Madhya Pradesh High Court
Kuldeep Rawat vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 21 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 WP. No. 12707 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 21st OF APRIL, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 12707 of 2025
KULDEEP RAWAT
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Vikas Samadhiya - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri S S Kushwaha - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):
(i) That, the impugned order dated 13/08/2024 (Annexure P-1)
passed by the respondent may kindly be set-aside with a further
direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner
for compensatory appointment as per the Policy prevailing at the
time of consideration of his application for compassionate
appointment and accordingly the respondent authority may kindly
be directed to grant the compensatory appointment to the
petitioner.
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(ii) That any other relief which is suitable in the facts and
circumstances of the case in favour of the petitioner including the
costs throughout may also be granted.
2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that father of petitioner had died
in harness on 16.10.2015. At the relevant time, there was no policy for
appointment on compassionate ground. The dependents of the deceased
employee were only entitled to an ex gratia compensation of Rs.One Lac which
was thereafter enhanced to Rs.Two Lacs and vide policy of the year 2016 even
dependents of work-charged contingency paid employees were also made
eligible for appointment on compassionate ground. It is submitted that
application has to be considered on the basis of the policy which was in vogue
on the date of consideration. Application of petitioner for appointment on
compassionate ground has been rejected on 13.08.2024, therefore, the rejection
of his application on the ground that he is not entitled to appointment on
compassionate ground is bad in law.
3. Heard learned counsel for petitioner.
4. The undisputed fact is that father of petitioner had expired on
16.10.2015. Although it is the claim of petitioner that he applied for
appointment on compassionate ground on 07.01.2016 but it appears that the
case of petitioner was recommended by the Executive Engineer, Water
Resources, Division Dabra, District Gwalior by letter dated 30.07.2024 which
was dismissed by Superintending Engineer, Water Resources, Division Gwalior
by order dated 13.08.2024. So far as the submission made by counsel for
petitioner that the policy which was in vogue on the date of consideration of
application would apply is concerned, the said submission is contrary to law.
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5. The Supreme Court in the case of Secretary to Govt. Deptt. Of
Education (Primary) Vs. Bheemesh reported in 2021 SCC Online 1264 has
held as under :
12. But we do not consider it necessary to do so. It is no doubt true
that there are, as contended by the learned senior Counsel for the
respondent, two lines of decisions rendered by Benches of equal
strength. But the apparent conflict between those two lines of
decisions, was on account of the difference between an amendment
by which an existing benefit was withdrawn or diluted and an
amendment by which the existing benefit was enhanced. The
interpretation adopted by this Court varied depending upon the
nature of the amendment. This can be seen by presenting the
decisions referred to by the learned senior counsel for the
respondent in a tabular column as follows:
Citation Scheme in force Modified Scheme Decision of this
on the date of which came into Court
death of the force after death
Government
servant
State Bank of The Scheme of the The 1996 Scheme Rejecting the
India v. Jaspal year 1996, which was subsequently claim of the wife
Kaur (2007) 9 made the financial modified by policy of the deceased
SCC 571 [a two condition of the issued in 2005, employee, this
member Bench] family as the main which laid down Court held that the
criterion, was in few parameters for application of the
force, on the date determining dependant made in
of death of the penury. One of the the year 2000,
employee in the parameters was to after the death of
year 1999. see if the income the employee in
of the family had the year 1999,
been reduced to cannot be decided
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less than 60% of on the basis of a
the salary drawn Scheme which
by the employee at came into force in
the time of death. the year 2005.
Therefore, the
wife of the
deceased
employee claimed
the consideration
of the application
on the basis of
parameters laid
down in the policy
of the year 2005.
State Bank of The employee But with effect This Court held
India v. Raj died on 1.10.2004 from 04.08.2005 a that the
Kumar (2010) 11 and the new Scheme for application could
SCC 661 [a two applications for payment of be considered only
member Bench] compassionate exgratia lump-sum under the new
appointment were was introduced in Scheme, as it
made on the place of the contained a
6.06.2005 and old Scheme. The specific provision
14.06.2005. On new Scheme relating to pending
the date of death contained a applications.
and on the date of provision to the
the applications, a effect that all
Scheme known as applications
compassionate pending under the
appointment old Scheme will
Scheme was in be dealt with only
force. in accordance with
the new Scheme.
