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Ramua vs Kodulal
2022 Latest Caselaw 3641 MP

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3641 MP
Judgement Date : 15 March, 2022

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramua vs Kodulal on 15 March, 2022
Author: Arun Kumar Sharma
                                   1

         THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : JABALPUR

1   Case Number               Second Appeal No.1558/2008
2   Parties Name              Ramua (Dead) and another vs. Kodulal and
                              another
3   Date of Judgment          15/03/2022
4   Bench Constituted of      Hon. Shri Justice Arun Kumar Sharma
5   Judgment delivered by     Hon. Shri Justice Arun Kumar Sharma
6   Whether approved for re- YES
    porting
7   Name of the counsel for   Shri Sushil Kumar Tiwari, Advocate for the ap-
    the parties               pellants.
                              Shri P. C. Paliwal, Advocate for respondent
                              no.1.
                              Shri Yogesh Mishra, PL for respondent no.2 /
                              State.
8   Law Laid down & Signif- Respondent no. 1 has miserably failed in show-
    cant paragraphs number
                            ing any "sufficient cause" which is necessary in-
    no. 12, 14 & 17
                            gredients under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
                              for condonation of delay. He has acted with cal-
                              lousness, irresponsibly and did not state true
                              facts in the applications. He has not ap-
                              proached the Court with clean hands


                                             (Arun Kumar Sharma)
                                                   Judge



JP/-
                                                    2                               SA No.1558/08




               HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, JABALPUR
(SINGLE BENCH : HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR SHARMA)
                                         S.A. No.1558/2008
                                 Ramua (Dead) and another
                                                      Vs.
                                       Kodulal and another
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shri Sushil Kumar Tiwari, Advocate for the appellants.
Shri P. C. Paliwal, Advocate for respondent no. 1.
Shri Yogesh Mishra, PL for respondent no. 2/ State.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              JUDGMENT

(15-03-2022)

Today the case is listed for hearing on IA No.6938/2021 under

Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC; IA No.6939/2021 under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act and also IA No.6937/2021 under Order 22 Rule 3/11 of

CPC. All these applications have been fled by respondent no. 1 on

20.09.2021.

2. I.A. No.6938/2021 under Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil

Procedure fled seeking setting aside of the abatement is barred

by time. It is fled accompanied by an application i.e. I.A.

No.6939/2021 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking

condonation of delay.

3. On 20.9.2021 the application i.e. IA No.6938/2021 under Order

22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside of the

abatement against the deceased appellant no. 1 has been fled by

respondent no. 1 stating that during the pendency of the cross-

appeal, appellant no. 1 Ramua S/o. Devi Mehra died on 12-07-2018

and respondent no.1 came to the knowledge of death of appellant

no. 1 in the month of September, 2021 frst time and thus,

respondent no.1 was required for substitution of his legal

representatives of the deceased appellant no. 1 in the memo of

cross-appeal within a period of 90 days but the same was not done

within the prescribed period of time and thus, the cross-appeal is

abated against the deceased appellant no.1 on 10-10-2018. The

limitation for fling the application was up to 9-12-2018 and this

application was also not fled within a period of 60 days from the

date of abatement. It is further contended that the counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants had not informed

respondent no. 1 and even this Court regarding the death of

appellant no. 1. Respondent no. 1 is residing in remote area and is a

rustic villager and he belongs to rural folk, or is poverty stricken or

illiterate and is mostly not aware of the necessity of taking steps

for substitution on the death of a party.

4. On 20.9.2021 the accompanied application i.e. I.A.

No.6939/2021 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been fled

stating that the cross-appeal is abated against the deceased

appellant no.1 on 10-10-2018. The limitation for fling the application

under Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC was up to 9-12-2018 and this

application was also not fled within a period of 60 days from the

date of abatement. Hence, this application is barred by 1016 days

which requires to be condoned inter-alia on the grounds that

respondent no. 1 is a 78 years old and sick person and is a very

hopeless state of health. Due to Covid-19 corona virus (pandemic),

respondent no. 1 could not establish connection between his

relatives and close friends. The delay in fling the application is

due to bona-fde and with sufficient cause. The approach has to be

liberal and judicious guided by the paramount consideration of not

depriving a litigant ordinarily of adjudication of rights on merits.

Hyper technical, too strict, and pedantic approach as may cause

injustice has to be avoided. Hence, prayer is made to condone the

delay.

