Madhya Pradesh Rural Road ... vs Ramendra Singh
2022 Latest Caselaw 16643 MP

                       (1)

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,
                   AT GWALIOR

                     BEFORE
        HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ROHIT ARYA
                        &
 HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE


        ARBITRATION REVISION NO.05 OF 2014

Between :-

1.    MADHYA PRADESH RURAL
      ROAD        DEVELOPMENT
      AUTHORITY THROUGH THE
      CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
      PARYAWAS BHAWAN, WING-II,
      ARERA    HILLS,   BHOPAL
      (MADHYA PRADESH).

2.    THE GENERAL MANAGER,
      PRADHAN MANTRI GRAMEEN
      SADAK   YOJNA,  MPRRDA,
      PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
      UNIT, GWALIOR (MADHYA
      PRADESH).

                                     .....PETITIONERS

(BY SHRI VIVEK KHEDKAR - ADVOCATE)

AND

      RAMENDRA SINGH S/O LATE
      SHRI MATHURA SINGH, AGED
      ABOUT 55 YEARS, R/O 103, NEW
      SHIVAJI NAGAR, THATIPUR,
                                     (2)

       MORAR, GWALIOR (MADHYA
       PRADESH).
                                                      .....RESPONDENT

(BY SHRI K.N.GUPTA - SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI
M.L.SWARNAKAR                   AND          MS.AYUSHI              POPHLI
ADVOCATES)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Reserved on : 21.09.2022
                      Pronounced on : 15.12.2022
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This petition having been heard and reserved for orders,
coming on for pronouncement this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice
Rohit Arya pronounced the following :


                                ORDER

This revision petition under section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the 'Adhiniyam') is directed against the Award dated 26/07/2014 passed in Reference Case No.1/2009 passed by M.P. Arbitration Tribunal, Bhopal.

2. Before adverting to rival contentions, it is expedient to reiterate relevant facts necessary for disposal of the revision petition :-

(i) The respondent/propriety firm was awarded contract for construction of 38.72 kms. of road {(i) Nayagaon-Chinnor-Dabra 26.65 kms. (ii) Chinore-Doni 4.49 km (iii) Chinore-Sirsa 4.09 kms and (iv) Pichore-Indargarh-Kaithore 3.4 kms}. The amount of contract was Rs.763.08 lacs. Stipulated period of contract was

9 months e/x-rainy season. Stipulated date of completion was 20/10/2006 (15 days for mobilization). Agreement was executed vide agreement No.42/2005-2006 on 16.09.2005 and work order was issued on 6/10/2005. Amount of work done is to the tune of Rs.6,13,19,564/-. However, from the final bill of amount of Rs.44,23,298/-, net amount paid was Rs.22,55,912/- after deduction of liquidated damages. Hence, the total payment received is Rs.6,13,19,564 - 22,00,000 (approx). As the contract was not completed within the stipulated period, four extensions were afforded under clause 27 of agreement, first up to 30/4/2007, second up to 30/6/2007, third up to 30/11/2007 and fourth up to 31/3/2008. The actual date of completion is 31/3/2008.

(ii) Clause 44 of the agreement provided for liquidated damages and clause 24 provided for dispute redressal system.

(iii) It appears that respondent raised a dispute (Ex.P/14) related to extension of time for the delay and imposition of liquidated damages and recovery of consultant's supervision charges under Clause 24 of the General Conditions of Contract before the competent Authority i.e. Chief Executive Officer, Madhya Pradesh, Rural Road Development Authority, Paryavas Bhavan Bhopal vide its petition (Ex.P/14) dated 03/08/2008. The competent Authority rejected the claim vide communication dated 18/12/2008 (Ex.P/15). Consequent thereupon, the respondent vide communication dated 20/10/2008 (Ex.P/16) was called upon to deposit the following amount :-

(i) 5% of amount of contract of Rs.7.63 Rs.38,15,422/-

        (ii) Consultancy Charges                     Rs.24,55,433/-


                                                      Rs.62,70,855/-
                                         minus

(i) Amount deposited under different heads Rs.37,33,559/-

       (ii) Withheld amount                           Rs. 8,66,188/-
                                                      Rs.47,99,747/-
              Total amount to be deposited            Rs.16,71,108

(iv) The respondent in the aforesaid backdrop of factual matrix, approached the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran, Bhopal by way of a dispute under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam.