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MGB Gramin The employee However, a new This Court took
Bank v. Chakrawa died on Scheme dated the view that the
rti Singh (2014) 19.04.2006 and 12.06.2006 came new Scheme alone
13 SCC 583 [a the application for into force on would apply as it
two member appointment made 6.10.2006, contained a
Bench] on 12.05.2006. A providing only for specific provision
scheme for ex gratia payment which mandated
appointment on instead of all pending
compassionate compassionate applications to be
grounds was in appointment. considered under
force on that date. the new Scheme.
Canara The employee The 1993 Scheme This Court
Bank v. M. died on was substituted by dismissed the
Mahesh 10.10.1998 and a Scheme for appeals filed by
Kumar (2015) 7 the application for payment of ex the Bank on
SCC 412 [a two appointment on gratia in the year account of two
member Bench] compassionate 2005. But by the important
grounds, was time the 2005 distinguishing
made under the Scheme was features,
Scheme of the issued, the namely, (i) that the
year 1993. It was claimant had application for
rejected on already appointment on
30.06.1999. The approached the compassionate
1993 Scheme was High Court of grounds was
known as "Dying Kerala by way of rejected in the
in Harness writ petition and year 1999 and the
Scheme." succeeded before rejection order
the learned Single was set aside by
Judge vide a the High Court in
Judgment dated the year 2003
30.05.2003. The much before the
Judgment was compassionate
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upheld by the appointment
Division Bench in Scheme was
the year 2006 and substituted by an
the matter landed ex gratia Scheme
up before this in year 2005;
Court thereafter. and (ii) that in the
In other words, the year 2014, the
Scheme of the original scheme
year 2005 came for appointment
into on compassionate
force : (i) after the grounds stood
rejection of the revived, when the
application for civil appeals were
compassionate decided.
appointment under
the old scheme;
and (ii) after the
order of rejection
was set aside by
the Single Judge
of the High Court
Indian The employee A new Scheme In the light of the
Bank v. Promila ( died on was brought into decision
2020) 2 SCC 15.01.2004 and force on in Canara
729 [a two the application for 24.07.2004 after Bank v. M.
member Bench] appointment was the death of the Mahesh Kumar,
made by his minor employee. Under this Court held
son on this Scheme an ex that the case of the
24.01.2004. On gratia claimant cannot be
these dates, a compensation was examined in the
circular bearing provided for, context of the
No. 56/79 dated subject to certain subsequent
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4.04.1979 which conditions. After Scheme and that
contained a the coming into since the family
Scheme for force of the new had taken full
appointment on Scheme, the gratuity under the
compassionate claimant was old scheme, they
grounds was in directed by the were not entitled
force. But the bank to submit a to seek
Scheme provided fresh application compassionate
for appointment, under the new appointment even
only for those who Scheme. The under the old
do not opt for claimant did not Scheme.
payment of apply under the
gratuity for the new Scheme, as he
full term of was interested
service of only in
employee who compassionate
died in harness. appointment and
not monetary
benefit.
N.C. Under the existing But by virtue of an After taking note
Santosh v. State of Scheme referable amendment to the of a reference
Karnataka (2020) to Rule 5 of the proviso to Rule 5, made in State
7 SCC 617 (a Karnataka Civil a minor dependant Bank of
three Member Services should apply India v. Sheo
Bench) (Appointment on within one year Shankar Tewari to
Compassionate from the date of a larger bench, a
Grounds) Rules, death of the three member
1999, a minor Government Bench of this
dependant of a servant and must Court held in N.C.
deceased have attained the Santosh that the
Government age of 18 years on norms prevailing
employee may the date of making on the date of
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apply within one the application. consideration of
year from the date Applying the the application
of attaining amended should be the basis
majority. provisions, the for consideration
appointment of of the claim for
persons already compassionate
made on appointment. The
compassionate Bench further held
grounds, were that the dependant
cancelled by the of a government
appointing employee, in the
authority which absence of any
led to the vested right
challenge before accruing on the
this Court. date of death of
the government
employee, can
only demand
consideration of
his application and
hence he is
disentitled to seek
the application of
the norms
prevailing on the
date of death of
the government
servant.
13. Apart from the aforesaid decisions, our attention was also drawn
to the decision of the three member Bench in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas. But that case arose out of a claim made by
the dependant of a deceased Government servant, who was originally
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appointed on a work charged establishment and who later claimed to
have become a permanent employee. The Court went into the
distinction between an employee with a permanent status and an
employee with a regular status. Despite the claim of the dependant
that his father had become a permanent employee, this Court held in
that case that as per the policy prevailing on the date of death, a work
charged/contingency fund employee was not entitled to
compassionate appointment. While holding so, the Bench reiterated
the opinion in Indian Bank v. Promila.
