[Cites 24, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Sunita Arya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 December, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:33649
1 WRIT PETITION No. 7550 of 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 19th OF DECEMBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 7550 of 2016
SMT. SUNITA ARYA
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Ms. Ruchi Mishra - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Shishupal Singh - Panel Lawyer for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):
"It is most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to allow the petition and the impugned orders dated 28-07-16
and 18-02-16 passed by the respondent No. 2 & 3 may kindly be
quashed in the |interest of justice.
Respondent authorities may kindly be directed to permit the
petitioner to work as Aganwadi helper of Aganwadi Centre situated at
Ward No. 6-A Tehsil Baroda District Sheopur M.P.
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Any other writ order, or direction as this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case be granted costs be
awarded"
2. It is submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that petitioner was appointed
on the post of Aanganwadi Helper and discharging her duties with sincerity and
full devotion. Petitioner was pregnant, therefore, she applied for grant of maternity
leave and respondent No.3 vide order dated 05.08.2015 granted maternity leave of
total 180 days from 01.03.2015 to 28.08.2015. After completing the maternity
leave, petitioner joined her services on 20.08.2015. Thereafter, on the basis of
complaint respondent No.3 abruptly inspected at Aanganwadi Centre on
25.11.2015 and at that time petitioner could not appear due to her illness. It is
further submitted that without following procedure prescribed in the policy dated
10.07.2007 services of petitioner have been terminated by respondent No.3. It is
further submitted that the removal order dated 18.02.2016 is stigmatic and before
issuance of the stigmatic removal order departmental enquiry is necessary.
Thereafter, petitioner preferred appeal and the Appellate Authority did not consider
the aforesaid aspect and rejected the appeal vide order dated 28.07.2016. Thus, on
these premised submissions, learned counsel for petitioner submits that the reliefs
sought for may kindly be extended to petitioner by allowing the present petition.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer made by
learned counsel for petitioner and supported the order impugned. It is further
submitted by him that petitioner was absent from 01.03.2015 to 10.04.2015
without any information and on 25.11.2015 the Project Officer, all of a sudden,
inspected the Aanganwadi Centre and found that petitioner was absent and
thereafter Project Officer issued letter/show-cause notice on 14.12.2015 but
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petitioner was not available at home and her grandmother also refused to receive
the same. It is further submitted that when petitioner did not come on duty, the
warning letter was issued on 29.01.2016. Petitioner submitted reply to the said
letter and stated that she was not present on duty due to some reason but no
specific reason could be assigned by her in reply. After submitting reply, she again
absented herself from duty. After considering all the facts and circumstances of the
case, order dated 18.2.2016 has rightly been passed by the Project Officer and the
appeal of petitioner has also rightly been rejected by the Appellate Authority.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The policy of the State Government dated 10.07.2007 (Annexure P/4)
provides for removal of Aanganwadi Worker from services, relevant extract of
which is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience:-
n&% vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dks in ls gVkus dh çfØ;k%&
¼1½ ;fn vkaxuokM+h dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk }kjk vkaxuokM+h dsUæ dk lapkyu
fu;ekuqlkj ugha fd;k tkrk gS vFkok muds }kjk vius drZO;ksa ,oa nkf;Roksa ds
fuoZgu esa ykijokgh dh tkrh gS rks ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh@efgyk ,oa cky
fodkl ds vU; mPp vf/kdkjh }kjk vkaxuokM+h dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dks lquokbZ
dk volj nsrs gq, tkap esa nks"kh ik;s tkus ij in ls i`Fkd fd;k tk
ldsxkA
6. Perusal of the record reveals that the impugned order has been passed by the
respondents without giving any opportunity of hearing and without issuing any
show-cause notice to petitioner. A specific procedure has been prescribed in the
policy dated 10.07.2007 and the respondents have not followed the said prescribed
procedure while removing petitioner from service.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:33649
7. Before issuing impugned order dated 18.02.2016 Annexure R-6, respondent
No.3 has neither issued any show-cause notice to petitioner nor has any
opportunity of being heard been given to him and by stigmatic order services of
petitioner have been terminated.
