Madhya Pradesh High Court
Kedar Singh vs State Of M.P. on 20 January, 2022
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1
Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
GWALIOR BENCH
DIVISION BENCH
G.S. AHLUWALIA
&
DEEPAK KUMAR AGARWAL J.J.
Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010
Kedar Singh and another
Vs.
State of M.P.
Cr.A. No. 691 of 2010
Bharat Singh & Ors.
Vs.
State of M.P.
Shri R.K.S. Kushwah with Shri S.K. Sharma, Counsel for the
Appellants in Criminal Appeal No.687/2010.
Shri Atul Gupta with Shri A.K. Jain, Counsel for appellant No.1 & 3
in Criminal Appeal No.691/2010.
Shri V.D. Sharma, Counsel for appellant No.2 in Criminal Appeal
No.691/2010.
Shri C.P. Singh, Counsel for the State in both appeals.
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Date of Hearing : 11-January-2022
Date of Judgment : 20- January-2022
Approved for Reporting :
Judgment
20- January -2022
Per G.S. Ahluwalia J.
1.
By this common judgment, Cr.A. No.687 of 2010 filed by
Kedar Singh and Cr.A. No.691 of 2010 filed by Bharat Singh,
Devaram, and Rampreet shall be decided.
2. It is not out of place to mention here that co-accused Surajbhan
absconded during trial. Two witnesses, i.e., Bhanupratap (P.W.1) and
Ajab Singh (P.W. 2) were examined in his presence, but thereafter he
absconded and could be arrested only after the co-accused persons
namely Kedar Singh, Ramhet, Bharat, Devaram and Rampreet were
convicted. His trial resumed and the remaining witnesses were re-
examined. In the light of the judgment passed by Supreme Court in
the case of K.T. Mydeen Vs. The Asstt. Commissioner,
Department of Customs, decided on 29-12-2021 in Cr.A. No.1306
of 2021, his Criminal Appeal No.6213 of 2021 has also been heard
simultaneously, but in order to avoid any confusion regarding
evidence led in the Trial of accused persons, his appeal shall be
decided by a separate judgment.
3. Further, a report was also received from the office of
Superintendent of Central Jail, Gwalior that Ramhet, Appellant No. 2
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
in Cr.A. No.687 of 2010 has expired on 19-3-2019 during his
treatment in J.A. Hospital, Gwalior, accordingly by order dated 11-1-
2022, his appeal has been dismissed as abated.
4. These two Criminal Appeals have been filed under Section 374
of Cr.P.C. against the judgment and sentence dated 28-7-2010 passed
by Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, Distt. Bhind in S.T.
No.118/2007, by which the Appellants have been convicted and
sentenced for the following offences :
Convicted under Section Sentence
302/149 of IPC Life Imprisonment and fine of
Rs. 1,000/- in default 6 months
R.I.
307/149 of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.
1,000/- in default 6 months R.I.
148 of IPC R.I. for 1 year
All the sentences shall run concurrently.
5. According to prosecution story, the complainant Bhanupratap
Singh Gurjar, lodged an FIR on 16-10-2006 at 10:45 A.M., on the
allegation that at about 10:15 A.M., he, his father Pahalwan, uncle
Darshan Singh, Cousin brother Ajab Singh were irrigating the field of
Ajab Singh. At that time, the Appellants as well as Surajbhan and
Dilip came to their field. They were armed with guns, lathi and other
weapons and surrounded his Father, Uncle and Cousin brother and
started abusing them. Kedar Singh and Ramhet said that they
(accused persons) would irrigate their fields first and in case if they
(complainant party) do not agree for that, then they (complainant
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
party) would be killed. His father replied, that some portion of his
field is left for irrigation and let it be completed. Then Bharat Singh
by using abusive language started insisting that he will irrigate his
land. His uncle also tried to persuade Bharat Singh that he may wait
for some time. Kedar Singh, Ramhet and Surajbhan were having
mouser guns, whereas Bharat was having Farsa, Devaram, Dilip and
Rampreet were having lathis. Kedar fired a gunshot causing injury on
the head of his father. Ramhet also caused gunshot injury to his
Uncle Darshan Singh. Surajbhan also fired gunshot causing injury on
the head of his father. Dilip Singh, Rampreet, Devaram started
assaulting Ajab Singh by means of lathi, Farsa as a result, he also fell
down. Ajab Singh sustained injuries on his head, hands and legs as
Bharat Singh had assaulted him by Farsa, whereas Devaram, Dilip
and Rampreet had assaulted by lathis. His father Pahalwan and
Darshan Singh died on the spot. Kedar Singh also chased him and
fired gunshots, but he escaped and ran towards his house. Ravi and
Brijendra have witnessed the incident. Kedar Singh has left his white
shirt, photocopy of his license and diary with Rs.150/- on the spot,
which he has brought.
6. On the basis of the report lodged by complainant Bhanupratap
Singh, police registered offence under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148,
149, 120-B of I.P.C. The dead bodies of Pahalwan Singh and Darshan
Singh were sent for post-mortem. The spot map was prepared.
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Statements of the witnesses were recorded. Police after completing
the investigation, filed charge sheet against the Appellants and
Surajbhan for offence under Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 120-B
of I.P.C., whereas co-accused Dilip was shown absconding.
7. The Trial Court by order dated 23-1-2008 framed charges
against the Appellants Bharat Singh, Devaram and Rampreet for
offence under Sections 148, 302/149 of IPC for causing murder of
Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, and under Section 307/149 of IPC for
making an attempt to kill Ajab Singh and Bhanupratap Singh. (It is
not out of place to mention here that singular charge under Section
302/149 of IPC was framed for murder of Pahalwan and Darshan
Singh, instead of framing charge on two counts. Similarly, singular
charge under Section 307/149 of IPC was framed for attempting to
kill Bhanupratap Singh and Ajab Singh, instead of framing charge on
two counts.). Similarly charges under Sections 148, 302 or in the
alternative 302/149, for murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh,
307 /149 of IPC for making an attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh and
Ajab Singh were framed against Kedar Singh, Ramhet and Surajbhan.
(It is not out of place to mention here that singular charge under
Section 302 or in the alternative 302/149 of IPC was framed for
murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, instead of framing charges
on two counts. Similarly, singular charge under Section 307/149 of
IPC was framed for attempting to kill Bhanupratap Singh and Ajab
Singh, instead of framing charges on two counts.)
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
8. The Appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded not guilty.
9. The prosecution examined Bhanupratap (P.W.1), Ajab Singh
(P.W.2), Dashrath Singh (P.W.3), Brijendra Singh (P.W.4), R.S.
Rathore (P.W.5), Munnilal Morya (P.W.6), Bharat Singh (P.W.7),
Mayaram (P.W. 8), Jabar Singh (P.W.9), Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10),
and Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj (P.W.11).
10. The Appellants examined Ganga Singh Bhadauriya (D.W.1) in
their defence.
11. The Trial Court by the impugned judgment and sentence
convicted and sentenced the Appellants for the above mentioned
offences.
12. Challenging the judgment passed by the Court below, it is
submitted by the Counsel for the Appellant Kedar Singh that
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are unreliable
witnesses. The ocular evidence is not supported by medical evidence.
The presence of rigor mortis indicates, that the deaths had already
taken place much prior to the alleged time of incident. In fact some
unknown persons might have killed the deceased Pahalwan and
Darshan Singh in the wee hours, but on account of previous enmity,
the Appellants have been falsely implicated. Multiple fired cartridges
were found on the spot, whereas according to prosecution witnesses,
only four gunshots were fired. In the FIR it is alleged by Bhanupratap
Singh that Kedar had left his white shirt on the spot, and he has
brought the same, but in his evidence, he clearly stated that after
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
leaving the place of incident, he did not return to the spot, therefore,
it is clear that there was no occasion for the complainant to bring the
white shirt of Kedar to the police station. The witnesses are related
and interested witnesses, therefore, they are not reliable.
13. In addition, Shri Atul Gupta with Shri Ashok Jain, Counsel for
Appellants Bharat and Rampreet as well as Shri V.D. Sharma,
Counsel for Devaram submitted that there is nothing on record to
show that the Appellants were the members of unlawful assembly or
were sharing common object. No injuries which could have been
caused by hard and blunt object were found on the body of the
deceased persons or injured.
14. Per contra, the Counsel for the State has supported the
findings recorded by the Trial Court.
15. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
16. Before adverting to the facts of the case, this Court would like
to consider as to whether the deceased Pahalwan and Darshan Singh
died a homicidal death or not?
17. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) conducted the post-mortem of
Pahalwan and Darshan Singh. The post-mortem of Pahalwan Singh
was conducted on 16-10-2006 itself at 4:00 P.M. and found the
following injuries :
Dead body lying on supine position. Both hand and legs
extended. Wearing check shirt, white pajama, rigor mortis
present all over body:
Injuries
(i)A oblique semi-lunar wound present over right forehead
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
just above of right eye brow, edges contused, inverted,
blackish, direction oblique, upwarded, size width 2 cm &
oblique 3 cm;
(ii) A semi-lunar wound present over right temporal
region, edges contused, inverted, blackening, width 2 cm x
1 cm vertically. Rest of skull disrupted, and total brain
tissue also absent and rest of skull (remaining part) is also
fractured in small pieces.
Total skull is disrupted at level of semi-lunar wound and
whole around the skull part.
Semi Undigested food material
Un-digested food material
Faecal matter in large intestine
In my opinion mode of death due to coma and caused by
head injury (due to gun shot) because total disruption of
head and brain tissue.
Time Duration about 6 to 12 hours since P.M.
The Post-mortem report is Ex. P.18.
18. The post-mortem of Darshan Singh was conducted at 4:30
P.M. and following injuries were found on the dead body:
(i) Incised wound over right parietal region of scalp
vertically 6x1xscalp deep. It is anti-mortem in nature.