14. The aforesaid decision in Amit Shrivas (supra) was followed by
a two member Bench of this Court in the yet to be reported decision
in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi decided on
18.11.2021.
15. Let us now come to the reference pending before the larger
Bench. In State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari (supra), a
two member Bench of this Court noted the apparent conflict between
State Bank of India v. Raj Kumar and MGB Gramin Bank on the
one hand and Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar on the other
hand and referred the matter for the consideration of a larger Bench.
The order of reference to a larger Bench was actually dated
8.02.2019.
16. It was only after the aforesaid reference to a larger Bench that
this Court decided at least four cases, respectively in (i) Indian
Bank v. Promila; (ii) N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka; (iii)
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas; and (iv) State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi. Out of these four decisions,
N.C. Santosh (supra) was by a three member Bench, which actually
took note of the reference pending before the larger Bench.
17. Keeping the above in mind, if we critically analyse the way in
which this Court has proceeded to interpret the applicability of a new
or modified Scheme that comes into force after the death of the
employee, we may notice an interesting feature. In cases where the
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benefit under the existing Scheme was taken away or substituted with
a lesser benefit, this Court directed the application of the new
Scheme. But in cases where the benefits under an existing Scheme
were enlarged by a modified Scheme after the death of the employee,
this Court applied only the Scheme that was in force on the date of
death of the employee. This is fundamentally due to the fact that
compassionate appointment was always considered to be an
exception to the normal method of recruitment and perhaps looked
down upon with lesser compassion for the individual and greater
concern for the rule of law.
18. If compassionate appointment is one of the conditions of service
and is made automatic upon the death of an employee in harness
without any kind of scrutiny whatsoever, the same would be treated
as a vested right in law. But it is not so. Appointment on
compassionate grounds is not automatic, but subject to strict scrutiny
of various parameters including the financial position of the family,
the economic dependence of the family upon the deceased employee
and the avocation of the other members of the family. Therefore, no
one can claim to have a vested right for appointment on
compassionate grounds. This is why some of the decisions which we
have tabulated above appear to have interpreted the applicability of
revised Schemes differently, leading to conflict of opinion. Though
there is a conflict as to whether the Scheme in force on the date of
death of the employee would apply or the Scheme in force on the
date of consideration of the application of appointment on
compassionate grounds would apply, there is certainly no conflict
about the underlying concern reflected in the above decisions.
Wherever the modified Schemes diluted the existing benefits, this
Court applied those benefits, but wherever the modified Scheme
granted larger benefits, the old Scheme was made applicable.
19. The important aspect about the conflict of opinion is that it
revolves around two dates, namely, (i) date of death of the
employee; and (ii) date of consideration of the application of the
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dependant. Out of these two dates, only one, namely, the date of
death alone is a fixed factor that does not change. The next date
namely the date of consideration of the claim, is something that
depends upon many variables such as the date of filing of
application, the date of attaining of majority of the claimant and the
date on which the file is put up to the competent authority. There is
no principle of statutory interpretation which permits a decision on
the applicability of a rule, to be based upon an indeterminate or
variable factor. Let us take for instance a hypothetical case where 2
Government servants die in harness on January 01, 2020. Let us
assume that the dependants of these 2 deceased Government servants
make applications for appointment on 2 different dates say
29.05.2020 and 02.06.2020 and a modified Scheme comes into force
on June 01, 2020. If the date of consideration of the claim is taken to
be the criteria for determining whether the modified Scheme applies
or not, it will lead to two different results, one in respect of the
person who made the application before June 1, 2020 and another in
respect of the person who applied after June 01, 2020. In other
words, if two employees die on the same date and the dependants of
those employees apply on two different dates, one before the
modified Scheme comes into force and another thereafter, they will
come in for differential treatment if the date of application and the
date of consideration of the same are taken to be the deciding factor.
A rule of interpretation which produces different results,
depending upon what the individuals do or do not do, is
inconceivable. This is why, the managements of a few banks, in the
cases tabulated above, have introduced a rule in the modified scheme
itself, which provides for all pending applications to be decided
under the new/modified scheme. Therefore, we are of the considered
view that the interpretation as to the applicability of a modified
Scheme should depend only upon a determinate and fixed criteria
such as the date of death and not an indeterminate and variable
factor.
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6. Thus, it is clear that the policy which was in force on the date of death of
employee would be applicable.