8. The services of petitioner have been terminated without holding any regular
departmental enquiry. Since impugned order Annexure P-2 dated 23.02.2016 is
stigmatic in nature, therefore, regular departmental enquiry ought to have been
held by respondents. The judgment passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
WP No.23267/2019 (Omprakash Gurjar vs. Panchayat and Rural Development &
Ors.), also the order dated 12.09.2023 passed in WP No.19117/2022 (Hukumchand
Solanki vs. Panchayat and Rural Development & Ors.) and the order dated
19.07.2023 passed in WP No.14663/2022 (Arvind Malviya vs. State of MP & Ors.)
are worth mentioning.
9. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rahul Tripathi Vs. Rajeev
Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal & Others reported in 2001(3) MPLJ 616 and
Jitendra Vs. State of M.P. & Others reported in 2008(4) MPLJ 670 has rightly
held that the order of termination is stigmatic in nature as the same entails serious
consequences on future prospects of employee and therefore, the same ought to
have been passed after holding an inquiry. This Court is further supported in its
view by the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Malkhan Singh Malviya Vs. State of M.P. reported in ILR(2018) MP 660. The
Apex Court while deciding the case of Khem Chand vs. The Union of India and
Ors. reported in AIR 1958 SC 300, had an occasion to summarize the concept of
reasonable opportunity, relevant para of which reads as under:-
"(19) To summarize: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the
provision under consideration includes-
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(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which
he can deny only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him
are and the allegations on which such charges are based;
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses
produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses
in support of his defence;
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed
punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the
competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his
mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the
government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three
punishments and communicates the same to the government servant."
10. The impugned order dated 18.02.2016 (Annexure R/6) is a stigmatic order,
relevant extract of which is reproduced below for ready reference and
convenience:-
dk;kZy; ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh ,dhd`r cky fodkl ifj;kstuk ';ksiqj xzkeh.k 02
Ø-@,-ck-fo-@LFkk-@2016@555 ';ksiqj fnukad 18-02-2016
@@vkns'k@@
fnukad 25&11&2015 dks v‚xuokMh dsUæ okMZ 06 cM+ksnk dk vkdfLed fujh{k.k fd;k
x;k fujh{k.k ds nkSjku vki v‚xuokM+h dsUæ ij vuqifLFkr FkhA v‚xuokM+h dk;ZdrkZ rFkk {kS=h;
ukxfjdksa }kjk crk;k x;k fd vki yxkrkj yEcs le; ls vuqifLFkr gSA bl ckor~ vkidks
dk;kZy;hu i= Ø-@,&ck&fo@LFkk-@2015@395 fnukad 14&12&2015 tkjh fd;k x;k Fkk ,oa
i= dh rkehy djkus gsrq i;Zos{kd Jherh jtuh 'kekZ dks vkns'k fn;k x;k Fkk muds }kjk
fyf[kr esa Vhi nh xbZ gS fd **vki fuokl ij ugh feyh og‚ ij vkidh lkl feyh ftUgks us i=
gS fd vki yxkrkj 01 ekg ls vuqifLFkr FkhA
ysus ls euk dj fn;kA** blls Li"V
blds mijkUr iqu% vkidks dk;kZy;hu i= Ø-509 29&01&2016 i;Zos{kd ds ek/;e ls
vfUre psrkouh i= fn;k x;kA ftlds tcko esa vkius fnukad 01&02&2016 dks le{k esa
mifLFkr gksdj 10-02-2015 dks dk;Z ij mifLFkr gksus ds fy, fy[kk Fkk] ysfdu vki vkt
fnukad rd vius dk;Z ij mifLFkr ugh gqbZ gSA blls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd vki dk;Z ugh
djuk pkgrh gS A vkidks yxkrkj dsUnz ls vuqifLFkr jgus ds dkj.k fgrxzfg;ksa ds foHkkxh;
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:33649
;kstukvksa vkSj lsokvksa dk ykHk ugha fey jgk gSA vkids }kjk inhu drZO;ksa o nkf;Roksa ds fuoZgu
esa ykijokgh cjrh tk jgh gS tks ?kksj vfu;ferrk dk ifjpk;d gSA
e0iz0 'kklu cky fodkl foHkkx Hkksiky dk Kkiu Ø-@,Q&3&2@06@50&2 fnukad 10-
07-2007 dh dafMdkvksa esa Li"V funsZ'k fn;s x, gS fd ;fn dksbZ dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk vius
drZO;ksa ,oa nkf;Roksa ds fuoZgu esa ykijokgh djrh gS rks mls RkRdky in ls izFkd fd;k tkosA
mDr dafMdk ds ikyu es Jherh lwuhrk vk;Z dks rRdky lsok ls izFkd fd;k tkrk gSA
¼mDr vkns'k rRdky izHkko ls IkzHkko'khy gksxk½
ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh
,dhd`r cky fodkl ifj;kstuk
';ksiqj xzkeh.k 02
11. From the aforesaid, it is clear that impugned order is stigmatic in nature,
therefore, without conducting regular departmental enquiry impugned order cannot
be issued. The impugned termination order has been issued without giving any
opportunity of hearing to petitioner and without conducting regular departmental
enquiry. From the language of impugned order, it is clear that it is a stigmatic
termination order.
