Madhya Pradesh High Court
Virendra Rathore vs Tehsildar on 22 May, 2024
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
1
W.P. No. 3745 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND
DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GAJENDRA SINGH
ON THE 22nd MAY , 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 3745 of 2024
BETWEEN:-
VIRENDRA RATHORE S/O MANOHARLAL RATHORE
1. OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O H.NO. 154 GRAM PANOUN
DISTT. MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
JEEVANLAL S/O MANOHARLAL RATHORE OCCUPATION:
2. AGRICULTURIST 154, GRAM PANOUN TEHSIL AND DIST.
MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
BHAVNA W/O VIRENDRA RATHORE OCCUPATION:
3. AGRICULTURIST 154, GRAM PANOUN TEHSIL AND DIST.
MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
BABLI W/O JEEVANLAL RATHORE OCCUPATION:
4. AGRICULTURIST 154, GRAM PANOUN TEHSIL AND DIST.
MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONERS
(SHRI KUSHAGRA JAIN, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS)
AND
1. TEHSILDAR DISTT. MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
SRG HOUSING FINANCE LIMITED THROUGH AN AUTHORISED
2. PERSON, OFFICE AT 321, S.M. LODHA COMPLEX, SHASTRI
CIRCLE UDIAPUR, RAJASTHAN (RAJASTHAN)
KAMLESH RATHORE S/O PRABHULAL R/O HOUSE NO. 20 WARD
3. NO. 01, GRAM RINDA, TEHSIL AND DIST. MANDSAUR (MADHYA
PRADESH)
NAND KISHORE RATHORE S/O BHUVAN RATHORE R/O HOUSE
4. NO. 121, WARD NO. 04, GRAM LADUNA, TEHSIL SITAMAU DIST.
MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
2
W.P. No. 3745 of 2024
KAMLESH RATHORE S/O PARBHULAL (GUARANTOR) AGED : NA,
5. OCC: NA R/O H.NO. 20 WARD NO. 01, GRAM RINDA, TEHSIL AND
DISTT. MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
NANDKISHROE S/O BHUVAN RATHORE (GUARANTOR 02)AGE :
6. NA. OCCU: AGRICULTURIST R/O H.NO. 121, WARD NO. 04 GRAM
LADUNA TEHSIL AND DIST. MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI ROHIT SABOO, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
NO.6)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on : 18.04.2024
Pronounced on : 22.05.2024
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This petition having been heard and reserved for order
coming on for pronouncement this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice S.A.
DHARMADHIKARI pronounced the following
ORDER
The present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution
of India takes exception to the impugned order dated 07.08.2023
passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), District Mandsaur
under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short
'SARFAESI Act'). The action is sought to be taken under Section 14
for recovery of a loan amount due on the part of the petitioner owed to
Respondent no. 2 (SRG Housing Finance Limited) (for short
'Respondent HFC').
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the petitioner borrowed a secured
loan of Rs. 8,00,000 (8 Lakhs) from Respondent HFC, mortgaging his
property as a collateral in lieu of the said loan. On his default in
repayment, the amount became outstanding and proceedings under
Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act of 2002 were initiated. Followed by
declaration of NPA and Section 13 proceedings, the CJM also
directed for coercive measures against the petitioner under Section 14
of the SARFAESI Act, taking over of possession, vide order
dated04.08.2023 passed in Case No. MJCR/2606/2023.
This has triggered the filing of the present writ petition.
3. Issue for resolution at the heart of this matter is whether
Respondent HFC is justified in resorting to provisions of
SARFAESI Act for recovery of their outstanding dues from the
petitioner, when it is lower than the monetary threshold of Rs. 20
Lakhs; a bar fixed by the Central Government (Ministry of
Finance) for Non Banking Financing Company ('for short
NBFC's).
A. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
4. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction and authority of the
Respondent HFC to institute SARFAESI proceedings as a 'secured
creditor' of the loan amount lent by a 'financial institution' under
the Act 2002 (for short 'FI'). It has been contended that proceedings
under SARFAESI could not be invoked by the Respondent HFC, since
they are admittedly an NBFC and the debt owed was less than Rs. 20
Lakhs.
5. Relying upon the Notification issued under Section 2 1(m)(iv)
of the SARFAESI Act, specifically the latest notification dated
12.02.2021, it is contended that NBFC's are allowed to resort to
machinery of SARFAESI Act towards loan recovery only when the
minimum debt is Rs. 20 Lakhs or more.
6. Referring to the Gazette Notification of 12.02.2021, the
petitioner vehemently argued that HFC's are one of the sub-species of
larger category of NBFC, and therefore, having once been categorised
as such bound by the Gazette Notifications.
7. Relying on various Circulars issued by the RBI, it is contended
that all Housing Finance Companies (for short HFCs) are covered
under the larger umbrella of Non- Banking Financial Companies
(NBFCs), and therefore notifications applicable with respect to
pecuniary jurisdiction to institute SARFAESI proceedings shall apply
on all the fours to HFCs/HFI's as well. Reference is also being made
to Clause 2 (a) of the Master Circular/ Directions of RBI dated
17.02.2021, relying on which it is argued that HFCs are treated as
covered within the upper and middle layer of NBFCs.
8. Earlier, the Competent Authority issued a list of NBFCs, but
later on superseding all the earlier notifications on 12.02.2021, it was
held and directed that if any NBFC intends to kickstart SARFAESI
proceedings, then the same will be applicable to loan net worth
amounts of Rs. 20,00,000/- ( Rupees Twenty Lakhs) and more. Thus,
in the present case when the loan amount is just Rs. 8,00,000/-
(Rupees Eight Lakhs), SARFAESI Act, 2002 cannot be fell back upon
for its recovery by the respondents.
B. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
9. The present Writ Petition is not maintainable and that the
petitioner has to avail statutorily available remedy under Section 17 of
the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by approaching the Debt Recovery
Tribunal, which is equally competent to decide on the issue of
applicability of provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 to the loan
arrangement in question.
