Madhya Pradesh High Court
Siddharath Upadhayay vs State Of M.P. Through Station House ... on 25 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:9559
1 M.Cr.C. No. 14509 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 25th OF APRIL, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 14509 of 2025
SIDDHARATH UPADHAYAY AND OTHERS
Versus
STATE OF M.P. THROUGH STATION HOUSE OFFICER AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Shivendra Singh Raghuvanshi, Advocate for petitioners.
Shri Mohit Shivhare, Public Prosecutor for respondent/State.
ORDER
This application, under section 528 of BNSS, has been filed for
quashment of FIR in Crime No. 61 of 2024 registered at Mahila Thana,
Ashoknagar for offences punishable under Sections 85 of BNS and 3 & 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, as well as, the charge sheet.
2. Applicant No. 1 is husband, applicant No. 2 is father-in-law, and
applicant No. 3 is mother-in-law of respondent No. 3.
3. Respondent No. 3 lodged an FIR on 19/10/2024 alleging that she got
married to Siddharth Upadhyay on 15/2/2023 in accordance with Hindu rites
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and rituals. Her father had given sufficient dowry as per his financial capacity.
For about one month, she was kept properly and thereafter applicants started
demanding ₹5,00,000 and a vehicle from her father. When she informed that
her father is not in a position to fulfill their demand, she was ousted by them
from her matrimonial house on 12/6/2023 and since then she is residing along
with her parents. Her parents also tried to convince her husband on multiple
occasions but he did not agree. On certain occasions, he also came to her
parental home and extended a threat but is not ready to take her back.
3. Challenging the FIR lodged by respondent No. 3, it is submitted by
counsel for applicant that second FIR for the same offence is not maintainable.
In fact, respondent No. 3 had made a written complaint to SHO Police Station
Mungavali, District Ashoknagar on 11/08/2024. It is submitted that on
23/02/2023 respondent No.3 went to her parental home. Thereafter she came
back to her matrimonial home for the last time in the month of April 2023 and
thereafter went to her parental home on 12/6/2023 and never came back. A
meeting was also convened on 7/6/2024 in which it was decided to live
separately and a compromise was reduced in writing which was duly signed.
On account of some pre-marriage reasons, behavior of respondent No. 3
towards her in-laws was not good. Accordingly, applicant No. 1 filed an
application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of
conjugal rights. In fact, respondent No. 3 does not want to live with applicant
No. 1 and therefore has falsely developed a story of demand of dowry and
cruelty. The complaint which was filed by respondent No. 3 on 11/08/2024 was
found to be incorrect and when respondent No. 3 realized that SHO Police
Station Mungawali, District Ashoknagar is not ready to lodge FIR on her
complaint, then she approached Mahila Thana, Ashoknagar by suppressing the
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earlier application and lodged the FIR in question. It is submitted that once a
complaint was filed by respondent No. 3 which was found to be incorrect, then
the FIR lodged at Police Station Mahila Thana District Ashoknagar is second in
number for similar offence, which is not maintainable. It is further submitted
that the allegations made in the complaint do not make out an offence under
Section 498A of IPC. Even police should have conducted preliminary enquiry
which was not done. Applicant has already cleared PSC examination and has
reached to the stage of interview and registration of offence is causing mental
disorder to him and thus it is submitted that FIR in question be quashed.
4. Per contra, the application is vehemently opposed by counsel for the
State.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. The first question for consideration is as to whether the written complaint
which was made by respondent No. 3 to Police Station Mungawali, District
Ashoknagar can be considered to be the first FIR and the impugned FIR which
was lodged at Police Station Mahila Thana, Ashoknagar would be second in
number or not ?
