Madhya Pradesh High Court
Madhusunan Pandey vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 May, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1 M.Cr.C.No.17374/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 1st OF MAY, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 17374 of 2024
BETWEEN:-
1. MADHUSUNAN PANDEY S/O
RAMSHARAN PANDEY, AGED ABOUT
50 YEARS, OCCUPATION: FARMER R/O
PURANI BASTI WARD NO. 13 OF BUDI
MAI MANDIR NEAR POLICE STATION
KOTWALI DISTRICT ANUPPUR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
2. MADHUVAN PANDEY S/O
RAMSHARAN PANDEY, AGED ABOUT
40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: PRIVATE
JOB R/O PURANI BASTI WARD NO. 13
NEAR BUDI MAI TEMPLE POLICE
STATION KOTWALI NAIKIN DISTRICT
ANUPPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. ARADHANA PANDEY W/O MADHUVAN
PANDEY, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE R/O
PURANI BASTI WARD NO. 13 NEAR
BUDI MAI TEMPLE POLICE STATION
KOTWALI NAIKIN DISTRICT
ANUPPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPLICANTS
(BY SHRI SOURABH SINGH THAKUR - ADVOCATE )
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH POLICE STATION RAMPUR
NAIKAN DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2. MEENAKSHI PANDEY W/O
DEEPNARARAN PANDEY, AGED
ABOUT 25 YEARS, R/O WARD NO. 13
POLICE STATION KOTWALI
DISTRICT ANUPPUR (MADHYA
2 M.Cr.C.No.17374/2024
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI K.S.BAGHEL - GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR THE
RESPONDENT NO.1/STATE )
...................................................................................................
This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
This application under section 482 of CrPC has been filed
seeking the following relief :-
"It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may be pleased to quash the F.I.R. registered in
Crime no.889/2023 on 11/09/2023 at Police Station
Rampur Naikain, District Sidhi (M.P.) and its
consequential proceeding thereto for an offences
punishable u/s 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 of I.P.C. and
u/s 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the
applicants, in the interest of justice."
2. The applicants no.1 and 2 are the elder brother-in-law;
whereas the applicant no.3 is the wife of applicant no.2. The
respondent no.2 lodged an FIR on the allegation that she got married
to Deepnarayan Pandey on 11.7.2016 as per Hindu rites and rituals.
In the marriage her parents had given sufficient dowry. For the first
time, she stayed in her matrimonial house for 11 days. Thereafter,
she came back to her parental home and was frequently visiting her
matrimonial home as well as parental home. The things moved
properly till 2020. On 10.6.2021 at 11:00 a.m. her husband
Deepnarayan Pandey as well as the applicants starting alleging that
her parents have not given much dowry in the marriage and,
therefore, she should bring an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- and a
Motorcycle. When she replied that the financial condition of her
parents is not such that they can give an additional dowry, then her
husband Deepnarayan Pandey after abusing her filthily, started
assaulting her by fists and blows. The applicants also insulted her by
calling her Bitch (Kameeni) and instigated her husband that she
should be ousted and the applicant no.3 also assaulted her. However,
she continued to stay in her matrimonial house because she is having
two children aged about 6 years and 4 years. On 19.7.2023 again her
husband and the applicant no.3 started abusing her filthily and also
assaulted her and extended a threat to her life. The applicants no.1
and 2 also abused her and instigated that she should be ousted from
her matrimonial house by calling her as Bitch. Then she narrated the
incident to her parents and came back to her matrimonial house
along with her brother. Her both children have been forcibly kept by
her husband and since then she is residing in her parental home.
3. It was further alleged that her in-laws have never called her
back to her matrimonial house. They are also extending a threat that
unless and until a motorcycle and an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- are not
given, she will not be allowed to come back to her matrimonial
house.
4. Challenging the FIR lodged by the respondent no.2 it is
submitted by counsel for the applicants that the husband of the
respondent no.2 had made a police complaint on 20.7.2023; whereas
the FIR in question was lodged on 11.9.2023. It is further submitted
that the husband of respondent no.2 Deepnarayan Pandey has filed
an application under section 10 of Hindu Marriage Act and after
receiving the notice of the said application, the respondent no.2 has
lodged the FIR by way of counter blast and the allegations are false.
5. Per contra, the application is vehemently opposed by counsel
for applicants.
6. Heard the learned counsel for the applicants.
7. Before considering the submissions made by the counsel for
the applicants, this Court would like to consider the scope of
interference at this stage.