10. Respondent HFC is a Financial Institution (for short 'FI') under
Section 2 (1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act,2002 and registered as
HFC under 29-A (5) of the National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (for
short 'NHB Act'); therefore, provisions of SARFAESI can rightly be
invoked by them being a company specifically mentioned under
Notification dated 17.06.2021, bearing no. S.O. 2405 (E).
11. NHB Act, 1987 is a special enactment designed and applicable
for HFCs, and therefore, dispensation with respect to NBFC shall not
be applicable to HFCs, which are special class of companies having
net worth of more than Rs. 100 Crores., within the larger generic
class of NBFCs.
12. Respondent HFC is entitled to invoke and resort to SARFAESI
Act, 2002 by being FI under the Act of 2002 , resultantly being a
'secured creditor' and jurisdictional monetary threshold of Rs.
20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) as applicable in the case of
NBFC shall not be applicable to them.
13. Separate set of Notifications are issued by the Central Govt.
(Ministry of Finance) under the provisions of NHB Act, 1987,
applicable to HFCs, read with section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002 for which no minimum pecuniary threshold of Rs.
20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) has been prescribed.
C. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITION
14. Ordinarily the Writ Court is loath to entertain writ petitions
directly, when challenge is laid to proceedings initiated under
SARFAESI ACT, and parties are always advised to resort to
alternative remedy available under the enactment itself of Section 17
before the DRT. (Refer Phoenix Arc Pvt. Ltd. v Vishwa Bharati
Vidya Mandir (2022) 5 SCC 345; Federal Bank Ltd. v Sagar
Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733; State Bank of India v Arvindra
Electronics (P) Ltd. 2022 SCC Online SC 1522; United Bank of
India v Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110).
15. However, in the present case, the said routine course may not be
followed as the petitioner questions the very jurisdiction and
applicability of the SARFAESI proceedings and raises a pure
question of law pertaining to invocation of Section 13 proceedings by
the Respondent HFC, when admittedly the debt stands to be below the
prescribed pecuniary threshold of Rs. 20,00,000/- .
16. It is trite, when the questions of jurisdiction are raised to the
maintainability of any proceedings or pure questions of law arise with
respect to existence, exercise of power by any statutory authority/
Tribunal created under a statute, then alternate remedy is no bar and is
rendered a mere technicality. The writ Court can extend the large arms
of its jurisdiction and powers to address and undo the wrong or illegal
usurpation of powers by any statutory authority. As been held recently
in the matter of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v Excise and Taxation Officer -
cum - assessing Authority and Ors. 2023 SCC Online SC 95,
alternative remedy will not stand in the way of a writ Court, when
questions pertaining to jurisdiction or pure questions of law going to
existence and exercise of powers of the concerned statutory
authority arise. The writ Court can determine whether the concerned
authority created under a statute (Respondent HFC in the present case)
is rightfully resorting to the draconian powers of taking over of
physical and symbolic possession of the mortgaged property; and that
whether it is entitled to do so. Various questions of law arise in the
current proceedings pertaining to applicability of Notifications
issued apparently relatable to the same provision of law, viz Section
2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act, which need to be resolved as it is
upon the said determination only, the larger question hinges - avail of
SARFAESI Act by the Respondent HFC. Such questions of law about
existence and exercise of powers by the lending company/FI can very
well be adjudicated upon by the writ Court in exercise of the multitude
of powers available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Vide Paras 7 - 9, the Supreme Court has in the matter of Godrej Sara
Lee Ltd. v Excise and Taxation Officer - cum - assessing Authority
and Ors. (Supra) after adumbrating various judgments on the point
held as follows :
"7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision
reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel
Limited) has reiterated the same principles in
paragraph 11.
8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the
decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC
724 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Indian Hume Pipe
Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of
India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a
plain reading of the former decision is that
whether a certain item falls within an entry in a
sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law
and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the
high court could entertain a writ petition in its
discretion even though the alternative remedy
was not availed of; and, unless exercise of
discretion is shown to be unreasonable or
perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the
latter decision, this Court found the issue raised
by the appellant to be pristinely legal requiring
determination by the high court without putting
the appellant through the mill of statutory
appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the
said decisions is that where the controversy is
a purely legal one and it does not involve
disputed questions of fact but only questions of
law, then it should be decided by the high court
instead of dismissing the writ petition on the
ground of an alternative remedy being available.
9. Now, reverting to the facts of this appeal, we
find that the appellant had claimed before the
High Court that the suo motu revisional power
could not have been exercised by the Revisional
Authority in view of the existing facts and
circumstances leading to the only conclusion
that the assessment orders were legally correct
and that the final orders impugned in the writ
petition were passed upon assuming a
jurisdiction which the Revisional Authority did
not possess. In fine, the orders impugned were
passed wholly without jurisdiction. Since a
jurisdictional issue was raised by the appellant
in the writ petition questioning the very
competence of the Revisional Authority to
exercise suo motu power, being a pure question
of law, we are of the considered view that the
plea raised in the writ petition did deserve a
consideration on merits and the appellant's writ
petition ought not to have been thrown out at the
threshold."
(emphasis supplied)
17. Therefore, the preliminary objections to the maintainability of
the writ petition in the present case are rejected, holding that writ
petition to decide upon such pure questions of law; touching upon the
jurisdiction, existence and exercise of powers by the respondent HFC
is maintainable.
D. APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION & APPLICABILITY
OF THE SARFAESI ACT
18. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 was brought in by the Parliament to
tackle the problem of sluggish pace of recovery of defaulting loans
and mounting levels of non-performing assets of Banks and FI's to
give proper impetus to industrial development. Designed toward
ensuring commercial stability of Banks and other FIs, swifter
mechanisms of recovery were ushered in through the SARFAESI Act.
It was brought into force to solve the problem of recovering large
debts in NPA's. The background and salient features of the
SARFAESI Act have been extensively discussed, analysed, and
elaborated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mardia
Chemicals Ltd. v. UOI (2004) 4 SCC 311 and United Bank of India
v. Satyavati Tandon (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260.