12. It is settled position that if the order of removal is stigmatic in nature, the
same entails serious consequences on future prospects of petitioner and therefore
the same ought to have been passed after holding an enquiry. In Arvind Malviya
(supra), it is held as under:-
"3) After hearing learned counsel for the parties and taking into
consideration the fact that the present petition is covered by the order
dated 25/4/2022 passed in WP No.23267/2019 (Omprakash Gurjar
(supra)), the present petition is allowed. The impugned order is hereby
set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner
in service with 50% backwages within a period of 2 months from the
date of communication of the order. However, liberty is granted to the
respondents to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance
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with law, if so advised. The said order passed in W.P. No.23267/2019
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the present case."
13. The Division Bench of this Court, at Principal Seat, Jabalpur, in the case of
Rajesh Kumar Rathore vs. High Court of M.P. and another (W.P. No.18657 of
2018) vide order dated 23/11/2021 has held as under:-
"6. The short question of law involved in the present case is as to
whether the services of an employee under the Rules relating to
Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Contingency Paid (District
and Sessions Judge Establishment) Employees Rules, 1980, can be
terminated without conducting a departmental enquiry when an order
of termination casts stigma on the employee.
7. We are in full agreement with the legal position expounded in
various judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent. However, in the instant case, the question that arise for
consideration, as stated above, is squarely covered by the decision of
co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Krishna Pal Vs. District
& Sessions Judge, Morena (supra). In the present case, it is an
admitted fact that neither charge-sheet was issued nor
departmental enquiry was conducted and order of termination
attributes dereliction of duty amounting to misconduct, and hence, the
same is clearly stigmatic order. The petitioner's services are
admittedly governed under the Rules of 1980. If the facts and situation
of the present case is examined in the context of the facts and situation
of the case of Krishna Pal (supra), it is found that this Court had taken
a view (para5 of the said judgment) that Normally when the services of
a temporary employee or a probationer or contingency paid employee
is brought to an end by passing innocuous order due to unsatisfactory
nature of service or on account of an act for which some action is
taken, but the termination is made in a simplicitor manner without
conducting of inquiry or without casting any stigma on the employee,
the provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules 1980 can be taken aid of.
However, when the termination is founded on acts of commission or
omission, which amounts to misconduct. Such an order casts stigma
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on the conduct, character and work of the employee and hence, the
principle of natural justice, opportunity of hearing and inquiry is
requirement of law.
8. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, we are not inclined
to take a different view, therefore, in view of the aforesaid, the
impugned order dated 06.06.2017 (Annexure-P-6) and order dated
20.06.2018 (Annexure-P-9) are set aside."
14. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.02.2024 passed in
WP.5856/2020 [Devkaran Patidar Vs. State of M.P. And others (Indore
Bench)] has also decided the similar issue in the following manner:
"4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
orders are illegal and arbitrary. He further submits that the
respondent no.4 without considering the provisions of 15.01, 15.02
and 16 of the scheme according to which the respondent no.4, is not
empowered to terminate the service of the petitioner, and the aforesaid
impugned order Annexure-P/1 has been wrongly uphold. He further
submits that the respondents have acted in high handed manner and
without following the instructions/guidelines issued by the Higher
Authorities, issued the impugned termination order. Thus, the action of
the respondents is unjust and arbitrary. In the present case, neither
any charge-sheet has been issued against the petitioner nor any
enquiry has been conducted before passing of the impugned stigmatic
order. In such circumstances, he prays that the impugned orders be set
aside. He further relied on the judgment passed by this Court in the
case of Rahul Tripathi vs. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal
2001 (3) MPLJ 616 and Prakash Chandra Kein vs. State of M.P. and
others 2010 (3) MPLJ 179.
