Madhya Pradesh High Court
A.P.Shukla vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 7 August, 2024
WA No.450 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA,
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VINAY SARAF
ON THE 7th OF AUGUST, 2024
WRIT APPEAL No. 450 of 2023
A. P. SHUKLA
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Dileep Kumar Pandey - Advocate for Petitioner.
Shri Arubendra Singh Parihar - Advocate for Respondent No.4.
Shri S.S. Chauhan - Government Advocate for State.
ORDER
Per: Sanjeev Sachdeva, Acting Chief Justice
1. Appellant impugns order dated 08.02.2023, whereby the application
filed by the respondent No.4 seeking dismissal of writ petition filed by
the petitioner has been allowed and the writ petition dismissed.
2. Appellant filed the subject petition, inter alia seeking a direction to
respondent No.1 to 3 i.e. Municipal Corporation to allot the extra land
adjacent to the appellant's house measuring 1637.25 Sq. Ft. on the same
rate, terms and conditions as has been allotted to respondent No.4.
3. By the subject application, respondent No.4 pointed out that
appellant had earlier filed a Civil Suit claiming identical relief of
allotment of the adjoining land on perpetual lease basis and as such the
claim of the appellant was barred by the principle of issue estoppel.
4. The learned Single Judge has noticed that the Suit of the appellant
was dismissed by the Trial Court holding that appellant was an
unauthorized encroacher upon the land annexed to his alloted house and
thus was not entitled for grant of permanent lease of the extra encroached
land. Learned Single Judge noticed the contention of learned counsel for
the appellant that the subject petition had been filed for a different cause
of action, but held that petitioner was trying to seek the same relief which
had earlier been declined by the Trial Court.
5. Before us also, an effort was made by learned counsel for the
appellant to contend that the relief sought for in the subject writ petition
is different from the relief that had been sought in the suit.
6. We are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the
appellant for the reason that the entire dispute in the Suit as well as in the
subject petition pertained to the land adjoining the existing land of the
appellant. In the civil suit appellant was seeking a direction to the
Municipal Corporation to allot the adjoining land on perpetual lease
basis. In the subject writ petition also, petitioner inter alia seeks a
direction to the respondents to allot the extra land adjacent to the
appellant's house. The other relief sought for by the appellant is with
regard to the decision of the respondents in rejecting the representation
for allotment of land to the appellant.
7. Substantive relief sought for in the Suit as well as in the Writ Petition
is with regard to the allotment of extra land adjacent to the appellant's
house.
8. We concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the
Suit and the subject Writ Petition both seek the same relief.
9. Reference may be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hope
Plantations Ltd. Vs. Taluk Land Board (1999) 5 SCC 590, wherein the
Supreme Court has held as under :
"26. It is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res
judicata are based on public policy and justice. Doctrine of
res judicata is often treated as a branch of the law of
estoppel though these two doctrines differ in some essential
particulars. Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a
judicial determination from litigating the same question
over again even though the determination may even be
demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained
finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped
from questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same
cause of action nor can they litigate any issue which was
necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. These two
aspects are "cause of action estoppel" and "issue
estoppel". These two terms are of common law origin.
Again, once an issue has been finally determined, parties
cannot subsequently in the same suit advance arguments or
adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue
was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is to approach
the higher forum if available. The determination of the issue
between the parties gives rise to, as noted above, an issue
estoppel. It operates in any subsequent proceedings in the
same suit in which the issue had been determined. It also
operates in subsequent suits between the same parties in
which the same issue arises. Section 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure contains provisions of res judicata but these are
not exhaustive of the general doctrine of res judicata. Legal
principles of estoppel and res judicata are equally
applicable in proceedings before administrative authorities
as they are based on public policy and justice.
*** *** ***
29. In Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Plc. [(1991) 2
AC 93 : (1991) 3 All ER 41, HL] the House of Lords noticed
the distinction between cause of action estoppel and issue
estoppel. Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of
action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the
earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the
same parties or their privies and having involved the same
subject-matter. In such a case, the bar is absolute in
relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is
alleged, such as to justify setting aside the earlier judgment.