19. Thus, the very rationale was to provide an expeditious
procedure, wherever there was a security interest. It is to provide a
quicker remedy to the lender against the borrower, who defaults in
repayment of the loan. The objective therefore, is clearly laudable
viz. to fix the bad debts and non performing loans, that become a
burden upon the economic fabric of the society and the country both.
The SARFAESI Act therefore must receive an interpretation that
furthers its object and not a self defeating one. In the context of
interpretation of its provisions, therefore a broad, purposive approach
must be adopted, that ensures the fulfilment of the objective and
reasons behind enactment. The approach of the Court therefore
should generally be towards holding that SARFAESI Act applies to
any recovery proceedings, then leaning against on the grounds of
technicalities.
E. STATUTES & STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN
THE PRESENT MATTER
SARFAESI ACT, 2002
20. Various provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 involved in the
present matter can be appropriately referred to.
Section 2(1)(m) defines Financial Institution as follows :-
[(m) "Financial Institutions" means- a public financial
institution within the meaning of Section 4-A of the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
ii) any institution specified by the Central
Government under sub-clause (ii) of clause (h)
of Section 2 of the Recovery of Debts Due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51
of 1993);
iii) the International Finance Corporation
established under the International Finance
Corporation (Status, Immunities and Privileges)
Act, 1958 (42 of 1958);
(iiia) a debenture trustee registered with the
Board and appointed for secured debt securities;
(iiib) asset reconstruction company, whether
acting as such or managing a trust created for the
purpose of securitization or asset reconstruction,
as the case may be;]
(iii) any other institution or
non-banking financial company as defined in
clause (f) of Section 45-I of the Reserve Bank of
India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934), which the Central
Government may, by notification, specify as
financial institution for the purposes of this Act;
[(ma) "financial lease" means a lease under any
lease agreement of tangible asset, other than
negotiable instrument or negotiable document,
for transfer of lessor's right therein to the lessee
for a certain time in consideration of payment
of agreed amount periodically and where the
lessee becomes the owner of the such assets at
the expiry of the term of lease or on payment of
the agreed residual amount, as the case may be;]
Section 2 (zd) defines Secured Creditor thus: -
[(zd) "secured creditor" means-
(i) any bank or financial institution or any
consortium or group of banks or financial
institutions holding any right, title or interest
upon any tangible asset or intangible asset as
specified in clause (1)
ii) debenture trustee appointed by any bank or
financial institution; or
iii) an asset reconstruction company whether
acting as such or managing a trust set up by
such asset reconstruction company for the
securitisation or reconstruction, as the case may
be, or
iv) debenture trustee registered with 5 [the
Board and appointed for secured debt
securities; or
v) any other trustee holding securities on behalf
of a bank or financial institution, in whose
favour security interest is created by any
borrower for due repayment of any financial
assistance.]
F. ABOUT THE NATIONAL HOUSING BANK ACT, 1987
21. The National Housing Bank Act is an Act establishing
National Housing Bank to operate as a principal agency to promote
Housing Finance Institutions (for short 'HFI') both at the local and
regional levels for providing financial and other support to such
institutions and matters connected therewith. The Act provides for an
organised institutional framework for providing Housing Finance
structure through the establishment of appropriate institutions at
various levels that catalyse and mobilise the housing activity. It also
plays a role in the formulation of policies designed to promote
housing in the country and laying down guidelines for working of all
the agencies connected with housing. Some of the definitions
occurring under the definition clause, viz. Section 2 pertinent for the
present matter read thus :
"Section 2 Definitions - In this Act, unless the
context otherwise requires--
(d) Housing Finance Institution -
includes every institution, whether
incorporated or not, which primarily
transacts or has a [one of its
principal objects], the transacting
of the business of providing finance
for housing, whether directly or
indirectly";
*
*
*
22. Section 29-A titled as -'Requirement Of Registration And
Net Owned Fund' stipulates about the HFI, which intends to
commence and operate the business of housing finance in the country.
It provides host of preconditions for any company, intending to
venture into the business of housing finance, whilst also laying down
the net worth and the minimum capital, it must possess in its balance
and audit sheets, prior to engaging in such business. It reads as thus:
"Section 29-A - Requirement Of Registration
And Net Owned Fund -
(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Chapter or in
any other law for the time being in force,
no housing finance institution which is a
company shall commence housing
finance as its principal business or carry
on the business of housing finance as its
principal business without -
(a) obtaining a certificate of
registration issued under this
Chapter; and
(b) having the net owned fund of ten
crore rupees or such other higher
amount, as the Reserve Bank may, by
notification, specify.
(2) Every housing finance institution
which is a company shall make an
application for registration to the
Reserve Bank in such form as may be
specified by the Reserve Bank:
Provided that an application made by a
housing finance institution which is a
company to the National Housing Bank
and pending for consideration with the
National Housing Bank as on the date of
commencement of the provisions of Part
VII of Chapter VI of the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019, shall stand transferred to the
Reserve Bank and thereupon the
application shall be deemed to have been
made under the provisions of this sub-
section and shall be dealt with
accordingly:
Provided further that the provisions of
this sub-section shall not apply to the
housing finance institution which is a
company and having a valid registration
certificate granted under sub-section (5)
on the date of commencement of the
provisions of Part VII of Chapter VI of
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019, and such
housing finance institution shall be
deemed to have been granted a certificate
of registration under the provision of this
Act.]