7. Before considering as to whether the subsequent policy was made
applicable to those employees who have expired prior to 2016 or not, this Court
would like to consider the delay in disposal of application for appointment on
compassionate ground. It is well established principle of law that delay in
disposal of application for appointment on compassionate ground by itself
would frustrate the very purpose of appointment on compassionate ground. The
appointment on compassionate ground is not a substitute of direct recruitment
but it is a solace to the dependents of the bread winner who were compelled to
face the financial hardship on account of death of their bread winner. If a
family has successfully survived for considerably a long time after the death of
their bread winner, then that circumstance by itself would also frustrate the very
purpose of appointment on compassionate ground.
8. The Supreme Court in the case of The State of West Bengal Vs.
Debabrata Tiwari & Ors. by judgment dated 03.03.2023 passed in Civil
Appeal Nos.8842-8855/2022 has held as under :-
"7.1. . . . . . .
v. There is a consistent line of authority of this Court on the
principle that appointment on compassionate grounds is given only
for meeting the immediate unexpected hardship which is faced by the
family by reason of the death of the bread earner vide Jagdish
Prasad vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 301. When an appointment
is made on compassionate grounds, it should be kept confined only to
the purpose it seeks to achieve, the idea being not to provide for
endless compassion, vide I.G. (Karmik) vs. Prahalad Mani
Tripathi, (2007) 6 SCC 162. In the same vein is the decision of this
Court in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008)
11 SCC 384, wherein it was declared that appointment on
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compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment, but a means to
enable the family of the deceased to get over a sudden financial
crisis.
vi. In State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir, AIR
2006 SC 2743, the facts before this Court were that the government
employee (father of the applicant therein) died in March, 1987. The
application was made by the applicant after four and half years in
September, 1991 which was rejected in March, 1996. The writ
petition was filed in June, 1999 which was dismissed by the learned
Single Judge in July, 2000. When the Division Bench decided the
matter, more than fifteen years had passed from the date of death of
the father of the applicant. This Court remarked that the said facts
were relevant and material as they would demonstrate that the family
survived in spite of death of the employee. Therefore, this Court held
that granting compassionate appointment after a lapse of a
considerable amount of time after the death of the government
employee, would not be in furtherance of the object of a scheme for
compassionate appointment.
vii. In Shashi Kumar, this Court speaking through Dr. D.Y.
Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that
compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule that
appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be
made on the basis of principles which accord with Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution. That the basis of the policy is that it recognizes
that a family of a deceased employee may be placed in a position of
financial hardship upon the untimely death of the employee while in
service. That it is the immediacy of the need which furnishes the
basis for the State to allow the benefit of compassionate
appointment......
8. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person
in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining
discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was
explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum
Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 PC 221 as under:
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"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation, in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking
the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief
to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of
relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under
Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M. R.
Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In
the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for
grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary
power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court
restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the
following words:
"9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent
and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the
High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise
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of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised
on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is
likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring,
in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised
after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not
only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-
party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction."
While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a
reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6
SCC 538; NDMC vs. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.
9. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners
submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year
2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter
and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite
to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal vs. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following
observations were made:
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance
it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead
cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere
submission of representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time."
(emphasis by us)
10. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, we hold
that the Respondents-Writ Petitioners, upon submitting their
applications in the year 2006-2005 did nothing further to pursue the
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matter, till the year 2015 i.e., for a period of ten years.
Notwithstanding the tardy approach of the authorities of the
Appellant-State in dealing with their applications, the Respondent-
Writ Petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a writ
in the nature of a mandamus against the authorities of the State. In
fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching the High Court, may
even be regarded as a waiver of a remedy, as discernible by the
conduct of the Respondents Writ Petitioners. Such a delay would
disentitle the Respondents-Writ Petitioners to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the order of the High
Court dated 17th March, 2015, whereby the writ petition filed by
some of the Respondents herein was disposed of with a direction to
the Director of Local Bodies, Government of West Bengal to take a
decision as to the appointment of the Respondents-Writ Petitioners,
cannot be considered to have the effect of revival of the cause of
action.