(v) The respondent had made following claims :-

Claim No.1 Claim for setting             aside Rs. 62,70,855=00
           liquidated    damages          and
           consultancy fee
Claim No.2 Claim for escalation                  Rs.1,16,93,100=00
Claim No.3 Claim for refund of amount Rs.             2,00,000=00
           illegally deducted from the
           running bill

Claim No.4 Claim for loss of overheads & Rs.3,89,64,291=00 loss of profits Claim No.5 Claim for interest Rs. 35,48,107=00 Total Claim Amount Rs.6,06,76,331=00

(vi) Claims No.2 and 3 have been rejected. The subject matter of the arbitration revolves around three claims namely :-

(i) Liquidated damages alongwith consultancy charges,

(ii) Loss of overheads and loss of profits, and

(iii) Claim for interest.

3. Now the petitioner M.P.Rural Road Development Authority is before this Court taking exception to the impugned award with following submissions :-

(a) By-parte agreement dated 16.09.2005 inter alia under Clause 44 provides for liquidated damages leviable on the contractor for the period between actual date of completion of the contact and intended date of completion of contract. As such, the liability of payment of liquidated damages neither can be disputed nor can be quantified. Therefore, the claim against liquidated damages adjusted from the final bill was not in the domain of arbitral dispute. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mitra Guha Builders (India) Company Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited reported in (2020) 3 SCC 222 (para 17 to 26). Hence, the impugned award suffers from patent illegality having setting aside the liquidated damages.

(b) Learned counsel further submits that even otherwise the Tribunal altogether ignored documents filed and relied upon to rebut the contentions of the contractor that the delay caused in completion of the contract was attributable to the petitioner - MPRRDA. Hence, the impugned award suffers from patent perversity, therefore, contrary to law.

(c) Learned counsel submits that in every letter of extension of period for completion of contract, there is specific stipulation that right to recover liquidated damage and consultation charges is reserved. Letters of extension are dated 7.11.2006 (Ex.D/9), dt.30.06.2007 (Ex.D/12), dt.16.05.2007 (Ex.D/26) and dt.7.12.2007 (Ex.D/29). As such, the intended action of recovery of liquidated damages has always been in the knowledge of the contractor but despite that, the delay is caused in completion of

the contract. Hence, the contractor could not deny the liability of payment of liquidated damages. Liquidated damages as specifically provided for under Clause 44 of the by-parte agreement, is not by way of penalty and it was agreed to be recovered from the contractor for the reasons of delay in completion of the contract. Learned counsel relies upon Section 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act dealing with compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract and compensation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated therein.

(d) Learned counsel further relies upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of the General Manager and another Vs. M/s Raisingh and Company reported in (2018) 2 MPLJ 404 to contend that once the rates of liquidated damages are prescribed in contract agreement, the Tribunal could not have interfered with the same as Clause 44 was part of the agreement agreed to between the parties.

(e) It is further submitted that the Tribunal while allowing the claim for loss of over head and loss of profit has rested its justification in the judgment rendered in M/s Arjun Kumar Vs. State of M.P. (Civil Revision No.605/1999) reported in 2004 Arbitration Weekly Law Journal 446 (MP), however, the said judgment stands overruled by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 07.02.2006 passed in C.R.No.395/2000 - Mukesh Kumar Singhal Vs. Nagar Palika Parishad Bhind. Hence, the impugned award is patently illegal.

(f) Furthermore the aforesaid claim was never raised before

the competent authority i.e. C.E.O. M.P.R.R.D.A. under Clause 24 of the agreement. Hence, such claims could not have been made before the arbitral tribunal in the light of the provisions of Section 7 (b) of the Adhiniyam and full bench judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kamal Kishore reported in the case of 2006 (1) MPHT 565. Learned counsel relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Looking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K.Ahuja reported in (2004) 5 SCC 109 and that of division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Saluja Construction Co. Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2000 (1) MPJR 618.