(4) The [Reserve Bank], for the purpose
of considering the application for
registration, may require to be satisfied
by an inspection of the books of such
housing finance institution or otherwise
that the following conditions are
fulfilled:-
(a) that housing finance institution is or
shall be in a position to pay its present or
future depositors in full as and when
their claims accrue;
(b) that the affairs of the housing finance
institution are not being or are not likely
to be conducted in a manner detrimental
to the interest of its present or future
depositors;
(c) that the general character of the
management or the proposed
management of the housing financial
institution shall not be prejudicial to the
public interest or the interests of its
depositors;
(d) that the housing finance institution
has adequate capital structure and
earning prospects;
(e) that the public interest shall be
served by the grant of certificate of
registration to the housing finance
institution to commence or to carry on
the business in India;
(f) that the grant of certificate of
registration shall not be prejudicial to
the operation and growth of the housing
finance sector of the country;and
(g) any other condition, fulfillment of
which in the opinion of the [Reserve
Bank], shall be necessary to ensure that
the commencement of or carrying on the
business in India by a housing finance
institution shall not be prejudicial to the
public interest or in the interests of the
depositors:
[Provided that the Reserve Bank may
wherever it considers necessary so to do,
require the National Housing Bank to
inspect the books of such housing finance
institutions and submit a report to the
Reserve Bank for the purpose of
considering the application.]
(5) The [Reserve Bank] may, after being
satisfied that the conditions specified in
sub-section (4) are fulfilled, grant a
certificate of registration subject to such
conditions which it may consider fit to
impose.
(6) The [Reserve Bank] may cancel a
certificate of registration granted to a
housing finance institution under this
section if such institution -
(i) ceases
to carry on the business of a
housing finance institution in
India;
Or
(ii) has failed to comply with any
condition subject to which the
certificate of registration had been
issued to it;
Or
(iii) at any time fails to fulfill any
of the conditions referred to in
clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section
(4);
Or
(iv) fails
(a) to comply with any direction
issued by the [Reserve Bank or
the National Housing Bank]
under the provisions of this
Chapter;
Or
(b) to maintain accounts in
accordance with the
requirement of any law or any
direction or order issued by the
[Reserve Bank or the National
Housing Bank] under the
provisions of this Chapter;
Or
(c) to submit or offer for inspection
its books of account and other
relevant documents when so
demanded by an inspecting
authority of the [Reserve Bank
or the National Housing
Bank];
Or
(v) has been prohibited from
accepting deposit by an order
made by the National Housing
Bank under the provisions of this
Chapter and such order has been
in force for a period of not less
than three months:
Provided that before cancelling a
certificate of registration on the
ground that the [housing finance
institution which is a company] has
failed to comply with the
provisions of clause
(ii) or has failed to fulfill any of
the conditions referred to in
clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section 4,
the [Reserve Bank], unless it is of
the opinion that the delay in
cancelling the certificate of
registration shall be prejudicial to
public interest or the interest of the
depositors or the [housing finance
institution which is a company],
shall give an opportunity to such
institution on such terms as the
[Reserve Bank] may specify for
taking necessary steps to comply
with such provision or fulfillment
of such condition:
Provided further that before
making any order of cancellation
of certificate of registration, such
institution shall be given a
reasonable opportunity of being
heard.
(7) A housing finance institution
aggrieved by the order or rejection of
application for registration may prefer
an appeal, within a period of thirty days
from the date on which such order of
rejection or cancellation is
communicated to it, to the Central
Government and the decision of the
Central Government where an appeal has
been preferred to it, or of the [Reserve
Bank] where no appeal has been
preferred, shall be final:
Provided that before making any order
of rejection of appeal, such institution
shall be given a reasonable opportunity
of being heard."
23. From the above provisions, it is clear that HFIs or HFCs are a
specific category of entities, created specially under the provisions of
the NHB Act, providing for establishment, regulation and running of
business by HFC's. They are established as being governed under
provisions of Section 29A under Special enactment of NHB Act, 1987.
G. ABOUT THE RBI ACT, 1934
24. The RBI Act governs running of banking activities in the
country.
Chapter III-B titled as "Provisions Relating To Non -
Banking Institutions Receiving Deposits And
Financial Institutions" contains various provisions
regulating entities and institutions indulging into
receiving of deposits. Section 45 (I) is the definition
clause, specially enacted for Chapter III-B, where
under vide Section 45 (I) (c) 'Financial Institution' is
defined; vide Section 45 (I) (e) 'Non Banking
Institution' is defined, and vide Section 45 (I) (f),
'NBFC' is defined. They read as follows:
"Section 2 Definitions -In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
[(c) ''financial institution'' means any non-
banking institution which carries on as its
business or part of its business any of the
following activities, namely:-
(i) the financing, whether by way of making
loans or advances or otherwise, of any
activity other than its own:
(ii) the acquisition of shares, stock, bonds,
debentures or securities issued by a
Government or local authority or other
marketable securities of a like nature:
(iii) letting or delivering of any goods to a
hirer under a hire-purchase agreement as
defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Hire-
Purchase Act, 1972:
(iv) the carrying on of any class of
insurance business;
(v) managing, conducting or supervising, as
foreman, agent or in any other capacity, of
chits or kuries as defined in any law which
is for the time being in force in any State, or
any business, which is similar thereto;
(vi) collecting, for any purpose or under any
scheme or arrangement by whatever name
called, monies in lumpsum or otherwise, by
way of subscriptions or by sale of units, or
other instruments or in any other manner
and awarding prizes or gifts, whether in cash
or kind, or disbursing monies in any other
way, to persons from whom monies are
collected or to any other person, 3 [but does
not include any institution, which carries on
as its principal business,-
(a) agricultural operations; or
(aa) industrial activity; or]
(b) the purchase or sale of any goods (other
than securities) or the providing of any
services; or
(c) the purchase, construction or sale of
immovable property, so however, that no
portion of the income of the institution is
derived from the financing of purchases,
constructions or sales of immovable property
by other persons;]
[Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause,
''industrial activity'' means any activity
specified in sub-clauses (i) to
(xviii) of clause (c) of
section 2 of the Industrial Development Bank of
India Act, 1964;]
(d) ''firm'' means a firm as defined in the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932 2 [* * *]; (e) ''non-
banking institution'' means a company,
corporation 3 [or cooperative society]
(e) ''non-banking institution'' means a
company, corporation 3 [or cooperative society]
(f) ''non-banking financial company''
means- (i) a financial institution
which is a company;
(ii) a non-banking
institution which is a company and which has
as its principal business the receiving of
deposits, under any scheme or arrangement
or in any other manner, or lending in any
manner;
(iii) such other non-
banking institution or class of such
institutions, as the Bank may, with the
previous approval of the Central
Government and by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify;]"
H. ANALYSIS OF INTER-RELATION BETWEEN THE
TRINITY OF ENACTMENTS IN QUESTION -
SARFAESI, NHB & THE RBI
25. Erudition of various provisions of the three enactments
referred to above (SARFAESI, RBI and NHB Acts) involved in the
present matter would demonstrate the following :
a) Under Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of SARFAESI
Act, a 'financial institution' shall include 'any other
institution' or 'NBFC' as defined under Section 45(I)
(f) of the RBI Act. Thus Section45(I)(f) of RBI
Act applies to NBFC defined under it. However other
than NBFC, there can be multiple other institutions
also, which may be so notified by the Central
Government. Therefore notification by the Central
Government in the Official Gazette is a precondition for
any NBFC or other institutions to be treated as FI under
the SARFAESI Act. The HFI as defined under NHB
Act can thus be treated to be covered under generic
expression 'any other institution' referred to under
Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of SARFAESI Act, having the
principle object and business of providing finances for
housing. Ergo, HFI must meet the preconditions for
registration with the RBI, under Section 29-A of the
NHB Act. Section 29-A stipulates some of the pre-
conditions for coming into existence and registration of
HFI/ HFC, one of them being possessing the minimum
prescribed annual turnover and net owned fund.