7. Whenever a preliminary enquiry is conducted and enquiry officer comes
to a conclusion that evidence is insufficient, then it is obligatory on the part of
concerned police Authority to supply a copy of the report to the complainant, as
well as, to file copy of the same before the Magistrate under Section 169
Cr.P.C./189 of BNSS. Nothing of that sort appears to have been done. Counsel
for applicant was also not in a position to point out the outcome of said
complaint. Accordingly, by order dated 23/04/2025, time was granted to the
applicant to file the documents to show the final outcome of enquiry report of
ASI/Enquiry Officer. When the case was taken up, it was fairly conceded by
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counsel for applicant that the complaint made by respondent No. 3 on earlier
occasion to Police Station Mungavali, District Ashoknagar cannot be said to be
the first FIR and accordingly submitted that he would not like to press this
ground that the FIR in question is second in number. Accordingly, aforesaid
ground is hereby dismissed as not pressed.
8. It is next contended by counsel for applicant that applicant No. 1 has
filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of
conjugal rights and therefore it is clear that the FIR in question has been lodged
by way of counterblast.
9. Considered the submission made by counsel for applicant.
10. The findings recorded by the Civil Court are not binding on the Criminal
Court and vice versa. The Supreme Court in the case of Kishan Singh (Dead)
Through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh and Others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775
has held as under:
"16. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah this Court
held as under : (SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should
be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil
and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two proceedings is
entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis
of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case
the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof
beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is
neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle
that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be
treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases
have to be decided on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein."
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17. In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi
Admn.) this Court considered all the earlier judgments on the
issue and held that while deciding the case in Karam Chand,
this Court failed to take note of the Constitution Bench
judgment in M.S. Sheriff and, therefore, it remains per incuriam
and does not lay down the correct law. A similar view has been
reiterated by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra,
wherein it has been held by this Court that the decision in
Karam Chand stood overruled in K.G. Premshanker.
18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by
the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal
case is concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different
in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of
probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal
principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or
criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties
while dealing with the same subject-matter and both the cases
have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced
therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of
Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the
relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be
taken into consideration."
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine
Imam And Another Vs. State (Delhi Administration) and Another reported
in (2009) 5 SCC 528 has held as under :
"24. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding,
indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own merit,
keeping in view the evidence brought before it and not in terms
of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding. The
question came up for consideration in K.G. Premshanker v.
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Inspector of Police wherein this Court inter alia held: (SCC p.
97, paras 30-31)
"30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is--
(1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied
upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the
Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same
parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3) in a
criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that
once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be
tried again for the same offence if the conditions
mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the criminal case
and the civil proceedings are for the same cause,
judgment of the civil court would be relevant if
conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but
it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive
except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides
which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is
stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a
previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided
under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the
Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to decide
to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to
the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a
case of alleged trespass by A on B's property, B filed a
suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession
from A and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal
prosecution by B against A for trespass, judgment
passed between the parties in civil proceedings would
be relevant and the court may hold that it conclusively
establishes the title as well as possession of B over the
property. In such case, A may be convicted for trespass.
The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above
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makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every
case, the first question which would require
consideration is--whether judgment, order or decree is
relevant, if relevant--its effect. It may be relevant for a
limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue.
This would depend upon the facts of each case."
25. It is, however, significant to notice that the decision of this
Court in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India,
wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil
courts will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is
not true, was overruled, stating: (K.G. Premshanker case, SCC
p. 98, para 33)
"33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M.
Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal
court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the
civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Further,
the general observations made in Karam Chand case
are in context of the facts of the case stated above. The
Court was not required to consider the earlier decision
of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case as well
as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act."
Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a
criminal court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly not
be binding on a civil court.
26. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the
Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or
decrees, other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42
are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or
decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other
provisions of the Act. No other provision of the Evidence Act
or for that matter any other statute has been brought to our
notice.
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27. Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion
to consider a similar question in Iqbal Singh Marwah v.
Meenakshi Marwah wherein it was held: (SCC p. 387, para 24)
"24. There is another consideration which has to be
kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC
contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry.
Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not
made during the pendency of the proceeding before the
court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding
is concluded and the final judgment is rendered.
