[Cites 21, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Vijay Kumar Sharma vs M P M K V V Com Ltd on 15 December, 2025

                                                                                     1

                             IN THE          HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                           AT G WA L I O R
                                                                  BEFORE
                                           HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
                                                WRIT PETITION No. 6869 of 2023
                                                    VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA
                                                             Versus
                                               M P M K V V COM LTD AND OTHERS
                           -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Appearance:
                           Shri Ravi Bhargava - Advocate for the petitioner.

                           Shri Ravi Jain- Advocate for the respondents.
                           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           RESERVED ON:                  18/11/2025
                           ORDER PASSED ON:                  /12/2025
                           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  ORDER

Petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for a direction to respondents to pay him full salary for the period from 25/1/2018 to 30/4/2021 during which he remained under suspension. He has also prayed for interest on the aforesaid amount.

2. Facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Store Assistant in the erstwhile M.P. Electricity Board on 3/4/1982. At the relevant time, he was working as Junior Engineer at Gwalior Division of the respondent/Company.

3. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner by the Special Police Establishment (SPE), Gwalior for offence under Section 7, 13(1) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120 of IPC alongwith other co-accused persons. The SPE filed challan in the Court of Special Judge on 18/1/2018. Accordingly, by virtue of instructions issued by the General Administration Department vide Circular dated 26/2/1998, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order

dated 25/1/2018 and was attached to the City Circle, Gwalior.

4. The criminal case was tried by learned First Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge (PC Act), Datia in SC LOK No.-01/2018. Vide judgment dated 29/7/2022, the petitioner and other co-accused persons are acquitted in the criminal case.

5. While the aforesaid criminal case was pending, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation and stood retired from service w.e.f. 30/4/2021. After acquittal in the criminal case, he approached the respondents for regularization of period of his suspension. Accordingly, vide order dated 10/2/2023 (Annexure P/1), the period of suspension from 25/1/2018 to 30/4/2021 has been treated to be on duty for all purposes except for pay and allowances for the said period. The petitioner is thus, aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the respondents in denying him benefit of pay and allowances for the period of suspension.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal case, the reason on account of which he was placed under suspension vanished. He therefore, submitted that the petitioner's suspension was unjustified and therefore, he should be paid full pay and allowances for the said period. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon the decision Babulal Jhad Vs Home Department & Ors., passed in W.P. No.8658/2018 (Indore Bench) which has been affirmed by Division Bench in W.A. No.120/2019. He also relied upon coordinate bench decision of this case in the case of Brijesh Singh Kushwaha Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., passed in W.P. No.22404/2021 which has been affirmed by Division Bench in W.A. No.426/2024. The learned counsel also relied upon decision of this Court in the case of Gouri Shankar Verma Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., passed in W.P. No.9850/2023, and Rampyari Bai Vs. Babulal & Anr., passed in W.P. No.30191/2024.

7. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents supported the impugned action of the respondents and submitted that the petitioner got

involved in the criminal case because of his own acts and the respondents were not instrumental in his prosecution. He further submitted that since the challan was filed by the SPE in the Court, by virtue of instructions issued by the General Administration Department, the petitioner was required to be placed under suspension. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner's suspension was unjustified. He further submitted that the respondents have treated the suspension period of the petitioner as on duty for all purposes except the benefit of pay and allowances. He referred to provisions of FR 54-B in support of his submissions. It is his submission that the competent authority since did not find the suspension of petitioner as wholly unjustified, he is rightly denied pay and allowances for the period of suspension. He relied upon Division Bench judgment in the case of Ramesh Singh Vs. M.P. State Electricity Board reported in 2011(1) MPLJ 466 as also in the case of Pratap Singh vs. State of M.P. & ors. In W.A. No.2397/2025. The learned counsel thus prayed for dismissal of writ petition.

8. Considered the arguments and perused the record.

9. In relation to his prosecution in the criminal case, the petitioner

remained under suspension from 25/1/2018 till 30/4/2021 i.e. the date of his

retirement. It is not in dispute that criminal prosecution of the petitioner was

not at the instance of the respondent/Company. Further, since the charge-

sheet was filed by SPE in the Court, it was incumbent on the part of

respondents to place the petitioner under suspension. Thus, it cannot be said

that the action of the respondents in placing the petitioner under suspension

was unjustified. The regularization/treatment of period of suspension of a

Govt. employee is governed by the provisions of FR 54-B. Sub-rule (3) of

FR 54-B is relevant for consideration of the controversy involved in this

case and is thus extracted below:

"(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended:

Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reason directly attributable to the Government servant it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation [within 60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served in him] and after considering the representation if any, submitted by him direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such [amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine."