b) A perusal of Section 29-A (Requirement Of
Registration And Net Owned Fund) of the NHB Act
would clarify beyond any pale of doubt that HFI's
under the Act may be an NBFC or may not be an
NBFC. The requirement of obtaining a certificate of
registration under Section 29-A (1) is from the RBI,
which is made, processed and issued under Sections 29-
A (2) to (5) of the NHB Act. The said registration
certificate so granted to HFI may also be cancelled on
contingencies coming into occurrence post its issuance
under Section 29-A (6) by the RBI.
c) Section 45 (I) & other provisions of Chapter
III-B (Provisions Relating To Non - Banking
Institutions Receiving Deposits And Financial
Institutions) may not stricto senso therefore apply in
case of HFI/ HFC, which are a special class and
category of institutions created under a special
enactment, viz NHB Act whilst determining
applicability of SARFAESI to either of the set of
companies.
d) The Court has closely examined Section 45
(I)(f)(ii) and (iii), which are inclusive of all the
companies, having principal business of receiving
deposits, under any scheme or arrangement or any other
manner or lending in any manner. However, the said
provision shall not apply in case of HFI's /HFC's being
registered with the RBI under Section 29-A of the NHB
Act, even if such HFI's/HFC's may be undertaking the
principal business of receiving of deposits, under any
scheme or arrangement or any other manner or lending
in any manner. For the purposes of regulation by the
RBI, the HFI's/ HFC's shall stand governed by the
provisions of Section 29-A of the NHB Act, which is a
complete code in itself governing the HFI's/ HFC's
created under special enactment of NHB Act.
e) Therefore the genesis and registration of
HFI's/ HFC's would always be traceable to
notifications issued under NHB Act, which are
independent of issuance of any notification under the
provisions of Chapter III-B (Provisions Relating To
Non - Banking Institutions Receiving Deposits And
Financial Institutions) r/w Section 45(I)(f) of the RBI
Act. When it comes to issuance of notification
pertaining to registration or bringing into existence of
any HFI/HFC, the same would always be sourced from
provisions of NHB Act, especially Section 29A, and not
to that of RBI Act. This is however with a clear rider
that RBI may prescribe guidelines/ directions laying
down preconditions for any HFCs/ HFIs to get
registered. But that doesn't dilute the character and
identity of any housing company as an HFIs/HFCs
under the NHB Act.For this reason therefore, the HFI/
HFC shall fall under the phrase 'any other institution'
occurring under Section 2 (1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI
Act and not as a sub-species of NBFC under Section 45
(I) of the RBI Act.
f) Therefore it would depend upon the tone and
tenor of the Notification issued under Section 2 (1)(m)
(iv) by the Central Government, as to whether it is
pertaining to NBFC or HFI's/HFC's under the NHB
Act. The latter part of Section 2 (1)(m)(iv), viz. 'any
other institution or non-banking financial company as
defined in clause (f) of Section 45-I of the Reserve Bank
of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934), which the Central
Government may, by notification, specify as financial
institution for the purposes of this Act' qualifies and
applies to both the distinct categories of FI's under
Section 2(1)(m)(iv), viz any other institution as also
NBFC both. Meaning thereby that the Central
Government may either through the notification specify
the NBFC as FI or 'any other institution' as the FI,
which is thereafter entitled to adorn the attire of a
'secured creditor' under Section 2 (z)(d) of the
SARFAESI Act. The import of Section 2(z)(d)(i)
defines 'secured creditor' as any bank or FI or group
of banks or FI refers to FI as enumerated under Section
2(1)(m)(iv), notified by the Central Government for the
said purpose.
g) In view of the above, clearly though in a
generic/ general sense, the provisions of Chapter III-B
of the RBI Act, specifically Section 45 (I)(f) may
include all companies engaged into the principal
business of housing finance and lending, however in the
face of existence of a special enactment of the NHB
Act, especially Section 29-A, the specific category or
the sub-species of the HFI/ FI shall stand out separately,
not covered by the general provisions of the RBI Act,
but covered by the specific provisions of the NHB Act.
In light of the above, it is condign now to refer to various
notifications issued by the Central Government for NBFCs as also
for the HFCs/ HFIs.
