Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 891 MP
Judgement Date : 19 January, 2022
1 W.P. No.13579/2008
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT JABALPUR (M.P.)
SINGLE BENCH : HON'BLE JUSTICE NANDITA DUBEY
Writ Petition No. 13579/2008
Mahendra Singh Bharti
Vs.
Union of India and others
____________________________________________________
Shri Mahendra Singh Bharti, petitioner in person.
Shri Ashok Sinha, learned counsel for the
respondents.
Arguments heard on : 26.09.2021
Order delivered on : 19.01.2022
ORDER
By this petition, the propriety and legality of the
order dated 26.10.2008 (Annexure P-5), passed by
respondent No.3 and notice dated 24.10.2008, issued by
Assistant Security Commissioner, RPF, Itarsi are under
challenge.
2. The facts of the case reveal that the petitioner
was working on the post of constable with the Railway
Protection Force. Initially, the petitioner was employed with
Armoured Corpus Centre and School, Ahmednagar,
Maharashtra, where he served from 1980 to 1985. He was
discharged (own request) from the Army Services and
thereafter recruited in the Railway Protection Force and
after training period was posted as Constable on
12.06.1995. Petitioner was served with a charge sheet
dated 24.10.2008 by the Assistant Security Commissioner,
Itarsi, whereby he was directed to remain present before
the enquiry officer for preliminary enquiry to be held on
31.10.2008 at Bhopal. The charge sheet mentioned that
earlier the petitioner has made a complaint against
respondent No.4, which was found false and baseless.
Thereafter, vide order dated 26.10.2008, petitioner has
been dismissed from service exercising the powers under
Rule 161.2 of RPF Rules, alleging that petitioner has
submitted false information at the time of seeking
employment.
3. The impugned order dated 26.10.2008 assailed
interalia on the ground that the same is passed without
holding any enquiry and in violation of principles of natural
justice. It is urged that the petitioner has earlier made a
complaint against respondent No.4, whereafter an enquiry
was conducted and charge sheet was issued to him. The
respondents without conducting proper enquiry with a
malafide intention terminated the service of petitioner.
4. Per contra, the stand of respondents is that the
order of termination dated 26.10.2008 has no connection
with the charge sheet dated 24.10.2008. It is stated that
the charge sheet was issued on the ground of dereliction of
duties and making false allegations and complaints against
senior officer, whereas the petitioner's services were
terminated for the reason that he obtained the service in
RPF by making false declaration in the application and
attestation form submitted by him. It is further argued that
an appeal is provided against the order of termination and
a further revision against the order of appellate authority.
Under such circumstances, filing of this petition without
availing the alternate remedy is not maintainable.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.
6. As far as challenge to charge sheet is concerned,
the scope and extent of judicial review and interference in
the charge sheet permissible under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is limited. It is settled law that
issuance of order or suspension or charge sheet at the
instance of the disciplinary authority to conduct an enquiry
cannot be treated as punishment and does not give rise to
a cause of action as no final order is passed at this stage.
Normally, a charge sheet is not quashed prior to conducting
the enquiry on the ground that facts stated in the charge
sheet are erroneous. The legal proposition in this regard
has already been settled by the Supreme Court in a number
of decisions that no writ lies against the charge sheet or
show cause notice unless the same is wholly without
jurisdiction or illegal for some other reasons.
7. Further, on perusal of record, it is evident that
the charge sheet issued on account of making false
complaint against his senior has no connection to the order
of termination which was passed on account of petitioner
giving false information in his application and attestation
form.
8. A perusal of the documents on record show that
petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable in the
year 1995. He had applied under the ex-servicemen
category (five years experience of service). With his
application, he submitted self attested copies of
certification of his service in Army from 18.09.1980 to
25.10.198, i.e., service of more than five years. He also
submitted attestation form declaring that he served in army
from 18.09.1980 to 25.10.1985. The warning clause 3 of
the attestation from clearly states that, "if the fact that
false information has been furnished or that there has been
suppression of any factual information in the attestation
form comes to the notice at any time during the service of
a person, his services would be liable to the terminated."