Thus, from reading FR 54-B(3), it is evident that full pay &

allowances are payable to the employee only when the competent authority

forms an opinion that the suspension of the employee was wholly

unjustified. In other words, it is only when the authority comes to the

conclusion that suspension was wholly unjustified, the pay and allowances

for the period of suspension are liable to be paid to the employee. In this

Case, there is no such finding recorded by the competent authority nor the

petitioner could establish that his suspension was wholly unjustified.

10. The issue involved in this case was considered by the Division Bench

of this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh (supra), wherein, the Division

Bench held in para 7 as under:-

"7.Thus, from perusal of F.R. 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules it is apparent that the authority who is competent to pass order of reinstatement is required to form an opinion as to whether suspension was wholly unjustified. If the authority comes to the conclusion that suspension was wholly unjustified, then the

incumbent would be entitled to full pay and allowances under sub-rule (8) of Rule 54-B. In the instant case, the competent authority vide order dated 31.3.2010 which was assailed in the writ petition by the appellant, has found that suspension of the appellant was mandatory as challan against him was filed in the Court for a criminal case. The appellant was acquitted by the court only by giving benefit of doubt, therefore, it cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. Accordingly, the period of suspension from 25.3.2000 to 22.9.2002 was directed to be treated as on duty and his pay and allowances for the said period were restricted to the subsistence allowance already paid to him. Thus, cogent reasons have been assigned by the competent authority while passing the order in terms of Rule 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules. The discretion conferred by the rule has rightly been exercised by the competent authority."

11. Similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Pratap Singh vs.

State of M.P. & ors. In W.P. No.165 of 2024. The order passed in writ

petition has been affirmed by Division Bench in W.A. No.2397/2025

holding as under:

"10. As in the present appeal, appellant was arrested on 22.07.2017 in pursuance to the criminal case and he was remained in custody up to 26.07.2017 which is more than 48 hours, therefore, he was placed under suspension w.e.f. 22.07.2017. The said suspension on account of arrest in a criminal case which was under Rule 9(2)(a) (deeming clause) of Rules 1966 on account of custody for more than 48 hrs., the authority had no other option but to place employee under suspension under the deeming clause of Rule 9(2)(a) of Rules 1966. Therefore, the said suspension cannot be treated as unjustified even in case of acquittal also, because at the time of suspension it was justified under deeming clause of Rule 9(2) of Rules 1966.

11. Once it is held that suspension of employee was not wholly unjustified, he cannot be held entitled to pay allowances for the period of suspension. As at the time of suspension, there was no other option but to suspend the appellant on account of his custody in a criminal case. Merely because he was acquitted, the said suspension of petitioner which was under the statutory rules cannot be treated as wholly unjustified."

12. The issue regarding payment of back-wages to an employee who was

dismissed from service on account of conviction in criminal case and was

later reinstated on his acquittal, has been dealt with by Apex Court at more

than one occasion. In the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore vs. Gujarat

Electricity Board reported in (1996)11 SCC 603, the Court was dealing

with an issue regarding payment of back wages to an employee who was

dismissed from service on account of his conviction in the criminal case.

The Court held thus:

"2. This case does not warrant interference for the reason that, admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for his involvement in a crime committed on 1-10-1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted the petitioner under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On that basis, the respondents had taken action to have him dismissed from service since he was working as a Junior Clerk in the respondent-Electricity Board. The petitioner challenged the validity of the dismissal order by way of a special civil application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Pending disposal, the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 14-10-1992 acquitted him of the offence. Consequently, while disposing of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge directed the respondent to reinstate him into the service with continuity of the service, but denied back wages. The petitioner then filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 319 of 1993 which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 26-8-1993. Thus, this special leave petition.

3.The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the

duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference."

13. The similar view was taken by Apex Court in the case of Union of

India vs. Jaipal Singh reported in (2004)1 SCC 121, wherein the Court

held thus:

"4.On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Ranchhodji [(1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 491] . If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail

of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside."