I. NOTIFICATIONS ISSUED FOR HFCs/ HFIs UNDER
SECTION 29-A of the NHB ACT
26. In exercise of powers conferred under Section 29-A, r/w
Section 2(1)(m) (iv), the Central Government (Ministry of Finance)
has issued notifications from time to time accompanied with
detailed tables specifying the HFC's/HFI's to be treated as FIs under
Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act. Though the notification
last and latest in time treats HFC's/HFI's with the net owned worth of
more than Rs. 100 Crores as FIs, however there is no specified list of
companies to be so treated as HFC/ HFIs enumerated in the said
notification, as was the practice before. Under the latest notification,
any & all HFC/HFI with a minimum net worth of Rs. 100 Crores, are
to be treated as FIs. The summary of those notifications issued from
time to time with respect to HFCs/ HFIs is catalogued in tabular
form below :
Date Details Remark
18.12. Notification bearing no. S.O. 3466 (E) issued This was
2015 with a list of HFCs registered under Section
however
29A(5) of the NHB Act, 1987 as Financial
Institutions under Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the subsequently
SARFAESI Act, 2002.
superseded by
Name of the Respondent finds mention at Sr.
No. 34 in the table appended to this notification notification
as notified FI's.
dated
22.01.2018
22.01. Another Notification bearing no. S.O. 404 (E)
2018 issued with an additional list of HFCs registered
as 'FI's' under Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002..
13.08. Press release by RBI, where in RBI has made it
2019 clear that HFCs will be treated as one of the
categories of NBFCs
17.06. Notification bearing no. S.O. 2405 (E) issued
2021 superseding all previously issued . All the HFCS
HFIs registered under section 29-A of the NHB
Act,1987 having assets worth more than 100 crore
rupees to be treated as HFIs under section
2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act,2002.
J.) NOTIFICATIONS ISSUED UNDER SECTION 45(I)(F) RBI
ACT FOR NBFCs :
27. The Central Government (Ministry of Finance) has been
likewise issuing a different set of notifications for various NBFCs and
Companies specified under Section 45(I)(f) of the RBI Act from time
to time, categorizing as FI for the purposes of Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of
the SARFAESI Act. Correspondingly from time to time they have also
been fixing the minimum pecuniary threshold for invocation of
SARFAESI proceedings by the NBFC, below which the concerned
NBFC is not entitled to resort to the same. Both the parties have
brought on record various notifications issued from time to time under
Chapter III-B r/w Section 45(I)(f) of the RBI as aforementioned.
The summary of those notifications issued from time to time
with respect to NBFCs are catalogued in tabular form below :
Date Details Remark
05.08. Notification bearing no. S.O. 2641 (E) containing a Superseded
2016 detailed list of NBFCs declared as 'FI's' under by
Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. subsequently
by
Notification
on dated 12.
27.08. Notification bearing no. S.O. 4176 (E) containing an
2018 additional list of NBFCs declared as 'FI's' under
Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
24.10. Notification bearing no. S.O. 5391 (E) containing an
2018 additional list of NBFCs declared as 'FI's' under
Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
24.02. Notification bearing no. S.O. 856 (E) issued fixing the
2020 minimum threshold amount for applicability of
section 2(1)(m)(iv) of SARFAESI Act, 2002to
Rs.50 Lakhs and above to loans/ borrowings
extended by NBFCs. However the net owned
worth of the NBFCs was laid down to be a
minimum of Rs. 100 Crores & above.
12.02. This notification bearing no. S.O. 652 (E) amended the
2021 previously issued notification dated 24.02.2020 on the
same subject fixing the minimum threshold limit for
SARFAESI Act applicability to a debt of more than or
equal to 20 Lakh rupees instead of previously fixed
limit of Rs. 50 Lakhs for the purposes of Section 2(1)
(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act.
K. FALL OUT OF DIFFERENT SET OF NOTIFICATIONS
HAVING ISSUED FOR HFCs / HFIs VIS. VIS. A VIS. THE
NBFCs
28. What does issuance of two different set of notifications
separately for HFCs/HFIs and NBFCs entail? How the Court must
interpret their correlations with each other. On a specific query being
put to counsel for both the parties, it was informed that amongst the
large number of NBFCs mentioned in the table constituting the
notification, issued from time to time, the name of Respondent HFC
doesn't find mention anywhere in the notifications pertaining to
NBFCs. No such notification was brought on record either on behalf
of the petitioner, that would evince the respondent having been
classified especially as NBFC as under Chapter III-B r/w Section 45(I)
(f) of the RBI Act. Thus it is luminescent that amongst the list of
NBFCs to be treated as FI's, the petitioner has never been notified in
such a category specifically. By necessary implication, therefore the
pecuniary threshold prescribed in the notification will not apply to
HFCs/ HFIs. However, to the contrary, the name of the Respondent
SRG Finance finds mention in the notification pertaining to HFCs
dated 18.15.2015 , vide Serial No. 34.
29. That it was further contention of the petitioner that the
notifications of 2021 & 2022 have applied the pecuniary threshold to
all the NBFCs as a generic class, across the board and therefore
specific mention of any company or for that matter of respondent HFC
(SRG Finance) was never needed. Since the minimum pecuniary
threshold was being determined and prescribed for all NBFCs across
the plane, therefore it would automatically cover Respondent HFC as
well. This contention of the petitioner is taken forward only to be
rejected. As already stated supra, the HFIs / HFCs being a special
genre of FIs / companies, created and regulated by special enactment
of NHB Act, the same cannot be compartmentalised in the bogie of
NBFCs, moreso when NHB Act does not u/s 29-A postulate the
applicability of Chapter III-B r/w Section 45(I)(f) of the RBI Act.
Therefore HFIs/ HFCs like the respondent cannot impliedly be
deemed to have been included under the umbrella of NBFC's, till and
until such an intention is express and explicit under the NHB Act or
the notifications issued under it. For this reason, therefore the
minimum pecuniary threshold of 20 Lakhs shall not apply to HFIs/
HFCs as contended by the petitioner as prescribed in case of the
NBFCs.
