Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3971 MP
Judgement Date : 23 March, 2022
W.P.No.6269/2000
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT
JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
ON THE 23rd OF MARCH, 2022
WRIT PETITION No. 6269 of 2000
Between:-
TIRATH SINGH, S/O SHRI BATTAN
SINGH, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
SHOVEL OPERATOR, NORTHERN
COALFIELDS LIMITED, COAL SECTION,
JAYANT PROJECT, DISTT.-SIDHI
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(SHRI ADITYA VEER SINGH, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER)
AND
1.NORTHERN COALFIELDS LIMITED
THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN-CUM-
MANAGING DIRECTOR, SINGRAULI,
DISTT-SIDHI (M.P.)
2. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,
NORTHERN COALFIELDS LIMITED,
JAYANT PROJECT, DISTT-SIDHI
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
( SHRI GREESHM JAIN, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
RESPONDENTS )
This petition coming on for final hearing this day, the court
passed the following:
ORDER
By filing this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is seeking a direction to the respondents to grant full salary for the period when he remained in judicial custody W.P.No.6269/2000
w.e.f. 6.10.1993 to 23.1.1996. Further direction is also sought to grant increment for the aforesaid period and also other benefits, which would have accrued in favour of the petitioner had he not been sent to the jail.
2. The brief facts leading to filing of this case are that the petitioner was working as Shovel Operator in the Northern Coalfields Ltd. and at the relevant time he was posted in Jayant Project. The petitioner was arrested by the Uttar Pradesh Police under the provisions of TADA due to his involvement in certain activities on 6.10.1993. He remained in custody upto 23.1.1996 on which date he was enlarged on bail. After his release on bail, the petitioner reported for duties and was permitted to join. In the meanwhile, for the offence for which the petitioner was arrested, was put to trial by Sessions Judge in Uttar Pradesh in Sessions Case No. 88/1995. Vide order dated 9.9.1989, the petitioner acquitted of the criminal charges. Earlier the instant petition was finally decided vide order dated 23.11.2010 dismissing the writ petition. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a review petition No.39/2011 and vide order dated 21.4.2011 this Court was pleased to recall the order dated 23.11.2010 and the petition was restored to its original number for hearing afresh.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the petitioner was kept under illegal custody, therefore, he is entitled for full salary for the period 6.10.1993 to 23.1.1996. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents cannot deny the salary to the petitioner for the aforesaid period of his detention in jail as neither any chargesheet was issued nor any inquiry was conducted by the respondents. Had the petitioner been placed under suspension, he would be entitled for the subsistence allowance. In view of the aforesaid, the respondents cannot hold the salary of petitioner for the aforesaid period, which is absolutely illegal and against the service jurisprudence.
W.P.No.6269/2000
4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed the prayer and stated that the petitioner was not kept away from the work by any order of the respondents. In fact no action whatsoever was initiated against the petitioner for his absence. Immediately after release on bail, the petitioner was reinstated in service, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for the salary for the aforesaid period. However, the respondents have regularized the period by treating it as "spent on duty for all purposes except salary". The salary has been denied on the principle of "no work no pay". Accordingly, the learned counsel for respondents contended that no salary can be paid to the petitioner for the aforesaid period when he remained under judicial custody. Though in the review petition, the order dated 23.11.2010 having been recalled, the petitioner would not be entitled to any subsistence allowance since he neither suspended nor any disciplinary action was initiated against him.
5. Learned counsel for respondents further submitted that the petition is hopelessly barred by time and the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgment rendered in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. R.K.Zalpuri and others (2015) 15 SCC 602. Learned counsel for respondents also submitted that the petitioner has been denied the salary on the ground of "no work no pay". In this context, he has also placed reliance in the case of Management of Reserve Bank of India Vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 54.
6. Learned counsel for respondents also relied on the judgment rendered in the case of Baldev Singh Vs. Union of India and others (2005) 8 SCC 747, wherein the Apex Court in Para 7 held as under :-
W.P.No.6269/2000
"As the factual position noted clearly indicates the appellant was not in actual service for the period he was in custody. Merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle him to get salary for the concerned period. This is more so, on the logic of no work no pay. It is to be noted that the appellant was terminated from service because of the conviction. Effect of the same does not get diluted because of subsequent acquittal for the purpose of counting service. The aforesaid position was clearly stated in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Anr. (1996 (11) SC 603)."
7. He also placed reliance on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121, whereby it has been held :-
"On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefore does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon for the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefore and operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in [1996] 11 SCC 603 (supra). If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest or by department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and it after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges, a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing re- instatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be re-instated, in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for W.P.No.6269/2000
which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court in so far as it directed payment of back wages are liable to be and is hereby set aside."
8. Heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the record.
9. In view of the aforesaid principles laid down in the cases of Baldev Singh and Jaipal Singh (supra), I find no error on the part of the respondents in denying the salary to the petitioner for the period w.e.f. 6.10.1993 to 23.1.1996. The petitioner remained absent on account of his misconduct/involvement in a criminal case, therefore, the respondents are no way responsible for keeping the petitioner away from duties. There is no merit in the claim made by the petitioner. The petitioner has been rightly denied the salary on the ground of "no work no pay". In doing so, the respondents have not committed any error, warranting interference.
10. Accordingly, finding no merit in the writ petition, the same is dismissed.
(S.A.DHARMADHIKARI) JUDGE
TG/-
Digitally signed by TRUPTI GUNJAL Date: 2022.03.24 16:51:50 +05'30'
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