Section 341 provides for an appeal against an order
directing filing of the complaint. The hearing and
ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time.
Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a court trying
the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is
brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against
the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of
which the matter has arisen. In view of these
provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all
for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits
where decisions are challenged in successive appellate
fora which are time-consuming. It is also to be noticed
that there is no provision of appeal against an order
passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the
case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These
provisions show that, in reality, the procedure
prescribed for filing a complaint by the court is such
that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender
for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a
guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses
become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence
gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us
from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be
placed upon clause (b)(ii)."
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28. Relying inter alia on M.S. Sheriff, it was furthermore held:
(Iqbal Singh Marwah case, SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should
be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil
and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two proceedings are
entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis
of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case
the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof
beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is
neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle
that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be
treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases
have to be decided on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein."
29. The question yet again came up for consideration in P.
Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, wherein it was
categorically held: (SCC p. 769, para 11)
"11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case,
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case."
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Prem Raj Vs. Poonamma Menon
and Another decided on 02.04.2024 in S.L.P.(Cr.) No.9778/2018 has held as
under:
"9. In advancing his submissions, Mr. K. Parameshwar,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, placed reliance on
certain authorities of this Court. In M/s. Karam Chand Ganga
Prasad and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors.(1970)3 SCC 694,
this Court observed that:
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".......It is a well-established principle of law that the
decisions of the civil courts are binding on the
criminal courts. The converse is not true."
In K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr,
(2002)8 SCC 87, a Bench of three learned Judges observed that,
following the M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC
397, no straight-jacket formula could be laid down and
conflicting decisions of civil and criminal Courts would not be
a relevant consideration except for the limited purpose of
sentence or damages.
10. We notice that this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs.
Daya Sapra (Smt.) (2009)13 SCC 729, had observed as under:
"26. It is, however, significant to notice a
decision of this Court in Karam Chand Ganga
Prasad v. Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 694,
wherein it was categorically held that the
decisions of the civil court will be binding on
the criminal courts but the converse is not true,
was overruled therein..."
This Court in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja (2021)1
SCC 414, considered a numerous precedents, including
Premshanker (supra) and Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra), to opine
that there is no embargo for a civil court to consider the
evidence led in the criminal proceedings.
The issue has been laid to rest by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs.
Meenakshi Marwah, (2005)4 SCC 370 :
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort
should be made to avoid conflict of findings
between the civil and criminal courts, it is
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necessary to point out that the standard of proof
required in the two proceedings are entirely
different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence, while in a criminal
case, the entire burden lies on the prosecution,
and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be
given. There is neither any statutory provision
nor any legal principle that the findings
recorded in one proceeding may be treated as
final or binding in the other, as both the cases
have to be decided on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein. While examining a similar
contention in an appeal against an order
directing filing of a complaint under Section
476 of the old Code, the following observations
made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff
v. State of Madras [1954 SCR 1144: AIR 1954
SC 397: 1954 Cri LJ 1019] give a complete
answer to the problem posed: (AIR p. 399,
paras 15-16)
"15. As between the civil and the criminal
proceedings, we are of the opinion that the
criminal matters should be given
precedence. There is some difference of
opinion in the High Courts of India on this
point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down but we do not consider that the
possibility of conflicting decisions in the
civil and criminal courts is a relevant
consideration. The law envisages such an
eventuality when it expressly refrains from
making the decision of one court binding
on the other, or even relevant, except for
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certain limited purposes, such as sentence
or damages. The only relevant
consideration here is the likelihood of
embarrassment.
16. Another factor which weighs with us is
that a civil suit often drags on for years
and it is undesirable that a criminal
prosecution should wait till everybody
concerned has forgotten all about the
crime. The public interests demand that
criminal justice should be swift and sure;
that the guilty should be punished while
the events are still fresh in the public mind
and that the innocent should be absolved
as early as is consistent with a fair and
impartial trial. Another reason is that it is
undesirable to let things slide till
memories have grown too dim to trust.