(g) Learned counsel also submits that even otherwise, there is no pleading in the claim petition related to loss of overhead and loss of profit. Therefore, the Tribunal in all fairness ought not to have addressed on the aforesaid claim. Hence, the impugned award ex facie is without jurisdiction and contrary to law of the land.

(h) Further elaborating his submissions that for want of justifiable reasons with due inadvertence to facts on record, the impugned award become vulnerable as the same is not a reasoned award, learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Apex Courts in the case of Anand brother and Private Limited Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2014) 9 SCC 212, Kranti Associates Vs. Masood Ahmed reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, Dyna Technologies Vs. Compton reported in (2019) 4 MPLJ 188 and Nandini Medical Laboratories Vs. M.P. Laghu Udyog reported in (2016) 4 MPLJ 188. In the obtaining facts

and circumstances, the aforesaid claim is without foundational facts and justification. Hence, the impugned award deserves to be set aside.

4. Per contra, Shri K.N.Gupta, learned Senior Counsel with Shri M.L.Swarnakar and Ms.Ayushi Pophli made following submissions :-

(i) A preliminary objection has been raised as regards scope of interference in an arbitral Award, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of J.G.Engineers Private Limited Vs. Union of India and another reported in (2011) 5 SCC 758. In the instant case, the impugned award neither can be said to be in conflict with public policy of India i.e. fundamental policy of Indian law or in conflict with the basic notions of morality or justice or induced or affected by fraud, corruption or misconduct. On the contrary, the award in question is based on consideration of material placed before the arbitrator with due application of mind and in accordance with terms of bi-party agreement. By no stretch of imagination the award can be said to be un-reasoned award or against the fundamental policy of Indian law in particular. Learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited reported in (2022) 2 SCC 382.

(ii) On merits, learned senior counsel submits that the Arbitrator in para 3.1 has mentioned the lapses on the part of the respondent, which resulted into undue delay with exhibits placed before it as pleaded in the petition, in para 3.2 to 3.12 and

thereafter in para 6.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 has dealt with it. Therefore, subject matter of delay having been dealt with on merits, no interference is warranted in the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 19 of the Adhiniyam unless the award is polluted for want of reasons as aforesaid or patent illegality or irregularity. That is not the case in hand.

(iii) Referring to Clause 44 of the agreement dealing with liquidated damages, learned senior counsel submits that even assuming there was delay caused and attributable to the respondent - contractor, the liability of liquidated damages could have been fastened upon him only after quantification thereof in terms of the procedure contained under Clause 44.1. At no stage of extension of time of period of contract i.e. on 30.04.2007, 30.06.2007, 30.11.2007 or 31.3.2008, there was determination of liquidated damages. The communication dated 18.12.2008 (Ex.P/15) saddling the contractor with the liability of liquidated damages is ex facie without application of mind and without due advertence to record in terms of Clause 44.1. Hence, no lilability of this nature of liquidated damages could have been calculated and adjusted against the outstanding bills of the contractor. As a matter of fact, non determination of liquidated damages at every stage of extension of period of contract tantamount to waiver at every stage of extension of period of contract. Therefore, adjustment of quantified liquidated damages against outstanding of final bill of the contractor is hit by the principle of waiver.

(iv) Now turning to the claim of overhead expenses, learned senior counsel submits that the Tribunal has dealt with the issue

of Claim No.4 on merits in para 6.4 of the award and relying upon the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Arjun Kumar Vs. State of M.P. vide Civil Revision No.605/1999 reported in 2004 Arb.W.L.J.446 has allowed it on lump sum basis at the rate of 5% of the total valuation of the contract, hence, no inference is warranted.

5. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.

6. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it is expedient to reiterate the grounds of interference in an Arbitral Award under revisional jurisdiction. In this regard, S.19 of the Adhiniyam specifically provides that the High Court can interfere with the Award of Arbitral Tribunal on the following grounds:

If it appears to the High Court that the Tribunal

(a) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law;or

(b) has failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested; or

(c) has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally, or with material irregularity; or

(d) has misconducted itself or the proceedings; or

(e) has made an award which is invalid or has been improperly procured by any party to the proceedings.

Besides, the law with regard to interference in an arbitral award, though in the context of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is well settled and in a catena of decisions it has been held that regard being had to the concept of Public Policy of India embodied in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 under

various provision viz; 28, 31, 34 etc., the Court while testing an arbitral award on the anvil thereof does not sit as a Court of appeal in common parlance and cannot correct the errors of facts as the arbitrator is the master of quantity and quality of facts. Nevertheless, the Court is expected to ascertain the assessment/ evaluation of such facts/material on record by the Arbitrartor on broad principles under the umbrella of Public Policy of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Associates Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 has observed that the duty to adopt judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the Court or the authority under the Statue as the Court or authority or tribunal cannot act in an arbitrary capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach ensures that the authority acts bona fide and deals with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and its decision is not polluted by any extraneous consideration. "Wednesbury Principle of Reasonablness", a well recognized principle in administrative laws, is also a dimension of Public Policy of India. A decision suffering from perversity or any irrationality cannot be construed as reasonable if tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury Principle. Therefore, decision that falls short of standard of reasonableness becomes vulnerable and open to challenge in the Court of law. Indeed, if an award is against justice or morality, it also becomes vulnerable being affront to the Public Policy of India besides, patently illegal if the award is passed in contravention of substantive laws of India. Indeed, if the award was induced or affected by fraud or corrpution, it stands vitiated

being contrary to the Public Policy of India as explicit from explanation appended to Section 34 (2)(b)(ii) of the Act, 1996. That apart, the Arbitral tribunal is under legal obligation to decide the dispute in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transcation, ignorance or deviation from the terms of the contract shall render the award polluted with patent illegality in the teeth of Section 6 of the Act, 1996. Conclusions drawn on the basis of available evidence are not open for correction unless, the same are polluted with arbitariness and capriciousness. Similarly, in the case of Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. Vs. M/s. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. & Ors. reported in AIR 2012 (SC) 1866 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that under Section 34 of the Act, the Court does not sit in an appeal over an award of an Arbitral tribunal to take recourse to reassessment and reappreciation of the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The same law has been reiterated in the case of Haryana Tourism

Limited Vs. Kandhari Beverages Limited reported in 2022 (3)

SCC 237 holding that in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996, the Court cannot enter into the merits of the claim.

The above-said conspectus with regard to scope of interference in an Arbitral Award, though is in the context of the provisions of the Act of 1996, yet the broad principles laid thereunder are germane to point in issue and are very well applicable in respect of jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal under the Adhiniyam.

7. As elucidated above, the learned Tribunal has set aside the adjusted amount of liquidated damages and consultancy fee. While doing so, the learned Tribunal in paragraph 5.0 found that the MPRRDA was not prepared well at the time of issuance of NIT, the DPR preparations were incomplete so as to have timely execution of work. Besides, they were not conversant with the site conditions and got the faulty DPR prepared resulting into revision in drawings and other issues such as use of select soil etc. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal found that the respondent /Contractor was not responsible for breach of terms of agreement in respect of non achievement of proportionate progress.

In the aforesaid backdrop, learned Tribunal in paragraph 6.12 concluded that for recovery of liquidated damages the contractor was to be made responsible for specific period of delay, convert this delay into weeks and then impose the liquidated damages, but, the amount of liquidated damages had not been worked out as per the procedure given in the contract data. In fact the delay period in number of weeks and compensation @ 1% for delay of every week was to be imposed. Since the given procedure had not been followed, therefore, the question of recovery of liquidated damages from contractor's sum which was available with the department, did not arise. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the claim for liquidated damages.