8. The Supreme Court in the case of XYZ v. State of Gujarat
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337 has held as under :
"14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and after perusing the impugned order and other
material placed on record, we are of the view that the
High Court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction
conferred under Section 482 CrPC, and quashed the
proceedings. Even before the investigation is
completed by the investigating agency, the High
Court entertained the writ petition, and by virtue of
interim order granted by the High Court, further
investigation was stalled. Having regard to the
allegations made by the appellant/informant, whether
the 2nd respondent by clicking inappropriate pictures
of the appellant has blackmailed her or not, and
further the 2nd respondent has continued to interfere
by calling Shoukin Malik or not are the matters for
investigation. In view of the serious allegations made
in the complaint, we are of the view that the High
Court should not have made a roving inquiry while
considering the application filed under Section 482
CrPC. Though the learned counsel have made
elaborate submissions on various contentious issues,
as we are of the view that any observation or findings
by this Court, will affect the investigation and trial,
we refrain from recording any findings on such
issues. From a perusal of the order of the High Court,
it is evident that the High Court has got carried away
by the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the
parties, and recorded a finding that the physical
relationship of the appellant with the 2nd respondent
was consensual. When it is the allegation of the
appellant, that such document itself is obtained under
threat and coercion, it is a matter to be investigated.
Further, the complaint of the appellant about
interference by the 2nd respondent by calling
Shoukin Malik and further interference is also a
matter for investigation. By looking at the contents of
the complaint and the serious allegations made
against 2nd respondent, we are of the view that the
High Court has committed error in quashing the
proceedings."
(Underline supplied)
9. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.
Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 has held as under:-
"7. In our view the assessment made by the High
Court at a stage when the investigation was yet to be
completed, is completely incorrect and uncalled for
..........."
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Das v. State
of Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319 has held as under :
"12. The counsel appearing for the appellant also
drew our attention to the same decision which is
relied upon in the impugned judgment by the High
Court i.e. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. In the said
decision, this Court held that it may not be possible
to lay down any specific guidelines or watertight
compartment as to when the power under Section
482 CrPC could be or is to be exercised. This Court,
however, gave an exhaustive list of various kinds of
cases wherein such power could be exercised. In para
103 of the said judgment, this Court, however,
hastened to add that as a note of caution it must be
stated that the power of quashing a criminal
proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and
with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases for the Court would not be justified in
embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in
the first information report or in the complaint and
that the extraordinary or the inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whim or caprice."
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v.
State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350 has held as under :
"5. Ordinarily and in the normal course, the High
Court when approached for quashing of a criminal
proceeding will not appreciate the defence of the
accused; neither would it consider the veracity of the
document(s) on which the accused relies. However
an exception has been carved out by this Court in Yin
Cheng Hsiung v. Essem Chemical Industries; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Harshendra Kumar D. v.
Rebatilata Koley to the effect that in an appropriate
case where the document relied upon is a public
document or where veracity thereof is not disputed
by the complainant, the same can be considered."
12. The Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v.
Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226 has held as
under :
"18. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily
embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained.
That is the function of the trial Judge/Court. It is true
that the Court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant
facts and circumstances into consideration before
issuing process, otherwise, it would be an instrument
in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same
time, Section 482 is not an instrument handed over to
an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and brings
about its closure without full-fledged enquiry.
19. Though the High Court may exercise its power
relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice, the power should be exercised sparingly.
For example, where the allegations made in the FIR
or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused or allegations in the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence or do not disclose commission of
any offence and make out a case against the accused
or where there is express legal bar provided in any of
the provisions of the Code or in any other enactment
under which a criminal proceeding is initiated or
sufficient material to show that the criminal
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused due to
private and personal grudge, the High Court may step
in.
20. Though the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 are wide, however, such power
requires care/caution in its exercise. The interference
must be on sound principles and the inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. We make it clear that if the allegations
set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence
of which cognizance has been taken by the
Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the
same in exercise of inherent powers under Section
482."
13. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Srikanth v. State of
Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373 has held as under :
"17. It could thus be seen, that this Court has held,
that where the allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute a case against the accused, the High Court
would be justified in quashing the proceedings.
Further, it has been held that where the
uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose any offence and make out a case against the
accused, the Court would be justified in quashing the
proceedings."
14. The Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Arvind Khanna
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686 has held as under :
"17. After perusing the impugned order and on
hearing the submissions made by the learned
Senior Counsel on both sides, we are of the view
that the impugned order passed by the High Court
is not sustainable. In a petition filed under Section
482 CrPC, the High Court has recorded findings
on several disputed facts and allowed the petition.
Defence of the accused is to be tested after
appreciating the evidence during trial. The very
fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the
most minute details, on the allegations made by
the appellant CBI, and the defence put forth by the
respondent, led us to a conclusion that the High
Court has exceeded its power, while exercising its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
18. In our view, the assessment made by the High
Court at this stage, when the matter has been
taken cognizance of by the competent court, is
completely incorrect and uncalled for."
15. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of State of MP Vs.
Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A.
No.709/2021 has held that a detailed and meticulous appreciation of
evidence at the stage of 482 of CrPC is not permissible and should
not be done. In the case of Kunwar Singh (supra), the Supreme
Court held as under:-
"8........At this stage, the High Court ought not
to be scrutinizing the material in the manner in
which the trial court would do in the course of the
criminal trial after evidence is adduced. In doing
so, the High Court has exceeded the well-settled
limits on the exercise of the jurisdiction under
Section 482 of CrPC. A detailed enquiry into the
merits of the allegations was not warranted. The
FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia..........."
