Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramsewak vs Ramsewak on 4 August, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:16410
1 FA-1165-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 4 th OF AUGUST, 2025
FIRST APPEAL No. 1165 of 2025
RAMSEWAK AND OTHERS
Versus
RAMSEWAK AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Raju Singh Sikarwar - Advocate for appellants.
Mr. Sanjay Singh Kushwaha - Govt. Advocate for respondent No. 13 /
State.
JUDGMENT
Heard on I.A. No. 5504/2025, an application for condonation of delay
in filing this appeal.
2. Although this Court was inclined to issue notice, but it is submitted
by counsel for appellants that appellants have suffered judgment and decree
dated 29.11.2017, but they came to know about the outcome of suit only
when execution proceedings were initiated. It is further submitted that even
their local counsel had expired, therefore, they could not get the information
about the dismissal of their suit, and thus, it is submitted that there is
sufficient cause for not filing this appeal within the period of limitation.
3. Considered the submissions made by counsel for appellants.
4. This appeal is barred by 2699 days. Since appellants were trying to
put the entire burden onto the shoulders of their local counsel, accordingly,
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counsel for appellants was directed to point out the date of death of local
counsel.
5. It is fairly conceded that neither the date of death of local counsel is
neither mentioned in the application, nor appellants are aware of the date of
death of their local counsel. It is fairly conceded by counsel for appellants
that even appellants did not appear before the Trial Court also.
6. Thus, it is clear that contention of appellants that, on account of
death of their local counsel, they could not get any information about the
outcome of the suit, is nothing but an afterthought. Even the appellants had
not participated in the trial, except by filing written statement and engaging
their counsel. Furthermore, the litigant cannot put the entire burden onto the
shoulders of the counsel, and it is the duty of the litigant also to keep track of
his case.
7. Appellants are the residents of Gormi, District Bhind, whereas suit
was also decided by District Judge, Bhind. Village - Gormi is hardly 35 km
away from the district headquarters of District Bhind. Thus, appellants did
not keep track of their case in spite of the fact that they were residing at a
distance of only 35 km from the place where the trial was pending.
Furthermore, nowadays, when the most advanced modes of conveyance are
available, appellants could have enquired about the status of their case from
their counsel on mobile phone, even that was not done. They could have
checked the status of the suit on the website of the District Court, even that
was not done.
8. Delhi High Court in the case of Jan Chetna Jagriti Avom
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Shaikshanik Vikas Manch and Others Vs. Anand Raj Jhawar Sole Proprietor
of M/S RR Agrotech , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Del 878 , has held as
under:-
"5. As mentioned above, the only explanation advanced by the appellants
with regard to the colossal delay of 565 days in filing the appeal is that
their erstwhile counsel kept them in dark. This explanation needs to be
tested on the anvil of the judicially sanctified parameters under Section 5
of the Limitation Act.
5.1 As regards Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the undisputed
propositions of law as culled out of various judicial precedents are as
follows. Where an applicant is able to satisfy the court that he was
precluded from filing the appeal or application other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI CPC from
circumstances beyond his control, the court has discretion to
condone the delay in filing the appeal etc. Like any other discretion,
the discretion under Section 5 of the Act also must be exercised
judiciously, keeping in mind the principles evolved across time. One
of those principles evolved across time is that the sufficiency of
cause set up by the applicant under Section 5 of the Act must be
construed liberally in favour of the applicant. Unless no explanation
for delay is submitted or the explanation furnished is wholly
unacceptable, the court must liberally condone the delay, if third
party rights had not become embedded during the interregnum. It is
not the length of delay but the sufficiency of cause which has to be
examined by the court, in the sense that if there is sufficient cause,
delay of long period can be condoned but if it is otherwise, delay of
even a few days cannot be condoned. The purpose of construing the
expression "sufficient cause" liberally is to ensure substantial justice
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is attributable
to the applicant.
5.2 No doubt, for the fault of counsel, the litigant should not be made
to suffer. But that cannot be a blanket rule. Each case has to be
examined on its peculiar factual matrix. The protection of the said
rule, which can in appropriate cases be extended to an illiterate lay
person, cannot be extended to an educated litigant or a corporate
entity or the government bodies. Merely by engaging a counsel, the
litigant cannot claim to be not under a duty to keep track of the case.
Most importantly, where the applicant attributing such delay to the
professional misconduct of the counsel opts not to take any action
against the counsel, his explanation cannot be believed. Condoning
delay in such circumstances, believing the bald allegations of the
applicant would be tantamount to condemning the erstwhile counsel
without hearing him and that too on judicial record.
5.3 In the case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed thus:
"7. In construing Section 5(of the Limitation Act), it is
relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The
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first consideration that the expiration of the period of
limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right
in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding
between the parties. In other words, when the period of
limitation prescribed has expired, the decree holder has
obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the
decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree holder by the lapse of time should not be
light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay
is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred upon the court in order that judicial power and
discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice."