14. The aforesaid legal proposition is reiterated by Apex Court in the case

of Crop. Mithilesh Kumar Vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in

(2020)12 SCC 423.

15. The aforesaid judgments by Apex Court held that a Govt. Servant is

not entitled to back wages if he got involved in a criminal case for his own

acts and the department is not responsible for his prosecution and resultant

conviction. This is because, the department could not avail his services

while he was out of service because of his conviction. The matter is held to

be different if the prosecution was at the instance of department.

16. Similar is the case with an employee who is suspended because of his

involvement in criminal case lodged not at the instance of department but at

the instance of a third person with which department is not concerned. In

such case also, under the service rules, the department is obliged to place

the employee under suspension and is thus not in a position to avail services

of the Govt. servant. As is held by Apex Court in aforementioned cases, the

employer cannot be burdened with payment of back wages in such cases.

Similarly, as has been held by Division Benches of this Court in the case of

Ramesh Singh and Pratap Singh (supra), the suspension in these

circumstances would not be wholly unjustified and the concerned Govt.

servant would not be entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of

suspension even when he is acquitted in the criminal case. This is because,

on his arrest, the suspension is inevitable.

17. There is another line of judgments which are relied upon by learned

counsel for petitioner. It be noted here that the judgment rendered in the

case of Gouri Shanker Verma, Anjana Prem Dayal, and Brijesh Singh

Kushwaha (supra) are based upon the judgment rendered in the case of

Babulal Jhad (supra). Further, the judgment rendered in the case of

Babulal Jhad is based upon the Division Bench judgment rendered in the

case of Umashanker Choubey vs. State of M.P. & ors. reported in 2006(2)

MPHT 471. The facts and law as discussed in the case of Umashanker

Choubey (supra) thus needs to be examined.

18. In Umashankar Choubey (supra), the petitioner was arrested in

relation to a criminal case for offence under Section 396 & 412 IPC and

Section 25, 29 and 30 Arms Act as a result of which he was placed under

suspension by his employer. Later on, on his acquittal in the criminal case,

his suspension period was treated to be on duty for all purposes except for

pay and allowances. The Division Bench of this Court interpreted FR 54-B

alongwith GOI OM No.F.15(8)-E.IV/57, dated 28.03.1959 and held in para

6 & 7 as under:

"6. In S. Samson Martin Vs. Union of India and others (supra), a Bench of as many as three members of Central Administrative Tribunal, has also taken a similar view that whatever the circumstances of acquittal may be, when the Disciplinary Authority has chosen to suspend on the fact of criminal proceed. ings only and to wait till end of the proceedings, it has no discretion on the matter of pay and has to abide by the

verdict of the Criminal Court. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority has placed the petitioner under suspension only because of his detention for more than 48 hours in a criminal charge and the said criminal proceeding has ended in acquittal. Admittedly, the Disciplinary Authority has not initiated separate disciplinary proceedings and has waited for the decision of the Sessions Court in the criminal case and has also reinstated the petitioner in service pursuant to the judgment of acquittal of the Sessions Court in the criminal case. This being the position, the petitioner was entitled for same treatment as per sub-rule (3) of F.R. 54-B as if the suspension was wholly unjustified and he would be entitled to full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended.

7. The decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. K. Ponnamma Vs. State of Kerala and others (supra) cited by Mr. Neekhra, is based on Rules 55, 56 and 57 of Kerala Service Rules which conferred a discretion on the Disciplinary Authority as to how he will consider the period of suspension of the Govern-ment servant and decide as to whether he would be entitled to full pay and allowances. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ranchodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. The Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board (supra) cited by Mr. Neekhra states that each case requires to be considered in its own backdrops. In the said case, there were no rules providing for payment of back wages for a period of suspension and the Supreme Court held in the facts of that case that the employee was not entitled to back wages after his acquittal. In the present case, on the other hand, we find that there are clear Administrative Instructions issued under the O.M. dated 28-3-1959 to the effect that Government servants deemed to be under suspension on account of a criminal charge when reinstated on acquittal would be entitled to full pay and allowance during the period of suspension in accordance with sub-rule (3) of F.R. 54-B".