The discovery of new factual matter which could not have
been found out by reasonable diligence for use in the earlier
proceedings does not, according to the law of England,
prevent the latter from being reopened. Issue estoppel may
arise where a particular issue forming a necessary
ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and
decided and in subsequent proceedings between the same
parties involving a different cause of action to which the
same issue is relevant, one of the parties seeks to reopen
that issue. Here also bar is complete to relitigation but its
operation can be thwarted under certain circumstances. The
House then finally observed.
"But there is room for the view that the underlying
principles upon which estoppel is based, public policy and
justice have greater force in cause of action estoppel, the
subject-matter of the two proceedings being identical, than
they do in issue estoppel, where the subject-matter is
different. Once it is accepted that different considerations
apply to issue estoppel, it is hard to perceive any logical
distinction between a point which was previously raised and
decided and one which might have been but was not. Given
that the further material which would have put an entirely
different complexion on the point was at the earlier stage
unknown to the party and could not by reasonable diligence
have been discovered by him, it is hard to see why there
should be a different result according to whether he decided
not to take the point, thinking it hopeless, or argue it faintly
without any real hope of success. In my opinion, your
Lordships should affirm it to be the law that there may be
an exception to issue estoppel in the special circumstances
that there has become available to a party further material
relevant to the correct determination of a point involved in
the earlier proceedings, whether or not that point was
specifically raised and decided, being material which could
not by reasonable diligence have been adduced in those
proceedings. One of the purposes of estoppel being to work
justice between the parties, it is open to courts to recognise
that in special circumstances inflexible application of it may
have the opposite result.
Next question for consideration is whether the further
relevant material which a party may be permitted to bring
forward in the later proceedings is confined to matters of
fact, or whether what may not entirely inappositely be
described as a change in the law may result in, or be an
element in special circumstances enabling an issue to be
reopened.
Your Lordships should appropriately, in my opinion,
regard the matter as entire and approach it from the point
of view of principle. If a Judge has made a mistake, perhaps
a very egregious mistake, as is said of Walton, J.'s judgment
here, and a later judgment of a higher court overrules his
decision in another case, do considerations of justice
require that the party who suffered from the mistake should
be shut out, when the same issue arises in later proceedings
with a different subject-matter, from reopening that issue?
I am satisfied, in agreement with both courts below, that
the instant case presents special circumstances such as to
require the plaintiffs to be permitted to reopen the question
of construction decided against them by Walton, J., that
being a decision which I regard as plainly wrong."
*** *** ***
31. Law on res judicata and estoppel is well understood in
India and there are ample authoritative pronouncements by
various courts on these subjects. As noted above, the plea of
res judicata, though technical, is based on public policy in
order to put an end to litigation. It is, however, different if
an issue which had been decided in an earlier litigation
again arises for determination between the same parties in
a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is
continuous cause of action. The parties then may not be
bound by the determination made earlier if in the
meanwhile, law has changed or has been interpreted
differently by a higher forum. But that situation does not
exist here. Principles of constructive res judicata apply with
full force. It is the subsequent stage of the same
proceedings. If we refer to Order XLVII of the Code
(Explanation to Rule 1) review is not permissible on the
ground
"that the decision on a question of law on which the
judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in
any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such
judgment".
10. In the case of Hope Plantations (supra), the Supreme Court has
held that the legal principles of res judicata and estoppel, grounded in
public policy and justice, are crucial in preventing the relitigation of
previously decided issues or causes of action. These doctrines ensure
finality in judicial determinations and apply to both court proceedings and
administrative hearings. Res judicata encompasses "cause of action
estoppel" and "issue estoppel," which bar parties from relitigating the
same question, even if the original determination may be flawed. The
House of Lords in Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Plc. (supra)
distinguished between cause of action estoppel (an absolute bar) and issue
estoppel (which can be reopened under special circumstances). In certain
cases, new material that couldn't have been discovered earlier through
reasonable diligence or changes in law interpretation by higher courts
may allow an issue to be reopened. However, in India, the principle of
constructive res judicata is strictly applied in subsequent stages of the
same proceedings, and a change in law interpretation in a different case is
not grounds for review of a judgment. These principles collectively serve
to maintain the integrity of the legal system and prevent endless
litigation."