(emphasis supplied)
5.4 In the case of Finolux Auto Pvt. Ltd. v. Finolex Cables Ltd.,
(2007) 136 DLT 585 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court held thus:
"6. In this regard, we may refer to a decision of the Supreme
Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 4 CLT
95 (SC). In the said decision, the Supreme Court has held that
unless and until a reasonable or satisfactory explanation is
given, the inordinate delay should not be condoned. In para 6
of the judgment, the Supreme Court has laid down in the
following manner:
"Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The
discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither
proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay
cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and
the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the
application for condonation of delay filed in the High
Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First
Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No
costs."
(emphasis supplied)
5.5 In the case of Pundlilk Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs v. Executive
Engineer Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India held that basically the laws of limitation are
founded on public policy and the courts have expressed atleast three
different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely (i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than
justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
dispute the stated claim, and (iii) that persons with good causes of
action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. It was
observed that the statutes of limitation are often called as statutes of
peace insofar as an unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation
creates insecurity and uncertainty which are essential for public
order.
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5.6 In the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
(2011) 4 SCC 363, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed
thus:
"19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally
speaking, the courts in this country including this court adopt a
liberal approach in considering the application for condonation
of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act".
The concepts of "liberal approach" and "reasonableness" in the
exercise of discretion by the courts in condoning delay were
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case
of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, holding
thus:
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has
to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the
concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party
concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction is
normally to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is
understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite
consequences on the rights and obligations of party to arise.
These principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending upon the facts and circumstances of a
given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one
party as a result of failure of the other party to explain the
delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will
be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of
the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of
negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be
done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can
be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in
implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair
to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued
to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.
27. ....
28. .... The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice
oriented approach" and "substantial justice" cannot be
employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
Especially in cases where the court concludes that there is no
justification of the delay...."
(emphasis supplied)
5.7 In the expressions of this Court in the case of Shubhra Chit Fund
Pvt. Ltd. v. Sudhir Kumar, (2004) 112 DLT 609, too much latitude
and leniency will make provisions of the Limitation Act otiose,
which approach must be eschewed by courts.
5.8 In the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs v. The
Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 the
Hon'ble Supreme Court recapitulated the scope of Section 5
Limitation Act and held thus:
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the
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law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is
evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right
to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease
to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained,
but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and
may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered
in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision".
5.9 So far as the issue regarding professional misconduct of the
counsel is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Salil
Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 held thus:
"8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
statements, made within the limits of authority given to him,
are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who
engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may,
in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex
parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or
misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client
was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that
a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No
such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute
rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult.
The observations made in Rafiq [(1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR
1981 SC 1400] must be understood in the facts and
circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an
absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this
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was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of
seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed
by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is
located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but
a private limited company with its head-office at Calcutta
itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where
their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications
were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing
they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. Maybe,
it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff.
May be not. But one thing is clear -- they chose to non-
cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards
the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence.
Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make
it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or
significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be
accepted and ought not to have been accepted".
(emphasis supplied)
5.10 In the case of Moddus Media Private Ltd. v. Scone Exhibition
Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8491, this Court observed thus:
"13. The litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his rights and is
also expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial
proceedings pending in the court of law against him or
initiated at his instance. The litigant cannot be permitted to
cast the entire blame on the Advocate. It appears that the
blame is being attributed on the Advocate with a view to get
the delay condoned and avoid the decree. After filing the civil
suit or written statement, the litigant cannot go off to sleep and
wake up from a deep slumber after passing a long time as if the
court is storage of the suits filed by such negligent litigants.
Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make
it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or
significance of the proceedings is a theory put forth by the
appellant/applicant/defendant company, which cannot be
accepted and ought not to have been accepted. The appellant is
not a simple or rustic illiterate person but a Private Limited
Company managed by educated businessmen, who know very
well where their interest lies. The litigant is to be vigilant and
pursue his case diligently on all the hearings. If the litigant
does not appear in the court and leaves the case at the mercy of
his counsel without caring as to what different frivolous
pleas/defences being taken by his counsel for adjournments is
bound to suffer. If the litigant does not turn up to obtain the
copies of judgment and orders of the court so as to find out
what orders are passed by the court is liable to bear the
consequences".
(emphasis supplied)
5.11 Most recently on 21.11.2024, in the case of Rajneesh Kumar v.
Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court dealt with the situation where the applicant coming under
Section 5 of the Act attributed the delay in filing the appeal to his
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erstwhile counsel, and observed thus:
"10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the
head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in
the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a
tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of
negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings
before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the
concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself,
cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the
litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is
expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings
pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant,
therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on
the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time
and seek relief".
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that it is the duty of the litigant to keep track of his
case, and he cannot put the entire burden onto the shoulder of his counsel.
9. In the present case, even the date of death of local counsel is not
known to appellants. Thus, this Court is of considered opinion that no
sufficient cause could be pointed out by counsel for appellants to issue
notices of I.A. No. 5504/2025.
10. Accordingly, I .A. No. 5504/2025 is hereby rejected , and appeal is
dismissed as barred by time .
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
AKS