8. It is well settled that the right to levy liquidated damages

does not exist in a vacuum and arises only upon breach by the contractor i.e. when the delay is attributable to the contractor. Thus, the right to levy liquidated damages is a subsidiary and consequential power and not a primary power to determine question of breach by the contractor.

In the case in hand, while attributing the delay on petitioners/MPRRDA, the learned Tribunal failed to take into account various documents of the MPRRDA and provisions viz. clauses 18.1 to 18.3 of the agreement in respect of Specifications and Drawings, Ex.D/16 pertaining to selected soil, various notices to contractor Ex.D/1, Ex.D/3, Ex.D/6 prior to termination of contract, various communications/notices including those with regard to alleged delay in payment of running bills - Ex.D/11, Ex.D/21, Ex.D/22, Ex.D/23 and Ex.D/24.

That apart, while doing so, the learned Tribunal went oblivion of the fact that it was not a Court of appeal and was bound by the terms of agreement between the parties.

Clause 44 of the agreement categorically provides for Liquidated damages; relevant clause 44.1 reads thus:- "The contractor shall pay liquidated damages to the Employer at the rate per week or part thereof stated in the Contract Data for the period that the Completion Date is later than the Intended Completion Date. Liquidated damages at the same rate shall be withheld if the Contractor fails to achieve the milestones prescribed in the Contract Data. However, in case the Contractor achieves the next milestone the amount of the liquidated damages already withheld shall be restored to the Contractor by adjustment in the next payment certificate. The total amount of liquidated damages shall not exceed the amount defined in the Contract Data. The Employer

may deduct liquidated damages from payments due to the Contractor. Payment of Liquidated damages shall not affect the Contractor's other liabilities".

As the contract was spread over a long tenure, the intention of the parties to provide for extensions surely reinforces the fact that timely performance was necessary and every time such extension was granted, the right to levy liquidated damages was reserved, as is explicit from letters Ex.D/9, D/26 and D/29. The extension in time does not extend the period of agreement. It only permits the Contractor to complete works but also subject to payment of liquidated damages. As such, the contractor was well aware of imposition of liquidated damages albeit the period for completion of contract was extended. Hence, the plea of Contractor for waiver of liquidated damages as against MPRRDA could not have been countenanced by the learned Tribunal.

In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd vs Saw Pipes Ltd ((2003)5 SCC 705) has held as under:-

"40. It cannot be disputed that for construction of the contract, it is settled law that the intention of the parties is to be gathered from the words used in the agreement. If words are unambiguous and are used after full understanding of their meaning by experts, it would be difficult to gather their intention different from the language used in the agreement. If upon a reading of the document as a whole, it can fairly be deduced from the words actually used therein that the parties had agreed on a particular term, there is nothing in law which prevents them from setting up that term.

{Re: Modi & Co. v. Union of India [(1968) 2 SCR 565]}. Further, in construing a contract, the Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are

such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it. {Re: Provash Chandra Dalui and another v. Biswanath Banerjee and another [1989 Supp (1) SCC 487]}.

41. Therefore, when parties have expressly agreed that recovery from the contractor for breach of the contract is pre-estimated genuine liquidated damages and is not by way of penalty duly agreed by the parties, there was no justifiable reason for the arbitral tribunal to arrive at a conclusion that still the purchaser should prove loss suffered by it because of delay in supply of goods.

42. Further, in arbitration proceedings, the arbitral tribunal is required to decide the dispute in accordance with the terms of the contract. The agreement between the parties specifically provides that without prejudice to any other right or remedy if the contractor fails to deliver the stores within the stipulated time, the appellant will be entitled to recover from the contractor, as agreed, liquidated damages equivalent to 1% of the contract price of the whole unit per week for such delay. Such recovery of liquidated damage could be at the most up to 10% of the contract price of whole unit of stores. Not only this, it was also agreed that:-

(a) liquidated damages for delay in supplies will be recovered by paying the authority from the bill for payment of cost of material submitted by the contractor;

(b) liquidated damages were not by way of penalty and it was agreed to be genuine, pre-estimate of damages duly agreed by the parties;

(c) This pre-estimate of liquidated damages is not assailed by the respondent as unreasonable assessment of damages by the parties.