(ii) Entry wound - Oval shaped, edges contused, inverted
blackish colour, bleeding with oozing coming out. Dept is
unlimited at past. Axillary line of right post lower chest
(iii) Exit wound- Level of 8th rib. 2 ½ x 2 cm size exit
wound present over at level of lower end of sternum,
irregular size, inverted edges, 4 x 3 cm direction is oblique,
backward right laterally, blackening of wound - liver of
right side is ruptured and distorted, disrupted.
Rupture of peritoneum at upper level
Small Un-digested food material
Un-digested food material
Faecal matter (+)
Liver : Ruptured, disrupted on right side.
In my opinion, mode of death due to shock, hemorrhage,
rupture of liver and esophagus and caused by gun shot.
Time duration - 6 to 12 hours since P.M.
The Post-mortem report is Ex. P.17.
19. This witness was cross-examined by the Appellants. He
admitted that copy of FIR and documents of Lash Panchnamas were
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
not sent by the police station. No Rojnamcha entries were also sent.
The weapon which had caused injury to deceased Pahalwan Singh
was not sent to him. The deceased Darshan Singh had only one entry
and exit wound which was caused by single gun. He admitted that in
case blackening is found around the wound, then the injury must have
been caused from a close range of utpo 4 feet. The food gets digested
within 4-6 hours and stage of semi-digested food starts from 2 hours.
It is possible that the deceased must have consumed food within 2-4
hours of death. He further admitted that although the incised wound
was found on the head of Darshan Singh, but it had not damaged any
vital organ. The gunshot injury no.1 found on the dead body of
Pahalwan Singh was caused from a close range of within 4 feet. The
injury no.2 was also caused from a close range of within 4 feet. The
duration of death was 6-12 hours.
20. From the evidence of Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10), it is clear that
the death of Darshan Singh and Pahalwan Singh was homicidal in
nature caused due to gunshots.
21. Further, Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W. 10) had examined Ajab Singh
and found following injuries on his body :
(i) Four incised wound over scalp ++ Bleeding
6x1xscalp deep (each) over scalp in different area, caused
by sharp weapon,
(ii) Incised wound 2x1x cartilage deep over right ear
caused by sharp weapon
(iii) Swelling over right wrist joint caused by hard and
blunt object
All the injuries were fresh and nature of injuries were
clinically simple
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
The injured Ajab Singh was referred to J.A.H. Gwalior for
further investigation. The M.L.C. is Ex. P.19
22. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W. 10) was also cross-examined regarding
injuries sustained by Ajab Singh, who stated that the injuries were
simple in nature and no weapon was sent to him. The injury no.2
could have been caused due to fall on pointed object. Injury no.3
could have been caused due to fall on hard surface. He had advised x-
ray, but no x-ray report was placed before him. If injured had not
sustained any fracture, then the nature of injuries was simple.
23. Thus, it is clear that the injured Ajab Singh (P.W.2) sustained 5
incised wounds and one swelling which could have been caused by
hard and blunt object.
24. Now the moot question for consideration is that whether the
Appellants are guilty of charges which were framed against them or
not?
25. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W. 1) has stated that on 16-10-2006 at
about 10-10:15 A.M., he, his uncle, his cousin brother and father
were watering their field. At that time all the accused persons, i.e.,
Appellants, Surajbhan and Dilip came there. The field of Bharat
Singh is adjoining to the field of this witness. The accused persons, in
furtherance of common object, surrounded them. The Appellant
Ramhet and Kedar said that they would give water to their field and
in case, if the complainant party do not agree for that, then they
would be killed. His father replied that watering is left only in a part
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
of his field, therefore, they may irrigate their field thereafter. On this,
the Appellant Bharat Singh started abusing. His uncle also asked
them not to quarrel and they may give water to their field after some
time. On this issue, the Appellants Ramhet, Kedar and Surajbhan
came forward with their mouser guns. The Appellant Kedar took off
his shirt and kept it on the earthen boundary of the field and
challenged that he would open water for his field. The deceased
Pahalwan asked him not to do so and requested that watering of his
field would be completed within a short period of time. Then on this
issue, the Appellant Kedar fired a gunshot on Pahalwan Singh, which
hit on his head. Surajbhan also fired a gunshot which also hit on the
head of the deceased. Ramhet fired a gunshot causing injury to
Darshan Singh. His father Pahalwan and uncle Darshan Singh fell
down on the ground. His father died on the spot. Darshan Singh was
assaulted by Bharat Singh by Farsa, and by Dilip, Rampreet,
Devaram by lathis. Dilip, Rampreet, Devaram and Bharat also
assaulted Ajab Singh. His uncle Darshan Singh also died, whereas
Ajab Singh sustained grievous injuries. One day prior to the incident,
the Appellants had shifted their women and children from their
houses along with their belongings. After the incident, Kedar
followed this witness and fired a gunshot with an intention to kill
him, but he escaped unhurt. This witness ran towards his house and
somehow succeeded in saving his life. The noise of gunshots were
heard by villagers. After noticing that some villagers are coming, the
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
assailants ran away. The incident was witnessed by Ravi and
Brijendra. Thereafter, he went to Police Station Gohad to lodge FIR.
Ravi and Brijendra had also accompanied him. The merg intimation
is Ex. P.1 and FIR is Ex. P.2. Thereafter, they took the dead bodies of
Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh as well as injured Ajab Singh to
Gohad Hospital. The police went to spot along with this witness.
Safina form, Ex. P.3 was issued. The Lash Panchnama of Pahalwan
Singh is Ex. P.4 and Lash Panchnama of Darshan Singh, Ex. P.5. The
dead bodies were received after post-mortem. The treatment of Ajab
Singh had begun. The spot map was prepared on his instructions, Ex.
P.6. His police statement was recorded.
This witness was cross-examined and in cross-examination,
this witness stated that he, his father, mother and wife resides in
Gwalior. However, one week prior to incident, his father Pahalwan
Singh had come to village and one day prior to incident, this witness
had also come to village. He had heard that the accused persons had
hatched conspiracy. This information was given by his uncle. The
names of his uncles are Ghanshyam and Govind Singh who resides in
Govind Ka Pura. He has personal relations with them. After gunshot
was fired by Kedar on this witness, he came back to village. 10-12
villagers had gathered there including Ghanshyam and Govind Singh.
This witness had informed the villagers that his father Pahalwan and
Uncle have died due to gunshots. At that time, Ghanshyam had
informed him about the conspiracy. He reached to the police station
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
at about 10:45 A.M. They went to Police Station on motorcycle. The
Motorcycle belongs to his friend Ravi. However, he stated that at the
time of lodging of FIR, Ex. P.2, he had also informed the police about
the conspiracy, but could not explain as to why the said fact is not
mentioned. The Appellant Kedar had fired only one gunshot at him.
All the three accused persons (Kedar, Ramhet and Surajbhan) had
fired about 6-7 gunshots. The hot talk continued for 2-3 minutes prior
to firing. He admitted that in spite of their distress shouts, no body
had intervened. He denied that Bharat, Dilip, Rampreet and Devaram
had not assaulted Ajab Singh. He further stated that after running
away from the spot, he went to his house and again came back to the
spot along with some persons and picked up the shirt of Kedar, copy
of license etc and brought it to the police station. He admitted that he
had not disclosed in his FIR, Ex. P.2 that he came back to the spot
and picked up the shirt of Kedar which was having copy of license
and diary. After lodging FIR, he came directly to the spot along with
police. At the time of Lash Panchnama, he, Ravi and 10-15 more
villagers were present. He admitted that at the time of preparation of
Lash Panchnama, Ex. P.4, he had not disclosed that which accused
caused injury by which weapon. He further stated that the accused
persons had surrounded his uncle, father and cousin brother Ajab
Singh. At the time of incident, he was at a distance of 50 ft.s from his
father, uncle and cousin brother. Kedar had fired at his father from a
distance of 25 ft., whereas Ramhet was 2 steps away from his uncle.
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Surajbhan was 5 steps away from his father and 10-12 steps away
from his uncle. Second gunshot was fired by Surajbhan at his father
Pahalwan, whereas the third gunshot was fired by Ramhet. He denied
that since a copy of license was found in the shirt, therefore, he is
claiming that incident was committed by Kedar. The dead bodies of
his father and uncle were lying at a distance of 6-7 steps. He admitted
that villagers have agricultural fields around the field of this witness.
He denied for want of knowledge that if watering is going on in the
field of one agriculturist, then without breaking wall, whether the
other agriculturists can irrigate their fields or not? He denied that his
dispute with other villagers on the question of irrigating their lands is
going on. He on his own stated that except the accused, he did not
have dispute with any other villager. He stated that at the time of
preparation of site map, he had disclosed the place, whereas Ajab
Singh was assaulted. He did not go to hospital along with Ajab Singh.
Since, the proceedings for recording FIR were going on, therefore, he
do not know as to whether Ravi and Brijendra had gone to hospital or
not? He admitted that Ravi is the resident of Pinto Park but claimed
that he was not his close friend. Ravi had no good reason to come to
village. He denied for want of knowledge that Ravi has been killed in
Police Encounter. He denied for want of knowledge that Ravi was a
History Sheeter Goon. He denied that because of criminal activities
of this witness, he had developed friendship with Ravi.
26. Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is the injured eyewitness. He also stated
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
that it was 10 A.M. on 16-10-2006. He, his uncles Pahalwan,
Darshan Singh and cousin brother Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) were
irrigating their fields. The field of Bharat Singh is adjoining to his
field. Devaram, Ramhet, Kedar Singh and Bharat Singh are real
brothers, whereas Surajbhan and Rampreet are sons of Bharat Singh.
This witness and the accused persons are resident of Chaudhari Ka
Pura. One day prior to incident, the accused persons had hatched a
conspiracy that when Pahalwan Singh would start watering his field,
then they would kill him. Accordingly, the women, children and
costly belongings were shifted to somewhere else. In furtherance of
common object, they surrounded the field and started abusing them.
