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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Prateek vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 December, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:34913
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 1ST OF DECEMBER, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 42384 OF 2025
PRATEEK
VERSUS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER
Appearance:
Shri Sanjay Kumar Sharma advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Apoorv Joshi, public prosecutor for State.
Shri Ramkrishna Shastri, advocate for respondent no.2.
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ORDER
This petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita,2023 is filed for quashing of FIR registered at crime No. 120/2024 at
P.S. Chimanganj Mandi, Ujjain District Ujjain for offence punishable under
Sections 376(2)(n), 506 and 450 of IPC in ST No. 71 of 2024 and
consequential proceeding against the petitioner.
2 The exposition of facts, in brief, giving rise to present petition, is as
under:-
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A. The complainant aged around 25 years, working as Nurse reported to
SHO P.S. Chimanganj Mandi on 20.02.2024 that she met Prateek Tiwari in an
engagement function at Dewas in year 2017. They used to communicate on
phone. Prateek proposed to marry her. Prateek came to her rented house on
26.1.2018 and had physical relations with her against her will on promise of
marriage. Prateek sexually exploited her till year 2023. She again asked
Prateek for marriage. Prateek refused to marry and threatened to kill her, if
she insists for marriage. She informed her parents and came to report. On
such allegations, the Police Station, Chimanganj Mandi registered FIR at
crime no. 120/2024 for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506
of IPC. The statement of witnesses were recorded. The statement of
complainant was also recorded under section 164 of Cr.P.C. Prateek Tiwari
was arrested on 15.3.2024. The final report was submitted on completion of
investigation. The case was committed for trial to the Court of Session. The
learned Xth Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain framed charges for offence
punishable under Section 376(2)(n), 506 (Part-II) and 450 of IPC against
accused Prateek Tiwari. The trial is underway. The evidence of complainant
has been recorded in the trial.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the petition contended that it is a case of long consensual
relationship between two educated adults which lasted for almost 6 years.
When their relationship could not continue and turned bitter, allegation of
rape on false promise of marriage are levelled against the applicant.
Learned counsel contends that the cousin sister of the complainant was
married to real brother of petitioner/accused. There was matrimonial
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discord between cousin sister of the complainant and brother of accused. A
domestic violence complaint was lodged by cousin sister of the
complainant. Thereafter, present FIR was lodged to wreck vengeance on
the family. Learned counsel referred to the statement of complainant
recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and her evidence recorded before the
trial Court to contend that the complainant has refused the proposal of
marriage by the applicant for the reason that her sister is married to brother
of accused, therefore, there was no question of false promise of marriage in
the relationship. The FIR and subsequent proceedings deserves to be
quashed.
4. Per contra learned counsel for the State ably assisted by counsel for
the objector/complainant contended that there is specific allegation of
sexual exploitation of the complainant which continued for almost 6 years.
The complainant had submitted a complaint on 5.12.2023 before the
Superintendent of Police, Ujjain but she was promised marriage with
Prateek and asked to withdraw her complaint. When Prateek tried to marry
elsewhere, she had lodged the FIR. The petition is meritless.
5. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
6. In case of State of Haryana v. BhajanLal reported in 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335, the Supreme Court laid down the principles for the exercise of the
jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the
proceedings, as under :
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of
the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under
Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C which we have
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extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) CrPC except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) CrPC.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and
the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence
but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) CrPC.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge."
7. In case of Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in
(2024) 11 SCC 398, the Supreme Court has held as under:-
26. The complainant had taken the plea that the appellant had physical
relationship with her against her consent by making a false promise that he would
marry her. In this regard, it has to be considered whether making a false promise to
marry amounts to an offence. If a false promise of marriage is made to a woman by a
man, thus deceiving the woman leading her to engage in sexual relations, it may
amount to misconception of fact, in which case the consent given by the woman may
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be vitiated. In this regard one may refer to the decision of this Court in Niam Ahmed
v. State (NCT of Delhi)5,
"21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the
prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception
of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he
did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of law and
the case fell under the Clause - Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is
pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and
committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the
accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the
prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false
promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of
breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have
given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have
encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise. So, it would be a
folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute
a person for the offence under Section 376."