This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special
considerations obtaining in any particular case might
make some other course more expedient and just. For
example, the civil case or the other criminal
proceeding may be so near its end as to make it
inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a
prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this
case we are of the view that the civil suits should be
stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."
(Emphasis Supplied)"
13. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Vs.
Rameshwari Devi and Others (Supra) has held as under:
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"16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was
filed only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial
home had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a
divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a
divorce petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to
quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the
Code as it is well settled that criminal and civil
proceedings are separate and independent and the
pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an end
a criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the
same set of facts. Such being the position, we are,
therefore, of the view that the High Court while
exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code
has gone beyond the allegations made in the FIR and
has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore,
the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR
by going beyond the allegations made in the FIR or by
relying on extraneous considerations."
(Underline supplied)
14. The Supreme Court, in the case of Sh. Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Smt.
Daya Sapra, decided on 05-05-2009 in Civil Appeal Number 3238 of 2009,
has held as under :
"30. Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to
consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi
Marwah & Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 370]. Relying on M.S. Sheriff
(supra) as also various other decisions, it was categorically held:
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should
be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil
and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two proceedings are
entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
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preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond
reasonable doubt has to be given."
31. The question yet again came up for consideration in P.
Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR 2008 SC
1884], wherein it was categorically held:
"13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case."
15. Thus, it is clear that the findings recorded by the Civil Court are not
binding on the Criminal Court and vice versa. Therefore, findings on the
application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act will not decide the fate
of FIR lodged under Section 498A of IPC. On the contrary, it appears that the
wife after realizing that they have reached to a point of no return, decides to
lodge the FIR then the same cannot be quashed merely on the ground that it
was lodged after institution of petition for divorce or restitution of conjugal
rights. Even otherwise, the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act is still pending and therefore allegations made in the said application
cannot be treated as proved. Thus, this Court is of considered opinion that the
FIR lodged by respondent No. 3 cannot be quashed on the ground that it was
lodged by way of counterblast to the proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act. If the allegations made in the FIR are considered then it is clear
that respondent No. 3 was ousted by the applicants from her matrimonial house
within 4 months from the date of marriage. Ousting a married woman from her
matrimonial house on the ground of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry would
certainly amount to mental cruelty.
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16. The Supreme Court in the case of Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., reported
in (2019) 5 SCC 384 has held as under:-
"14. "Cruelty" which is the crux of the offence under
Section 498-A IPC is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary to mean "the intentional and malicious
infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living
creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage
(abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)". Cruelty can be
both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the
mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of the
husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma
of being driven away from the matrimonial home and
her helplessness to go back to the same home for fear
of being ill-treated are aspects that cannot be ignored
while understanding the meaning of the expression
"cruelty" appearing in Section 498-A of the Penal
Code. The emotional distress or psychological effect on
the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue
to traumatise the wife even after she leaves the
matrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental
home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in
the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts
do not occur at the parental home, there can be no
doubt that the mental trauma and the psychological
distress caused by the acts of the husband including
verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to
leave the matrimonial home and take shelter with her
parents would continue to persist at the parental home.
Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive
and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the
parental home even though there may not be any overt
act of physical cruelty at such place."
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17. This Court in the case of Amar Singh vs. Smt. Vimla decided on
22.06.2021 in Criminal Revision No.2376/2020 (Gwalior Bench) has held
that compelling a married woman to live in her parental home amounts to
cruelty.
18. So far as the compromise application is concerned, once the parties
decide to amicably settle the dispute then it is not expected that all the details of
atrocities should be mentioned therein.
19. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case,
coupled with the fact that respondent No. 3 has been ousted from her
matrimonial house by the applicants on account of non-fulfillment of demand
of dowry, this Court is of considered opinion that it is not a fit case for
quashment of FIR or charge sheet filed against the applicants.
20. Accordingly, the application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
(and)