16. Similar law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the
cases of Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2018) 5
SCC 678, Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15
SCC 221, State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan, reported in
(2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal reported in (2010)
5 SCC 600, Sangeeta Agrawal v. State of U.P., reported in (2019)
2 SCC 336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9
SCC 460, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri
Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437, M.N. Ojha
v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682.
17. Thus, it is clear that this Court can quash the proceedings only
if the uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence and this
Court cannot conduct a mini trial at this stage to find out the
correctness of the allegations.
18. So far as the complaint made by the husband of the respondent
no.2, which has been filed as Annexure P-2 is concerned, the same
cannot be relied upon because at this stage this Court cannot hold
that the allegations made in the complaint are correct. It is the
question of defence liable to be proved by the applicant in the trial.
So far as the institution of application section 10 of Hindu Marriage
Act is concerned, it is suffice to mention here that merely because
the FIR was lodged after the institution of the said application, the
FIR cannot be quashed on the ground of counter blast.
19. The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari
Devi, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:-
"14. From a plain reading of the findings
arrived at by the High Court while quashing
the FIR, it is apparent that the High Court
had relied on extraneous considerations and
acted beyond the allegations made in the
FIR for quashing the same in exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code. We have already noted the
illustrations enumerated in Bhajan Lal
case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 426] and from a careful reading of
these illustrations, we are of the view that
the allegations emerging from the FIR are
not covered by any of the illustrations as
noted hereinabove. For example, we may
take up one of the findings of the High
Court as noted hereinabove. The High Court
has drawn an adverse inference on account
of the FIR being lodged on 31-12-2001
while the appellant was forced out of the
matrimonial home on 25-5-2001.
15. In our view, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court
was not justified in drawing an adverse
inference against the appellant wife for
lodging the FIR on 31-12-2001 on the
ground that she had left the matrimonial
home at least six months before that. This is
because, in our view, the High Court had
failed to appreciate that the appellant and
her family members were, during this
period, making all possible efforts to enter
into a settlement so that Respondent 2
husband would take her back to the
matrimonial home. If any complaint was
made during this period, there was every
possibility of not entering into any
settlement with Respondent 2 husband.
16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint
was filed only when all efforts to return to
the matrimonial home had failed and
Respondent 2 husband had filed a divorce
petition under Section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view,
filing of a divorce petition in a civil court
cannot be a ground to quash criminal
proceedings under Section 482 of the Code
as it is well settled that criminal and civil
proceedings are separate and independent
and the pendency of a civil proceeding
cannot bring to an end a criminal
proceeding even if they arise out of the
same set of facts. Such being the position,
we are, therefore, of the view that the High
Court while exercising its powers under
Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond
the allegations made in the FIR and has
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and,
therefore, the High Court was not justified
in quashing the FIR by going beyond the
allegations made in the FIR or by relying on
extraneous considerations.
*****
22. For the reasons aforesaid, we are
inclined to interfere with the order of the
High Court and hold that the High Court in
quashing the FIR in the exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code by relying on the investigation report
and the findings made therein has acted
beyond its jurisdiction. For the purpose of
finding out the commission of a cognizable
offence, the High Court was only required
to look into the allegations made in the
complaint or the FIR and to conclude
whether a prima facie offence had been
made out by the complainant in the FIR or
the complaint or not."
20. Merely because the wife did not lodge the FIR at the first
instance and maintained silence in order to save her marital life, then
it cannot be said that the allegations are afterthought. If the wife after
realizing that her husband has crossed all the limits thereby closing
the chances of reconciliation and if decides to lodge the FIR with
regard to the cruelty meted out to her, then it cannot be said that the
allegations made in the FIR are false or are afterthought.
21. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of considered opinion that when there are specific
allegations against the applicants with date and the role played by
them, no case is made out warranting interference.
22. At this stage, it is submitted by counsel for the applicants that
although they are residing in the same colony but in the different
house.
23. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the
applicants.
24. The applicants have filed Samagra IDs to show that they are
the residents of Ward No.13, Anuppur, Zone-I, Municipal Council,
Anuppur, District Anuppur. From the complaint, which was lodged
by the husband of the respondent no.2, it is clear that he has also
disclosed his address as Anuppur, Ward No.13, District Anuppur.
25. Thus, prima facie it appears that the applicants and the
husband of the respondent no.2 are residing in the same premises.
However, it is for the applicants to prove that they were residing
separately and having no access to the residence of the respondent
no.2.
26. Since the allegations made against the applicants are specific
and cannot be said to be vague, general and omnibus, therefore, no
case is made out warranting interference.
27. The application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S.AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
TG/-
TRUPTI GUNJAL
2024.05.03 16:30:19
+05'30'