19. The case of Umashankar Choubey could be distinguished on facts

inasmuch as it related to a Central Govt. employee and was based upon the

instructions issued by GOI vide aforesaid OM. However, relying upon this

case, the single bench of this Court in the case of Babulal Jhad (supra)

decided the case in favour of Govt. servant and the same was affirmed by

Division Bench in W.A. No.120/2019. Similarly, relying upon Babulal

Jhad, the case of Brijesh Kumar Kushwaha (supra) was decided in favour

of Govt. servant. Again this judgment was affirmed by Division Bench in

W.A. No.426/2024. Both the cases of Babulal Jhad and Brijesh Kumar

Kushwaha related to State Govt. employees.

20. Thus, there are two sets to cases decided by different Division

Benches of this Court i.e. case of Umashankar Choubey, Babulal Jhad &

Brijesh Kumar Kushwaha on one side and the cases of Ramesh Singh &

Pratap Singh (supra) on the other side. In both the cases, FR 54-B is

considered while taking divergent views.

21. The issue was also considered by Apex Court in the case of Gurpal

Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan reported in (2012)13 SCC

94. It was a case where a Judicial Magistrate was prosecuted for charge of

murder. On account of his arrest, he was placed under suspension by

Rajasthan High Court on 22.12.1985. He remained under suspension till his

acquittal by Trial Court and thereafter the appeal against acquittal was

decided by High Court. His suspension still continued since the High Court

initiated disciplinary proceedings thereafter wherein also the employee was

exonerated. At this stage his suspension was revoked by High Court on

26.03.2008. The he thus remained under suspension for a long period of

time from 22.12.1985 to 26.03.2008. While deciding the issue as to whether

the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of

suspension or not, the Apex Court divided the entire period into different

stages. The extract of the Apex Court judgment is reproduced hereunder-

"29.The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage is as to whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the subsistence allowance as already paid to him or full salary and allowances, in view of his acquittal in the criminal case and the exoneration in departmental proceedings. Related to the aforesaid issue would be a consequential issue of notional promotion from the date an officer junior to him was promoted in the Rajasthan Judicial Service and the consequential entitlement to the emoluments on the promotional post, which in turn would determine the amount of suspension allowance and the other retiral benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

35.We have examined the entire issue keeping the aforesaid principles in mind. In order to determine the issue relating to the entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other allowance(s) upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be examined at the different stages/point of time. The first stage commenced at the time when the petitioner was initially suspended on 22-12-1985 w.e.f. 20-12-1985. The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot legitimately protest against his suspension, at the initial stage, when he had remained in police custody for more than forty-eight hours, though unfortunately for circumstances for which he was not responsible. This suspension was naturally continued when he was facing the trial for murder.

xxx xxx xxx

39. As noticed above, Mr Calla has submitted that the suspension of the petitioner should have been revoked at this stage. It will not be possible to accept the proposition that as soon as the trial court had acquitted the petitioner, the Rajasthan High Court was required to forthwith revoke the order of suspension. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have been given a non-sensitive posting, not involving judicial functions. But, it was not imperative for the High Court to revoke the suspension, at that stage. It is a matter of record, that the prosecuting agency decided to file an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the trial court, acquitting the petitioner. The appeal filed by CBI was admitted by the Delhi High Court and remained pending till it was decided on 27-9- 2005 [State v. Gurpal Singh, (2005) 124 DLT 282] . Therefore, the conclusions recorded by the trial court, were not final. They were liable to be reversed in appeal by the High Court. Thus, during the said period/stage, it cannot be said that the continuance of the suspension of the petitioner was wholly

unjustified. Merely because the High Court could have revoked the suspension, would not render the decision to continue the suspension, wholly unjustified.

xxx xxx xxx

52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. We, however, hold that the continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27-9-2005 i.e. the date of the judgment [State v. Gurpal Singh, (2005) 124 DLT 282] rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We further hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies the requirements as per the Rules) from the date when a person junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher post. Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order."

It is thus evident that, even though the petitioner therein was found to

be fully innocent, the period of suspension during the trial was held to be

justified inasmuch as it was inevitable to suspend the petitioner on account

of his arrest in criminal case. He was thus held not entitled to pay &

allowances for this period and was granted the same for the period

thereafter. The issue thus stood conclusively decided by Apex Court in the

case of Gurpal Singh (supra).

22. Therefore, even though there are divergent views taken by different

benches of this Court, in view of the authoritative and binding precedent of

Apex Court in the case of Gurpal Singh (supra), the petitioner does not get

any help from the judgment cited by his counsel. His suspension for the

period he was facing trial cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. He is