5. IA No.6937/2021 under Order 22 Rule 3/11 of CPC for bringing

the legal representatives of the deceased -appellant no. 1 Ramua

S/o. Devi Mehra in the memo of cross-objection / appeal has been

fled. The application is supported by an affidavit of respondent

no. 1 / plaintiff Kodulal.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants refuting the aforesaid

contentions contended that the application (IA No.6938/21) under

Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC has not been fled within the prescribed

time period and there is inordinate delay of 1016 days for which day

to day explanation has not been given even no satisfactory

explanation and sufficient cause has been shown. Moreover, the

appellants / defendants fled the present second appeal on

20.11.2008 against the judgment and decree dated 22.08.2008

passed by Additional Judge to the Court of Third Additional District

Judge (Fast Track Court) Shahdol in C. A. No.140-A/2007, whereby

the said appeal preferred by respondent no. 1 / plaintiff Kodulal

was partly allowed and passed the decree that possession of the

plaintiff shall not be removed except in accordance with law. This

appeal was listed for hearing on 18-03-2009 and on the same day,

the appellants / defendants had withdrawn the appeal. During the

pendency of this second appeal, on 6.2.2009 respondent no. 1 /

plaintiff fled the cross appeal / objection under Order 41 Rule 22 of

the Code of Civil Procedure which is pending and is barred by 525

days and on 16.7.2010 the application i.e. IA No.7941/2010 under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act was fled seeking condonation of

delay in fling the cross-appeal / objection. This court vide order

dated 14.12.2009 called for record of the courts below and directed

to list the case for cross-objection / appeal fled by respondent no. 1

immediately after receipt of the record. Vide order dated 21.6.2010

the case was fxed for 24.6.2020 for consideration the question

regarding maintainability of the cross objection in the disposed of

second appeal. However, on 24.6.2010 the case was adjourned for

admission of cross objection and on 30.06.2010 before making any

submission on merits of cross objection for admission, counsel for

respondent no. 1 prayed for time to fle an appropriate application

on the question of limitation. IA No.7941/2010 under Section 5 of

the Limitation Act fled seeking condonation of delay occurred in

fling the cross-appeal / objection was barred by 525 days in which

day to day delay has not been explained by respondent no.1 in

fling the cross objection so also the delay of fling an application

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Further contended that no

cause, much less sufficient, has been shown for setting aside the

abatement. Due to non-availability of explanation of day to day

delay and also due to vague and general application, the same is

liable to be rejected. Resultantly, on the ground of delay alone,

cross -objection / appeal is not sustainable. Further contended that

respondent no. 1 / plaintiff has no right, title or any kind of owner

on the land dispute in question has already been held initially by

learned both the courts below and thus, the cross objection is sans

merit and it is liable to be dismissed in motion stage and the

second appeal fled by the appellants has been dismissed as not

pressed and now, there is no substantial question of law to

entertain the cross objection after dismissal of the second appeal.

7. Further contended that respondent no. 1 has suppressed

very important fact of the case regarding getting information

about the death of appellant no. 1. While, respondent no.1 is the

real brother of deceased -appellant no. 1 Ramua; resident of the

same village. According to the particular of record of courts below

and the particular of memo of cross appeal and even from the

particular of address of affidavits of Kodulal Mehra fled presently

in support of all aforesaid applications showing himself as a

resident of the same village i.e. Dindori, PS Chandia, District Umaria

and how can one assume that a sibling has no knowledge about his

brother's death. Further submitted that no reasonable and

plausible explanation has been given in the aforesaid applications

by respondent no.1 about the particular date of time of knowledge

of death of Ramua and about the particular of source of

information from anyone; either from relatives or friends of

respondent no.1 or the deceased Ramua and in fact, vague and

general explanation has been given to set aside the abatement of

cross appeal against appellant no. 1 and condoning the delay of

fling the application for bringing the LR's on record and thus in

absence of "sufficient cause" delay need not be condoned. On

behalf of appellant no.2, the learned counsel invited the attention

of this court that admittedly the appeal fled by the appellants

Ramua and Smt. Janki Dvei was dismissed as not pressed on very

frst hearing of admission stage without any notice to any

respondents on dated 18.03.2009 i.e. much before the date of

death of Ramua who died on 12.07.2018. But, only because of the

fling of cross objection it is surviving, in which since the date

21.06.2010 it was not argued on maintainability of cross objection

being not fled within the prescribed limitation for fling the second

appeal and now the aforesaid applications have been fled after

about more than 3 years from the date of death of Ramua and not

fled within the prescribed limitation of 90 days. The respondent

no.1 in the said two applications admitted the delay of about 1016

days but the said delay has not been explained properly and

submitted that if he did not take any steps to bring the same on

record in this appeal within limitation, resultantly the appeal has

become abated automatically under the law. Thus, there is no

sufficient cause to condone such delay and setting aside the

aforesaid abatement and prayer for dismissal of such applications

was made.

8. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and on a bare

perusal of the aforesaid applications, it is found that admittedly

there is a delay of 1016 days according to respondent no. 1 in fling

the application for bringing the legal representatives on record and

for setting aside of the abatement. To explain this delay,

respondent no. 1 has fled application mentioning general cause,

and no sufficient cause and reasonable cause has been shown for

condoning the delay. Respondent no. 1 has taken grounds that

respondent no. 1 is an old and infrm person and resides in a

remote area and there is no connection between the deceased -

appellant no. 1, because of which, respondent no. 1 could not get

information regarding the death of appellant no. 1 and for the frst

time in September, 2021 respondent no. 1 came to know about the

death of appellant no. 1. Mere allegations about belated

knowledge of death of the opposite party would not be sufficient.