Kedar said that they would irrigate their field, and if the complainant
party do not agree for that, then they would kill them. On this issue,
his uncles, Pahalwan Singh and Darshan replied that only a few
portion of their field remains to be irrigated, therefore, they may
irrigate their fields thereafter. On this, the accused persons started
assaulting him. When his uncles Pahalwan and Darshan Singh tried to
intervene, then Kedar Singh fired a gunshot on Pahalwan. Surajbhan
fired gunshot causing injury to Pahalwan. Ramhet fired gunshot
causing injury to Darshan Singh. Bharat, Devaram, Dilip Singh and
Rampreet assaulted this witness as well as caused injury to Darshan
Singh. As he had sustained multiple injuries therefore, he fell
unconscious, therefore, do not know that who shifted him to Hospital,
but he regained consciousness in Gwalior Hospital. This witness was
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
cross-examined.
In cross-examination, this witness has stated that he himself
had not seen the accused persons hatching conspiracy, but got
suspicious after noticing that they were shifting women, children and
costly belongings. He further stated that after hearing his shouts,
when his uncles Pahalwan and Darshan Singh came to save him, then
Kedar Singh fired gunshot. After he regained consciousness in
hospital, his relative Girraj was present, but did not tell about the
incident. He admitted that at the time of his beating, Kedar, Ramhet
and Surajbhan were having guns, but they did not fire gunshots at
him. He further admitted that generally the work of irrigating the
fields start at 3-4 A.M. However, he stated on his own, that the work
of irrigating the fields continues for 24 hours. He denied that in case,
a person do not start irrigating his fields at 3-4 A.M., then he would
not be able to irrigate his field as the person who has started irrigating
his field would finish his work first. He admitted that the dispute
arose on the question of watering the field and as some portion of his
field was left for irrigation, therefore, the accused persons were
disputing. He denied that for the last one week, dispute with villagers
was going on. He denied that unidentified persons had assaulted this
witness and had killed his uncles Pahalwan and Darshan Singh. He
admitted that Darshan Singh had come to village about 2-3 days back.
27. Dashrath Singh (P.W.3) has stated that the police had issued
Safina form , Ex. P.3 and Lash Panchnama of Pahalwan Singh, Ex.
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
P.4 and Lash Panchnama of Darshan Singh, Ex. P.5 were prepared.
At the time of site inspection, the police had seized blood stained
earth, plain earth, empty cartridges as well as one golden frame of
glasses of Pahalwan Singh, vide seizure memo Ex. P. 7.
28. Brijendra Singh (P.W.4) is also an eyewitness. He stated that
after answering the call of nature, he was returning back. The moment
he reached near Bamba, he saw that hot talk was going on between
Darshan Singh, Pahalwan Singh, Ajab Singh and the accused persons.
After hearing the noise, he went towards these persons. He saw that
Devaram, Bharat, Rampreet and Dilip started assaulting Ajab Singh
(P.W.2). Kedar fired a gunshot which hit on the right side of the head
of Pahalwan Singh. Surajbhan fired another gunshot hitting on the
forehead of Pahalwan Singh. Ramhet fired a gunshot, hitting on the
chest of Darshan Singh. After Darshan Singh fell down on the
ground, Bharat Singh assaulted him by Farsa which landed on the
back side of neck. After noticing that some people from Chaudhary
ka pura are coming, the accused persons ran away. Although this
witness was cross-examined, but none of the Counsel for the
Appellants, referred to the cross-examination of this witness. In fact,
none of the Counsel touched the evidence of this witness, merely by
saying that even the Trial Court has not relied on him. But they could
not point out any findings by the Trial Court to show that this witness
was disbelieved by the Trial Court.
29. R.S. Rathore (P.W. 5) was posted as S.H.O., Police Station
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Gohad. On the said date, he recorded the FIR, Ex. P.2 on the
information given by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.2) for offence under
Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, 149, 120-B of IPC. He also issued
Safina form, Ex. P.3. Lash panchnama of dead body of Pahalwan
Singh, Ex. P4, Lash Panchnama of dead body of Darshan Singh, Ex.
P5 were prepared. On the instructions of Bhanupratap Singh, he
prepared spot map, Ex. P.6. On 16-10-2016, he seized blood stained
earth, plain earth, golden frame of glasses of Pahalwan and four
empty cartridges vide seizure memo Ex.P..7. On 29-10-2006 he
further seized one brass shell of cartridge vide seizure memo Ex. P.8.
On 16-10-2006, he vide seizure memo, Ex. P.9, had seized one white
shirt of Kedar, photocopy of his license and diary on production of
the same by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). On 9-11-2006, Bharat Singh
was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. P.10. Devaram was arrested vide
arrest memo Ex. P.11. On 10-11-2006, he had seized one lathi with
farsa affixed on it from Bharat Singh vide seizure memo Ex. P.12. On
10-11-2006, he had seized one lathi from Devaram, Ex. P.13. The
blood stained earth which was seized near the dead body of Pahalwan
Singh is Article "C". Plain earth is article "D". Golden frame is
article "E". Four empty cartridges are article "F". The blood stained
earth seized near the body of Darshan Singh is Article "G", plain
earth is Article "H" and one fired cartridge which was seized
subsequently is Article "I". The cross-examination of this witness was
referred by the Counsel for the Appellants only for the purpose of
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
submitting that the omissions and contradictions in the police
statements of the prosecution witnesses were also pointed out to this
witness. It was further stated that this witness had not put any
specimen of seal on the seizure memo Ex. P.8.
30. Munnilal Morya (P.W. 6) had recorded the merg intimation, Ex.
P.1. This witness had also seized the packets containing cloths of
Darshan Singh and Pahalwan Singh which were brought by constable
Ramdas from the hospital, vide seizure memo Ex. P.14. The packet
containing cloths of Pahalwan is Article "L" and packet containing
cloths of Darshan is Article "M".
31. Bharat Singh (P.W.7), Mayaram (P.W.8) turned hostile.
32. Jabra Singh (P.W.9) has stated that one brass shell of cartridge
was seized by police from his field vide seizure memo Ex. P.8.
33. Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj (P.W.11) is also an Investigating
Officer. The Counsel for the Appellants accepted that guns and lathis
from the possession of Kedar Singh, Ramhet and Rampreet were
seized and accordingly, the weapons were not called in the Court, and
only the arrest memo and seizure memos were proved by this witness.
Whether the witnesses have changed the sequence of incident and
if so, then its effect
34. By referring to the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), it is
submitted by the Counsel for the Appellants that according to this
witness, the gunshots were fired at the earliest thereby killing
Pahalwan and Darshan Singh and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) was assaulted
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
subsequently. However, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) has stated that he was
assaulted first and when Pahalwan and Darshan Singh tired to
intervene in the matter, only then gunshots were fired resulting in
deaths of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh. Therefore, in view of major
variance in the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab
Singh (P.W.2), both the witnesses are not reliable.
35. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
parties.
36. As already pointed out, the Trial Court has not disbelieved the
evidence of Brijendra (P.W.4), but on the contrary, in para 23 of the
judgment, it has been held that the evidence of Brijendra (P.W. 4)
corroborates the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab
Singh (P.W.2). As already held, none of the Counsel for the
Appellants, challenged the evidence of Brijendra (P.W.4) but merely
relied on para 27 of the judgment and submitted that since, the Trial
Court has held that Bhanupratap (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are
reliable witnesses and has not referred to Brijendra (P.W.4), therefore,
it is to be presumed that Brijendra (P.W.4) was disbelieved by Trial
Court. This submission of the Counsel for the Appellants cannot be
accepted in the light of findings given by the Trial Court in para 23 of
judgment.
37. Further, Brijendra (P.W.4) has stated in his evidence that
initially Ajab Singh (P.W.2) was assaulted and when Pahalwan and
Darshan Singh intervened in the matter, then gunshots were fired by
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Kedar, Ramhet and Surajbhan. Even Ajab Singh (P.W.2) has stated
that while he was being assaulted by Bharat Singh, Rampreet, Dilip
(absconding) and Devaram, no gunshots were fired by Kedar, Ramhet
and Surajbhan. Further, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is an injured witness, and
he enjoys a special status in comparison to other witnesses. The
Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Naresh, reported in
(2011) 4 SCC 324 has held as under :
27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due
weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence
cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to
be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the
actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else.
The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy
and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and
place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony
that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the
testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status
in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual
assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person
falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the
evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless
there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the
basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.
(Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, Balraje v. State of
Maharashtra and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P.)
* * *
29. A mere relationship cannot be a factor to affect
credibility of a witness. The evidence of a witness cannot be
discarded solely on the ground of his relationship with the
victim of the offence. The plea relating to relatives'
evidence remains without any substance in case the
evidence has credence and it can be relied upon. In such a
case the defence has to lay foundation if plea of false
implication is made and the court has to analyse the
evidence of related witnesses carefully to find out whether it
is cogent and credible. (Vide Jarnail Singh, Vishnu v. State
of Rajasthan and Balraje)
30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to
occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of
time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror
at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a
contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the
truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make
material improvement while deposing in the court, such
evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor
contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or
improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the
core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground
on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The
court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the
witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition
inspires confidence.
"9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence
brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test
credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire
evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the
touchstone of credibility."*
Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a
witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may
be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier.
The omissions which amount to contradictions in material
particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the
trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony
of the witness liable to be discredited. [Vide State v.
Saravanan, Arumugam v. State, Mahendra Pratap Singh v.
State of U.P. and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v.
State of Maharashtra.]
38. The Supreme Court in the case of Baleshwar Mahto v. State
of Bihar, reported in (2017) 3 SCC 152 has held as under :
12. Here, PW 7 is also an injured witness. When the
eyewitness is also an injured person, due credence to his
version needs to be accorded. On this aspect, we may refer
to the following observations in Abdul Sayeed v. State of
M.P.: (SCC pp. 271-72, paras 28-30)
"28. The question of the weight to be attached to the
evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the
course of the occurrence has been extensively
discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the
occurrence has himself been injured in the incident,
the testimony of such a witness is generally considered
to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the
crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in
order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing
evidence is required to discredit an injured witness."
[Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, Malkhan
Singh v. State of U.P., Machhi Singh v. State of
Punjab, Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, Bonkya v. State
of Maharashtra, Bhag Singh, Mohar v. State of U.P.
(SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan,
Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, Annareddy Sambasiva
Reddy v. State of A.P. and Balraje v. State of
Maharashtra.]
29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, where this Court reiterated
the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of
an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held
as under: (SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29)
'28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He
had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could
not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details
of the incident as he was present at the time when the
assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa
Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka this Court has
held that the deposition of the injured witness should
be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for
rejection of his evidence on the basis of major
contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that
his presence on the scene stands established in case it
is proved that he suffered the injury during the said
incident.
29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand a similar view has
been reiterated observing that the testimony of a
stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy.
The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time
and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony
that he was present during the occurrence. In case the
injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-
examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his
testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v.
State of Haryana). Thus, we are of the considered
opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has
rightly been relied upon by the courts below.'
30. The law on the point can be summarised to the
effect that the testimony of the injured witness is
accorded a special status in law. This is as a
consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the
crime and because the witness will not want to let his
actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely
implicate a third party for the commission of the
offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness
should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds
for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major
contradictions and discrepancies therein."
39. Thus, the fact that a witness had suffered injuries in an
incident, is by itself a guarantee that the said witness was present on
the spot. Further, unless and until, there are strong reasons, the
testimony of injured witness should not be discarded.
40. In the present case, although Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) was
also present on the spot, but he has stated that he had witnessed the
incident from a distance of 50 ft., whereas Ajab Singh (P.W.2) had
sustained injuries in the same incident. Ajab Singh had sustained five
incised wounds, out of which 4 incised wounds were on the head and
1 was on right ear, whereas he also sustained swelling over right
wrist which was caused by hard and blunt object. Thus, it is clear
that injuries were caused on vital parts of the body of Ajab Singh
(P.W.2). Furthermore, the FIR, Ex. P.2 was lodged within 30 minutes
from the incident and in the FIR. Ex.P.2, itself it is specifically
mentioned that Ajab Singh (P.W.2) has been assaulted by the accused
persons. Thus, if there is some discrepancy regarding the sequence of
the incident, then, due weightage is to be given to the testimony of an
injured witness. Further, the evidence of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is
corroborated by Brijendra (P.W.4), whose testimony was not
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
challenged by any of the Counsel under a wrong notion that he has
been disbelieved by the Trial Court. Thus, it is held that gunshot
injuries were caused to Pahalwan and Darshan Singh only after they
tried to intervene in order to save Ajab Singh (P.W.2). In the opinion
of the Court, the variance in the sequence of incident, cannot be said
to be of major in nature, as not only the incident took place in a quick
session, but Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) was watching the incident
from the distance of 50 ft.s. Thus, with regard to sequence of
incident, the evidence of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) to the effect that initially
he was assaulted by Bharat Singh, Rampreet, Devaram and Dilip and
thereafter, Pahalwan and Darshan Singh were killed by causing
gunshot injuries, is accepted.
Whether Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) had picked up the White
Shirt, Copy of arm license, diary of Kedar from the spot or not?
41. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) in his FIR, Ex. P.2 has stated that
Kedar had left his white shirt, copy of license and a diary on the spot,
which he has brought. By referring to the evidence of Bhanupratap
Singh (P.W. 1), it is submitted by Shri R.K.S. Kushwaha, Counsel for
Kedar that, after Pahalwan and Darshan were killed, this witness had
ran towards his house and from there he went to police station and
thus, he had no occasion to pick up the white shirt of Kedar from the
spot.
42. Heard the learned Counsel for the Appellants.
43. This witness in para 13 of his cross-examination has stated that
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
after the incident took place, he rushed back to his house and
thereafter, he came back to the spot along with 10-12 persons and
picked up the white shirt of Kedar which was containing photocopy
of his license and a diary and went to police station to lodge the
F.I.R. Although in para 14 of his cross-examination, he has stated
that he did not mention in his FIR, Ex. P.2 that he went back to the
spot and picked up the white shirt of Kedar containing photocopy of
license and diary and came to lodge the FIR, but in the considered
opinion of this Court, this omission in the FIR, Ex. P.2 is not a major
omission going to the root of the credibility of this witness.
44. It is well established principle of law that FIR is not an
encyclopedia and need not to contain each and every minute details
of the incident. The FIR must contain the broad features of the
incident. The Supreme Court in the case of V.K. Mishra v. State of
Uttarakhand, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 588 has held as under :
13. FIR is not meant to be an encyclopaedia nor is it
expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case. It
may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case
are stated in the FIR...........
45. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kant Dubey Vs.
State of U.P. reported in (2015) 11 SCC 145 has held as under :
18.....it is a well-accepted principle that the first
information report need not contain every single detail and
every part of the case of the prosecution........
46. Any improvement which does not effect the basic substratum
of the matter will not make the evidence of a person unreliable.
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
However, in the present case, the complainant Bhanupratap Singh
(P.W.1) at the time of lodging FIR itself, brought the white shirt of
Kedar along with photocopy of arms license and diary, which was
duly seized on 16-10-2006 itself vide seizure memo Ex. P. 9 at 10:55
A.M.
47. Furthermore, it is well established principle of law that minor
omissions and contradictions will not make the witness unreliable.
The Supreme Court in the case of Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P.,
reported in (2011) 6 SCC 288 has held as under :
32. It is a settled legal proposition that while appreciating
the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial
matters, which do not affect the core of the prosecution's
case, may not prompt the court to reject the evidence in its
entirety. "Irrelevant details which do not in any way
corrode the credibility of a witness cannot be labelled as
omissions or contradictions." Difference in some minor
details, which does not otherwise affect the core of the
prosecution case, even if present, would not itself prompt
the court to reject the evidence on minor variations and
discrepancies. After exercising care and caution and sifting
through the evidence to separate truth from untruth,
exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a
conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient
to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should
not be attached to omissions, contradictions and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and
shake the basic version of the prosecution witness. As the
mental capabilities of a human being cannot be expected to
be attuned to absorb all the details, minor discrepancies are
bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. (See State of
U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash,
State v. Saravanan and Prithu v. State of H.P.)
48. The Supreme Court in the case of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer
Singh, reported in (2017) 11 SCC 195 has held as under :
Discrepancies in evidence
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are
not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be
considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The
test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of
the court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be
accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in
the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes
to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the
defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs
no special emphasis to state that every omission cannot take
place of a material omission and, therefore, minor
contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant
embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution
case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the
prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious
doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a
witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions
which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not
every contradiction or omission. (See Rammi v. State of
M.P., Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, Bihari Nath Goswami
v. Shiv Kumar Singh, Vijay v. State of M.P., Sampath Kumar
v. Inspector of Police, Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. and
Mritunjoy Biswas v. Pranab.)
49. Thus, it cannot be said that the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh
(P.W.1) is unreliable. On the contrary, he has explained as to how he
came in possession of white shirt of Kedar Singh.
Whether Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are
unreliable, being related and interested witnesses?
50. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) is the cousin brother of Ajab Singh
(P.W.2), son of deceased Pahalwan and nephew of deceased Darshan
Singh. Similarly, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is nephew of deceased
Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh and cousin brother of
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). Although the evidence of Brijendra
(P.W.4) was not challenged by the Counsel for the Appellants, but he
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
is brother-in-law (lkyk) of deceased Darshan Singh.
51. Now the moot question is that whether the evidence of
witnesses can be discarded merely on the ground that they are
"related witnesses" or it has to be proved that they are "interested
witnesses".
52. The Supreme Court in the case of Rupinder Singh Sandhu v.
State of Punjab, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 475 has held as under :
50. The fact that PWs 3 and 4 are related to the deceased
Gurnam Singh is not in dispute. The existence of such
relationship by itself does not render the evidence of PWs 3
and 4 untrustworthy. This Court has repeatedly held so and
also held that the related witnesses are less likely to
implicate innocent persons exonerating the real culprits.
53. The Supreme Court in the case of Shamim Vs. State (NCT of
Delhi) reported in (2018) 10 SCC 509 has held as under :
9. In a criminal trial, normally the evidence of the wife,
husband, son or daughter of the deceased, is given great
weightage on the principle that there is no reason for them
not to speak the truth and shield the real culprit.............
54. The Supreme Court in the case of Rizan v. State of
Chhattisgarh, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 661 has held as under :
6. We shall first deal with the contention regarding
interestedness of the witnesses for furthering the
prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor to affect
credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a
relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make
allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to
be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases,
the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse
evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible.
7. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab it has been laid down as
under: (AIR p. 366, para 26)
"26. A witness is normally to be considered
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
independent unless he or she springs from sources
which are likely to be tainted and that usually means
unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against
the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely.
Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen
the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent
person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is
personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to
drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has
a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be
laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of
relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure
guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any
sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on
its own facts. Our observations are only made to
combat what is so often put forward in cases before us
as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general
rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by
its own facts."
8. The above decision has since been followed in Guli
Chand v. State of Rajasthan in which Vadivelu Thevar v.
State of Madras was also relied upon.
9. We may also observe that the ground that the witness
being a close relative and consequently being a partisan
witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This
theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh
case in which surprise was expressed over the impression
which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar
that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking
through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed: (AIR p. 366, para
25)
"25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of
the High Court that the testimony of the two
eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation
for such an observation is based on the fact that the
witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men
hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If
it is grounded on the reason that they are closely
related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is
a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one
which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to
dispel in -- 'Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan' (AIR at
p. 59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still
persists, if not in the judgments of the courts, at any
rate in the arguments of counsel."