30. For yet another reason the contention of the petitioner is liable
to be rejected. That being issuance of separate series of notifications
by the very same department, very same arm of the Central
Government (Ministry of Finance), as would be explicated infra for
the HFCs / HFIs. HFCs/ HFIs are governed holistically by Section 29-
A of the NHB Act, the notifications that have been issued qua them
specifically shall regulate applicability of SARFAESI to them and not
other notifications issued generically for NBFCs. Bare glance at
various notifications issued for HFCs/ HFIs from time to time by the
Central Government also shows that earlier HFCs were being
mentioned specifically to be treated as FIs under Section 2(1)(m)(iv)
of SARFAESI. Otherwise there was never any occasion or necessity
for the Central Government to have come up with a distinct bee line of
notifications for HFCs / HFIs. The fact that notifications are issued
separately with a separate list of enumerated HFCs / HFIs by the
Central Government is indicative of the regime that HFCs / HFIs
stand in an altogether different steel silo then the NBFCs. Ergo
therefore the contentions of the respondent deserves acceptance
that HFCs/ HFIs are an entirely different special class, which are
covered under the phrase 'any other institution' adumbrated under
Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of SARFAESI Act and can't be classed with other
NBFCs.
L) APPLICABILITY OF 'GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON
DEROGANT'
31. Both the sides made extensive arguments on the Respondent
HFC being a NBFC, being into the principal business of money
lending and transacting. The petitioner, where on one hand contended
that by virtue of the principal business of money lending, the
Respondent being a NBFC would be treated so, apart from being
treated as HFC/HFI under Chapter III-B read with Section 45(I)(f).
Therefore having being once treated as so, irrespective of notifications
being issued for HFC's/HFI's, they would also be amenable to
notifications issued for NBFC's by the Central Government from time
to time. The counsel for the Respondent on the other hand contended
that notifications pertaining to NBFC shall not apply as
HFI's/HFC's are though FI's, but they are governed by the self
contained arrangement provided under special enactment of NHB Act.
32. The interpretation and reconciliation of so called conflicting
and overlapping provisions contained in two enactments has often
been resolved by applying the long settled principle of statutory
interpretation - 'generalia specialibus non derogant'. It means
'general provisions never derogate from the special ones and that
general provisions must always give way to the special provisions'.
This principle is applied in the context of either two different
conflicting/overlapping enactments or two provisions overlapping /
conflicting with each other under the same enactment.
33. The Supreme Court recently had an occasion to discuss the
applicability of this principle in the matter of Managing Director,
Chhattisgarh State Co - operative Bank Maryadit v. Zila Sahkari
Kendriya Bank Maryadit & Ors. (2020) 6 SCC 411 as a much
revered tool of statutory interpretation. The special enactment must be
held to be operative with the general enactment presumed to be
applicable & taking effect only with the remaining parts not dealt
with / or covered by the special enactment. By this logic, thus both
the different enactments become applicable without any head-on
conflict with each other. Vide Paras 33, 34, 36, and 37, the Supreme
Court whilst propounding on the said principle held thus:
"33. It is a settled principle of law that where two
provisions of an enactment appear to conflict, courts
must adopt an interpretation which harmonises, to the
best extent possible, both provisions. Justice G.P.
Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory
Interpretation states:
"To harmonise is not to destroy. A familiar
approach in all such cases is to find out which of
the two apparently conflicting provisions is
more general and which is more specific and to
construe the more general one as to exclude the
more specific... The principle is expressed in the
maxims generalia specialibus non derogant and
generalibus specialia."
Similarly, Craies in Statute Law states:
"The rule is, that whenever there is a particular
enactment and a general enactment in the same statute,
and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense,
would overrule the former, the particular enactment
must be operative, and the general enactment must
be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute
to which it may properly apply."
Where two provisions conflict, courts may enquire
which of the two provisions is specific in nature and
whether it was intended that the specific provision is
carved out from the application of the general
provision. The general provision operates, save and
except in situations covered by the specific provision.
The rationale behind this principle of statutory
construction is that were there appears a conflict
between two provisions, it must be presumed that the
legislature did not intend a conflict and a subject-
specific provision governs those situations in
exclusion to the operation of the general provision.
34. In an early decision of this Court in J.K. Cotton
Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [J.K. Cotton
Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1961
SC 1170] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court
considered whether the principle applied to conflicts
within the same enactment. Clause 5(a) of the
Government Order dated 10-5-1948 conferred upon,
inter alia, any employee or a registered trade union of
employers the right to move the Board constituted
under the order to initiate an enquiry into an industrial
dispute. Clause 23 stipulated that where an enquiry is
pending before the Regional Conciliation Officer,
notwithstanding the pendency of a case before the
Board or Industrial Court, no employer shall discharge
or dismiss any workman. Under Clause 24, an order
of the Board, unless modified in appeal, was final and
conclusive. The appellant, representing the employer's
union, contended that once an order is made under
Clause 5(a), Clause 23 has no application and the
employer may proceed to dismiss the workmen. The
Court rejected the contention noting that any employer
could defeat the provisions of Clause 23 merely by an
application under Clause 5(a). The Court held that
Clause 23 was made with a definite purpose.
Consequently, where an enquiry was pending under
Clause 23, an application under Clause 5(a) was
barred. The Court held : (AIR pp. 1174-75, paras 9-10)
"9. ... We reach the same result by applying
another well-known rule of construction
that general provisions yield to special
provisions. The learned Attorney General
seemed to suggest that while this rule of
construction is applicable to resolve the
conflict between the general provision in
one Act and the special provision in another
Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a
conflict between general and special
provisions in the same legislative
instrument. This suggestion does not find
support in either principle or authority. The
rule that general provisions should yield to
specific provisions is not an arbitrary
principle made by lawyers and Judges but
springs from the common understanding of
men and women that when the same person
gives two directions one covering a large
number of matters in general and another to
only some of them his intention is that
these latter directions should prevail as
regards these while as regards all the
rest the earlier direction should have effect.