***
13. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate
appointment has been lost in the present case. This is attributable to
the authorities of the Appellant-State as well as the Respondents-
Writ Petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim which was made in 2005-
2006, in the year 2023, would be of no avail, because admittedly, the
Respondents-Writ Petitioners have been able to eke out a living even
though they did not successfully get appointed to the services of the
Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we think that this is
therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of the Respondents-
Writ Petitioners for appointments on compassionate grounds, be
considered or entertained."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank Vs. Ajithkumar G.K.
decided on 11/2/2025 in Civil Appeal No. 30532/2019 has held as under:-
11. Decisions of this Court on the contours of appointment on
compassionate ground are legion and it would be apt for us to
consider certain well-settled principles, which have crystallized
through precedents into a rule of law. They are (not in sequential
but contextual order):
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a) Appointment on compassionate ground, which is offered on
humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the rule of equality in the
matter of public employment [see General Manager, State Bank of
India v Anju Jain (2008)8 SCC 475].
b) Compassionate appointment cannot be made in the absence of
rules or instructions [see Haryana State Electricity Board v. Krishna
Devi (2002)10 SCC 246)].
c) Compassionate appointment is ordinarily offered in two
contingencies carved out as exceptions to the general rule, viz. to
meet the sudden crisis occurring in a family either on account of
death or of medical invalidation of the breadwinner while in service
[see V. Sivamurthy v. Union of India (2008)13 SCC 730].
d) The whole object of granting compassionate employment by an
employer being intended to enable the family members of a deceased
or an incapacitated employee to tide over the sudden financial crisis,
appointments on compassionate ground should be made immediately
to redeem the family in distress [see Sushma Gosain v. Union of
India (1989)4 SCC 468].
e) Since rules relating to compassionate appointment permit a
sidedoor entry, the same have to be given strict interpretation [see
Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi (2009)11 SCC 453].
f) Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and the
criteria laid down in the Rules must be satisfied by all aspirants [see
SAIL v. Madhusudan Das (2008)15 SCC 560].
g) None can claim compassionate appointment by way of inheritance
[see State of Chattisgarh v. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar (2009)13 SCC
600].
h) Appointment based solely on descent is inimical to our
constitutional scheme, and being an exception, the scheme has to be
strictly construed and confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve
[see Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India (2011)4 SCC 209].
i) None can claim compassionate appointment, on the occurrence of
death/medical incapacitation of the concerned employee (the sole
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bread earner of the family), as if it were a vested right, and any
appointment without considering the financial condition of the family
of the deceased is legally impermissible [see Union of India v.
Amrita Sinha (2021)20 SCC 695)].
j) An application for compassionate appointment has to be made
immediately upon death/incapacitation and in any case within a
reasonable period thereof or else a presumption could be drawn that
the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in
immediate need of financial assistance. Such appointment not being a
vested right, the right to apply cannot be exercised at any time in
future and it cannot be offered whatever the lapse of time and after
the crisis is over [see Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Anil Badyakar
(2009)13 SCC 112)].
k) The object of compassionate employment is not to give a member
of a family of the deceased employee a post much less a post for post
held by the deceased. Offering compassionate employment as a
matter of course irrespective of the financial condition of the family
of the deceased and making compassionate appointments in posts
above Class III and IV is legally impermissible [see Umesh Kumar
Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994)4 SCC 138].
l) Indigence of the dependents of the deceased employee is the first
precondition to bring the case under the scheme of compassionate
appointment. If the element of indigence and the need to provide
immediate assistance for relief from financial destitution is taken
away from compassionate appointment, it would turn out to be a
reservation in favour of the dependents of the employee who died
while in service which would directly be in conflict with the ideal of
equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution [see
Union of India v. B. Kishore (2011)13 SCC 131].
m)The idea of compassionate appointment is not to provide for
endless compassion [see I.G. (Karmik) v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi
(2007)6 SCC 162].
n) Satisfaction that the family members have been facing financial
distress and that an appointment on compassionate ground may assist
them to tide over such distress is not enough; the dependent must
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fulfil the eligibility criteria for such appointment [see State of
Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari (2012)9 SCC 545].
o) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the
applicant becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are
some specific provisions [see Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar
(2000)7 SCC 192].
p) Grant of family pension or payment of terminal benefits cannot be
treated as substitute for providing employment assistance. Also, it is
only in rare cases and that too if provided by the scheme for
compassionate appointment and not otherwise, that a dependent who
was a minor on the date of death/incapacitation, can be considered for
appointment upon attaining majority [see Canara Bank (supra)].
q) An appointment on compassionate ground made many years after
the death/incapacitation of the employee or without due consideration
of the financial resources available to the dependent of the
deceased/incapacitated employee would be directly in conflict with
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution [see National Institute of
Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh (2007)2 SCC 481].
r) Dependents if gainfully employed cannot be considered [see
Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh (1998)5
SCC 452].