10. Again in Masalti v. State of U.P. this Court observed:
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
(AIR pp. 209-10, para 14)
"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend
that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded
only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or
interested witnesses. ... The mechanical rejection of
such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan
would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hardand-
fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence
should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be
cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea
that such evidence should be rejected because it is
partisan cannot be accepted as correct."
11. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh and Lehna v. State of Haryana.
55. Why a "related witness" would spare the real culprit in order to
falsely implicate some innocent person? There is a difference between
"related witness" and "interested witness". "Interested witness" is a
witness who is vitally interested in conviction of a person due to
previous enmity. The "Interested witness" has been defined by the
Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Rojali Ali v. State of Assam,
reported in (2019) 19 SCC 567 as under :
13. As regards the contention that all the eyewitnesses are
close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that
a related witness cannot be said to be an "interested"
witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim.
This Court has elucidated the difference between
"interested" and "related" witnesses in a plethora of cases,
stating that a witness may be called interested only when he
or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation,
which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the
witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused
punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has
a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see
State of Rajasthan v. Kalki; Amit v. State of U.P.; and
Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy). Recently, this
difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N., in
the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench
decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki: (Ganapathi case,
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
SCC p. 555, para 14)
"14. "Related" is not equivalent to "interested". A
witness may be called "interested" only when he or she
derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in
the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused
person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is
the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a
case cannot be said to be "interested"."
14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is
witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence
on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence
of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by
labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the
earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in
criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v.
State of Punjab, wherein this Court observed: (AIR p. 366,
para 26)
"26. A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from sources
which are likely to be tainted and that usually means
unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against
the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely.
Ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen
the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent
person."
15. In case of a related witness, the Court may not
treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted, and
needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently
reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer
to the observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State
(UT of Pondicherry): (SCC p. 213, para 23)
"23. We are of the considered view that in cases where
the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of
the interested witnesses, the approach of the court,
while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses
must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in
appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the
interested witnesses but the court must not be
suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of
the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence
of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely
because it comes from the mouth of a person who is
closely related to the victim."
56. As already pointed out, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is an injured
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
witness and he enjoys a special status in comparison to other
witnesses. The Counsel for the Appellants could not point out any
thing from the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), Ajab Singh
(P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4) to show that they had an intention to
falsely implicate the Appellants. Thus, Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1),
Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4) cannot be disbelieved only
on the ground that they are "related witnesses.".
Whether Ocular Evidence is contrary to Medical Evidence?
57. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that the
Ocular Evidence is contrary to Medical Evidence. To substantiate
their submissions, it is submitted that Bhanupratap Singh (P.W. 1) has
stated that Kedar had caused gunshot injury to his father Pahalwan
from a distance of 25 ft.s but in the post-mortem report, blackening
was found around the wounds, therefore, the Ocular Evidence is
contrary to Medical Evidence.
58. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
Appellants.
59. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) has stated that Kedar had caused
gunshot injury to his father Pahalwan Singh from a distance of 25 ft.s
whereas Ramhet was 2 steps away from Darshan Singh, and
Surajbhan was 5 steps away from Pahalwan Singh. In post-mortem
report, Ex. P.18, Dr. G.R. Shakya has mentioned that blackish skin
was found around injury no.1 and blackening was found around
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injury no.2. The injury no.2 was found over right temporal region
and rest of skull was disrupted and total brain tissues were also
absent and rest of skull was also fractured in small pieces. Even in
the spot map, Ex.P/6 the brain matter of the deceased Pahalwan was
found scattered on the ground. Further, R.S. Rathore (P.W. 5) had
himself seen that the brain matter of Pahalwan was lying scattered on
the ground, thus, this aspect of the matter is admissible as it was not
based on the information given by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). The
Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Narain v. State of U.P.,
reported in (1996) 8 SCC 199 has held as under :
9.......In our opinion neither the criticism of the trial court
nor the reason ascribed by the High Court in its rebuttal can
be legally sustained. While preparing a site plan an
Investigating Police Officer can certainly record what he
sees and observes, for that will be direct and substantive
evidence being based on his personal knowledge; but as, he
was not obviously present when the incident took place, he
has to derive knowledge as to when, where and how it
happened from persons who had seen the incident. When a
witness testifies about what he heard from somebody else it
is ordinarily not admissible in evidence being hearsay, but
if the person from whom he heard is examined to give
direct evidence within the meaning of Section 60 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 the former's evidence would be
admissible to corroborate the latter in accordance with
Section 157 CrPC (sic Evidence Act). However such a
statement made to a police officer, when he is investigating
into an offence in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code
of Criminal Procedure cannot be used to even corroborate
the maker thereof in view of the embargo in Section 162(1)
CrPC appearing in that chapter and can be used only to
contradict him (the maker) in accordance with the proviso
thereof, except in those cases where sub-section (2) of the
section applies. That necessarily means that if in the site
plan PW 6 had even shown the place from which the shots
were allegedly fired after ascertaining the same from the
eyewitnesses it could not have been admitted in evidence
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
being hit by Section 162 CrPC. The law on this subject has
been succinctly laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Tori Singh v. State of U.P. In that case it was
contended on behalf of the Appellant therein that if one
looked at the sketch map, on which the place where the
deceased was said to have been hit was marked, and
compared it with the statements of the prosecution
witnesses and the medical evidence, it would be extremely
improbable for the injury which was received by the
deceased to have been caused on that part of the body
where it had been actually caused if the deceased was at the
place marked on the map. In repelling the above contention
this Court observed, inter alia:
"... the mark on the sketch-map was put by the Sub-
Inspector who was obviously not an eyewitness to the
incident. He could only have put it there after taking
the statements of the eyewitnesses. The marking of the
spot on the sketch-map is really bringing on record the
conclusion of the Sub-Inspector on the basis of the
statements made by the witnesses to him. This in our
opinion would not be admissible in view of the
provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, for it is in effect nothing more than the
statement of the Sub-Inspector that the eyewitnesses
told him that the deceased was at such and such place
at the time when he was hit. The sketch-map would be
admissible so far as it indicates all that the Sub-
Inspector saw himself at the spot; but any mark put on
the sketch-map based on the statements made by the
witnesses to the Sub-Inspector would be inadmissible
in view of the clear provisions of Section 162 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure as it will be no more than
a statement made to the police during investigation."
60. Now where the whole skull had shattered and the bullet had hit
right temporal region, then due to scalp hair, it is clear that it is
difficult to find out as to whether there was any blackening around
the wound or not.
61. It is submitted that since, Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) is a
prosecution witness, therefore, his evidence is binding on the
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prosecution.
62. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
Appellants.
63. The question is that whether, the post-mortem report which is
an opinion of the Doctor, is binding on the Court or the Court can re-
appreciate the evidence in order to find out the truth.
64. The medical report has to be read in conjunction with other
evidence and then Court has to form is final opinion.
65. The Supreme Court in the case of Dayal Singh v. State of
Uttaranchal, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 263 has held as under :
40. We really need not reiterate various judgments which
have taken the view that the purpose of an expert opinion is
primarily to assist the court in arriving at a final conclusion.
Such report is not binding upon the court. The court is
expected to analyse the report, read it in conjunction with
the other evidence on record and then form its final opinion
as to whether such report is worthy of reliance or not. Just
to illustrate this point of view, in a given case, there may be
two diametrically contradictory opinions of handwriting
experts and both the opinions may be well reasoned. In
such case, the court has to critically examine the basis,
reasoning, approach and experience of the expert to come
to a conclusion as to which of the two reports can be safely
relied upon by the court. The assistance and value of expert
opinion is indisputable, but there can be reports which are,
ex facie, incorrect or deliberately so distorted as to render
the entire prosecution case unbelievable. But if such
eyewitnesses and other prosecution evidence are
trustworthy, have credence and are consistent with the eye-
version given by the eyewitnesses, the court will be well
within its jurisdiction to discard the expert opinion. An
expert report, duly proved, has its evidentiary value but
such appreciation has to be within the limitations
prescribed and with careful examination by the court. A
complete contradiction or inconsistency between the
medical evidence and the ocular evidence on the one hand
and the statement of the prosecution witnesses between
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
themselves on the other, may result in seriously denting the
case of the prosecution in its entirety but not otherwise.
66. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the case, it is
held that merely because Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) had mentioned
blackening around the wound, it would not be sufficient to discard
the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) specifically when no such
question was asked to Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4)
about the distance from which the gunshots were fired by the
appellants and Surajbhan.
Whether the incident took place at 10-10:15 A.M., or the
deceased persons as well as Ajab Singh (P.W. 2) were
killed/assaulted by unknown persons at early hours of 16-10-
2006?
67. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that
since, rigor mortis was present all over the bodies of the deceased
Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, and the post-mortem of Pahalwan and
Darshan Singh was conducted at 4:00 P.M./4:30 P.M. therefore, it is
clear that the death must have taken place much before 10 A.M. and
in view of the specific admission by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) that
the work of watering the fields starts at 3-4 in the morning, it is clear
that the incident must have taken place in the wee hours.
68. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
parties. As per Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, the development of
rigor mortis primarily depend upon the weather conditions.
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Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Therefore, there cannot be any universal and uniform development of
Rigor Mortis. Thus, in each and every case, the defence must put a
specific question to the autopsy surgeon as to whether the rigor
mortis could have developed under the prevailing weather conditions
or not?