43. Further, at the time when the respondent sought extension of time for supply of goods, time was extended by letter dated 4.12.1996 with a specific demand that the clause for liquidated damages would

be invoked and the appellant would recover the same for such delay. Despite this specific letter written by the appellant, respondent had supplied the goods which would indicate that even at that stage, the respondent was agreeable to pay liquidated damages."

(Emphasis supplied) In view of the above, as well as, aforesaid categoric term of contract and section 73 of the Indian Contract Act providing for compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract, the Tribunal was not justified in totally denying the liquidated damages, that too in ignorance of relevant documentary evidence on the point of delay. If there was any error on the part of competent Authority in quantification of liquidated damages as per the terms of contract, in all fairness, the matter ought to have been remanded to the Authority for such quantification.

9. With regard to the claim for loss of overheads and loss of profit, learned Tribunal after relying upon the decision in the case of Arjun Kumar (Supra), in paragraph 6.4.3 has given a table showing the calculation under the said head and a sum of Rs.35,14,442.00 at the rate of 5% of value of the contract. However, the claim for loss of profits has been rejected by the Tribunal for want of relevant documents in that behalf.

In fact, the decision in the case of Arjun Kumar (Supra) stands over-ruled by the judgment in the case of Mukesh Kumar Singhal (ibid), wherein this Court while relying upon decision in the case of Dwarkadas Vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1999 SC 1031) and Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K.Ahuja ((2004)5 SCC

109) has categorically held that in absence of specific proof of loss of overhead or loss of profit, it was not possible for the

Tribunal to allow damages on such heads.

In the instant case, no such claim under the head of loss of overhead expenses was ever raised before the competent Authority prescribed under clause 22 of the agreement. As such, there was no occasion for the competent Authority to address upon the said claim. Therefore, in view of rigor as contemplated under section 7-B of the Adhiniyam, no such claim could have been raised before the Arbitration Tribunal for the first time.

That apart, to claim loss of profit or overhead expenses, in either case, the Contractor is required to substantiate such claim with specific pleadings and relevant evidence. In absence thereof, as held by Division Bench of this Court in Mukesh Kumar Singhal (Supra), the learned Tribunal could not have awarded lumpsum at the rate of 5% on the total value of contract towards loss of overhead expenses, that too without recording findings.

10. In view of the aforesaid, we are constrained to hold that the impugned Award not only suffers from patent illegality but is also hit by the mandate contained in S.19 of the Adhiniyam. The same is, therefore, liable to be interfered with.

Resultantly, the claim awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of overheads in lumsum to the tune of Rs.35,14,442/- is set aside. The findings with regard to liquidated damages are also set aside and the matter is remitted to the competent Authority for quantification of liquidated damages strictly in accordance with terms of the contract. The said exercise shall be completed by the competent Authority within a period of six weeks from the date of

receipt of certified copy of this order.

Before parting, it is imperative to mention that although cross-objections in the form of I.A. No.811/2015 seeking awarding of interest at the rate of 18%, challenging rejection of claim for escalation and quantum of loss of overheads are placed on record, yet, the same were neither pressed nor substantiated by learned counsel for the respondent at the time of arguments.

Vide order dated 27/11/2014, interim relief was granted to the petitioner/MPRRDA subject to payment of amount of Rs.46,00,000/- (Rupees forty six lacs) to the respondent, which was further modified vide order dated 4/1/2016 and the petitioners were directed to deposit the said sum of Rs.46 lacs in a Fixed Deposit in a nationalized bank which was to be renewed from time to time and kept in the said account till any further modification of the order passed by this Court.

The aforesaid order dated 4/1/2016 shall continue to remain in operation till decision of the competent Authority.

With the aforesaid, the petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

                           (ROHIT ARYA)                 (MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
                             JUDGE                               JUDGE
SP/and

     ANAND SHRIVASTAVA
     2022.12.16 10:38:03
     +05'30'