9. It is clear from a bare reading of the applications (IA

No.6938/21 & 6939/21) that respondent no. 1 was totally callous

about pursuing his appeal. He has acted irresponsibly and even

with negligence. Besides this, he has not approached the Court

with clean hands. Respondent no. 1, who seeks aid of the Court for

exercising its discretionary power for condoning the delay, is

expected to state correct facts and not state lies before the Court.

Approaching the Court with unclean hands itself is a ground for

rejection of such applications.

10. On the reason mentioned in the application U/O 22 Rule 9

read with application U/s. 5 of the Limitation Act and on

submission raised by the learned counsel, it is evident from the

above narrated facts that appellant no.1 died on 12.07.2018, while

the present applications have been fled on or about 23.09.2021.

Thus, there is delay of about 1080 in fling these applications and

very vague and general explanation has been given that

respondent no.1 came to know about Ramua's death in

September, 2021 and what was the explanation in between

12.07.2018 to September 2021, no sufficient cause or reason has

been assigned about such huge delay despite the fact that

respondent no.1 is real brother of Ramua and no one can assume

that a sibling wasn't aware of his brother's death. And even no

reasonable cause has been shown for condoning the delay of more

than 3 years and the appeal has already abated.

11. The Apex Court in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v.

Jagdish Singh and others, (2010) 8 SCC 684 has held that "even if

"sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must

squarely fall within concept of reasonable time and proper conduct

of party concerned. Liberal construction cannot be equated with

doing injustice to the other party. There is no straitjacket formula

uniformly applicable to all the cases.

12. It is a settled position of law that a suit or an appeal abates

automatically if the legal representatives, particularly of the sole

appellant, are not brought on record within the stipulated period.

Relevant paragraphs 37 and 38 are reproduced here as under:-

37. "We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra). In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with applications fled under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation of delay in fling the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as under:-

"13 (i) The words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words `sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fdes, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant."

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation

of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.

(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.

(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in fling an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-fling

the appeal after rectifcation of defects.

(v) Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for fnal hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal.

We may also notice here that this judgment had been followed with approval by an equi-bench of this Court in the case of Katari Suryanarayana (supra).

38. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fde reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and

applications belatedly fled beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in fling such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the fling of such applications.

13. Same was the view of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case

of Union of India and others vs. Nripen Sarma, reported in 2013

(3) MPLJ 5 and this Court in the case of Anoop Choudhary vs.

Smt. Usha Bhargawa, ILR (2008) MP 1763 has also dismissed the

application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on ground of

"insufficient cause".

14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and taking into

consideration the aforesaid case laws, this court fnds that

respondent no. 1 has totally failed to show "sufficient cause" to

condone the delay and has also failed to show why immediate

steps were not taken by respondent no.1. Thus, this Court has no

hesitation to reject the applications being IA No.6939/21 under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act and consequently, IA No.6938/21

under Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC and IA No.6937/21 under Order 22

Rule 3/11 of CPC.

15. Heard on IA No.7941/2010 under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act which is barred by 525 days in fling the cross -objection /

appeal fled by respondent no. 1.

16. Learned counsel for appellant no. 2 has also fled reply to the

aforesaid application being IA No.3535/2017 in detail and prayed

for dismissal of the same as well as cross-appeal / objection in

preliminary stage on admission.

17. This application (IA No.7941/2010) also deserves to be

dismissed as not maintainable due to barred by time and also in

absence of satisfactory & reasonable explanation of day to day

delay in fling the cross objection (cross appeal). Further, this

application has also been fled by misrepresenting the facts and

vague and general cause has been shown for condoning the delay

which are not under the purview of "Sufficient cause" and

moreover, respondent no. 1 has not come before this Court with

clean hands and tried to misguide and mislead the Court by putting

wrong facts regarding getting information about the death of

appellant no. 1. The deceased appellant no. 1 Ramua was the real

brother of respondent no. 1 / plaintiff Kodulal as it is axiomatic

from the cause title of memo of appeal, cross-appeal/ objection

and from the records of the courts below. The Apex court in the

case of Union of India and others vs. Nripen Sarma reported in

2013 (3) MPLJ 5 and this court also in the case of State of M.P. and

others vs. Virendra Shankar and another reported in 2013 (1) MPLJ

662, had not condoned the delay in fling the appeal holding that

no satisfactory explanation exist for condoning inordinate delay

and the Court expressed deep anguish and distress.

18. This Court also expresses deep cogitation about the conduct

of respondent no. 1 regarding not getting information about his

real brother in time. It is unbelievable that how one person like

respondent no.1 can say that he could not get information about

the death of his real brother on time. Even in the cause title of

cross-objection itself, address of appellant no. 1 and respondent

no. 1 are same. Apart from it, respondent no. 1 has mentioned in his

application that appellant no.1 was residing in Ranjhi, Jabalpur but

no document has been fled regarding address proof of appellant

no. 1.

19. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, this

application does not survive for consideration and is hereby

dismissed. Consequently, the cross-objection / appeal also stands

dismissed.

20. Records of both the courts below be sent back along with a

copy of this order to the trial court for information and necessary

action.

There shall be no orders as to costs.

(ARUN KUMAR SHARMA) JUDGE Jp/-

JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA 2022.03.15 14:57:54 +05'30'

 
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