69. No specific question was put to Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) in
this regard. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) had specifically opined that
the duration of death was 6-12 hours since post-mortem. The incident
is alleged to have taken place at 10-10:15 A.M. and the post-mortem
of Pahalwan was conducted at 4:00 P.M. and of Darshan Singh at
4:30 P.M. Thus, it is clear that the post-mortem of dead bodies of
Pahalwan and Darshan Singh was done after 6 hours of incident. The
defence should have specifically asked Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10)
about the basis on which he had formed the opinion about the
duration of death, but that was not done. Further, the submissions
made by the Counsel for the Appellants cannot be accepted for
another reason. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W. 10) had found undigested
food material in stomach and small intestine. A specific question was
put to Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) in this regard and in para 5 of his
cross-examination, this witness specifically opined that the food gets
digested within 4-6 hours and the position of semi-digested food
starts after 2 hours. Therefore, the deceased must have consumed
food prior to 2-4 hours of his death. If the submission of the Counsel
for the Appellants, that the death must have taken place at around 3-4
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
hours is considered, then it is clear that the deceased should have
taken food at around 1 A.M. in the night. Semi-digested food was
found in the small intestine of both the deceased persons. It is a
matter of common knowledge that no-body consumes food at 1:00
A.M.. On the contrary, the prosecution story is that the incident took
place at around 10-10:15 A.M., therefore, the deceased persons must
have taken their breakfast at around 8-8:15 A.M., which is probable
and supports the prosecution case. The Supreme Court in the case of
Charan Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1975) 3 SCC 39 has
held as under :
18. The first information report about the present
occurrence was lodged promptly and this is apparent from
the fact that a copy of the first information report was
received by the Judicial Magistrate concerned at Ludhiana
at 8.12 p.m. the same evening. We are not impressed by the
suggestion that the occurrence took place not at 5 p.m. but
much earlier. According to the post-mortem examination
reports, the stomach of each one of the two deceased
persons was empty at the time of the post-mortem
examination. Normally a vegetable diet containing mostly
farinaceous food as usually taken by an Indian does not
leave the stomach completely within six to seven hours
after its ingestion (see p. 151 of Modi's Medical
Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Sixteenth Edn). If the
occurrence had taken place at 2 or 3 p.m. as suggested on
behalf of the accused-Appellants, the mid-day meals
usually taken by the Villagers at about 11 a.m. would still
be in their stomachs and the same would not have been
empty at the time of the post-mortem examination. The fact
that the stomach of each of the deceased persons was empty
lends assurance to the prosecution version that the
occurrence took place at about 5 p.m.
Whether Bharat, Rampreet, Devaram were members of Unlawful
Assembly and had acted in furtherance of Common Object or
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
not?
70. This Court has already referred the evidence of Bhanupratap
Singh (P.W.1), Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4). The FIR
was lodged within 30 minutes of incident. The names of Bharat,
Rampreet and Devaram were already disclosed as one of the
assailants. Even according to the evidence of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and
Brijendra (P.W.4), the Appellants Bharat, Rampreet and Devaram had
assaulted Ajab Singh (P.W.2) as well as Darshan Singh, one of the
deceased. Bharat Singh was armed with Farsa. Darshan Singh had
suffered one incised wound over right parietal region, which
corroborates the ocular evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), Ajab
Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4). Similarly, Ajab Singh sustained
5 incised wounds i.e., four on scalp and one over right ear.
Therefore, the allegations against Bharat Singh that he had assaulted
the injured Ajab Singh (P.W.2) as well as deceased Darshan Singh are
corroborated by Medical Evidence. Thus, it is clear that Bharat Singh
had actively participated in the incident.
71. The allegations against Devaram and Rampreet are that they
were armed with lathis and assaulted Ajab Singh (P.W.2). One
swelling on the wrist of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) was found in his MLC,
Ex. P.19. Thus, it is clear that Ajab Singh (P.W.2) had sustained
atleast one injury which could have been caused by hard and blunt
object.
72. The Supreme Court in the case of Manjit Singh Vs. State of
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Punjab reported in (2019) 9 SCC 529 has held as under :
Unlawful assembly and rioting with deadly weapons
14. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of both the
Appellants that the essential ingredients of Section 141 IPC
for the formation of unlawful assembly with the common
object having not been established, the conviction of the
Appellants with the aid of Section 149 IPC is not justified.
14.1. The relevant part of Section 141 IPC could be usefully
extracted as under:
"141. Unlawful assembly.--An assembly of five or
more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if
the common object of the persons composing that
assembly is--
* * *
Third.--To commit any mischief or criminal trespass,
or other offence; or
* * *
Explanation.--An assembly which was not unlawful
when it assembled, may subsequently become an
unlawful assembly."
14.2. Section 149, rendering every member of unlawful
assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of
common object reads as under:
"149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of
offence committed in prosecution of common object.
--If an offence is committed by any member of an
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common
object of that assembly, or such as the members of that
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of that object, every person who, at the
time of the committing of that offence, is a member of
the same assembly, is guilty of that offence."
14.3. We may also take note of the principles enunciated
and explained by this Court as regards the ingredients of an
unlawful assembly and the vicarious/constructive liability
of every member of such an assembly. In Sikandar Singh,
this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 483-85, paras 15 &
17-18)
"15. The provision has essentially two ingredients viz.
(i) the commission of an offence by any member of an
unlawful assembly, and (ii) such offence must be
committed in prosecution of the common object of the
assembly or must be such as the members of that
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
prosecution of the common object. Once it is
established that the unlawful assembly had common
object, it is not necessary that all persons forming the
unlawful assembly must be shown to have committed
some overt act. For the purpose of incurring the
vicarious liability for the offence committed by a
member of such unlawful assembly under the
provision, the liability of other members of the
unlawful assembly for the offence committed during
the continuance of the occurrence, rests upon the fact
whether the other members knew beforehand that the
offence actually committed was likely to be committed
in prosecution of the common object.
* * *
17. A "common object" does not require a prior
concert and a common meeting of minds before the
attack. It is enough if each member of the unlawful
assembly has the same object in view and their number
is five or more and that they act as an assembly to
achieve that object. The "common object" of an
assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and
language of the members composing it, and from a
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It
may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted
by the members of the assembly. For determination of
the common object of the unlawful assembly, the
conduct of each of the members of the unlawful
assembly, before and at the time of attack and
thereafter, the motive for the crime, are some of the
relevant considerations. What the common object of
the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the
incident is essentially a question of fact to be
determined, keeping in view the nature of the
assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the
behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the
incident. It is not necessary under law that in all cases
of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common
object, the same must be translated into action or be
successful.
18. In Masalti v. State of U.P. a Constitution Bench of
this Court had observed that: (AIR p. 211, para 17)
17. ... Section 149 makes it clear that if an offence is
committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or
such as the members of that assembly knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of that object,
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every person who, at the time of the committing of that
offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of
that offence; and that emphatically brings out the
principle that the punishment prescribed by Section
149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always
proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually
committed by every member of the unlawful
assembly.'"
14.4. In Subal Ghorai, this Court, after a survey of leading
cases, summed up the principles as follows: (SCC pp. 632-
33, paras 52-53)
"52. The above judgments outline the scope of Section
149 IPC. We need to sum up the principles so as to
examine the present case in their light. Section 141
IPC defines "unlawful assembly" to be an assembly of
five or more persons. They must have common object
to commit an offence. Section 142 IPC postulates that
whoever being aware of facts which render any
assembly an unlawful one intentionally joins the same
would be a member thereof. Section 143 IPC provides
for punishment for being a member of unlawful
assembly. Section 149 IPC provides for constructive
liability of every person of an unlawful assembly if an
offence is committed by any member thereof in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly or
such of the members of that assembly who knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.
The most important ingredient of unlawful assembly is
common object. Common object of the persons
composing that assembly is to do any act or acts stated
in clauses "First", "Second", "Third", "Fourth" and
"Fifth" of that section. Common object can be formed
on the spur of the moment. Course of conduct adopted
by the members of common assembly is a relevant
factor. At what point of time common object of
unlawful assembly was formed would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. Once the case of
the person falls within the ingredients of Section 149
IPC, the question that he did nothing with his own
hands would be immaterial. If an offence is committed
by a member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution
of the common object, any member of the unlawful
assembly who was present at the time of commission
of offence and who shared the common object of that
assembly would be liable for the commission of that
offence even if no overt act was committed by him. If a
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large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults
intended victims, all may not take part in the actual
assault. If weapons carried by some members were not
used, that would not absolve them of liability for the
offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC if they shared
common object of the unlawful assembly.
53. But this concept of constructive liability must not
be so stretched as to lead to false implication of
innocent bystanders. Quite often, people gather at the
scene of offence out of curiosity. They do not share
common object of the unlawful assembly. If a general
allegation is made against large number of people, the
court has to be cautious. It must guard against the
possibility of convicting mere passive onlookers who
did not share the common object of the unlawful
assembly. Unless reasonable direct or indirect
circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution case
that they shared common object of the unlawful
assembly, they cannot be convicted with the aid of
Section 149 IPC. It must be proved in each case that
the person concerned was not only a member of the
unlawful assembly at some stage, but at all the crucial
stages and shared the common object of the assembly
at all stages. The court must have before it some
materials to form an opinion that the accused shared
common object. What the common object of the
unlawful assembly is at a particular stage has to be
determined keeping in view the course of conduct of
the members of the unlawful assembly before and at
the time of attack, their behaviour at or near the scene
of offence, the motive for the crime, the arms carried
by them and such other relevant considerations. The
criminal court has to conduct this difficult and
meticulous exercise of assessing evidence to avoid
roping innocent people in the crime. These principles
laid down by this Court do not dilute the concept of
constructive liability. They embody a rule of caution."
14.5. We need not expand on the other cited decisions
because the basic principles remain that the important
ingredients of an unlawful assembly are the number of
persons forming it i.e. five; and their common object.
Common object of the persons composing that assembly
could be formed on the spur of the moment and does not
require prior deliberations. The course of conduct adopted
by the members of such assembly; their behaviour before,
during, and after the incident; and the arms carried by them
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
are a few basic and relevant factors to determine the
common object.
73. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Jagannath
Markad v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 537
has held as under :
21. An offence committed in prosecution of common object
of an unlawful assembly by one person renders members of
unlawful assembly sharing the common object vicariously
liable for the offence. The common object has to be
ascertained from the acts and language of the members of
the assembly and all the surrounding circumstances. It can
be gathered from the course of conduct of the members. It is
to be assessed keeping in view the nature of the assembly,
arms carried by the members and the behaviour of the
members at or near the scene of incident. Sharing of
common object is a mental attitude which is to be gathered
from the act of a person and result thereof. No hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down as to when common object can be
inferred. When a crowd of assailants are members of an
unlawful assembly, it may not be possible for witnesses to
accurately describe the part played by each one of the
assailants. It may not be necessary that all members take
part in the actual assault. In Gangadhar Behera, this Court
observed: (SCC pp. 398-99, para 25)
"25. The other plea that definite roles have not been
ascribed to the accused and therefore Section 149 is
not applicable, is untenable. A four-Judge Bench of
this Court in Masalti case observed as follows: (AIR p.
210, para 15)
'15. Then it is urged that the evidence given by the
witnesses conforms to the same uniform pattern and
since no specific part is assigned to all the assailants,
that evidence should not have been accepted. This
criticism again is not well founded. Where a crowd of
assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly
proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance
of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it is
often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately
the part played by each one of the assailants. Besides,
if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons
assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary
that all of them have to take part in the actual assault.
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
In the present case, for instance, several weapons were
carried by different members of the unlawful
assembly, but it appears that the guns were used and
that was enough to kill 5 persons. In such a case, it
would be unreasonable to contend that because the
other weapons carried by the members of the unlawful
assembly were not used, the story in regard to the said
weapons itself should be rejected. Appreciation of
evidence in such a complex case is no doubt a difficult
task; but criminal courts have to do their best in
dealing with such cases and it is their duty to sift the
evidence carefully and decide which part of it is true
and which is not.'"
74. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that
since, only one injury was found on the body of Ajab Singh (P.W.2)
which could have been sustained by hard and blunt object, whereas
two persons, namely Devaram and Rampreet were having lathis,
therefore, it is clear that the allegations of assault by Devaram and
Rampreet by lathis is false.
75. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
Appellants.
76. The Supreme Court in the case of Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai
Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 743
has held as under :
43. The High Court recorded a finding with reference to 4
accused (A-2, A-4, A-9 and A-15) who according to the
prosecution were alleged to have carried sticks, that there is
no evidence on record to prove the same on three grounds:
(i) that their names were not to be found in the FIR (ii) that
there were improvements in the evidence of the PWs at
various stages regarding the presence of the four accused,
and (iii) that the medical evidence does not disclose any
injury which could have been attributed to the beatings by
sticks.
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
44. In our opinion, the first two reasons given by the High
Court are legally tenable, however, the third reason i.e. the
absence of injuries attributable to a stick, need not
necessarily result in a conclusion that the accused were not
present in the unlawful assembly. But the absence of such
injuries cannot be said to be an irrelevant consideration in
arriving at a conclusion whether the four accused
participated in the unlawful assembly in the background of
the other two factors mentioned above. But a similar
analysis with respect to the seven of the other accused who
were given the benefit of doubt by the Sessions Court is
lacking in the judgment of the High Court.
77. Mere absence of injuries would not lead to conclusion that the
accused was not present, and the Court has to look into other
surrounding circumstances also to find out as to whether the accused
was the member of unlawful assembly or not and whether he was
sharing common object or not?
78. In the present case, FIR, Ex. P.2 was lodged within 30 minutes
of the incident. The names of the Appellants Devaram and Rampreet
were also mentioned in the FIR as one of the assailants. 2 persons
had died and one was seriously injured. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1)
had no occasion to deliberate on this issue and to cook up a false
story.
79. The Supreme Court in the case of Krishnan v. State, reported
in (2003) 7 SCC 56 has held as under :
17. The fact that the first information report was given
almost immediately, rules out any possibility of deliberation
to falsely implicate any person. All the material particulars
implicating the four Appellants were given.....
80. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Harban
Sahai, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 50 has held as under :
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
13......In such a situation the prompt and early reporting of
the occurrence by PW 1 to the police with all its vivid
details gives us an assurance regarding truth of his version.
81. Thus, it is clear that Rampreet and Devaram were also present
on the spot. Three persons were carrying mouser guns whereas one
person was carrying Farsa. The accused persons came to the spot on
the question of watering the fields. The irrigation of the field of
complainant party was already going on and the accused persons
came to the spot to stop the complainant party from irrigating their
land. Thus, it is clear that the Assembly of accused persons who were
more than 5 in number, was Unlawful from the very inception and in
furtherance of their Common Object, they assaulted Ajab Singh
(P.W.2) and killed two persons namely Pahalwan and Darshan Singh
by firing repeated gunshots. Further, gun shot was fired by Kedar at
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). Thus, it is held that Devaram and
Rampreet were also the members of Unlawful Assembly and were
sharing Common Object.
Whether Forensic Evidence supports prosecution case
82. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that as
per the FSL report,Ex. P.23, the marks of firing pin found on the fired
cartridges were "similar" to that of gun seized from the possession of
Kedar. However, it is submitted that in absence of specific finding
that the marks were "identical", it cannot be said that the Forensic
Evidence corroborates the prosecution case. To buttress his
contentions, the Counsel for the Appellant Kedar relied upon the
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
judgment passed by this Court in the case of Krishna Sewak Vs.
State of M.P. reported in 1988 JLJ 321.
83. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
Appellants.
84. As per F.S.L. report, Ex. P.23, the marks of firing pin were ",d
leku", which necessarily means "identical". Thus, it cannot be said
that the F.S.L. report, Ex. P.23 is of no help for the prosecution.
Multiple fired cartridges were found on the spot, whereas only
three gunshots were fired
85. It is submitted that Pahalwan Singh had sustained two gunshot
injuries whereas Darshan Singh had sustained one gunshot injury,
thus, it is clear that only three gunshots were fired, but 5 fired
cartridges were found on the spot, therefore, it is clear that the
prosecution has suppressed the very genesis of the incident.
86. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
Appellants.
87. It is true that three gunshots injuries were found on the dead
bodies of Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh, but it is also the case
of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) that gunshots were also fired by Kedar
at him, but he escaped unhurt. Therefore, multiple gunshots were
fired by Kedar. Thus, the recovery of multiple fired cartridges from
the spot is natural.
Whether injuries caused to Ajab Singh (P.W.2), and miss fire on
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) would make out an offence under
Section 307 of IPC or not?
88. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellants, that since, the
nature of injuries sustained by Ajab Singh (P.W.2) were simple and
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) did not sustain any injury at all, therefore,
no offence under Section 307 of IPC would be made out.
89. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants.
90. Section 307 of IPC reads as under :
307. Attempt to murder.--Whoever does any act with
such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances
that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of
murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any
person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to
imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is herein
before mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts.--When any person offending
under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for
life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
91. From the plain reading of Section 307 of IPC, it is clear that
presence of injury is not sine qua non for making out an offence
under Section 307 of IPC. If any act is done with an intention or
knowledge that, if assailant by that act causes death, then the
assailant would be guilty of murder, then such act would certainly be
punishable under Section 307 of IPC.
92. Thus, the following two ingredients are necessary to make out
an offence under Section 307 of IPC :
(a) Knowledge or intention that by his act, if murder is caused,
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then he would be guilty of murder.
(b) Does any act towards commission of that offence.
93. The first part of Section 307 of IPC deals with a situation,
where no injury is caused and second part of Section 307 of IPC
deals with a situation where hurt is caused. "Hurt" is defined in
Section 319 of IPC which reads as under :
319. Hurt.--Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or
infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
94. Thus, the nature of injuries is not a decisive factor to determine
as to whether the act of the assailant would be an act punishable
under Section 307 of IPC or not. In order to gather intention or
knowledge, the weapon used, part of the body on which injury was
caused as well as nature of injuries are some of the important aspects.
95. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Harjeet
Singh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 524 has held as under :
5.6.1. If a person causes hurt with the intention or
knowledge that he may cause death, it would attract Section
5.6.2. This Court in R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, held
that: (SCC p. 30, paras 8-9)
"8. ... The first blow was on a vital part, that is, on the
temporal region. Even though other blows were on
non-vital parts, that does not take away the rigour of
Section 307 IPC. ...
9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section
307 if there is present an intent coupled with some
overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that
bodily injury capable of causing death should have
been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually
caused may often give considerable assistance in
coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused,
such intention may also be deduced from other
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be
ascertained without any reference at all to actual
wounds. The section makes a distinction between the
act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has
to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was
done with the intention or knowledge and under
circumstances mentioned in the section."
(emphasis supplied)
5.6.3. If the assailant acts with the intention or knowledge
that such action might cause death, and hurt is caused, then
the provisions of Section 307 IPC would be applicable.
There is no requirement for the injury to be on a "vital part"
of the body, merely causing "hurt" is sufficient to attract
Section 307 IPC.
5.6.4. This Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana held
that: (SCC p. 370, para 12)
"12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307
IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to
commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused.
The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had
attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution
witness. Whether the accused person intended to
commit murder of another person would depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a
conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential
that fatal injury capable of causing death should have
been caused. Although the nature of injury actually
caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as
to the intention of the accused, such intention may also
be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of
the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances
like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the
accused at the time of the incident, motive of the
accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused
and the nature of injury and severity of the blows
given, etc."
(emphasis supplied)
5.6.5. This Court in the recent decision of State of M.P. v.
Kanha held that: (SCC p. 609, para 13)
"13. The above judgments of this Court lead us to the
conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening
hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under
Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the
accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if
any, as well as from surrounding circumstances.
Among other things, the nature of the weapon used
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
and the severity of the blows inflicted can be
considered to infer intent."
96. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Kanha
reported in (2019) 3 SCC 605 has held as under :
13. The above judgments of this Court lead us to the
conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is
not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of the
Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained
from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding
circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the
weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be
considered to infer intent.
97. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Saleem
reported in (2005) 5 SCC 554 has held as under :
12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should
have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually
caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to
a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention
may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may
even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at
all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction
between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an
act may not be attended by any result so far as the person
assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which
the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not
necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the
assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to
cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has
to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done
with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances
mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal
need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if
there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof.
