक उम्रक 49 सडाल, आरनोपथीकबचनससजहक पतत्र नडाथकत ससजहक उम्रक 57 सडालक समसकक्‍तक जडातक्‍तक नरवररयडाक तन.रणक ददौतनयडापतरडाक कहेक ववरूदधक अपरडाधक धडारडा ज 09.08.2024 कनो 306,34 भडादववक कडाक वडाखपबबक ससदधक पडायडाक जडानहेक सहेक चडालडानक क. 149/24 ददनजकक कक्‍तडाकककयडाकरयडा, जनोकनकयडायडाथर्गकसडादरकसहेवडाकममेंकपहेवषक्‍तकहहै।

26. On perusal of the case diary, it is apparent that there are specific allegations against the petitioners, therefore, taking into consideration the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments

cited above as well as allegations leveled against the petitioners in the FIR as well as statement of the father, mother and brother of the deceased, this Court finds no merits in the case as would warrant quashing of FIR registered bearing Crime No.0152 of 2024 registered at Police Station Gormi, District Bhind (M.P.) for the offences punishable under Sections 306, 34 of IPC and all consequential proceedings.

27. As a result, these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed being devoid of merits.

(Milind Ramesh Phadke) PAWA Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR Judge N DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA

pwn* PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, 2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab3 01c34d631287f1b1cdd90b4a49f265f0

KUMA 2d9d593f, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh, serialNumber=61B9D129971D2EA4F D4455ED49EA436EA65E26164BEEED8 9153191C56E98CE21, cn=PAWAN KUMAR

R Date: 2025.01.20 18:17:09 +05'30'

 
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