27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false
promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical
relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by
other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical
relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal
liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.
28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged
period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said
physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the
appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship
was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with
the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it
cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.
29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to
misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90 of IPC, it must have been
made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade
her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent
was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid
consent. In this regard we may refer to the case of "Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana", in which it was held as follows:
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained
willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side.
There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually
wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:34913
of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine
whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the
accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of
her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account
of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his
control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if
the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide,
and that he had clandestine
motives."
"24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that
at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no
intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There
may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable
circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence
available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to
come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must
have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in
such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal
liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the
very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."
8. Recently, in case of Samadhan S/o Sitatram Manmothe Vs. State of
Maharashtra and another reported in 2025 INSC 1351, the Supreme Court
held as under:
24. Another question which arises for consideration is whether the appellant engaged
in physical relationship with respondent No.2 based on a deception or a false
promise to marry.
25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on respondent No.2's
claim that appellant established physical relations with her on false pretext of
marriage. It is alleged by the appellant that respondent No.2 opposed the idea of
marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the appellant kept
on insisting possibly this was because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is,
however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the idea of marriage,
respondent No.2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations
with him even though she was already married.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:34913
28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent
No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for
a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained
close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred
during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as
instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in
marriage.
29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency
wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The
offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there
exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert
every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of
the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice.
Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the
criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls
for condemnation.
30. In Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking
through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship
between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings.
What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot
be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a
marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under:
"20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they
stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC are
absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section
164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at
the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case
is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged
in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of
marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and
also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a
consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a
consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a
colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital
relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have
moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the
prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of
law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution."
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a
woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:34913
fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such
relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage
made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under
section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as
under:
"33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant
and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an
educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which
could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused
if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being
established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she
even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the
allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the
inception of the relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the
complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting.
Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of
deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre,
Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a
consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the
complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live
together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there
was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been
registered immediately after this incident.
However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that
the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop
his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein
she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore,
his marriage must be stopped.
xxx
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape
if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has
also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused."
9. The material on record is examined in light of aforestated propositions
of law. The record reveals that the complainant is aged around 25 years and
the accused is aged around 27 years. The complainant has been working as
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Nurse in the hospital. Apparently, she was educated and worldly-wise. The
complainant and the accused were in relationship for 6 long years.
They continued the relationship knowing consequence of their act and
conduct. The statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 of
CrPC indicates that she declined the proposal to marry by applicant for the
reason that her cousin sister was married to the brother of accused. In view of
the obtaining facts and circumstances, intention to defraud on false pretext of
the marriage cannot be inferred from the inception.
10. The FIR was lodged on 20.02.2024 reporting the incident between
26.1.2018 to 1.09.2023. The complainant had submitted a complaint to
Superintendent of Police Ujjain on 5.12.2023. But she did not pursue the
complaint stating amicable settlement. The cousin sister of the complainant
had matrimonial discord with brother of applicant. The delay and timing of
present FIR raise question on its bonafide.
11. In view of above discussion, in the considered opinion of this Court,
the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a
gross abuse of the process of law. No purpose would be served by continuing
the prosecution. Thus, inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 can justifiably be invoked to prevent abuse
of the process of law and wasteful exercise by the Court.
12. Consequently, this petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is allowed and the FIR bearing crime No. 120 of
2024 registered at the P.S. Chimanganj Mandi, District Ujjain against the
petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 506, 450 of
IPC in ST No. 71 of 2024 and consequential proceedings pending against the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:34913
petitioner are hereby quashed.
13. The Registry to send a copy of this order to the trial Court and the
concerned Police Station for information and necessary action.
CC as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
BDJ