13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307
if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury
capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The
section makes a distinction between the act of the accused
and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act,
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or
knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the
section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307
IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries
inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.
14. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v.
Balram Bama Patil, Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. and R.
Prakash v. State of Karnataka.
15. In Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar it was observed in para
6 that mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the
accused did not cut any vital organ of the victim, is not by
itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of Section
16. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that
death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend
on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the
injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not
by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The
determinative question is the intention or knowledge, as the
case may be, and not the nature of the injury. The basic
difference between Sections 333 and 325 IPC is that
Section 325 gets attracted where grievous hurt is caused
whereas Section 333 gets attracted if such hurt is caused to
a public servant.
98. According to Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) the injured Ajab Singh
(P.W. 2) had suffered 4 incised wounds on his head and one incised
wound over right ear. Thus, five incised wounds were on vital part of
the body of Ajab Singh (P.W.2). The injuries were caused by Bharat
by Farsa. Causing incised wounds by a sharp edged weapon like
farsa on the vital part of the body like head, would certainly involve
intention or knowledge on the part of the assailant. Thus, it is
incorrect to say that the injuries caused on the vital parts of the body
of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) would not bring the act of the accused persons
within the purview of Section 307 of IPC.
99. It is next contended by the Counsel for the appellants, that
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
since, no injury was sustained by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1)
therefore, it cannot be said that any attempt was made to kill
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1).
100. As already pointed out, Section 307 of IPC is in two parts :
a. When no injury is caused;
b. When hurt is caused.
101. Presence of injury is not a sina qua non for bringing the act
within the purview of Section 307 of IPC. Firing a gunshot at a
person, would certainly involve intention or knowledge on the part of
the assailant. Furthermore, multiple fired cartridges were recovered
from the spot, which indicates, that the guns were reloaded. Thus, the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing beyond reasonable doubt
that an attempt was made to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W. 1) by firing
at him.
Names of assailants not mentioned in inquest report.
102. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellants that while
preparing Lash Panchnamas of dead bodies of Pahalwan Singh and
Darshan Singh, Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) had not disclosed the
names of assailants, therefore, it is clear that he is not a reliable
witness.
103. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
appellants.
104. The purpose of inquest is to find out the cause of death and not
to find out as to who caused death. Therefore, non-mentioning of
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
names of assailants in the Lash Panchnamas Ex. P.4 and P.5 would
not make the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) unreliable. The
Supreme Court in the case of Guiram Mondal v. State of W.B.,
reported in (2013) 15 SCC 284 has held as under :
12. The inquest report normally would not contain the
manner in which the incident took place or the names of
eyewitnesses as well as the names of accused persons. The
basic purpose of holding an inquest is to report regarding
the cause of death, namely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal,
accidental, etc. Reference may be made to the judgments of
this Court in Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. and Amar
Singh v. Balwinder Singh.
13. In Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P. this Court held
that the scope of inquest is limited and is confined to
ascertainment of apparent cause of death. Inquest is
concerned with discovering whether in a given case the
death was accidental, suicidal or homicidal, and in what
manner or by what weapon or instrument the injuries on the
body appear to have been inflicted. The details of overt acts
need not be recorded in the inquest report. The High Court
has rightly held that the manner and approach of the trial
court in disbelieving the prosecution story by placing
reliance on the inquest report was erroneous and bad in law.
105. No other argument is advanced by the Counsel for the parties.
106. Thus, considering the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1),
Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4), coupled with the Medical
Evidence and Forensic Evidence, this Court is of the considered
opinion, that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the
appellants formed an Unlawful Assembly and in furtherance of
Common Object, Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh were killed, as
well as an attempt was made to kill Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1).
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
107. Although the Trial Court has convicted the Appellants for
committing murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as for
making an attempt to Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh
(P.W.2) and held them guilty for offence under Section 302/149 and
307/149 but did not mention that the conviction of the Appellants for
offence under Section 302/149 and 307/149 of I.P.C is on two counts.
Even in the charges which were framed by the Trial Court, it was
mentioned that the Appellants had committed murder of Pahalwan
and Darshan Singh as well as had attempted to commit murder of
Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2), but charges
under Section 302/149 of IPC on two counts and 307/149 of IPC on
two counts were not framed. Thus, it was clearly mentioned that the
charges are that the Appellants have killed Pahalwan and Darshan
Singh and therefore, their act is punishable under Section 302/149 of
IPC and have made an attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and
Ajab Singh (P.W.2), therefore, their act is punishable under Section
307/149 of IPC. However, in the light of Section 219 of Cr.P.C.,
while framing charge, the Trial Court should have mentioned that the
act of the Appellants is punishable for offence under Section 302/149
of IPC on two counts and similarly for offence under Section
307/149 of IPC, it should have been mentioned that their act is
punishable on two counts.
108. Although Section 218 of Cr.P.C., provides that separate charge
should be framed for distinct offence and Section 220 of Cr.P.C.
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Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
provides that if, in one series of acts so connected together as to form
the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the
same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every
such offence, but at the same time, the Appellants cannot claim that
the charges were vague thereby adversely effecting their valuable
rights to contest the Trial or caused any prejudice. The Appellants
were aware of the fact that they are being tried for murder of
Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as for making an attempt on the
lives of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2). The
Supreme Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Laisal Haque,
reported in (1989) 3 SCC 166 has held as under :
1.....The State Government of West Bengal and the
complainant Mohd. Abu Bakkar Siddique Molla have come
up in appeal by way of special leave, from the judgment and
order of a Division Bench (Sukumar Chakravarty and
Gobinda Chandra Chatterjee, JJ.) of the High Court of
Calcutta dated 14-8-1986 setting aside the finding and
sentences recorded by Shri S.K. Mitra, Additional Sessions
Judge, 24 Paraganas, 14th Court, Alipore dated 4-4-1985 in
Sessions Trial No. 3(8) of 1983 directing retrial of the
respondents before us, 16 in number, on the ground of
material defect in the framing of the charges which,
according to the learned Judges, had occasioned in failure
of justice. The High Court held that (1) it appears from the
heads of the charges framed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge that the principal accused Laisal Haque was
charged along with other accused persons under Section
302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 alleging
that in furtherance of the common object of killing the
deceased Gulam Rabbani and injure others, all the rioters
committed the murder of Gulam Rabbani. If such a charge
was framed against all the accused persons including Laisal
Haque, there was no warrant for framing a charge against
the accused Laisal Haque under Section 302 simpliciter,
"without making that charge as an alternative charge". (2)
The charge framed by the learned Additional Sessions
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Judge as against the accused persons was materially
defective inasmuch as it was a "rolled up charge", the
common object of the unlawful assembly being to murder
Golam Rabbani and injure others. The use of the words
"injure others" without specifically mentioning the names
of the persons who were injured made the charge vague and
indefinite. Instead the learned Additional Sessions Judge
ought to have framed separate and distinct charges for the
assault and causing of grievous hurt in respect of each of
the persons assaulted. (3) The judgment of the learned
Additional Sessions Judge suffers from a serious infirmity
in that he had in a slipshod manner not discussed at all the
evidence separately under different heads of the charges
framed against each of the accused persons. While
convicting the accused persons under Section 324 read with
Section 149 he had not discussed which of the accused
persons caused hurt to whom.
* * * *
8. Next, Section 464 of the Code provides that no finding,
sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall
be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was
framed or on the ground of any error, omission or
irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of
charges, unless, in the opinion of the court of appeal,
confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has, in fact,
been occasioned thereby.
9. In the celebrated case of Willie (William) Slaney v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the
court after an elaborate discussion observed that in judging
a question of prejudice, as of guilt, the courts must act with
a broad vision and look to the substance and not to the
technicalities, and their main concern should be to see
whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what
he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be
established against him were explained to him fairly and
clearly, and whether he was given a full and fair chance to
defend himself. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. The principles laid down
by that very eminent Judge in Slaney case1 have throughout
been followed by this Court. See: K.C. Mathew v. State of
Travancore-Cochin, Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab,
Birichh Bhuian v. State of Bihar and State of Maharashtra
v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak.
109. Since, the Appellants were aware of the fact that for which
ARUN KUMAR
MISHRA
21.01.2022 11:23
Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
offence, they are being tried, therefore, by no stretch of imagination,
it can be said that any prejudice was caused to them. Even otherwise,
this ground was not raised and argued by the Counsel for the
Appellants.
110. Accordingly, the Appellants are held guilty of committing
murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as for making an
attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) in
furtherance of Common Object. Accordingly, their conviction for
offence under Section 302/149 for causing murder of Pahalwan and
Darshan Singh, 307/149 for making an attempt to kill Bhanupratap
Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and under Section 148 of IPC
as held by the Trial Court is hereby upheld.
111. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, the minimum
sentence for the offence of murder is Life Imprisonment. Therefore,
no interference is called for.
112. Ex-consequenti, the judgment and sentence dated 28-7-2010
passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, Distt. Bhind in S.T.
No.118/2007 is hereby Affirmed.
113. The Appellant Kedar Singh in Cr.A. No.687 of 2010 is in jail.
He shall undergo the remaining jail sentence.
114. In Cr.A. No.691 of 2010, the Appellant No.1 Bharat Singh was
granted bail by order dated 25-8-2020, whereas the Appellants No. 2
and 3 namely Devaram and Rampreet were granted bail by order
ARUN KUMAR
MISHRA
21.01.2022 11:23
Kedar Singh and another Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 687 of 2010)
Bharat Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. (691 of 2010)
dated 16-11-2011. Their bail bonds are hereby cancelled. They shall
immediately surrender before the Trial Court for undergoing the
remaining jail sentence.
115. Let a copy of this judgment be provided to the Appellants
immediately, free of cost.
116. The Registry is directed to immediately sent back the record to
the Trial Court for necessary information and compliance.
117. The Criminal Appeals No.687/2010 and 691 of 2010 are
hereby Dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) (Deepak Kumar Agarwal)
Judge Judge
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MISHRA
21.01.2022 11:23