11. Reference may also be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Bhanu Kumar Jain Vs. Archana Kumar and Anr. reported in 2005 (1)
SCC 787, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under :
"29. There is a distinction between "issue estoppel" and
"res judicata". (See Thoday v. Thoday [(1964) 1 All ER 341
: (1964) 2 WLR 371 : 1964 P 181 (CA)])
30. Res judicata debars a court from exercising its
jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality
between the parties whereas the doctrine issue estoppel is
invoked against the party. If such an issue is decided against
him, he would be estopped from raising the same in the latter
proceeding. The doctrine of res judicata creates a different
kind of estoppel viz. estoppel by accord.
31. In a case of this nature, however, the doctrine of "issue
estoppel" as also "cause of action estoppel" may arise. In
Thoday [(1964) 1 All ER 341 : (1964) 2 WLR 371 : 1964 P
181 (CA)] Lord Diplock held: (All ER p. 352 B-D)
"... 'cause of action estoppel', is that which prevents a party
to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other
party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-
existence or existence of which has been determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between
the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to
exist i.e. judgment was given on it, it is said to be merged in
the judgment.... If it was determined not to exist, the
unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is
estopped per rem judicatam." [Ed.: The rest of the extract
from Thoday [(1964) 1 All ER 341 : (1964) 2 WLR 371 :
1964 P 181 (CA)] may usefully be referred to (All ER p. 352,
B-F)"Estoppel per rem judicatam is a generic term which in
modern law includes two species. The first species, 'cause of
action estoppel', is that which prevents a party to an action
from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the
existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence
or existence of which has been determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the
same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist,
i.e., judgment was given on it, it is said to be merged in the
judgment, or for those who prefer Latin, transit in rem
judicatam. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful
plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per
rem judicatam. This is simply an application of the rule of
public policy expressed in the Latin maxim, 'nemo debet bis
vexari pro una at eadem causa'. In this application of the
maxim, causa bears its literal Latin meaning. The second
species, 'issue estoppel', is an extension of the same rule of
public policy. There are many causes of action which can
only be established by proving that two or more different
conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as
many separate issues between the parties as there are
conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff in order to establish
his cause of action; and there may be cases where the
fulfilment of an identical condition is a requirement common
to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation on
one such cause of action any of such separate issues whether
a particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, either on evidence or on
admission by a party to the litigation, neither party can, in
subsequent litigation between them on any cause of action
which depends on the fulfilment of the identical condition,
assert that the condition was fulfilled if the court has in the
first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was
fulfilled if the court in the first litigation determined that it
was."]
32. The said dicta was followed in Barber v. Staffordshire
County Council [(1996) 2 All ER 748 (CA)] . A cause of
action estoppel arises where in two different proceedings
identical issues are raised, in which event, the latter
proceedings between the same parties shall be dealt with
similarly as was done in the previous proceedings. In such
an event the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided
save and except allegation of fraud and collusion. [See C. (A
Minor) v. Hackney London Borough Council [(1996) 1 All
ER 973 : (1996) 1 WLR 789 (CA)]]"
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra) held
that the legal concepts of issue estoppel and res judicata, as outlined in
Thoday v. Thoday (1964), are distinct but related. Res judicata prevents
courts from re-examining finalized disputes, creating an "estoppel by
accord." Issue estoppel, on the other hand, stops parties from re-raising
previously decided issues. These principles include cause of action
estoppel (preventing assertion or denial of a determined cause of action)
and issue estoppel (applying to identical conditions in different causes).
13. Ratio of the said judgments is squarely applicable to the facts of the
present case. Appellant has already availed of the remedy of filing of a
suit claiming the same relief, thus a Writ Petition on the same ground
would not be maintainable and is barred by principles of issue estoppel.
In any event, the dispute raised by the Appellant is a factual dispute,
which in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this
Court would not entertain as it involves complicated disputed question of
facts.
14. In view of above, we find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is
consequently, dismissed.
15. We are informed that the appellant has already filed an appeal
impugning the order, whereby its suit was dismissed and the appeal is
still pending. It is clarified that this Court has neither considered nor
commented on the merits of the contention of the either parties. All rights
and contentions of the parties are reserved.
(SANJEEV SACHDEVA) (VINAY SARAF)
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
Shub
Date: 2024.08.27 13:04:42 +05'30'