5. The respondents have filed the reply and has submitted that a
number of complaints has been received against the petitioner. After
receiving the complaints a Committee was constituted for
conducting an enquiry against the petitioner and on the basis of the
enquiry report submitted by the Committee a show cause notice was
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issued to the petitioner and after giving opportunity to the petitioner to
file reply, the respondent has terminated the services. In such
circumstances, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner is working on the post
of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and neither any charge-sheet has been
issued to the petitioner at any point of time nor any enquiry was
conducted with the participation of the petitioner. This Court has
passed the judgment in the case of Ramchandra vs. State of M.P. and
others decided in W.P. No.16572/2014 on 02/08/2017 and several
other writ petitions on the subject are under consideration before this
Court.
8. In the light of the aforesaid as no charge-sheet was issued to the
petitioner and no enquiry has been conducted, the impugned orders
dated 12.06.2017(Annexure-P/1) and 27.08.2016(AnnexureP/2),
passed by the respondents deserves to be quashed and are accordingly,
quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in
service; however a liberty is granted to proceed against the petitioner
in accordance with law, in case if need so arises in future."
15. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.04.2024 in Writ
Petition No.9065/2014 [Nilesh Vs. State of M.P. and Others - Indore Bench]
has held as under:
6. ........... The appointment was made under the directions issued
by MANREGA in which the procedure for appointment as well as the
procedure for termination are provided. Clause 15 of the guidelines
deals with appointment of Gram Rojgar Sahayak. There is a provision
for discipline and control. Under Clause 15 (2) of the aforesaid
guidelines, the Collector is having the power to terminate the services
of Gram Rojgar Sahayak as well as under Clause 16 the services are
liable to be terminated on 8 grounds which are reproduced as under:-
**16- lafonk lsok lekfIRk & xzke jkstxkj lgk;d dh lafonk lsok vof/k iw.kZ
gksus ds iwoZ fuEu fo'ks"k fLFkfr;ksa esa xzke iapk;r }kjk lekIr dh tk ldsaxh&
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:33649
1- lsok vof/k ds nkSjku O;fDrxr ,oa ukeTkn vkijkf/kd izdj.k ds laca/k esa
izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ (FIR)@Charge gksus ij vFkok 48 ?k.Vs ls vf/kd fu:)
jgus ijA
2- vf/kd`r izf'k{k.k esa vuqifLFkr gksus vFkok izf'k{k.k dks i;kZIr dkj.k cxSj
e/; vof/k esa NksMus ij vFkok izf'k{k.k esa vU; xaHkhj ykijokgh djus ijA
3- oXkSj lwpuk ds ,d ekg ls vf/kd eq[;ky; esa vuqifLFkr gksus ijA
4- Lo;a dk R;kxi= nsus ijA
5- lacaf/kr ds ikxy@fnokfy;k ?kksf"kr gksus ijA
6- vfu;fer o =qfViw.kZ fu;qfDr izekf.kr gksus ijA
7- eq[; dk;Zikyu vf/kdkjh ftyk iapk;r }kjk ikfjr vkns'k ds vuqØe esa
vfu;ferk ,oa dRRkZO; fuoZgu esa ?kksj ykijokgh izekf.kr gksus ijA
8- xzke iapk;r dk vfLrRo lekIr gksus ijA**
7. As per Clause 7 of the guidelines, in case of gross negligence in
the duty and irregularities there should be an order by Chief Executive
Officer, Jila Panchayat. Unless the charges are proved then only Gram
Rojgar Sahayak can be terminated from the service. So far as the
issuance of show cause notices is concerned these notices were not
given before proposing termination from service or proposing
imposition of any penalty, therefore, it cannot be treated as show cause
notice before the termination from service. Even in these show cause
notices very vague allegations are made about the delay in the
construction of toilets, whereas in the final order, no such figure has
been given as to how many toilets were sanctioned and how many were
not completed or constructed by the petitioner. No such findings have
been recorded and only on the basis of vague allegations about
negligence in duty, the petitioner has been terminated. Therefore, the
order not only suffers from violation of principles of natural justice but
it is a stigmatic order.
8. In the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the case of
Rahul Tripathi Vs. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission reported in 2001
(3) MPLJ 616, that the order is unsustainable in law.