...
10. Applying this rule of construction that in
cases of conflict between a specific
provision and a general provision the
specific provision prevails over the general
provision and the general provision applies
only to such cases which are not covered by
the special provision, we must hold that
Clause 5(a) has no application in a case
where the special provisions of Clause 23
are applicable."
(emphasis supplied)
This Court affirmed that the principle that the general
excludes the specific is a tool of statutory interpretation
even in cases of conflict within the same enactment.
Where one of the conflicting provisions is general in
nature and the other is specific, "common
understanding" dictates that the specific provision is
given effect, while the general provision continues to
apply to all other situations.
***********
36. The Court held that where two
provisions are in question -- one of general application
and the other specific in nature, a harmonious
interpretation would mean that the general law, to the
extent it is dealt with by the special law, is impliedly
repealed. This Court, relying on the principle generalia
specialibus non derogant held that Item 1-E is a
"subject specific provision". The Court noted that the
amendment removed "new cement industries" from the
non-eligible Annexure 'B' and placed it into Annexure
'C' amongst the eligible industries. Consequently, the
Court rejected the contention of the Respondent
assessee and held that as Item 1-E concerned the more
specific unit, it was excluded in its application from
other general entries. The principle that the general
provision excludes the more specific has been
consistently applied by this Court in South India Corpn.
(P) Ltd. v. Board of Revenue [South India Corpn. (P)
Ltd. v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1964 SC 207] , Paradip
Port Trust v. Workmen [Paradip Port Trust v.
Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 339 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 253 :
AIR 1977 SC 36] , Maharashtra State Board of
Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh
Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of
Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh
Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] , CCE v.
Jayant Oil Mills (P) Ltd. [CCE v. Jayant Oil Mills (P)
Ltd., (1989) 3 SCC 343 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 423] , P.S.
Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. [P.S. Sathappan v.
Andhra Bank Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 672] , Sarabjit Rick
Singh v. Union of India [Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union
of India, (2008) 2 SCC 417 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 449]
and Pankajakshi v. Chandrika [Pankajakshi v.
Chandrika, (2016) 6 SCC 157 : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ)
105] .
37. While sub-section (3) of Section 54 deals with a
class of societies, clauses (a) and (b), as inserted by the
2016 Amendment Act are specific in their application
to only cooperative banks. Furthermore, while Section
54(3) deals with the appointment of deputed cadre
officers on cadre posts, clauses (a) and (b) deal only
with the appointment of CEOs of cooperative banks.
Clause (a) contemplates that the eligibility guidelines
prescribed by RBI will apply to officers holding the
post of CEO of a cooperative bank. Significantly,
clause (b) of Section 54(3) beings with the words "if
the concerning cooperative bank fails to appoint"
which denotes an intention to vest with cooperative
banks the power to appoint their CEO. The provision
also stipulates that where the cooperative bank fails to
appoint CEO within a specified period, the Registrar
may appoint an eligible officer of the bank. The
stipulation that in the case of default, CEO shall be an
officer of the bank and not an officer from the cadre as
notified under Section 54(3) demonstrates the intention
of the legislature to vest with cooperative banks the
power to appoint their CEO."
34. Thus, where two interpretations arise out of interplay of two
different enactments, Courts must always adopt that interpretation that
furthers the intention of the legislature to be applied for, which is also
reflected from the legal maxim 'verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res
magis valeat quant pereat' (if two constructions of a provision are
possible on its face and one would clearly advance the legislative
purpose, whilst the other might end up achieving little or nothing, the
former should always be preferred).
35. In view of our above exposition of the principal of 'generalia
specialibus non derogant', clearly the provisions contained under
Chapter III-B of the RBI Act, specifically Section 45 (1)(f) cannot be
treated to be applicable in the context of HFI's/HFC's established
under Section 29A of the NHB, for the purposes of interpretation of
notifications issued under 2 (1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act.
HFIs/HFCs will be categorised as FI's not by virtue of their being
NBFC's, but because of their falling under the phrase 'any other
institution' as mentioned under Section 2 (1)(m)(iv). The notifications
resultantly issued pertaining to NBFC would therefore on the strength
of above reasoning will also not apply to HFC's/HFI's.
36. In view of the above reasoning, we reach an irresistible
conclusion that all the contentions of the petitioners are liable to be
rejected, holding in turn as follows:
(a) The present writ petition is maintainable and
petitioner may not be relegated to the alternative remedy
available under SARFAESI Act for the reasons stated
supra.
(b) Respondent HFC is entitled under law to resort to
SARFAESI Act towards recovery of their loans and
borrowings, irrespective of the loan borrowings in favour
of the petitioner falling below the threshold of Rs. 20
Lakhs.
(c) The notifications relied upon by the petitioner as
issued by the Central Government (Ministry of Finance)
on applicability of SARFAESI Act on NBFCs shall not
be applicable in the context of HFCs / HFIs, but only in
the context of NBFCs so defined under Chapter III-B of
the RBI Act, 1934, specially Section 45(I)(f).
(d) The petitioner, if aggrieved by any of the measures
taken under sections 13 or 14 of the SARFAESI Act
against them, shall be entitled to resort to Section 17
application before the DRT on other grounds available to
them factually or legally, except the one decided in the
present petition. Reserving the said liberty in favour
of the petitioner, the present writ petition is
accordingly dismissed with no costs.
(S.A. Dharmadhikari) (Gajendra Singh)
Judge Judge
sh/-
SEHA Digitally signed by SEHAR
HASEEN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
R
INDORE, ou=BENCH AT
INDORE,
2.5.4.20=900ec6fc757798eae
b3df7a32860bd3298415a4d1
c2d91436213f2568c8f27da,
HASE
postalCode=452001,
st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=E7DBBA955B2
62C04B8413251CE7FB6F0B7D
BA610C57F1559C08BF6C6F5
EN
DD40D4, cn=SEHAR HASEEN
Date: 2024.05.22 16:49:59
+05'30'
