Madhya Pradesh High Court

Smt. Shobha Mangal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 8 July, 2022

Author: Sunita Yadav

                              1
        IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                     AT GWALIOR
                              BEFORE
                 HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE SUNITA YADAV
                       ON THE 8th OF JULY, 2022

            CRIMINAL REVISION No. 2301 of 2022

     Between:-
1.   SMT. SHOBHA MANGAL W/O VIPIN MANGAL ,
     AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, JIWAJIGANJ (MADHYA
     PRADESH)

2.   SMT MEERA AGARWAL W/O SHRI O.P.
     AGARWAL , AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
     GOPALPURA, MORENA (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                                     .....PETITIONERS
     (BY MS. AYUSHI VYAS - ADVOCATE)

     AND

     THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH INCHARGE
     POLICE STATION PS GRP (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                                     .....RESPONDENT
     (BY MR. LOKENDRA SHRIVASTAVA - PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)

            CRIMINAL REVISION No. 1595 of 2022

     Between:-
1.   ASHISH MANGAL S/O MAHESH CHAND
     MANGAL , AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
     OCCUPATION: BUSINESS SIKARWARHI BAZAR
     (MADHYA PRADESH)

2.   MADHAV MANGAL S/O SHRI SUBHASH
     MANGAL , AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, A-26 T.R.
     PURAM (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                                     .....PETITIONERS
     (BY MR. PRASHANT SINGH KAURAV - ADVOCATE)

     AND

     THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH INCHARGE
     POLICE STATION P.S. GRP (MADHYA PRADESH)
                                    2

                                                               .....RESPONDENT
        (BY MR. LOKENDRA SHRIVASTAVA - PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)

      These revisions coming on for hearing this day, th e court passed the
following:
                                    ORDER

Since common question of law is involved in both these CRR Nos. 2301/2022 and 1595/2022, therefore, they are heard analogously and are decided by this common order. For the sake of convenience the facts mentioned in CRR No. 2301/2022 is taken into consideration.

Present criminal revisions have been filed U/s. 397/401 of Cr.P.C. against the common order dated 11/2/2022 passed by Second Additional Sessions

Judge, Morena in S.T. No. 34/2021, whereby charge under Section 306/34 of IPC has been framed against the present petitioners.

Brief facts leading to filing of the present revisions are that on 03/2/2020, a FIR was registered at GRP, Morena pertaining to the incident dated 01/4/2018 under Section 306/34 of IPC at Crime No. 09 of 2020 against the present petitioners and other co-accused persons for abetting the deceased Shrinivas to commit suicide. Body of Shrinivas was found laying near the train tracks behind Railway Station, Morena. A suicide note was found in the pocket of the kurta wore by the deceased. According to the suicide note, present petitioners along with other co-accused persons were harassing the deceased and on account of their harassment, he committed suicide. During investigation, handwriting of the deceased was examined by the fingerprint and handwriting expert and it was found that the suicide note was in the handwriting of the deceased. After investigation, charge-sheet under Section 306/34 of IPC has been filed and charge has been framed under the same section against which these revisions

have been filed.

Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that on perusal of the first information report, it is clearly revealed that the offence as alleged are not made out against the present petitioners. It is further argued that in such circumstances where the offence alleged are not made out against the petitioners, the First Information Report as well as its consequential proceedings deserves to be quashed in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal, [AIR 1992 SC 604] in which the Apex Court has observed that where the allegations revealed are so manifestly and inherently improbable and where they are attended for malafides for wreaking vengeance, the First Information Report would be termed as the abuse of process of law and should be quashed and set aside. The further argument of the petitioners is that for the sake of arguments, if the allegations are accepted in toto, also then, basic ingredients of Section 306 of IPC are not fulfilled and, therefore, case under Section 306 of IPC is not made out against the present petitioners. To buttress their arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the cases of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, [(2010) 1 SCC 707], M. Arjunan Vs. State, Represented by its Inspector of Police, [(2019) 3 SCC 315] and Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors, [(2021) 2 SCC

427].

On the other hand, learned counsel for the State argued that from the evidence collected during the investigation, prima facie there are sufficient grounds to frame charge for offence under Section 306/34 of IPC against the petitioners. It is further argued that at the time of framing of charges, the veracity of the evidence is not to be seen. The deceased has clearly indicated in

his suicide note that the present petitioners - accused persons were harassing him and on account of their harassment, he committed suicide which is also supported by the police statements of the prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 of CrPC in which there are specific allegations of harassment. Therefore, the impugned order does not need any interference from this court.

Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the available record.

A bare perusal of record shows the deceased in the suicide note has alleged that inspite of the Court's judgment in his favour in respect to a plot for which a civil suit was pending, present petitioners along with co-accused persons were harassing him and, therefore, he has decided to commit suicide for which the accused persons are responsible. Prosecution witnesses Vinod Pathak, Vimla Devi, Archana Dhingra and Rekha Pachauri have specifically stated in their police statement that on account of harassment by the accused persons, deceased Shrinivas Pathak committed suicide. They have further stated that if the accused persons had not harassed the deceased, he would not have committed suicide. The suicide note was examined by the fingerprint and handwriting expert and was found to be written by the deceased.

The Supreme Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi, [(2009) 16 SCC 605], while dealing with the term "instigation", held as under :-

"16................instigation is to goad, urge forward,provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of 'instigation', though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes 'instigation' must

necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an 'instigation' may have to be inferred."

It is well settled that while exercising its power under Section 397 or 482 of CrPC, the High Court cannot embark into an enquiry. At the stage of framing of charges, the only thing to be seen is that whether a prima facie case is made out or not and at this stage, analysis of the evidence is not required at all. The Supreme Court in the case of Soma Chakravarty vs. State (Th. CBI), [2007 AIR SCW 3683] has held as under:-

"20...... "It may be mentioned that the settled legal position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on the basis of material on record the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial."

Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Fatehkaran Mehdu, [(2017) 3 SCC 198] has observed that at the stage of

framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof of allegation, rather it has to focus on material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. Framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Power of quashing criminal proceedings particularly, charge framed in terms of Section 228 Cr.p.C. should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The Court should apply the test as to whether uncontroverted allegations as made from record of case and documents submitted therewith, prima facie establish the offence or not. The same principle has been laid down in the case of P. Vijayan vs. The State of Kerala, [2010 (2) SCC 398]. It is therefore well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is only required to see whether a prima facie case has been made out or not.

The Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, [AIR 1977 SC 2018] has held that "whereas strong suspicion may not take

the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Trial Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused."

The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, [AIR 1979 SC 366] has held as under:-

"(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which

has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial."

In the present case, the allegations in the FIR as well as the police statements of the prosecution witnesses indicate the commission of offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC by the petitioners. Besides, in the suicide note, the deceased had made clear allegations of harassment against the petitioners and gave specific reasons for committing suicide and according to which, on account of harassment by the petitioners along with other co-accused persons, he had decided to commit suicide. Therefore, the arguments rendered by the counsel for the petitioners are not acceptable that merely pendency of a civil suit cannot be termed as abetment to commit suicide because as discussed above, prima facie the suicide was not committed only on account of pendency of a civil suit but on account of harassment by the petitioners.

As discussed above, since in this case, prima facie material for framing charges are available, therefore, the case law cited by the petitioners do not help them.

Thus this Court is of the considered opinion that there is a sufficient material available on record against the petitioners so as to frame charges for offence under Section 306 of I.P.C.