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16. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 18.10.2019 in Writ
Petition No.7916/2019 [Mahesh Kumar Maru S/o Bhagirah Maru Vs. State of
M.P. and others - Indore Bench] has held as under:
6. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner is working on the
post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and neither any chargesheet has been
issued to the petitioner at any point of time nor any enquiry was
conducted with the participation of the petitioner. This Court in the
case of Ramchandra vs. State of M.P. and others decided in W.P.
No.16572/2014 on 02/08/2017 several other writ petition on the
subject under consideration before this Court in the present petition.
7. So far availability of the alternative remedy is concerned, the
impugned stigmatic order of termination has been passed contrary to
the settled law and without following the principle of natural justice.
Hence, as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Whirlpool Corporation and other vs. RegistrarTrade Mark and others
reported in AIR 1999 SC 22 alternative remedy is no bar for filing a
petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India.
8. In the light of the aforesaid as no charge-sheet was issued to the
petitioner and no enquiry has been conducted, the impugned order
dated 22/02/2019 (Annexure-P/1) passed by the respondents deserves
to be quashed and is accordingly, quashed. The respondents are
directed to reinstate the petitioner in service; however a liberty is
granted to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law, in
case if need so arises in future.
17. This Court in the case of Smt. Parvati Pawar Vs. State of MP and others
(W.A.No. 111/2018, decided on 18/2/2019) in paragraphs 6 and 7 has held as
under:-
6. Shri Patne has placed reliance upon the policy issued by the State
Government dated 10.7.2007 and his contention is that for removing
an Anganwadi Worker an inquiry is mandatory with the participation
of the employee and in the present case, undisputedly the petitioner
was critically ill, as she met with an accident. The certificates are on
record issued by the Government Doctors and in all fairness, proper
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:33649
opportunity of hearing should have been given to the petitioner. In
similar circumstances, this Court while dealing termination of
Anganwadi Worker in the case of Smt. Kansa Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh reported in (2015) 4 MPLJ 151 in paragraphs 9 to 18 has held
as under:-
"9. In the aforesaid order only the name of the village has
been changed in all 84 cases. The policy dt. 10/7/2007 issued by
the State Government provides for a procedure for discontinuing
an "Aanganwadi worker" and the same reads as under :
n& vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dks in ls gVkus dh izfØ;k %
1 ;fn vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk }kjk vkaxuokMh dsUnz dk
lapkyu fu;ekuqlkj ugha fd;k tkrk gS vFkok muds }kjk vius
drZO;ksa ,oa nkf;Roksa ds fuoZgu esa ykijokgh dh tkrh gS rks ifj;kstuk
vf/kdkjh@ efgyk ,oa cky fodkl ds vU; mPp vf/kdkjh }kjk
vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dks lquokbZ dk volj nsrs gq, tkWap es
nks"kh ik;s tkus ij in ls i`Fkd fd;k tk ldsxkA
2 ;fn lg;ksfxuh ekr` lfefr fdlh dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk ds dk;Z ls
larq"V ughs gSa rks i`Fkd lg;ksfxuh ekr` lfefr bl vk'k; dk izLrko
mi;qDr dkj.k n'kkZrs gq, cSBd esa izLrqr djsaxh ,oa cSBd esa izLrko
cgqer ls ikfjr gksus ij i;Zos{kd dks izsf"kr djsxh A i;Zos{kd Lo;a
lacaf/kr lfefr }kjk izkIr izLrko ds ifjizs{; esa gVkus ds dkj.kksa ds
rF;ksa dh tkap djsxh A mlds i'pkr viuk tkap izfrosnu 15 fnol esa
Li"V vuq'kalk lfgr cky fodkl ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh dks Hkstuk gksxkA
ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh }kjk i;Zos{kd ds tkap izfrosnu dk ijh{k.k
djus ,oa mi;qDr dkj.k ik;s tkus ij lkr fnol esa vkaxuokMh
dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dh lsok lekfIr dk fu.kZ; ysdj lsok lekfIr dk
vkns'k tkjh fd;k tkosxk A vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dks in ls
i`Fkd djus ds iwoZ lquokbZ dk volj fn;k tkuk vfuok;Z gksxkA ;fn
lg;ksfxuh ekr` lfefr o i;Zos{kd ds er esa fHkUurk gks rks cky fodkl
ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh }kjk tkap mijkar fu.kZ; fy;k tkdj ftyk
dk;Zdze vf/kdkjh@ftyk efgyk cky fodkl vf/kdkjh ds vuqeksnu
i'pkr in ls i`Fkd fd;k tk ldsxk A
3 ;fn i;Zos{kd dh tkudkjh esa dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk ds fo:?n dksbZ
xaHkhj f'kdk;r lh/ks vkrh gS rks og bu f'kdk;rksa ij tkap mijkar
viuk tkap izfrosnu 15 fnol esa Li"V vuq'kalk lfgr cky fodkl
ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh dks Hkstuk gksxkA ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh }kjk i;Zos{kd
ds tkap izfrosnu dk ijh{k.k djus ,oa mi;qDr dkj.k ik;s tkus ij
lkr fnol esa vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ @ lgkf;dk dh lsok lekfIr dk
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:33649
fu.kZ; ysdj lsok lekfIr ds vkns'k tkjh fd;k tkosxk A vkaxuokMh
dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dks in ls i`Fkd djus ds iwoZ lquokbZ dk volj
fn;k tkuk vfuok;Z gksxkA
4 dk;ZdrkZ@lgkf;dk dh mez 60 o"kZ iw.kZ gksus ij mudh lsok Lor%
lekIr gks tk,xh A
10. The aforesaid policy deals with the appointment as well as
removal of the Aanganwadi worker. In the present case, no such
procedure has been followed by the respondents and no enquiry
with the participation of the petitioner was conducted by the
employer. The employer has even failed before this Court to
establish that they have issued notice to the petitioner. The
respondents have violated the principles of natural justice and
fair play.
11. In India there is no statute which prescribes the minimum
procedure which administrative agencies or quasi judicial bodies
