Rameshwar Prasad Golhani vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2022 Latest Caselaw 1148 MP

                       The High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
                              WP No. 2338 of 2009
         (RAMESHWAR PRASAD GOLHANI Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS)

Jabalpur, Dated : 25-01-2022
      Heard through Video Conferencing.

      Shri Satya Prakash Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner.

      Shri Sanjeev Kumar Singh, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondents/State.

Heard on the question of admission.

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has filed seeking

following reliefs :-

"(i) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents

to take back the petitioner on his services who has been orally terminated without

any specific reason.

(ii) Any other writ/writs/order/orders which this Hon'ble Court deemed fit in

the facts and circumstances of the case may also be awarded in favour of the

petitioner.

(iii) To award cost of the petition."

The brief facts leading to filing of this case are that the petitioner was

appointed on the post of Guruji vide order dated 04.12.1997 under the Education

Guarantee Scheme, 1997 at Execution Centre, Station Umarpani, Gram Panchayat

Chari, Janpad Panchayat Ghansaur, District Seoni (M.P.). After appointment, he

had participated in training programme with effect from 10.03.1997 to

19.03.1997. The petitioner was performing his duties with utmost devotion and

hard work till 12.12.1998 but all of a sudden without there being any reason the

respondents have orally terminated the petitioner from the post of Guruji.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that no order

of termination is under challenge in this writ petition. Even if the petitioner was

terminated orally in the year 1998, he ought to have approach this Court within a

reasonable time. Repeated representations will not bring the case within

limitation. There is delay of more than 11 years in approaching this Court as the

petitioner has approached this Court in the year 2009 challenging his oral

termination. In such circumstances, this petition suffers from an inordinate delay and laches. Therefore, the same deserves to be dismissed.

Heard the learned counsel for parties.

This Court by order dated 4.9.2020 passed in W.P.No.12836/2020 has held

as under:-

"The delay defeats equity and if the petitioner approaches the Court after a

long delay, then the relief prayed by him may be denied on the ground of delay and

laches irrespective of the fact that the similarly situated other candidates have been

extended the benefit of judgment.

The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power

Corporation Limited and Ors. vs.Ram Gopal by order dated 30/01/2020 passed in

Civil Appeal No.852 of 2020 (Arising Out of Special Leave Petition No.36253 of has

held as under:-

''iii) Inordinate delay in filing writ petition

14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have

been overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were

terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the

Respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal

notice in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap

between when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its

redressal (in 1990).

15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the

Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a

civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent,

would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar

situation where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his

junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v.State of Tamil Nadu, held

as follows:

"2........if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971............In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now........It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters......."

16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to

proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India,

nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of

time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would

always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be

reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who

have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence sitters cannot

be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience,

and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of

time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu vs. State of

Kerala, this Court observed thus:

"17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats

equity".....It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High

Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground

of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the

other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment."

(emphasis supplied)

17. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India this Court while

considering the claim of candidates who, despite being higher in merit,

exercised their right to parity much after those who were though lower in

merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed that:

"27....It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of

justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of

delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the

path of extinction with the passage of time."

18. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to

judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its instrumentalities are

expected in such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a

judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing

each person to individually knock the doors of Courts. This distinction

between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in

personam, is lucidly captured in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Arvind Kumar

Srivastava laying down that:

22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given

relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike

by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and

would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle

needs to be applied in service matters court from time to time postulates that all

similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule

would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach

the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.

22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in

the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did

not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same

and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts

who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then

such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the

case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as

fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid

ground to dismiss their claim.

22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the

judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give

benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or

not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to

itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation

can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy

matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K. C. Sharma v. Union of India [ K. C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S)

226]). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding

that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and

such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found

out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the

benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their

petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence."

(Emphasis supplied)

19. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam Behari Lal in service, does not

possess any ingredient of a Judgment in rem. The above cited exception, therefore, does not come

to the Respondent rescue. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor is it

apparent from the material on record that the Respondent was unable to approach the court of law

in time on account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have

availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. Instead, he

seems to be under the assumption that the termination order is illegal, that he consequently has a

right to be reinstated, and that he can agitate the same at his own sweet-will. Neither of these three

assumptions are true, as elaborated by us earlier.

The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and Others vs. S. M. Kotrayya and

Others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 267 has held as under:-

''9. Thus considered, we hold that it is not necessary that the respondents should give an

explanation for the delay which occasioned for the period mentioned in sub-sections (1) or (2) of

Section 21, but they should give explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the

aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should be required to

satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper explanation. In this case, the explanation

offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that

they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was

required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the

remedy of redressal of their grievance before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section

(1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal is wholly unjustified in

condoning the delay.

Faced with such a situation, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that although his prayer

for grant of arrears of salary for the period up-to 31st May, 2018 may be barred by limitation, but if

the said additional period of three years is added to the service of the petitioner, then it will affect

the pension of the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner has recurring cause of action so far as the

pension is concerned.

xxx

The Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs. Babita Puniya and Others by order dated 17th February, 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 9367-9369 of 2011 has made

direction applicable to a particular class of Women Army Officers. When certain Women Officers

who have retired after the pronouncement of judgment but before formulation of scheme moved

Miscellaneous Application No.1497- 1498/2020, then by order dated 03/09/2020, the said

application was dismissed on the ground that it would amount to a review."

On perusal of the order sheets, it is seen that the counsel for the petitioner

vide order dated 06.04.2009 granted time to explain the question of delay and

laches. Thereafter, on number of occasions adjournments were granted to the petitioner to explain the delay even in para four of the writ petition, no plausible

explanation has been put fourth for the delay.

The petitioner has approached this Court after 11 long years, for which no

plausible explanation has been put forth by him. Moreover, after 2009 till 2020

counsel for the petitioner was granted number of opportunities to explain the delay

but to no avail. Repeated representations will not bring the case within limitation.

Stale and dead cases can not be reopened.

In view of the above, this Court refrains from exercising extraordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the petition suffers

from unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner.

Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed on the ground of delay and

laches, at the admission stage itself.

(S. A. DHARMADHIKARI) JUDGE

vc VARSHA CHOURASIYA 2022.01.28 18:04:43 +05'30'