9. Later, a complaint was received that petitioner
has obtained service in RPF by submitting tampered
documents. Petitioner when asked to submit the original
documents, stated that his original documents were lost.
An enquiry was conducted by the Internal Vigilance Group
of RPF (IVG). The verification report regarding the
documents and service period submitted by the petitioner
was called from the Major Senior Record Officer, who vide
communication dated 17.05.2008 (Annexure R-3) informed
the IVG that the petitioner was enrolled in the Army on
18.09.1981 and discharged from service on 26.10.1986, on
his request on compassionate ground. The IVG submitted
its report dated 27.08.2008 (Annexure R-4). The IVG found
that petitioner has obtained appointment by giving false
declaration and using tampered documents and
recommended registration of FIR under Sections 419, 420,
467, 468 and 471 of I.P.C. and also to take strict action as
per 161.2 of RPF Rules.
10. Rule 161.2 provides that, "where the authority
competent to impose the punishment is satisfied for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner
provided in these rules, the authority competent to impose
the punishment may consider the circumstances of the
case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit."
11. The aforesaid rule itself provides that where it is
not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry, the authority
competent after considering the circumstances may pass
such orders as it may deem fit.
12. In the instant case, the petitioner in his
application and attestation from has mentioned his period
of service as ex-servicemen from 18.09.1980 to
25.10.1985, whereas the verification report/letter dated
17.05.2008 (Annexure R-3) by Major Senior Record Officer
shows his date of enrollment in the Army as 18.09.1981.
Under the circumstances, when the original documents
were reported lost by the petitioner and the documents as
submitted by the petitioner at the time of applying for
service in RPF were on record, it was not practicable to hold
an enquiry. The authority concerned has not erred in
passing the impugned order in view of the warning clause
of attestation form and the verification report.
13. Further contention of petitioner is that since both
the criminal and departmental proceedings were based on
the same set of facts, therefore, after he being acquitted in
the criminal case is entitled to be reinstated and the order
of dismissal based on the report of IVG is not legally
tenable. A perusal of the documents show that the
allegation in departmental proceedings and the criminal
case were totally different. In the criminal case, he was
charged for committing an offence under Sections 419,
420, 467, 468, 471 of I.P.C. that he obtained service in RPF
by manipulating his earlier service records, whereas in
departmental proceedings, the charge is that he
suppressed or gave wrong information in the application
and attestation form.
14. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings
relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent
officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the
relevant statutory rules or law, and proof in that behalf is
not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. The nature
of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the
departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone
of human conduct. The standard of proof in the
departmental proceedings is not the same as of the
criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the
standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required
in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the
Evidence Act. (See (1999) 2 SCC 699 Depot Manager
A.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd.
Yousuf Miya and Others.)
15. The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial
proceedings and the effect of acquittal by a criminal court
has been examined in (2019) 7 SCC 799 Shashi Bhusan
Prasad vs Inspector General, CISF, wherein the
Supreme Court after reiterating the law laid down in the
case of (2005) 7 SCC 764 Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General
Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia
and Others has held thus :-
"18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia and Others , this Court held as under: "As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would
not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other 4 2005(7) SCC 764 hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. We are in full agreement with the exposition of law laid down by this Court and it is fairly well settled that two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives.
Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on an offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service Rules. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. Even the rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a Court of law whereas in the departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal by the Court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto absolve the delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authority. This what has been considered by the High Court in the impugned judgment in detail and needs no interference by this Court."
16. In view of the aforestated facts and law, there is
no merit in the petition. The petition is dismissed
accordingly.
(Nandita Dubey) Judge SMT. GEETHA NAIR 19/01/2022 gn 14:32:08 +05'30' 2022.01.19
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