must follow while taking decisions which affect the rights of the
individuals. Nonetheless, they are bound by the principles of
natural justice. The principles of natural justice signify the basic
minimum fair procedure which must be followed while
exercising decision making powers. Natural justice forms the
very backbone of a civilized society.
12. The wheels regarding the application of principles of
natural justice to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings
started turning from 1963 when the House of Lords in the
United Kingdom delivered the landmark and oft-quoted
judgment of Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2. An order for
dismissal of a Constable was quashed because he was not
provided any opportunity to defend his actions. Presently, in our
country, the principles of natural justice are applicable in totality
to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. This is
consistent and in line with the rapidly increasing role, functions
and jurisdiction of such bodies in a welfare state like ours.
13. The below-mentioned passages by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. AIR 2009
SC 2375 exhaustively explain natural justice and deserve to be
quoted in full in the context of the current dispute:
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"6. Natural justice is another name for commonsense
justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons.
But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of
man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a
commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially
on natural ideals and human values. The administration of
justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted
considerations which are usually associated with a
formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and
grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which
has to determine its form.
7. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice"
do not present a water-tight classification. It is the
substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and
whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn
purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice.
Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary
technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical
prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated
law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure
should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a
litigants' defence.
8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as
recognized by all civilized States is of supreme
importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on
determining disputes between the parties, or any
administrative action involving civil consequences is in
issue. These principles are well settled. The first and
foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi
alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be
condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this
principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should
appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet.
Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to
enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a
notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the
order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but
essential that a party should be put on notice of the case
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before any adverse order is passed against him. This is
one of the most important principles of natural justice. It
is after all an approved rule of fair play.....
10. Principles of natural justice are those rules which
have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum
protection of the rights of the individual against the
arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making
an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to
prevent such authority from doing injustice.
12. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the
subject. The most important of them is the Board of
Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179:80 LJKB 796), where
Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows:
"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they
have originated, the practice of imposing upon
departments or offices of State the duty of deciding or
determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose
usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes, it
will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or
even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the
Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also
to ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either
they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides
for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides
anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a
question as though it were a trial....The Board is in the
nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a Court of law has no
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either
upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either
that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have
described, or have not determined the question which they
are required by the Act to determine, then there is a
remedy by mandamus and certiorari".
13. Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision
the observation of the Lord Chancellor that the Board can
obtain information in any way they think best, always
giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the
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controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant
statement prejudicial to their view". To the same effect are
the observations of Earl of Selbourne, LO in Spackman v.