s) The retiral benefits received by the heirs of the deceased employee
are to be taken into consideration to determine if the family of the
deceased is left in penury. The court cannot dilute the criterion of
penury to one of "not very well-to-do". [see General Manager (D
and PB) v. Kunti Tiwary (2004)7 SCC 271].
t) Financial condition of the family of the deceased employee,
allegedly in distress or penury, has to be evaluated or else the object
of the scheme would stand defeated inasmuch as in such an
eventuality, any and every dependent of an employee dying-inharness
would claim employment as if public employment is heritable [see
Union of India v. Shashank Goswami (2012)11 SCC 307 , Union
Bank of India v. M. T. Latheesh (2006)7 SCC 350 , National
Hydroelectric Power Corporation v. Nank Chand (2004)12 SCC
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487 and Punjab National Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja (2004)7
SCC 265].
u) The terminal benefits, investments, monthly family income
including the family pension and income of family from other
sources, viz. agricultural land were rightly taken into consideration by
the authority to decide whether the family is living in penury. [see
Somvir Singh (supra)].
v) The benefits received by widow of deceased employee under
Family Benefit Scheme assuring monthly payment cannot stand in
her way for compassionate appointment. Family Benefit Scheme
cannot be equated with benefits of compassionate appointment. [see
Balbir Kaur v. SAIL (2000)6 SCC 493]
w) The fixation of an income slab is, in fact, a measure which dilutes
the element of arbitrariness. While, undoubtedly, the facts of each
individual case have to be borne in mind in taking a decision, the
fixation of an income slab subserves the purpose of bringing
objectivity and uniformity in the process of decision making. [see
State of H.P. v. Shashi Kumar (2019)3 SCC 653].
x) Courts cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic
consideration [see Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha
Ramchandra Ambekar (1994)2 SCC 718].
y) Courts cannot allow compassionate appointment dehors the
statutory regulations/instructions. Hardship of the candidate does not
entitle him to appointment dehors such regulations/instructions [see
SBI v. Jaspal Kaur (2007)9 SCC 571].
z) An employer cannot be compelled to make an appointment on
compassionate ground contrary to its policy [see Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangathan v. Dharmendra Sharma (2007)8 SCC 148].
It would be of some relevance to mention here that all the decisions
referred to above are by coordinate benches of two Judges.
29. The second sub-issue pertains to the real objective sought to be
achieved by offering compassionate appointment. We have noticed
the objectives of the scheme of 1993 and construe such objectives as
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salutary for deciding any claim for compassionate appointment. The
underlying idea behind compassionate appointment in death-in-
harness cases appears to be that the premature and unexpected
passing away of the employee, who was the only bread earner for the
family, leaves the family members in such penurious condition that
but for an appointment on compassionate ground, they may not
survive. There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable uniformly
to all cases of employees dying-in-harness which would warrant
appointment on compassionate grounds. Each case has its own
peculiar features and is required to be dealt with bearing in mind the
financial condition of the family. It is only in "hand-to-mouth" cases
that a claim for compassionate appointment ought to be considered
and granted, if at all other conditions are satisfied. Such "hand-to-
mouth" cases would include cases where the family of the deceased is
'below poverty line' and struggling to pay basic expenses such as
food, rent, utilities, etc., arising out of lack of any steady source of
sustenance. This has to be distinguished from a mere fall in standard
of life arising out of the death of the bread earner.
30. The observation in Kunti Tiwary (supra) noted above seems to
assume significance and we draw inspiration therefrom in making the
observation that no appointment on compassionate ground ought to
be made as if it is a matter of course or right, being blissfully
oblivious of the laudable object of any policy/scheme in this behalf.
31. Thus, examination of the financial condition to ascertain whether
the respondent and his mother were left in utter financial distress
because of the death of the bread earner is not something that can be
loosely brushed aside."
10. If the facts and circumstances of the case are considered, then it is clear
that father of petitioner had died in harness on 16.10.2015. Petitioner is still
residing in an official accommodation which is evident from the cause-title i.e.
resident of H-3, Irrigation Colony, Ward 8, Bhitarbar, Dist- Gwalior (MP).
11. Be that whatever it may be.
12. More than 9-1/2 years have passed from the date of death of father of
petitioner. Although it is the claim of petitioner that he had made an application
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for appointment on compassionate ground on 07.01.2016 but it appears that his
application was forwarded on 30.07.2024. The petition is completely silent as
to why petitioner maintained beautiful silence for the last 09 years. Therefore, it
is clear that the very purpose of appointment on compassionate ground has
been lost on account of delay in the matter.
13. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court
is of considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference.
14. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
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