Plumstead District Board of Works (1985 (10) AC 229:54
LJMC 81), where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor
observed as follows:
"No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how
the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply
no more than that the substantial requirements of justice
shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense
of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of
being heard before him and stating their case and their
view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the
matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not
under the dictation of some other person or persons to
whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no
malversation of any kind. There would be no decision
within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of
that sort done contrary to the essence of justice".
14. Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice
consisted in requiring that all parties should have an
opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision
they are to be bound, such considerations as in their
judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases
lay down the very important rule of natural justice
contained in the oft-quoted phrase 'justice should not only
be done, but should be seen to be done'.
15. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great
deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are
not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in
rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the
nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What
particular rule of natural justice should be implied and
what its context should be in a given case must depend to
a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case,
the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is
held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an
administrative act has withered away. Even an
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administrative order which involves civil consequences
must be consistent with the rules of natural justice.
Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction
of not merely property or personal rights but of civil
liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary
damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that
affects a citizen in his civil life.
16. Natural justice has been variously defined by different
Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and
Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as
'universal justice'. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty
the Queen (1877- 78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort
P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy
council, used the phrase 'the requirements of substantial
justice', while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead
District Board of Works (1884-85(10) App.Case 229,
240), Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase 'the
substantial requirement of justice'. In Vionet v. Barrett
(1885(55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, MR defined natural
justice as 'the natural sense of what is right and wrong'.
While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local
Board of Health (1890 (24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R.
instead of using the definition given earlier by him in
Vionet's case (supra) chose to define natural justice as
'fundamental justice'. In Ridge v. Baldwin (1963(1) WB
569, 578), Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered
natural justice with 'fairplay in action' a phrase favoured
by Bhagawati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
(1978 (2) SCR 621). In re R.N. (An Infant) (1967 (2) B
617, 530), Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to describe natural
justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments
Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment (1976 WLR
1255) Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely
described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip' while
Geoffrey Lane, LJ. In Regina v. Secretary of State for
Home Affairs Ex Parte Hosenball (1977 (1) WLR 766)
preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness'.
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17. How then have the principles of natural justice been
interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to
be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial
interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing
the principles of natural justice in judicial process,
including therein quasi-judicial and administrative
process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair
hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for
fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any
particular race or country but is shared in common by all
men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sua' or 'nemo
debet esse judex in propria causa sua' as stated in (1605)
12 Co.Rep.114 that is, 'no man shall be a judge in his own
cause'. Coke used the form 'aliquis non debet esse judex
in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars'
(Co.Litt. 1418), that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his
own case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same
time be a party'. The form 'nemo potest esse simul actor
et judex', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and judge'
is also at times used. The second rule is 'audi alteram
partem', that is, 'hear the other side'. At times and
particularly in continental countries, the form 'audietur at
altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same thing. A
corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and
particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely 'qui
aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet
dixerit, haud acquum facerit' that is, 'he who shall decide
anything without the other side having been heard,
although he may have said what is right, will not have
been what is right' (See Bosewell's case (1605) 6 Co.Rep.
48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed,
'justice should not only be done but should manifestly be
seen to be done'.
What is known as 'useless formality theory' has received
consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of
India (1999(6) SCC 237). It was observed as under:
"Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we
would like to state that case relating to breach of natural
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justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or
are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases
there is a considerable case-law and literature as to
whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that
the case of the applicant is not one of 'real substance' or
that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that
the result will not be different, even if natural justice is
followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn: (1971)2 All
ER 1278, HL) (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce),
Glynn v. Keele University: (1971) 2 All ER 89;
Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority: (1980) 2 All ER
368, CA) and other cases where such a view has been
held. The latest addition to this view is R v. Ealing
Magistrates' Court, ex p. Fannaran (1996 (8) Admn. LR
351, 358) (See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where
Straughton, L.J. held that there must be 'demonstrable
beyond doubt' that the result would have been different.
Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan (1987 (1) All ER 1118,
CA) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in
certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New
Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959 NZLR 1014)
however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of
bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is
'real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice'. On the other
hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-
72) says that slight proof that the result would have been
different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument,
we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40:
(1963) 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees
(1969 (2) All ER 274) stating that there are always 'open
and shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice
can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the
authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the 'useless
formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however
inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His
Lordship observed that 'convenience and justice are often
not on speaking term'. More recently, Lord Bingham has
deprecated the 'useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief
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Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p.
Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also
his article 'Should Public Law Remedies be
Discretionary?' 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic
criticism of the 'useless formality theory' has been made
much earlier in 'Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by
Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63)
contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were
wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn.
1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596)
and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be
decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th
Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not
yet committed themselves to any one view though
discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative
Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile
writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made
according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to
cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable
facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion
whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the
outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of
substance or if he can prove a 'real likelihood' of success
or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote
chance of success. We may, however, point out that even
in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond
dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts
can, in exercise of their 'discretion', refuse certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural
justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet
another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.
Sharma (1996 (3) SCC 364), Rajendra Singh v. State of
M.P. (1996 (5) SCC 460) that even in relation to statutory
provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made
between cases where the provision is intended for
individual benefit and where a provision is intended to
protect public interest. In the former case, it can be
waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.
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We do not propose to express any opinion on the
correctness or otherwise of the 'useless formality theory'
and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case,
inasmuch as the case before us, 'admitted and
indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain
as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J."
14. Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply
rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental.
The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the
prevention of miscarriage of justice." With regard to the
disputed nature of the useless formality test as discussed in the
M.C. Mehta case (see supra), it is important to note that in the
instant petition, the petitioner and other similarly placed
petitioners, were dismissed by a cyclostyle order. The order for
dismissal for the Anganwadi workers is identical word by word
in all the 84 cases. Only the name of the village has been
changed in the orders. In such circumstances, this Court is of the
view that following audi alteram partem will most definitely not
be a useless formality.
15. The principles of natural justice are firmly grounded in
Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 14
of the Constitution guarantees equality before law and equal
protection of law. Through the process of interpretation,
procedural safeguards have been read into Article 14 by the
Courts. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Union,
AIR 1991 SC 101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "the
audi alteram partem rule, in essence, enforce the equality clause
in Art 14 and it is applicable not only to quasi-judicial bodies but
also to administrative order adversely affecting the party in
question unless the rule has been excluded by the Act or
Regulation or Rule." Not giving any hearing results in decisions
which are arbitrary in nature. Arbitrariness and equality are
antithesis of each other. Similarly under Article 21 of the
Constitution, no person can be deprived of his life or liberty
except according to the procedure established by law. Audi
alteram partem forms a part of the procedural due process under
the Indian Constitution. Procedure established by law must be
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just, fair and reasonable and not oppressive, unreasonable or
arbitrary.
16. The present case reflects a very sorry state of affair in
respect of functioning of the Department. By a common order
about 84 Aanganwadi workers have been terminated. The
petitioner is having a family to support. She has not committed
any misconduct and is serving with the Department without any
blemish.
17. This Court keeping in view the fact that the respondents
have not followed the prescribed procedure is of the considered
opinion that the impugned order dt. 9/3/2015 has to pave the
path of extinction.
18. Resultantly, the impugned order dt. 9/3/2015 is hereby
quashed. The Writ Petition is allowed. The petitioner shall be
entitled for backwages and all consequential benefits flowing
out of this order. The petitioner shall also be entitled for a cost of
Rs.2000/-. Cost be paid to the petitioner within 30 days from the
date of receipt of copy of this order."
7. In light of the aforesaid judgment, as there was violation of
principles of natural justice of fair play, the circular dated 10.7.2007
was not followed merely because the appellant was not available at the
time of inspection that too on account of her being critically ill, this
Court is of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the
respondents dated 26.11.2015 deserves to be quashed and is
accordingly, quashed. The appellate order dated 15.5.2017 is also
quashed. The judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge dated
28.8.2017 is set aside. The writ appeal is allowed. The respondents are
directed to reinstate the appellant forthwith in service. The appellant
shall also be entitled for 50% backwages/honorarium."
18. In light of aforesaid discussion, it is seen that no charge-sheet was issued to
petitioner and no regular departmental enquiry has been conducted and the
impugned stigmatic order has been passed.
19. Considering the aforesaid, the impugned orders dated 18.02.2016 and
28.07.2016 are hereby quashed. Consequently, respondents are directed to reinstate
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petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy
of this order and the respondents are also directed to extend all the consequential
benefits except backwages on the principle of "No Work No Pay". However,
respondents would be at liberty to proceed against petitioner in accordance with
law, in case if need so arises in future.
20. With the aforesaid observation, the petition is disposed of.
21. Any interlocutory application, if pending, is also disposed of.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Ahmad
